

Scholastic Discourse

Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644) on Theological and
Philosophical Distinctions and Rules

Publicaties van het
Instituut voor Reformatieonderzoek

Publications of the
Institute for Reformation Research

Editor
William den Boer

PIRef 4



Instituut voor Reformatieonderzoek
Apeldoorn 2009

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Philosophical Distinctions and Rules

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Instituut voor Reformatieonderzoek
Apeldoorn 2009

© Instituut voor Reformatieonderzoek Apeldoorn 2009
(Theologische Universiteit Apeldoorn)

ISBN 978-90-79771-05-9

NUR 704

On the cover: University of Franeker, ca. 1700, in: Andries Schoemaker, 'Beschrijving van Friesland'. Ms 998 Tresoar, Leeuwarden, The Netherlands

Printed by: Drukkerij Verloop, Alblasterdam, The Netherlands

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Preface

One of the best ways to acquaint oneself with an unfamiliar (or even supposedly familiar) view is to allow its advocates to speak for themselves. This book by Johannes Maccovius (1588-1644) does just that; it presents a new critical Latin edition and an English translation of his seminal work on theological and philosophical distinctions. During most of the seventeenth century it was used as a classroom book at Reformed universities and academies from England to Transylvania.

The present volume fulfils the urgent need for an English translation of Maccovius' treatise. Moreover, it provides an answer to the question: What did the seventeenth-century scholastic discourse in theology and philosophy mean in its own context? Following Quentin Skinner, the Cambridge historian and philosopher, the authors of this volume emphasize that when reading an historical text, one should not simply ask what the writer of the text was saying; one must also, and more importantly, ask what the writer was doing.

By applying this principle to the study of Maccovius' writings, especially his *Distinctiones*, we are able to think anew about why the Reformed scholastics in general and Maccovius in particular, organized their thoughts and writings in a certain way, why they developed a certain vocabulary, and why certain arguments were particularly popular. Maccovius presents us the main topics of early seventeenth century Reformed theology and its basic conceptual framework and tools. Therefore, Maccovius' *Distinctiones* still are immensely helpful for students of Post-Reformation theology who try to understand Maccovius and his contemporaries in light of their own concerns, vocabulary and context. The English translation of this work will allow greater access to a very critical corpus of writings that has nowadays become obscure to most of us.

The present book is the outcome of several years of scholarship on the works of Johannes Maccovius by individuals in Europe and the United States of

America. The authors all share a passion for Maccovius' scholastic enterprise. Thus, prof. Michael Bell, theologian and church historian (formerly at Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia), wrote his doctoral dissertation on Maccovius' teaching on predestination in 1986. Prof. Willem van Asselt, theologian and church historian at Utrecht University and the Evangelical Theological Faculty, Louvain, published several articles on Maccovius' writings. Mr. Gert van den Brink, a Ph.D. candidate at Utrecht University, published on Herman Witsius. The classical scholar dr. Rein Ferwerda took care of the disentanglement of the often difficult and terse scholastic Latin of both Arnoldus and Maccovius.

We are grateful to the Research Group Classical Reformed Theology (Werkgezelschap oude Gereformeerde Theologie) in Utrecht for a critical reading of the manuscript and to drs. Gerben Groenewoud, retired associate professor of Medieval Philosophy at the Free University of Amsterdam, for correcting the English translation of the *Distinctiones*

Finally, we must express our gratitude to dr. William den Boer of the Theological University of Apeldoorn for his editing of this volume and accepting it in the Apeldoorn series PIRef (Publications of the Institute for Reformation Research).

The authors

Utrecht, Fall 2008

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Translators' Introduction

What the Angelic doctor, the subtle mystic, the profound poet and the chief master or all the other scholastics have ever said: the one and only Makowsky now at last has bequeathed it to posterity.¹

1. Present state of Maccovius Research

In ecclesiastical historiography the Polish aristocrat and theologian Jan Makowsky (1588–1644) – who Latinized his name as Johannes Maccovius – does not rank among the most popular theologians of the seventeenth century.² Many textbooks on the history of theology include references to him as a *super-scholastic* whose defense of scholastic method and logical distinctions in theology engendered an excessive form of ‘rationalism’ resulting in an extreme emphasis upon the doctrine of predestination, which was seen as a perversion of the ‘biblical theology’ of the reformers. Authors like W.B.S. Boeles, Paul Althaus, Otto Ritschl, Otto Weber, G.C. Berkouwer, and Keith L. Sprunger, to name just a few, time and again used Maccovius as a sort of ‘whipping boy’ in order to express their own aversion of the scholastic method and logic in Post-Reformation Reformed theology. According to these authors, the introduction of the scholastic method by authors like Maccovius implied a substantial modification of the theological framework, which the Reformation theologians had set forth in their works.³

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- 1 Part of a poem on Maccovius by his pupil Andreas Petri, in: MACCOVIUS, *Loci Communes* (1650): ‘Angelicus ille doctor, subtilis ille mysta; profundus ille vates; magister ille primus, Scholastici vel omnes dixere quicquid unquam: id unus hic Makowsky iam posteris relinquit’ (references to Thomas Aquinas, Johannes Duns Scotus, Thomas Bradwardine and Peter Lombard?).
 - 2 According to the custom of his days there is a great variety in spelling his name. In Polish: Makkowski, Makowsky, Makowski, Makousky, Makouski. In the Album of the university of Franeker he was matriculated as Johannes Makowsky. His Latin name is also spelled differently: Makkovius, Mackovius, Makovius, Maccovius, Maccowius etc. He himself always used the Latin name Maccovius.
 - 3 BOELES, *Hoogeschool* 2, 90–94 refers to Maccovius as ‘Calvinista tam rigidus et paradoxus, ut aliis rigidis displiceret’; ALTHAUS, *Prinzipien*, 262–265; RITSCHL, *Dogmengeschichte* 3, 306–310; WEBER,

Nevertheless, this negative attitude toward Maccovius' theological work was not universal. Theologians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were much more positive.⁴ John Owen, for example, wrote of him as being 'judicious' and as 'the veteran leader, so well trained to the scholastic field.'⁵ And when Richard Baxter claimed that Maccovius' arguments (in the case of justification) were 'weak and ineffectual', Owen responded: 'I did not formerly account Maccovius to be so senseless and weak a disputant as here he is represented to be.'⁶ Another interesting example of respect for Maccovius can be found in the Dutch theologian from Scottish origin Alexander Comrie (1706–1774).⁷ When writing about the Synod of Dordt he referred to Maccovius as 'a Polish nobleman, one of the most subtle disputers of his time.' According to Comrie, Maccovius was appointed professor at Franeker University 'because of his excessive skills, his godliness and his ability to impose silence upon his adversaries.' He proceeded by saying that his Franeker colleague Lubbertus 'envied the very great confluence of students, which from all regions arrived, because of his profound and most accurate stating of the state of differences in each chapter of divinity.'⁸

It is not difficult to find a reason for the change in appreciation. In later Remonstrant historiography the Maccovius affair was explicitly used to disqualify the Contra-Remonstrant position on predestination. In his *Antidotum* the Remonstrant leader Simon Episcopius depicted Maccovius as the protagonist of the most extreme form of determinism and wrote that the 'Polish professor defended the most harsh and cruel propositions on predestination ever defended.'⁹ According to the *Historisch Verhael*, written by the Remonstrant theologians Johannes Uytenbogaert and Bernard Dwinglo, Maccovius stubbornly persisted in Manichean teachings.¹⁰ According to Gerard Brandt, the Remonstrant historiographer, Maccovius 'was chasing the thought that every-

Grundlagen 1, 141; BERKOUWER, *Divine Election*, 18–20; SPRUNGER, *Ames*, 76 called predestination 'Maccovius' favorite topic.'

- 4 For example, see VOETIUS, *Disputationes Selectae* I, praef., 1, where he recommends his students to read Maccovius' *Collegium disputationum*. In *idem* 520–552, Voetius defends Maccovius' negative answer on the *quaestio*: 'An Christus qua mediator sit adorandus?' See also VOETIUS, *Disputationes Selectae* II, 304–362.
- 5 OWEN, *Divine Justice*, 586.
- 6 OWEN, *Death of Christ*, 471.
- 7 Confer VAN DEN BRINK, *Witsius*, 159–170.
- 8 COMRIE, *Brief*, 35–36.
- 9 EPISCOPIUS, *Antidotum*, 24–25. See for the complete Latin text of the *Antidotum*: EPISCOPIUS, *Opera Theologica*, 10–47.
- 10 UYTENBOGAERT & DWINGLO, *Oorspronck*. The first part, dealing with the origin of the conflict probably was written by Uytenbogaert, but the extensive account of the discussions and happenings at the Synod itself was probably composed by B. Dwinglo, who was present in Dordrecht.

thing happens necessarily.¹¹ Moreover, Contra-Remonstrant historiographers such as Willem Baudartius and Jacobus Trigland did not touch upon the Maccovius affair.¹² So it became easily the case that the negative picture of Maccovius' extreme position created by Remonstrant polemics has dominated historiography until now.

Very few substantial works on the life and work of Maccovius have been published.¹³ The first and most important source of biographical information on Maccovius is the funeral oration given by his colleague at Franeker University, the federal theologian Johannes Cocceius (1603–1669), delivered on July 2, 1644, about a week after Maccovius' death.¹⁴ In this *oratio funebris* Cocceius presented a rather congenial overview of Maccovius' life and works, calling him an expert in philosophy, a good historian and well versed in Hebrew, Greek and Latin, although he pronounced his Latin with a strange accent. He was a brilliant teacher and attracted many students. Unlike his colleagues, he did not read his lectures from a textbook, but extemporized when lecturing without the help of any books. Cocceius stressed the fact that Maccovius studied under Bartholomaeus Keckermann and that he, although a late starter, quickly developed into a prominent Reformed theologian who during his whole lifetime defended the *veritas gratiae* (the truth of grace) against all its opponents.

It is also worth noting that the influential thinker of the Early Enlightenment – Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) – used Cocceius' *oratio* for a fascinating lemma on Maccovius in his *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1697). Apparently, Bayle was aware of Maccovius' influence and called him a fearsome opponent of Jesuit and Socinian doctrines concerning God and grace, and a man of 'grand zèle contre les Arminiens' (great zealot against the Arminians). Like Cocceius, he excused the rather flamboyant temperament of the Polish aristocrat by referring to the Arminian crisis that was threatening the cause of Dutch and even European Calvinism during his lifetime. In this context, he compared Maccovius with a guard dog that protects the house of its master by barking against all intruders and also with that of a sailor shouting to his colleagues in order to try to save the ship of the Reformed Church that was being torn apart by the Arminian storm.¹⁵

11 BRANDT, *Historie* III, 569: 'Hij dreef ook, dat alle dingen noodtsaeklijk geschieden.'

12 BAUDARTIUS, *Memoryen*; TRIGLAND, *Kerckelycke Geschiedenissen*.

13 POSTMA & VEENHOF, 'Disputen', 249–285; MCKIM, *Encyclopedia*, 230–231; MAHLMANN, 'Maccovius', 515–552; VAN ITTERZON, 'Maccovius', 311–314; WERBECK, *RGG*, 563.

14 COCCEJUS, 'Oratio', 52–54. A short biographical sketch 'Eulogium Joannis Maccovii' was also included in Vriemoet, *Athenarum Friscarum* I, 151–160. For other biographical details, see BOELIS, *Hoogeschool* 2, 90–94; KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 3–100. See also VAN SELSET, 'Coccejus', 92–98.

15 BAYLE, *Dictionnaire*, III, 291 (291–293).

The first modern historian who produced a detailed study on Maccovius was Jodocus Heringa (1765–1840), theology professor at the University of Utrecht in the first half of the nineteenth century. He wrote extensively on Maccovius' trial at the Synod of Dordrecht based upon manuscripts and archival evidence.¹⁶ More than sixty years later, in 1899, Abraham Kuyper Jr. produced a doctoral dissertation on Maccovius, discussing the biographical details of Maccovius' life in the first part of this work, whereas the second part was devoted to a study of Maccovius' methodology. In the third part of his dissertation, Kuyper offered an historical description of some of the Franeker polemics that occurred between Maccovius and Sibrandus Lubbertus (professor, 1585–1625), and between Maccovius and William Ames (professor, 1622–1633). According to Kuyper, Maccovius' problems at Franeker with Lubbertus and Ames grew out of theological and philosophical differences: Lubbertus' infralapsarianism versus Maccovius' supralapsarianism and Ames' Ramism versus Maccovius' Aristotelianism.¹⁷ Moreover, Maccovius' Bohemian way of life fell clearly short of Ames' standards, who, according to Keith Sprunger, was a 'Puritan of the rigidest sort.'¹⁸ Kuyper called Maccovius 'the pioneer of Reformed scholasticism in the Netherlands'¹⁹ and argued in favor of a kind of Maccovius 'renaissance' in Calvinist circles.²⁰ He saw Maccovius as 'a herald announcing the times to come', i.e. the theology developed by his father, (Abraham Kuyper, Sr.) whom he saw as the 'regenerator of Calvinism and the father of a reborn Calvinism according to the consciousness of this century.'²¹

Maccovius had to wait almost another century for a second monography. In 1986, Michael Daniel Bell wrote a dissertation, in which he examined and evaluated the teaching of Maccovius on the specific question of the object of predestination. Bell offers a very helpful description of Maccovius' views and refers to the medieval sources of Maccovius' teaching on predestination and theology in general. Moreover, Bell clearly demonstrated that Maccovius was not willing to speak of sin as a necessary effect of reprobation. On the contrary: Maccovius was attempting to break any link that might make God appear as the author of sin, for he denied it the role of cause and instead spoke only of

16 HERINGA, 'Twistzaak', 503–664.

17 For the different opinions on these controversies, see KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 44–45 (pro Maccovius); VAN DER WOUDE, *Lubbertus*, 338–370 (via media); SPRUNGER, *Ames*, 87–88 (contra Maccovius).

18 SPRUNGER, *Ames*, 96–101.

19 KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 131.

20 For this qualification, see VEENHOF, *Prediking*, 288–290. For the rest, Veenhof deplors this development by saying that the reintroduction of the "miserable theology of Maccovius" in 1900 by Abraham Kuyper Jr. 'was a radical misinterpretation and deformation of the theology of the Reformers and the reformed confessions' (*idem*, 289).

21 KUYPER, *Maccovius*, introduction, 5 ('Aan mijne ouders') and 399.

reprobation as the antecedent of sin.²² At the same time, Bell emphasized the fact that Reformed scholasticism should not be viewed as a monolithic system of theology in which every theologian followed exactly the same principles and methodologies.

Some recent authors have investigated further the nature of Maccovius' thought. First, we refer to the work by Donald W. Sinnema on the issue of reprobation at the Synod of Dordrecht, in which he argues for an essential continuity between the first generation Reformers and Dordrecht on this point, although the Synod accepted a more moderate position on this issue than either Calvin or his successor Beza had held. According to Sinnema, Maccovius used 'the late medieval solution' that defined reprobation as twofold – negative and positive – and identified God's will as the cause of its negative side (*non esse electum*) and human sin as the cause of its positive side (*ordinatio ad poenas*). Sinnema's conclusion is that Maccovius' formulation concisely captured a balance of divine and human factors in reprobation.²³

Another recent article by Martin I. Klauber (utilizing some ideas found in Bell's dissertation) focuses on Maccovius' use of philosophy in theology.²⁴ His conclusion is that Maccovius' positive use of philosophy within his theological system does not represent the development of a rational system that was a marked deviation from the early Reformers. In no manner did Maccovius raise reason to an equal status with revelation as the thesis of Brian Armstrong suggests.²⁵ Henri Krop discussed Maccovius' contribution to the development of metaphysics in Reformed theology. In his view, Maccovius was the first in Franeker to lift the 'humanist ban' on metaphysics. Krop concluded that Maccovius never identified theology and metaphysics. Metaphysics was cognate with logic, dealing with various philosophical and theological issues on account of its concepts, principles, and distinctions.²⁶ Gert van den Brink wrote on Maccovius' view on justification. He debunks the misinterpretation of Maccovius as a proponent of justification from eternity.²⁷ Lastly, Willem van Asselt published several articles on Maccovius, both in English and in Dutch.²⁸

In order to appreciate Maccovius' position in the history of Reformed theology, it should also be remembered that his theological views and methodology remained highly influential. He spent more than thirty years of his life

22 BELL, *Potestatem*, 127–128.

23 SINNEMA, *Reprobation*, 177–181, 292–295 (quotation from 5).

24 KLAUBER, 'Philosophy', 376–391.

25 So ARMSTRONG, *Amyraut Heresy*, 32.

26 KROP, 'Maccovius', 661–665.

27 VAN DEN BRINK, 'Maccovius', 336–353.

28 VAN ASSELT, 'Theologian's Tool Kit', 23–40; VAN ASSELT, 'Bijdrage', 121–140; VAN ASSELT, 'Maccovius Affair'.

teaching theology in the Netherlands and never returned to his homeland of Poland. This long period of teaching seems to have had a profound effect not only on Dutch students but also influenced many Eastern European students who had come to the Low Countries from Poland, Lithuania, Transylvania, Prussia, and Hungary.²⁹ H. De Ridder-Symoens wrote that the ranks of foreign students at Franeker swelled notably during the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). The attraction of Franeker to Eastern Europeans – after the Poles, the Hungarians and the Germans were the largest groups – was probably due to Maccovius.³⁰ Accordingly, the extent of Maccovius' influence as a Reformed author is well attested by several editions of his writings, during his lifetime and after his death. His writings were to be found in most of the influential universities in Great Britain and many important countries in Western Europe also. It appears that his smaller works on theology and metaphysics may have been textbooks at Oxford and even Yale.

In this volume, we present a translation from the Latin text of Maccovius' most popular work, *Theological and Philosophical Distinctions and Rules*. This work seeks to provide a guide for understanding the rise and development of Reformed scholasticism and its use of technical distinctions in theology and philosophy. In what follows, we present a short biography and bibliography of Maccovius, and, finally, some comments on the genre, method, and sources of his famous *Distinctions*.

2. Maccovius' Life

As we already noted, the first and most important source of biographical information on Maccovius is the funeral oration given by his colleague at Franeker University, Johannes Cocceius. Despite their somewhat different approaches to theological method, Cocceius gave a rather sympathetic overview of his colleague's life. Maccovius was born at Lobzenic, a village not far from Poznan in Poland. His parents, Samuel Makowsky and Margaretha Seklewska, belonged to the Polish aristocracy. Maccovius' birthplace, Lobzenic, was one of the centers of the Bohemian Brethren who found refuge in Great Poland after banishment from their homeland in 1548. Protected by a local lord, the Brethren organized their community and sometime before 1568 opened their school there. Maccovius was born in 1588 and it is possible that he attended the Brethren school at Lobzenic.³¹

29 For more information, see KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 3–100; BELL, *Potestatem*, 5–29.

30 DE RIDDER-SYMOENS, 'Studenten', 73–89.

31 See ODLOZILIK, 'Nobleman', 3–32, here 6.

From at least 1604 until about 1607 or 1608 Maccovius studied liberal arts at the famous gymnasium at Gdansk (Danzig) under the tutelage of its rector, Bartholomaeus Keckermann (1571–1609).³² Keckermann had studied at Heidelberg where he was influenced by the work of Girolamo Zanchi.³³ As we shall see later in some detail, it was Keckermann who had a major influence on Maccovius' philosophical and theological work. Rejecting the theory of 'double truth', defended by the Lutheran theologian Daniel Hofman in 1593, he also referred to Keckermann's arguments against this theory.³⁴

After completing his studies at Gdansk, Maccovius became the governor of two young noblemen named Sieniensky with whom he traveled around to several universities in Eastern Europe. According to Cocceius, Maccovius himself used this time to study theology during these journeys. After a visit to the University of Prague, where Maccovius confronted the Jesuits who were in control there, they moved to the city of Lublin where he disputed with the Socinians. By mid-September of 1610 the party arrived at the Reformed University of Marburg, where Maccovius heard the lectures of the theologian and philosopher Johann Combach.³⁵ In the spring of the following year, Maccovius and his noblemen patrons matriculated at the University of Heidelberg. Here, Maccovius left his role as governor of the Sienienskys and became the governor of two sons of Baron Gorai Goriasky, named Johannes and Christian. As governor of these two nobles, he traveled with them to the universities at Leipzig, Wittenberg, and Jena. Finally, they visited the Netherlands in the fall of 1613, where the two Goriaskys studied law, while their governor and two family servants (*famuli*) studied theology at the University of Franeker. The Franeker *album studiosorum* mentions that Maccovius matriculated at the university on October 21, 1613.³⁶

Having studied theology throughout the fall and winter at Franeker and after having disputed on the topic 'De ecclesia', Maccovius received his doctorate under the promotion of Sibrandus Lubbertus (ca. 1555–1625) on March 8, 1614. Because of the deteriorating political situation of the Protestants in Poland during the reign of Sigismund III (1586–1632), Maccovius decided not to return to Poland, but, supported by his students, asked for permission to give private

32 For Keckermann, see VAN ZUYLEN, *Keckermann*; MULLER, 'Vera Philosophia', 122–136.

33 For a survey of Keckermann's philosophical method, see HOTSON, *Alsted*, 29–34.

34 See MACCOVIUS, *Theses Theologicae* 2 (1641), 4–5; cf. MACCOVIUS, *Collegia* (1641), 542–543 (diss. 22). Here Maccovius argues that contrary to theology the object of philosophy concerns natural things. Some truths, such as 'from nothing, nothing will originate', or 'a virgin will not give birth', can be true in philosophy; the theologian, however, accepts this 'cum exceptione aliqua aut determinatione: per causam primam, quae infinita est ut fieri possit, ita et factum est.'

35 See on Combach, GUNDLACH, *Catalogus*, no. 690; VON LILIENCRON, *Biographie* IV, 999.

36 KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 7–10.

lectures as *privaat-docent*. Starting in July of 1614, he lectured on the *locus De Deo* as the inception of his series of lectures under the title *Systema breve theologiae, comprehendens materias praecipuas*, of which two manuscripts of students are preserved.³⁷

At that time, Lubbertus was the only professor of theology at Franeker.³⁸ In the meantime, students were so impressed and enamored by the teaching of the young Polish professor that they requested the curators of the university to give him an official appointment on the theological faculty. For the time being, however, the curators decided to grant Maccovius the position of a *professor extraordinarius*, because they still hoped to fill the vacant positions with Johannes Bogerman, minister at Leeuwarden and future president of the Synod of Dordt, and Godefridus Sopingius, minister at Bolsward.³⁹ When, after six months, it became clear that neither Bogerman nor Sopingius were in a position to come to Franeker, the curators promoted Maccovius to the full professorate by making him *professor ordinarius* of both theology and physics at the Franeker University, although at first he mainly taught metaphysics, logic, and rhetoric.⁴⁰ In 1616, Maccovius published his *Collegium metaphysicum*, one of the earliest metaphysical manuals to be written in the Dutch Republic. It comprised eighteen theses in which the principles and properties of 'being' were dealt with. A second version was posthumously edited by Adriaan Heereboord, but this was dictated shortly before 1630. Maccovius' successor and compatriot, Nicolaus Arnoldus, published a third version which he incorporated in his *Opuscula Philosophica Omnia*, a compilation and republication of Maccovius' philosophical works, which will be discussed in the section on Maccovius' works later on.

Initially, the relationship with Lubbertus was very friendly, but soon problems arose.⁴¹ Maccovius was a brilliant and very popular teacher, but he showed little reverence to his older colleague and promotor. Lubbertus was then in his sixties and had been professor at Franeker since the founding of the university in 1585. Maccovius, at that time just thirty years old, was not a very diplomatic person and scheduled his lectures in conflict with those of Lubbertus and was in this manner drawing away students from him.⁴² Besides the conflict at the personal level, the true basis for the controversy was their different view on orthodox Reformed theology. Using the scholastic method,

37 For a discussion of these manuscripts and their authors, see VAN ASSELT, 'Maccovius Affair'.

38 On 14 March, 1614 Henricus Antonides van der Linden (Nerdenus), the other professor of theology, died. See KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 19.

39 For more biographical details about Sopingius, see NAUTA, 'Sopingius', 342.

40 BELL, *Potestatem*, 13–14.

41 VAN DER WOUDE, *Lubbertus*, 339–340.

42 VAN DER WOUDE, *Lubbertus*, 342.

Maccovius loved to utilize the forum of the theological debate by asking new questions and proposing bold (and sometimes provocative) propositions as consequences of his supralapsarianism. This made Maccovius highly suspect in the eyes of the older infralapsarian Lubbertus who saw the young noisy Polish scholar as a dangerous influence on 'his' university and its students.⁴³

The conflict escalated in 1617 after Maccovius presided over two sets of disputations, *De praedestinatione* and *De traductione hominis peccatoris ad vitam*, the first set drawn up and defended by Lambert Ernesti Hiddingh⁴⁴, the second set defended by the English student Thomas Parker.⁴⁵ Especially the Parker disputation became a source of debate. Maccovius was called before the classis of Franeker and charged with a list of fifty errors. Thirty were derived from the Parker disputation, the rest from lectures and other disputations of Maccovius. He was accused of teaching that 'God destines man to sin' although such a teaching is not explicitly found in Maccovius' writings.⁴⁶

It should be noticed that the list of fifty errors has been unknown for a long time. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they were not known. Neither the Remonstrant historian Geraert Brandt (1626 – 1685) in his *History of the Reformation* (1704)⁴⁷ nor the Reformed minister Jacobus Leydekker (1656 – 1729) in the two volumes of his *The Honor of the National Synod of Dordt* (1705–1707)⁴⁸ did mention them. Brandt complained that the Synod's dealings with Maccovius 'were not mentioned in the acts.'⁴⁹ And to Brandt's regret, the Scottish

43 VAN DER WOUDE, *Lubbertus*, 344.

44 Lambert Ernesti Hiddingh was a native of Mastenbroek, a village in the province of Overijssel, and had participated in a student revolt in Franeker. The title of the disputation was: *Γύμνασμα Θεολογικόν de praedestinatione*. He defended his theses 'sub septemplex clypeo' of Maccovius. See POSTMA & VAN SLUIS, *Auditorium*, 55.

45 In the company of Amesius, Thomas Parker left England for Leiden and had tried in vain to dispute on this subject at Leiden University. The Leiden minister and regent of the Staten College, Festus Hommius, advised him to ask Maccovius. After some correspondence with Hommius and Amesius, Maccovius was willing to preside the disputation and to take responsibility for it. Parker dedicated his disputation to Amesius. See POSTMA & VAN SLUIS, *Auditorium*, 55. When Parker returned to England, he served as an assistant minister to William Twisse at Newbury, teaching at the town school and studying theology under Twisse's tutelage. In 1634 he crossed the Atlantic to become pastor in a town in Massachusetts he named Newbury. See JOHNSON, *Dictionary* XIV, 241–242.

46 For this disputation, see SINNEMA, *Reprobation*, 178–179; VAN DER WOUDE, *Lubbertus*, 358 refers to the remarks of Hommius on this point during the synod of Dort. At that moment there was a flaming debate going on between Lubbertus and Hommius.

47 BRANDT, *Historie der Reformatie* 3.

48 LEIDEKKER, *Eere*.

49 BRANDT, *Historie der Reformatie* 3, 565; BRANDT, *History of the Reformation* 3, 283: '[The Remonstrants] added, that the Synod proceeded in a quite different manner with Johannes Maccovius, Professor of Divinity at Franeker, about whom there had been a great stir made, and who had been vehemently accused of maintaining the Manichean errors; since after much dispute

delegate Balcanqual did not list them either.⁵⁰ The Dutch theologian Comrie suggested that at least some of the accusations concerned the doctrine of justification. Since the Synod thought all fifty accusations against Maccovius to be unfair, Comrie concluded that the Synod had accepted Maccovius' idea of an 'eternal justification.'⁵¹ However, Comrie's suggestion seems not to be true: none of the fifty errors addressed the topic of justification.

The classis declared Maccovius guilty of heresy but he protested and appealed to the provincial synod of Friesland (1618). It referred the case to the Frisian government, which, after investigation, in turn, referred it to the Synod of Dordt.⁵² The Synod of Dordrecht discussed the case on April 25 and the following day the documents sent to the Synod were read, including the list of fifty errors and a short and long reply by Maccovius in which he denied some of the alleged errors and sought to explain others. In his longer reply, he explained in what sense the proposition 'God destines man to sin' should be interpreted: 'God did not decree to effect sin as sin, but to permit it to happen'. In both replies he appealed to leading Reformed theologians such as Paraeus, Junius, Piscator, and Beza.⁵³ During the preliminary deliberations of the Synod, some foreign delegates such as Balcanqual from England and Alsted of Nassau spoke in favor of Maccovius and his scholastic methodology as exemplified in his lectures and in the theses of Parker. In addition, Gomarus, Thysius, Hommius, Lydius, and Voetius, all Dutch pastors and theologians, stood up to defend the scholastic methodology. They spoke of Maccovius as following in the footsteps of such respected theologians as Zanchius, Sadeel, Danaeus, Junius, and Trelcatius (both father and son). Even Lubbertus himself, they asserted, had used this scholastic method in his debate with Conrad Vorstius.⁵⁴

the matter was dropt without entering any thing in their Acts concerning him, save only in the following general terms, viz. the particular affair, which was transmitted hither from Friesland, has been discussed.'

50 BRANDT, *Historie der Reformatie* 3, 569; BRANDT, *History of the Reformation* 3, 285: 'In the first place they read an account of fifty errors, with which he had been charged in the Classis of Franeker. The substance of those Errors is not mentioned in the writings of Balcanqual, only he says, that excepting one or two, they did not seem to be of any great importance.'

51 COMRIE, *Brief*, 37. On Maccovius' view on justification, see VAN DEN BRINK, 'Maccovius'.

52 For an overview of the Maccovius case at the Synod of Dordt, see DIJK, *Strijd*, 206–220; VAN DER WOUDE, *Lubbertus*, 359–362; SINNEMA, *Reprobation*, 177–181.292–295.

53 SINNEMA, *Reprobation*, 292–294.

54 HERINGA, 'Twistzaak', 556. Heringa refers to Voetius' report of the deliberations of the synod on the Maccovius case: 'Posteriores vero eandem a doctissimis et praestantissimis nostris Theologis Zanchio, Sadeele, Danaeo, Junio, Trelcatio, aliisque adhibitam dicebant et ipsum Sibrandum Lubbertum, nisi his armis adversus deliria Vorstii, quae pleraque sunt Philosophica et Scholastica, pugnasset, parum promotorum fuisse.'

On April 27, a committee of six members – three foreign and three Dutch theologians – was appointed to examine the case.⁵⁵ Over the course of the next two days, the commission read the material available on this case, including the shorter and the larger responses by Maccovius and the extensive list of fifty errors. On Tuesday, 30 April 1619, at session 145 of the Synod, the commission presented its preliminary judgment which declared Maccovius free from heresy but strongly admonished him 'to use in his teaching a perspicuous, clear, and plain kind of language and speak with the Prophets, Christ, and the Apostles rather than with Bellarmine, Suarez, and the like', and also to speak more cautiously and circumspectly about the determination of man to sin and to avoid such statements as 'God wills and decrees (*decernere*) sin.' Although the *judicium* did not use the expression 'phrases duriores' as has been often suggested in the secondary literature⁵⁶, yet it included a list of admonitions addressed to Maccovius in order that he might abstain in his teaching from 'all themes that would disturb the concord of the university teachers, such as calling the distinction used by some colleagues between sufficiency and efficiency a futile one and also condemning infralapsarianism by telling his students that it is incorrect to teach that fallen humanity is the object of predestination (*genus humanum lapsum esse objectum praedestinationis*). Neither party was in agreement with the first *judicium* and thus in order to seek reconciliation between Lubbertus and Maccovius the committee developed a compromise formula acceptable to both parties.⁵⁷ Although neither party was completely in agreement, both Maccovius and Lubbertus accepted this final *judicium* and for the sake of peace both parties shook hands.⁵⁸

In 1620, however, new conflicts with Lubbertus arose, this time regarding their views on the resurrection of Christ, the last judgment, justification by faith, and the sufficiency and efficiency of Christ's atoning death. We do not know by whom these polemics were raised and it is difficult to indicate precisely the contents of each debate. Nevertheless, Maccovius was called to account to the University Senate, but refused to appear. He appealed to the

55 The foreign members were Abraham Scultetus, professor at Heidelberg; Paulus Steinus, professor at Kassel; Johannes Breytinger professor at Zurich. The three Dutch members were Gomar, professor at Groningen; Thysius, professor at Harderwijk, and Eilhardus van Mehen (Mehnius) of Harderwijk. See BELL, *Potestatem*, 19–21. VAN 'T SPIJKER, *Synode*, 188–189.

56 See, for example BERKOUWER, *Divine Election*, 18–20. One of the deputies from Hessen, Paulus Stein, used the words 'locutiones duriores' in the *literae delegatonum Hassiacorum de iis, quae in Synodo Dordracena acta sunt ad Landgraviatum Mauritium missae*; confer SEPP, *Godgeleerd Onderwijs* 1, 142–143, referring to H. HEPPE, *Zeitschrift für Historische Theologie*, 1853, S. 226 ff.

57 The Latin version of both the first and final judgment that was read before the Synod on Saturday, 4 May 1619, can be found reproduced in DIJK, *Strijd*, 212–213.216. On the differences between the text of both judgments, see DIJK, 217–218.

58 See HERINGA, 'Twistzaak', 614–630; AUGUSTIJN, *Reformatrica*, 135–136.

States-General of Friesland that eventually brought about an end to the polemics in 1621. But the tensions between the older and the younger professors remained until the death of Lubbertus in 1625.⁵⁹

It was in this context that the English Puritan, William Ames, entered in 1622 his professorate at the University of Franeker. After the Synod of Dordrecht, the tension between Lubbertus and Maccovius could hardly have been a surprise or secret to Ames. Nevertheless, the situation became even more complicated with Ames as a third party to the disputes, for when Ames entered Franeker, he also brought with him the arrival of a strict form of Puritanism to the Franeker University. Hence, the controversy on orthodox Reformed theology at Franeker received a new dimension that further escalated it. Although Ames had defended the Parker disputation (since he was the one who sent Parker to Maccovius in the first place) and intervened on behalf of Maccovius at the Synod of Dordt, Maccovius attacked him for introducing 'Ramism' into theology and denying the structural priority of the intellect in regeneration. Contrary to Ames, Maccovius denied preparing grace before regeneration. In addition, Ames also defended the thesis (1631) that Christ ought to be worshipped as Mediator, including both His divine and human natures.⁶⁰ To these various theological disputations of Ames, Maccovius replied with several theses defending the theological notion that Christ ought to be worshipped only as He is truly God according to His divine nature. In this conflict about the *adoratio Christi* theologians of other universities also took sides: Andreas Rivetus (1573–1651), Franciscus Gomarus (1563–1641), and Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) sided with Maccovius; Samuel Maresius (1599–1673) and Antonius Walaëus (1573–1639) agreed with Ames.

Actually, the great differences in lifestyle between Maccovius and William Ames, and, consequently their different perspective on the Reformed practice of piety were the inherent and main causes of the troubles between them at Franeker.⁶¹ According to a letter to one of the Curators of the University of Franeker, dated 22 June 1626, Ames, in that year acting as rector of the Frisian Academy, along with the professors Johannes Hachting, Sixtinus Amama, and Arnoldus Verhel, sought to have Maccovius dismissed from the university faculty accusing him of habitual drunkenness and leading a *belluinam vitam*,

59 See KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 256–314; VAN DER WOUDE, *Lubbertus*, 362–370.

60 These topics are examined in KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 315–396.

61 See BELL, *Potestatem*, 25: 'Ames, of course, was a very strict puritan in his theology and practice and mirrored that lifestyle to all his students. He typified the kind of piety that was prevalent in England and New England among the puritans ... Maccovius, of course, had grown up in a less restrictive atmosphere and it seems likely that his practice of piety would remain closer to the German and Swiss Reformed viewpoints, even when he moved to the Netherlands.' See also SPRUNGER, *Ames*, 96–101.

defaming his colleagues, taking part in brawls, promoting clanship among the students and visiting brothels.⁶² Whether these charges had any truth or merit to them and be that as it may, in the years 1617 (before Ames' arrival) and 1633 (after the departure of Ames), Maccovius held the honorific office of *rector magnificus* of the University.⁶³ In 1639, Maccovius was joined by Nicolaus Vedelius, a professor of theology at the school of Deventer, who died in 1643. Maccovius gave the funeral oration on behalf of Vedelius, which is printed in the beginning of the collection of Maccovius' philosophical works mentioned above. In 1644, just before he died, Maccovius promoted Johannes Cocceius to the theological doctorate. It was this so-called 'father of federal theology' who gave the funeral oration on Maccovius' death and who became the professor of theology in his place.

During his lifetime, Maccovius married three times. His first wife was Antje Ulenborgh, daughter of the Leeuwarden burgomaster Rombertus Ulenborgh. Her younger sister, Saskia, was married to Rembrandt van Rhijn. After the death of their father in 1624, Saskia was living in the household of Maccovius in the months immediately before Antje's death on 9 November 1633.⁶⁴ According to B.P.J. Broos, it is highly probable that Maccovius was present at the wedding of Rembrandt and Saskia Ulenborgh on June 8, 1634.⁶⁵ In 1638 Rembrandt was involved with Maccovius in an inheritance concern. As far as we know, their acquaintanceship never led to a Rembrandt portrait of Maccovius. There is, however, a painted portrait of the Polish professor in the Stedelijk Museum 't Coopmanshuis in Franeker by Johannes Pandelius – a Polish student of theology who had matriculated at Franeker University on June 13, 1643. C. van Dalen made an engraved print of this painting.⁶⁶ It shows Maccovius wearing a black suit and a flat white collar and a skull-cap on his gray hair along with an injured right eye. Probably, it is conjectured, the cause of this injury was due to his conspicuous life style and his willingness to become embroiled in disputations. Was Rembrandt thinking of the one-eyed Polish professor when he painted the blind eye of Julius Civilis in the Stockholm painting? Or did Rem-

62 For the actual Latin text of this letter with the list of charges, see BOELES, *Hoogeschool I*, 479–483. See also KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 44–45; SPRUNGER, *Ames*, 87–88.

63 See COCCEIUS, *Oratio funebris*, 2 [*Orationes*, 52].

64 See BELL, *Potestatem*, 28. For further details on the family relationships between Maccovius and Rembrandt, see also ODLOZILIK, 'Nobleman', 3–32; and BROOS, 'Portrait', 192–218.

65 According to Bell, Maccovius and Rembrandt were never brothers-in-law in a technical sense 'since Antje died before Saskia was married, but since Saskia was betrothed to Rembrandt in June of 1633, there was the likelihood that the Maccovius household was visited frequently by Rembrandt in the months before Anna's death.' See BELL, *Potestatem*, 28.

66 See EKKART, *Portretten*, 84–86. Cf. HOLLSTEIN, *Etchings* 5, 118, nr. 143.

brandt have the young Maccovius in mind when painting his ‘portrait of a Pole and his horse’?⁶⁷

Cocceius also notes that Maccovius, after the death of Antje, married two more times, first with a daughter of Raphael Clingbijn, professor of medicine at Franeker, and after her death with a daughter of Frederik a Bonnama, a government deputy of Friesland. Cocceius also mentions the fact that Maccovius suffered many physical pains and ailments during his lifetime. Podagra, a nasty cough and asthma tormented him a long time; the last two years before his death were troubled by a liver disorder, dropsy, and serious fevers. Nevertheless, he endured, according to Cocceius, his sufferings ‘without a sign of impatience’ (*absque omni impatientiae signo*). He died on June 24, 1644, leaving only one son, Johannes Maccovius Jr.

3. The Writings of Maccovius

Maccovius’ published writings can be basically divided into two major parts. First, there are those writings, which Maccovius saw to the press during his lifetime. These are small in number. The second group consists of those works which were published after his death through the efforts of his students and disciples. Some of these were new editions of the works previously published by Maccovius himself, while others were released for the first time. Nicolaus Arnoldi or Arnoldus (1618–1680) took on responsibility for editing and publishing most of them. He was a fellow Polish countryman of Maccovius and a great admirer of the Franeker professor. Like Maccovius he had studied liberal arts at the Reformed gymnasium in Gdansk (1635), whereupon he became rector of the Latin school in Jablonov in 1639. Attracted to the teaching of Maccovius, he went to Franeker for his theological studies (1641–1645). From 1645–1651 he was a Reformed minister in Beetgum in Friesland. When Cocceius’ departure from Franeker to Leiden University in 1650 created a vacancy, Arnoldus was appointed professor of theology, an office he held until his death in 1680.⁶⁸

3.1. Works Published during his Lifetime

During his lifetime, Maccovius published a collection of his theological lectures under the title *Collegium theologicum*, which seem to have gone through several editions; the publisher Johannes Jansonius published the first one in Amsterdam in 1623 in octavo format. The second edition of this work appeared in 1631 at Franeker and was published by Ulderickus Balck, printer to the University.

⁶⁷ Suggestion made by BROOS, ‘Portrait’, 212.

⁶⁸ For more biographical details, see VAN IJTERZON, ‘Arnoldi’, 37–38.

The final edition published in 1641 before his death carried the title *Collegia theologica*. According to Kuyper, this work contained the theological lectures for the years 1618–22, 1625, and included lectures upon various miscellaneous subjects.⁶⁹ The second work Maccovius published during his lifetime was entitled *Volumen thesium theologiarum per locos communes disputatarum in Academia Franequerae* which, according to Bell, saw its first edition in Amsterdam in 1626 from the house of Jansson.⁷⁰ This volume gathered together some of the theological theses which had been disputed under his direction. Uldericus Balck published a second edition or *Editio altera* at Franeker in 1639 in small octavo format, being in length ca. 375 pages. Both works, the *Collegia* and the *Loci communes*, were supplementary to each other and present a true picture of Maccovius' teaching.

In 1641 Maccovius decided to bring both works together in one volume. The first part is entitled *Collegia theologica quae extant omnia: tertio ab auctore recognita, emendata, et plurimis locis aucta*, and is approximately 550 quarto pages in length. The second part of this volume is entitled: *Thesium theologiarum per locos communes in Academia Franequerae disputatarum pars altera. Editio tertia in multis aucta et emendata*, and comprises about 440 quarto pages. This particular edition of his writings is dedicated to Prince Radziwill, an aristocratic friend of Maccovius and the Reformed Church in Poland and Lithuania.⁷¹ This was the final collection of the various *collegia* and *theses* that had been printed in the years 1618–1641 as separate single broadsides, yearly collections of *collegia* or *disputationes* and the culmination of the earlier octavo formats of the collected *collegia* and *theses*. In 1643, a small octavo book entitled *Disputationes Theologicae Miscellaneorum Quaestionum* appeared which included theological theses that had been disputed under Maccovius' presiding for the years 1642–43. This was the very last set of theological writings Maccovius personally sent to publication.⁷²

As was noted above, the only philosophical writing that Maccovius published during his lifetime was the *Collegium disputationum metaphysicarum* pub-

69 KUYPER, *Maccovius*, Bijlagen no. v.

70 BELL, *Potestatem*, 30 notes that he was not able to trace this first edition. However, a copy is present in the library of the Provinciale bibliotheek van Friesland Tresoar in Leeuwarden.

71 This work can be found in the University of Utrecht Library, the library of Theological University at Kampen (Broederstraat), the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, the New College Library at the University of Edinburgh, The British Museum Library, and the library at the University of North Carolina.

72 This volume is very rare and extremely difficult to locate, but it can be found at the Provinciale Bibliotheek van Friesland in Leeuwarden.

lished in 1616 by Fredericus Heynsius at Franeker, which contained 18 disputations of about 260 small octavo pages.⁷³

3.2. Posthumous Publications

Although Maccovius saw three editions of his two important theological works through publication, they represented only a small part of his nearly thirty years of teaching. Postma and Van Sluis in their bibliography of the Franeker orations and disputations record more than 300 disputations presided by Maccovius during the years 1616–1644.⁷⁴ Therefore, after his death, his students and followers felt the need to publish the remainder of his work. Bell mentions that in October 1644, a year after Maccovius' death, the right to publish all his philosophical and theological works was granted to the publishing house of Johannes Arcerius and Idzardus Albertus in Franeker.⁷⁵ In the years 1654–1660 Elsevier at Amsterdam published the complete editions of his theological and philosophical works. These posthumous editions can be divided into two categories. First, there are the collected theological and philosophical works (in quarto fashion), and secondly there are the smaller works which were individually printed and reprinted many times (in duodecimo form). To the first group belongs the work with the title *Loci communes theologici*, which was an enhanced version of the volume that Maccovius had published himself in 1641, integrated and edited by Arnoldus into one unified whole work with additional material added. This appeared in 1650 at Franeker and then a second corrected edition appeared from the Elzevir house in 1658 at Amsterdam. Next, Arnoldus gathered Maccovius' theological *opuscula* into a work entitled, *Johannes Maccovius Redivivus, seu manuscripta eius typis exscripta* (Franeker 1647), which was published *cum privilegio* of the States General of the Dutch Republic and dedicated to Willem Frederik (1613–1664), Count of Nassau and Stadholder of Friesland and Groningen.

The initial edition of the *Redivivus* appeared in 1647 containing the funeral oration delivered by Johannes Cocceius, and four polemical works: the *Theologia polemica* (169 pages), the ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΠΣΕΥΔΟΣ or *Prima falsa adversariorum* (141 pages); the *Casus conscientiae de norma doctrinae sociniana compositi per dialogum* (27 pages), a Dutch translation being published in 1666⁷⁶; and, finally, the *Anti-Socinus* (170 pages). The second edition of the *Maccovius Redivivus* was published

73 This series of metaphysical disputations is also very hard to locate, but can be found at the University Library at Tilburg in the Netherlands and at the Bibliothek der Franckeschen Stiftungen, Hauptbibliothek, Halle an der Saale in Germany.

74 POSTMA & VAN SLUIS, *Auditorium*, 54–75.

75 BELL, *Potestatem*, 31.

76 The Dutch translation of the *Casus conscientiae* was entitled: *Sociniaanse sieken-troost*.

in 1654 at Franeker and contained besides the works of the first edition the following treatises: *Distinctiones et regulae theologicae ac philosophicae*, and an expanded version of the *Theologia polemica*, fragments of his lectures on Arminius' debate with William Perkins (*Fragmenta praelectionum contra Arminium pro Perkinsio*), his *Theologia quaestionum*, and some fragments of his lectures against the writings of Socinus, and, finally, an appendix on Atheists (*Appendix de Atheis*). With the additions and expansions, this brought the size of this work up to about 850 quarto pages. The last and most complete edition of the *Redivivus* came from the Elzevir publishing house in 1659 and included further corrections to the works in earlier editions and the addition of several new theological *opuscula*. These included a new work on Theology by Means of Consequences (*Theologia per consecraria*), a new polemical series against the Lutheran controversialist, Heinrich Eckhardt (*Fasciculus controversiarum theologiarum*, 1613/1619), entitled, *Anti-Eckhardus*, and in addition to an expanded general version of his polemic against the Socinians (the *Anti-Socinus*), Arnoldus now presents a specific work against the Socinian writer Adam Goslavius⁷⁷ (c. 1580 – c. 1640) with the title *Anti-Goslavius*. With the addition of these new works and the correction and retype setting of those in the earlier editions of the *Redivivus*, the work now comprised over 950 quarto pages.

Lastly, his philosophical works were collected into a volume called, *Opuscula philosophica omnia*, which contained the text of his various lectures on philosophical subjects, such as physics, metaphysics, logic, rhetoric and a treatise on the method for collecting *loci communes*. It was published in 1660 in Amsterdam under the editorial care of Arnoldus once again by the Elzevir publishing house.⁷⁸ If nothing else, the value of Maccovius' works at this time can be judged by the fact that all three major works in their last editions were put forth and sold by the Elzevir publishing concern in Amsterdam which was no small matter as this family publishing house was renowned for its editorial and publishing skill and care throughout Europe.

The treatise on metaphysics was edited several times separately. In 1658 Adriaen Heereboord (1614–1661), a Dutch (Cartesian) professor of philosophy at Leiden, published a third and annotated edition of Maccovius' *Metaphysica*, in which he discussed the usefulness of Maccovius' terminology, principles, and

77 The works of Goslavius, a Polish Knight and close advisor to Johannes Crellius, are very difficult to locate but his most important two works are: GOSLAVIUS, *Refutatio* and GOSLAVIUS, *Disputatio*.

78 This edition of the *Opuscula* contained: 1. *Oratio in obitum Vedelii* (funeral oration for Vedelius). 2. *Logicae Libri III*. 3. *De usu logicae libri III*. 4. *Breve Systema Rhetoricae*. 5. *Systematis physici Libri III*. 6. *Tractatus de anima separata*. 7. *Metaphysica theoretica-practica*. 8. *Tractatus philosophiae practicae, ethici, politici, oeconomici*. 9. *Methodus locos communes colligendi*. 10. *Methodus legendarum historiarum*.

distinctions in metaphysics for the theological debate. In the preface to this third edition of the *Metaphysica* Heereboord wrote that Maccovius like Keckermann and Alsted, considered metaphysics as dealing with being in general (*sola Entis tractatione atque ambitu in genere*), while the particular problems of relationship between soul and body that were usually treated in the second part of metaphysics were considered by them as a special science called *Pneumatics*.⁷⁹ According to Heereboord, this was the reason why in the third edition of the *Metaphysica* the printer omitted Maccovius' treatise: 'On the separate soul' (*De anima separata*), which in the second edition, together with his *Metaphysica*, was printed in one volume.⁸⁰

3.3. Editions of Maccovius' *Distinctiones*

In scholarly research on Maccovius little attention has been paid to one of his most popular writings. It was a short treatise called *Distinctiones et regulae theologicae ac philosophicae* that was edited at least ten times in the Latin original and four times in a Dutch translation.⁸¹ It seems that for many Reformed pastors in the Netherlands and outside its borders the *Distinctiones* were probably their only firsthand knowledge of Maccovius' teaching since the fuller collections of his works were more expensive and difficult to obtain. The Latin editions were published at Franeker 1652, 1653, 1654, Amsterdam 1653, 1656 (two times) 1659, Oxford 1656, Geneva 1661 and Amsterdam 1663.⁸² The Oxford edition, published by Henry Hall, printer to the University (1642–1680) and Robert Belgrave, bookseller at Oxford (1652–1662), shows that Maccovius' influence extended beyond the European continent. Copies of the Oxford edition can not only be found in British and Scottish libraries (British Library, Bodleian Li-

79 HEEREBOORD, *Metaphysica, Praefatio*, 5–6: 'De principiis hisce posterioris generis [on created and uncreated soul], vulgo agi solet in secunda parte Metaphysicae, quam particularem aut specialem vocant: sed enim de iis altum est in hac Maccovii Metaphysica silentium, quia putavit his author, Metaphysicam terminari atque absolvi sola Entis tractatione atque ambitu in genere, fecitque partem specialem, quae agit de spiritu; tum increato, tum creato, novam specie scientiam, quam Pneumaticam vulgo vocant; quae sententia quoque est, Pererii, Keckermanni, Alstedii, Scharfii, Clootzii, Zeizoldi, aliorumque hoc seculo philosophorum, qui primam partem Metaphysicae vulgaris, dictam universalem seu generalem, solam faciunt ac vocant Metaphysicam, & rectius Graece οντοσοφίαν seu οντολογίαν appellant.'

80 HEEREBOORD, *Metaphysica, Praefatio*, 6. The second edition had appeared under Heereboord's editorial care in 1650 at Leiden and was reprinted in 1651 by Jansson at Amsterdam.

81 For more details of the several editions of the *Distinctiones* in Latin and Dutch, see pp. 37–38 of this book.

82 The 1663 Amsterdam edition was entitled: *Johannis Maccovii ... Distinctiones et regulae theologicae ac philosophicae, auctae et illustratae studio Francisci Cnutii, Neomagensis Gelri, Amsterdam 1663*. Cf. VRIEMOET, *Athenarum*, 158–160. We have not been able to trace an extant copy of this book.

brary, Christ Church in Oxford, Caius College in Cambridge, Eton College, New Castle Library, Aberdeen and Glasgow University), but also in American libraries.⁸³

The *Distinctiones* were not published during Maccovius' lifetime. As we already noted, it was Nicolaus Arnoldus, who gathered Maccovius' unpublished theological works into a work called *Johannes Maccovius Redivivus, seu manuscripta eius typis exscripta* (Franeker/Amsterdam 1647/1654/1659) that saw several editions including the *Distinctiones*. Before the publication of the *Redivivus*, however, Arnoldus had already published in 1652 a separate edition of the *Distinctiones* in small duodecimo format at Franeker after he became a professor in 1651. In doing so, Arnoldus clearly meant to present Maccovius' work to a broader public and, especially recommended it to the Reformed ministers in Little Poland, the Polish center of Reformed strength, Larger Poland and Lithuania. It was dedicated to four young Polish aristocrats: Stanislaus de Sbaszyn Sbaski, Christophorus de Gruzew Gruzewski, Johannes Melchior Bielewicz, and Georgius Bielewicz. In this dedication Arnoldus reminded them of the Church of his Fatherland, the Polish Reformed Church that had fostered Maccovius and himself as well, using the words of Psalm 137:

It has pleased God to place me as a foreigner in these regions in authority of the church and academy [i.e. Franeker in Friesland]. But 'when I forget the church of my fatherland, let my right hand forgetherself, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I do not remember you', if I do not set the Polish Church that fostered me in its bosom for so many years 'above my highest joy.'

It is perhaps useful to say a few words about Arnoldus' *Dedicatio*. Unlike Maccovius' *Distinctiones*, the *Dedicatio* is a good example of the flamboyant style of writing of medieval and post-medieval humanist authors. They were very fond to show their knowledge of classical Latin by quoting as many sentences and proverbs from classical antiquity as they could, often without referring to the authors they used. They often based themselves on *adagia*, compilations of useful expressions and proverbs, collected by numerous authors among whom Erasmus is the most famous. A contemporary schoolmaster of Arnoldus, a teacher of Latin in the neighbouring city of Bolsward, whose name was Johannes Hilarides, used the same method.⁸⁴ They were sincerely convinced that the *eloquentia* they showed in this way proved their *eruditio* in the subject they described. In this respect they were followers of people like Lorenzo Valla (*Praefatio elegantiae linguae Latinae*, 1444) and Juan Luis Vives, who wrote at the beginning of his *De tradendis disciplinis* (1531) that the first knowledge a human being acquires is speaking. Around this principle the Humanists built their

⁸³ PLOMER, *Dictionary*, 88. Cf. WING, *Catalogue*, 502.

⁸⁴ See FERWERDA, 'Hilarides', 72–92.

preference for the classical languages and their love of beautiful forms, sometimes detrimental to the contents. It is true that this fascination for eloquence and beautiful forms was waning in Arnoldus' time. Erasmus himself had already asked, in a rather bitter tone, what the use of eloquence was without knowledge. But in things like dedications or laudatory speeches, when the contents were less important than the form, the writers could have their way and that is what Arnoldus did in this *Dedicatio*. He continually quotes classical authors, he refers to numerous historical events, he quotes the Bible several times and he extols the Polish nation. It is clear that a dedication in this form was a great joy to the readers and would make the digestion of the rather dry *Distinctiones* more palatable.

All the same, the style of the *Distinctiones* is very readable through its use of illustrations taken from daily life, and, at the same time, it provided a good overview of Maccovius' thought. Bell, however, is right in asserting that the *Distinctiones* should not be mistaken 'as a complete and definitive example of the range and depth' of Maccovius' teaching.⁸⁵

In 1658 a Dutch translation of the *Distinctiones* appeared, written by the Dutch minister Theodorus van der Meer⁸⁶ that was reprinted in 1666 and 1681.⁸⁷ In the preface, he praised the *Distinctiones* as 'containing the marrow of theology' that presented 'a short summary of the art of argumentation' and 'the pith of metaphysics.' It 'teaches the language of Canaan and confuses that of Babel.' Two hundred years later Maccovius' *Distinctions* must still have been popular, for in 1875 an edition of this unaltered translation was published by H. Bokma at Leeuwarden, adapting Van der Meer's translation to nineteenth-century Dutch spelling and syntax.

4. The Didactic Genre of the *Distinctiones*

The *Distinctiones* were probably meant for the benefit of students trained in the *artes* faculty and starting their theological education. It was a classroom book, gathered by Arnoldus from Maccovius' manuscripts. In the preface, Arnoldus wrote that he had compared various current manuscripts with his own copy

⁸⁵ Cf. BELL, *Potestatem*, 36.

⁸⁶ Theodorus van der Meer, born in Wormer (1621) was a Dutch Reformed minister in Wijdenes (1650). In 1657 he was dismissed and became rector of the Latijnse school in Amsterdam. See VAN LIEBURG, *Repertorium*, 161.

⁸⁷ The Dutch translation, entitled: *De Gods-geleerde onderscheydingen en De Godts-geleerde, en wijsgeerige regulen* was published at Amsterdam in 1658 by Servaes Witteling(h), 'boekverkooper by de hoek van de Paapenbrug-steeg aan de Warmoesstraat'. The 1666 Amsterdam edition was also printed by Servaes Witteling, but then he had apparently moved to 't Gravestraatje in a house called 't Gestrikt Schrijf-Boek. The 1681 edition was printed in Rotterdam.

and mentioned that he had mended the *errata* that had crept in, probably due to the neglect of copiers. In addition, he wrote that he considered the publication of the *Distinctiones* as a forerunner of the *Maccovius Redivivus*.

Since the Middle Ages and later on, writing on distinctions was not an unknown didactic genre. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Roman Catholic, Lutheran, and Reformed theologians had already published on this subject. No wonder, for making clear distinctions (*distinguere*) was the heart of the scholastic tradition. It consisted of disentangling the senses of ambiguous words and terms used in theological discourse. Seventeenth-century authors profited by the results of the historical and philological research that had been undertaken by Renaissance humanists in the preceding centuries.⁸⁸

As a classroom book the *Distinctiones* edited by Arnoldus belongs to the same didactic genre. It consists of 23 chapters comprising 198 pages and runs through all the *loci communes* of Reformed dogmatics. The genre of *loci communes theologiae*, commonplaces or, better, universal topics of theology, was the typical form of the scholastic Protestant system. They were originally doctrinal expositions written as portions of commentaries on Scripture, for the sake of grounding dogmatics in its Biblical context. They moved directly from an exegetically grounded formulation to the gathering of doctrinal topics into a theological compendium or system. As Richard Muller has pointed out, these topics were elicited from Scripture and were given their content on the basis of rather painstaking reflection on Scripture and tradition, common to the theological systems of the medieval period and to the systems of Protestant theology, beginning with Melancthon and Hyperius.⁸⁹ In addition, it should also be noted that the internal dynamics of the *locus* method reflected an interest in the *historica series*, which accounts for the arrangement of the *loci* which, for that reason, are not strictly deducible either from one another or from the doctrine of God.⁹⁰

In his *Distinctiones*, Maccovius consciously followed the traditional order of the *loci* and the historical *series* of the biblical witness, as is clearly indicated by the movement of the *Distinctiones* from Scripture (Law and Gospel), to the Triune God, His predestination, to creation and providence, human nature, free will and sin, redemption in Christ, the covenant, justification and regeneration, good works, the church and the sacraments, and eschatology.

Finally, the last part of the *Distinctiones* presents a *centuria* or ten decades of the most important philosophical and theological distinctions (*distinctiones generalissimae*) to be observed by theologians when doing systematic theology.

⁸⁸ For a good example, see ALSTED, *Distinctiones*.

⁸⁹ MULLER, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* 2, 514–515.

⁹⁰ See MULLER, *After Calvin*, 57–60.

Each decade Maccovius compared to a maniple of soldiers and just as soldiers are divided into certain ranks and under different banners, so here too the several distinctions should be placed under a common banner. For example, when Maccovius discusses the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge he equates it with the distinction between intellectual knowledge and sensory perception, distinct and confused knowledge, perfect and imperfect knowledge, comprehensive and apprehensive knowledge, and finally, adequate and inadequate knowledge.⁹¹

In this manner, Maccovius presented a ‘tool kit’ for theologians in the introductory section of which he pointed out why academic theologians should employ the best of philosophical methods and techniques of their time. It was for the purpose of gaining as much clarity as possible concerning the content of the major concepts, presuppositions and tenets of their theological commitment, as well as the many connections that exist among them.

Each topic of the *Distinctiones* is divided into definitions, distinctions or divisions, and rules. These divisions are also typographically visible in the *Distinctiones*. In each of the twenty-three chapters and the ten decades the distinctions are printed in large Roman type and most of the time they are followed by commentaries from Scripture and illustrations taken from daily life in smaller print. They include answers to objections of opponents, especially Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Arminians, and, most of all, the Socinian position and the assertions of Conrad Vorstius (1569–1622). At the same time, they clarify unknown and ambiguous words and phrases, defend the truth of the definitions and distinctions and refute the objections against it. Moreover, many distinctions used in metaphysics, logic and rhetoric are gathered and classified into equipollent or equivalent, identical, and coincidental pairs. Equivalent (*aequipollentia*) distinctions are, for example, the following pairs: essence & existence, abstract & concrete, idea & subject, form & the thing formed. Identical distinctions (*idem*) are, for example, the pairs univocal and equivocal, truly and seemingly, synonym and homonym, proper and improper, really and nominally. Rhetorical distinctions that coincide (*coincidunt*) are, for example, broadly and strictly, loosely and concisely, general and special, popular and philosophical, etc.

In this way, Maccovius shows that conceptual analysis – making distinctions and looking at their implications – is a prerequisite for a sound and solid way of doing theology. Neat distinctions, moreover, are necessary, not only for the theologian, but they are also required for the coherence and consistency of the doctrine of the church (*ordo doctrinae*) and for defending doctrine against heresies. Therefore, the order of doctrine should not be something like the

⁹¹ *Decuria* 1,9.

Lesbian rule used by the ancient Greek, i.e. an inaccurate measuring rod used by ancient craftsman for measuring an irregular object. No, the order of doctrine has to be an accurate one, like the balance of Critolaus (2nd century BC), a Greek philosopher and pupil of Aristotle, who rejected rhetoric and did not consider it as a science: rhetoric was disastrous for finding philosophical truth.⁹² Therefore, the order of Christian doctrine, Maccovius insists, should conform to rules like those of the sculptor Polykleitos (450–420 BC), who wrote a treatise, now lost, on the harmony of ideal proportions.⁹³ Or still better: the distinctions can be compared with a Lydian Stone, which was the exact measure of alloys in ancient times.⁹⁴

5. The Scholastic Method and Sources of the *Distinctiones*

Maccovius is often classified as a Reformed scholastic. As we already stated in the introduction, this scholasticism is seen as one of the ways in which Protestant orthodoxy of the seventeenth century went wrong. On this view, Maccovius, as a representative of seventeenth-century Protestant scholastic orthodoxy, constitutes a lapse from true Protestantism. Recent research, however, suggests that the alleged anti-scholasticism of the Reformation theology is 'an invention of tradition'. Calvin and Luther were in many respects children of their time, and continued to use scholastic distinctions and did not attack the scholastic method as such. Therefore, there is more continuity between late medieval theology, early Reformation theology, and Reformed scholasticism, than the traditional view admits. Furthermore, research on Protestant Scholasticism in the last few decades, has reached the consensus that, in the past, the term 'scholasticism' had been insufficiently defined, and that the definitions were often charged with value judgments and used pejoratively.⁹⁵

Moreover, recent historical reappraisals of Protestant Scholasticism have concluded that the contrast so often drawn between Scholasticism, Reformation and Humanism is outdated. When these phenomena are studied in their historical and cultural context, they turn out to be closely related to each other. Modern research interprets Protestant Scholasticism as a methodological approach, rather than a certain type of content.⁹⁶ It rejects clear breaks and

92 LAROUSSE, *Dictionnaire* V, 557–558. See also CICERO, *Tusculanae Disputationes* V.51, where the balance of Critolaus is explained.

93 *Decuria* IV, 3.

94 *Prolegomena*.

95 For a summary of old and new research on Protestant Scholasticism, see VAN ASSELT & DEKKER, *Reformation and Scholasticism*, 11–43.

96 MULLER, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* 1, 27–85; TRUEMAN, *Claims of Truth*, 6.8.13–24; TRUEMAN, 'Calvin and Calvinism', 225–244; RYKEN, 'Scottish Reformed Scholasticism', 198–200; VAN

lines of demarcation, and it emphasizes the continuous development within the history of theology. It is assumed that Protestant Scholasticism was in a confessional continuity with the theology of the Reformers as well as in a methodological continuity with medieval theology. The proposed definition of the term 'scholasticism' as basically a method also guards against the idea that, through the use of the scholastic method, one particular doctrine or concept is necessarily moved to the foreground, thereby assuming the status of a 'Central Dogma' (so Alexander Schweizer)⁹⁷, which may serve as a key to the understanding of the whole system. The generic definition of scholasticism as a description of the medieval academic method presented by L.M. de Rijk can also be applied to the scholastic theology of later periods, for instance that of Reformed Scholasticism. De Rijk describes 'scholasticism' as follows:

An approach, which is characterized by the use, in both study and teaching, of a constantly recurring system of concepts, distinctions, definitions, propositional analyses, argumentative techniques and disputation methods.⁹⁸

From this definition we can learn that logical tools ('argumentative techniques') were vital for the methodology of scholasticism. The definitions of G.R. Evans and Marcia L. Colish point in the same direction. Both describe the rise of scholasticism in medieval cathedral schools and universities as the historical development of logic and grammar.⁹⁹ Although scholastic theology has been criticized for its alleged 'rationalism' – as if all theological truths can be logically derived from those truths that are available to human nature – it has been overlooked that the Kantian divide between epistemology and metaphysics cannot be read back in pre-Kantian historical positions. Scholasticism was 'the attempt to adapt the Reformation to the demands of the academy in terms of a pre-critical world-view.'¹⁰⁰

When it comes to sources used in the *Distinctiones*, one can easily see that Maccovius is deeply indebted to his predecessors. Of the Church Fathers Augustine is quoted most frequently. This Augustinian orientation is also visible in the three or four state-model by which the different situations that man finds himself in relation to God and to the good are described.¹⁰¹ It also comes to the fore in the chapters on predestination, justification, and the sacra-

ASSELT, *Inleiding*, 100–101.131–133; VAN ASSELT & DEKKER, *Reformation and Scholasticism*, 38–40; BECK, *Voetius*, 19–30.

97 Cf. SCHWEIZER, *Centraldogmen*.

98 DE RIJK, *Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte*, 25.111. English Translation in VAN ASSELT & DEKKER, *Reformation and Scholasticism*, 25.

99 EVANS, *Language and Logic*; COLISH, *Foundations*, 265–301. See also VOS, 'Scholasticism and Reformation', 99–119.

100 See especially TRUEMAN & CLARK, *Protestant Scholasticism*.

101 *Distinctiones* VI, 13–15.17; IX, 1–2.

ments¹⁰² and in a long quotation from the *Causa Dei contra Pelagium et de virtute causarum libri tres* (third ed., London 1618) of the late medieval Augustinian archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Bradwardine (ca 1290–1349), presented by Maccovius as being helpful to solve existential problems of human experience in the mysterious ways of divine providence.¹⁰³

From the medieval scholastic tradition, Maccovius does not quote *expressis verbis* any particular author, but it is clear that many times he refers positively to the distinctions developed by the medieval scholastics, especially those of Thomas Aquinas regarding the doctrine of divine attributes. But the exposition and (sometimes) criticism of medieval distinctions are for Maccovius but a means to the formulation of his own judgment and the construction of truly Reformed doctrine. Therefore, his approach to medieval definitions and distinctions can be best qualified as eclectic. It is an eclecticism that critically tests all theories, whether ancient or contemporary, and assembles the conclusions reached into a synthesis marked by solidity and doctrinal coherence.

This eclecticism Maccovius undoubtedly inherited from his teacher Bartholomaeus Keckermann (1571–1609).¹⁰⁴ In his philosophical teaching, Keckermann tried to avoid the limitations of both the Peripatetic and Ramistic traditions. In this manner he attempted to organize and develop a complete Protestant curriculum, a unified body of knowledge.¹⁰⁵ He defined theology as an operative discipline (*disciplina operatrix*) predominated by the analytical method. Whereas metaphysics discusses God as Being, theology presents God as the end (*finis*) of all things. According to Keckermann, the end of theology is not the contemplation but the enjoyment of God, *the fruitio Dei*.¹⁰⁶ It was Keckermann who had a major influence on Maccovius' view on the relationship between theology and philosophy.¹⁰⁷ But although Maccovius owed much to his former teacher, he refuted the latter's view on predestination, because Keckermann excluded reprobation from predestination.¹⁰⁸

102 *Distinctiones* XIII, 16; XVII, 12.

103 *Distinctiones* VIII, 11.

104 For Keckermann's eclecticism, see: VAN ZUYLEN, *Keckermann*, 13–15; Cf. MULLER, *After Calvin*, 126–128.

105 For a survey of Keckermann's philosophical method, see HOTSON, *Alsted*, 29–34.

106 KECKERMANN, *Opera* 2, at end, second pagination, cols. 68–69: 'Finis theologiae est ipsa salus, de qua in sequentibus agitur. Salus sive felicitas, est fruitio Dei tanquam summi boni.'

107 Cf. Maccovius' definition of theology: 'Theologia est disciplina bene ac beate vivendi in aeternum (...): nil enim revelatur, nil cognoscitur in religione Christiana, quod ad hunc finem non tendat, ut serio pietati studeamus. Itaque illi vehementer errant, qui theologiam scientiis quarum finis praecipuus est contemplatio, analogon esse statuerunt, tota enim ad praxin tendit.' See MACCOVIUS, *Theses Theologicae*, Disp. I (1).

108 *Distinctiones*, VII, 16.

Of other Reformed theologians Petrus Martyr Vermigli is positively quoted in the *Distinctiones* in the chapter on sin. Here Maccovius praises the exegetical work of Martyr on the first chapters of Genesis.¹⁰⁹ Calvin, however, is criticized because of his conception of God's absolute power. According to Maccovius, Calvin 'seems to deny that there is absolute power in God, but this is wrong. For in that case Luke 3: 8 ("God is able to raise up children of Abraham out of these stones") and Matthew 26: 53 ("Could I not pray to my Father and He would give me more than twelve legions of angels?") cannot not be explained.'¹¹⁰ Theodore Beza's *Annotationes Majores* to the New Testament on body and soul,¹¹¹ the Heidelberg Catechism on the *satisfactio poenalis*¹¹² and Scharpius' exposition on the imputation of sin¹¹³ are mentioned in full agreement. He appreciates Piscator's exposition of the analogy of faith – defined by The Apostles' Creed, The Lord's Prayer, The Decalogue and the whole Catechism – as the first means of interpreting Scripture.¹¹⁴ But on predestination he completely disagrees with the German-Reformed theologian from Herborn. In the eyes of Maccovius, Piscator made a terrible mistake by being willing to speak of sin as a necessary effect of reprobation. We already saw that Maccovius ardently denied this position because, if reprobation were the cause of sin, then God would become the author of sin. Thus, God would no longer be permitting sin but actually making it occur.¹¹⁵

From all this it should be clear that Maccovius did not limit himself to the mere repetition of the theories of others, nor did he accept any doctrine for the sole reason that it had been advocated by an authority such as Calvin. Maccovius carefully developed his thought by showing very clearly how one question relates to the other, what the core of the problem is and how the root of the difficulty can be uncovered. At the same time, however, after proposing his views, he always gave his opponents another chance to urge their arguments. By his method and his recourse to Scripture, he contributed substantially to the advancement of orthodox Reformed theology.

6. Clarification of some Terms and Concepts in the *Distinctiones*

The last section of the *Distinctiones* dealing with 'one hundred most general distinctions' is characteristic for Maccovius' way of doing theology. It is typical

109 *Distinctiones*, X, *Additum*.

110 *Distinctiones* IV, 23.

111 *Distinctiones* VI, 12.

112 *Distinctiones* XI, 23.

113 *Distinctiones* X, 3.

114 *Distinctiones* I, 31–32.

115 *Distinctiones* VII, 21.

both of his scholastic method and of his theological thought; many of his characteristic doctrines are briefly treated in it, or at least indicated. In this section we confine ourselves to a discussion of those concepts and terms that in earlier research gave rise to the misunderstanding that Maccovius was presenting a deterministic and a metaphysically controlled predestinarian system. The relevant concepts and terms to be discussed in the following sections can be roughly divided in three groups: first ontological concepts; secondly, anthropological terms; and thirdly, logical distinctions. In addition to some terms and distinctions that occur in the *Distinctiones*, we use some terms that are common in modern philosophy of religion or philosophical theology, since we find them useful in explaining Maccovius' thought. In fact, recent philosophy of religion largely draws on the tradition of medieval and post-reformation scholasticism. This procedure, however, does not exclude an interpretation of the same concepts within their own context in the *Distinctiones*.¹¹⁶

6.1. Ontological Concepts.

At Franeker Maccovius, following Keckermann, developed a course and manual on metaphysics (as well on logic and ethics) in which he rejected the approach of Suárez to metaphysics. For Suárez, metaphysics included the doctrine of God on the ground that God is being.¹¹⁷ In his textbook on metaphysics, which he taught for some years at the philosophy department (*artes faculty*) at Franeker University, Maccovius excluded the doctrine of God from the metaphysical discussion of being in general.¹¹⁸ His theology, however, shows the active usage of philosophical categories in order to articulate distinctively Christian assumptions concerning reality.¹¹⁹ This concerns the fundamental insight in the relationship between God as the Creator and the world as His creation. In the *Distinctiones* this relationship is framed in terms of God as the First Cause (*prima causa*) and creatures as the secondary causes (*causae secundae*). Regarding the concept of cause, Maccovius and the Reformed orthodox made a distinction between a natural cause and a free cause. A natural cause was seen as having such a nature that it could produce only one kind of act or effect. Therefore, it

116 In the next sections we draw heavily on the forthcoming book VAN ASSELT, *Reformed Thought* (forthcoming).

117 See MULLER, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* 1, 390.

118 MACCOVIUS, *Metaphysica* (1658), 2: 'Metaphysica agit de Ente quatenus Ens est, specificative, sed non reduplicative; sc. quatenus Ens est idem, quod explicat rationem Entis in genere sive ut sic: hinc aperte convincitur, de Deo non esse agendum in Metaph. quia mera est contradictio, agere de Ente ut sic sive in genere, & tamen de Ente tali vel tali, uti Deo, &c.' (annotation of Heereboord).

119 *Prolegomena*, 10.

was called a necessary cause: it could only produce that act and not another, like fire that was made to act always by burning. In contrast, a free cause was seen to be able to act variously or at one and the same moment. Whereas the effects of natural causes were called natural or necessary effects, the effects of free causes were called free or contingent effects. According to Maccovius, the distinction between natural and free causes is given with the way they ‘determine’ their act. A free cause determines itself by freedom to one of the possible acts, a natural cause is determined by its own nature to one and the same act. The verb ‘determine’, however, should not be associated with the modern term ‘determinism’, because that concept did not yet exist. The concept of determinism Maccovius denoted by other terms like ‘Stoic fate’.¹²⁰ At the same time, Maccovius indicated that this causal terminology did not imply a ‘manipulative’ relationship between God and men as free causes. God as the Creator initiates, comprehends, sustains, and governs all that exists, while leaving room for contingency and the causal activity of His creatures. God does not only stand at the beginning, but is present to every moment of time in providing life, powers, and possibilities for action. At the same time, Maccovius underscored the fact that in this relationship God is independent of creatures, while they are totally dependent on God.¹²¹

In his *Distinctiones* Maccovius also uses what in terms of modern logic is called modal ontology. Modal ontology is a branch of philosophy that studies the aspects of reality: actuality, possibility, impossibility, necessity and contingency. It elaborates on important achievements from medieval scholasticism, notably on the thought of John Duns Scotus and similar thinkers. In this ontology, the distinction between necessity and contingency is very important. A theologian, Maccovius argues, will need to be especially careful about what it is that is being said to be of necessity. Therefore, Maccovius distinguishes several forms of necessity: natural or absolute necessity, i.e. necessity inherent in the essential nature of a thing.¹²² Second, physical necessity, i.e. necessity deriving from an outward cause that forces someone or something, which necessity is also called necessity of coercion (*necessitas coactionis*).¹²³ Third, he also uses the concept of rational necessity: for, example, if the intellect judges an act to be good, it is rationally necessary that the will follows and assents.¹²⁴ The fourth form of necessity is moral necessity: a good act cannot but be approved of, while a bad act cannot be but rejected. It is presupposed that, if, nevertheless, a

120 MACCOVIUS, *Metaphysica* (ed. Heereboord), I.XIII, 119–145.

121 MACCOVIUS, *Metaphysica*, I.IX, 69–81 (*De necessitate et contingentia*). Cf. *Distinctiones*, VIII, 1.

122 *Decuria* IX, 5.

123 *Decuria* IX, 5.

124 *Distinctiones*, IX, 8.

bad act is performed, this happens under the pretext of its being seemingly good for some purpose.¹²⁵ The fifth form of necessity is the necessity of immutability: a necessity on supposition of God's decree that encompasses all that happens in the world.¹²⁶

The basic distinction that Maccovius uses in explaining the concept of necessity is the distinction between absolute necessity on the one hand, and hypothetical or conditional necessity on the other hand.¹²⁷ On the basis of this distinction, Maccovius, following the medieval scholastics, could also point out how necessity and contingency are compatible instead of squarely contradictory:

There is a distinction between absolute necessity and hypothetical necessity of the divine will. Necessity is absolute in respect of God's internal works (*opera ad intra*). It is hypothetical regarding his external works (*opera ad extra*). This distinction occurs in almost all the scholastics. It can easily correct the error of those who think that freedom is not compatible with necessity. For all things God works outside of Him, He does with the hypothetical necessity of his decree, and yet He does them freely.¹²⁸

From this quotation it becomes clear that Maccovius did not accept the claim of his opponents that the divine decree destroyed contingency and freedom of created reality. The fact of God decreeing some action does not impose an absolute necessity upon it.¹²⁹ A neglect of this distinction would entail either a necessitarian, 'hard' determinist worldview or an unstable, arbitrary ontology of mere contingency. Maccovius maintained a refined balance of necessity and contingency.

¹²⁵ *Distinctiones*, IX, 7.

¹²⁶ *Distinctiones*, VIII, 3.

¹²⁷ *Distinctiones*, VIII, 4. Although not mentioned by Maccovius in his *Distinctiones*, medieval and Reformed scholastics also used the semantic distinction between *necessitas consequentis* and *necessitas consequentiae* in stead of the distinction between absolute and hypothetical necessity. The necessity of the consequent is the proposition behind 'then' in a statement: 'if and only if..., then ...'. The necessity of the consequence is the consequence itself, that is, the implicative relation. Take for example, the two statements (1) 'If God foreknows that Adam will sin, then Adam will necessarily sin' and (2) 'Necessarily, if God foreknows that Adam will sin, then Adam will sin.' The second statement only asserts that the connection between Adam's sinning and God's foreknowledge is necessary, but it does not follow that Adam's sinning is in itself necessary. This distinction depends on the placement of the 'necessity operator.' Probably, Boethius (480–524) was the first philosopher to mark this semantic distinction clearly. Maccovius discusses the distinction *necessitas consequentis* - *necessitas consequentiae* elaborately in MACCOVIUS, *Metaphysica* (1658), 74–76. It is a distinction which renders every deterministic reading of Reformed orthodoxy, including Maccovius, impossible.

¹²⁸ *Distinctiones*, VIII, 4

¹²⁹ *Distinctiones*, VIII, 12.

6.2. Anthropological Terms

Important for understanding the doctrine of free choice in Maccovius' oeuvre is the anthropological framework of Reformed scholasticism, as explained in the *Distinctiones*. It consists of two basic perspectives, which together yield the relevant consequences for human freedom. In modern terms, we can describe the first perspective as the *essential* level of anthropology, the second perspective as the *accidental* level. The first perspective regards man's essential make-up. Here, Maccovius uses the following terms. First of all, man is a mind-gifted nature (*creatura rationalis*), which term implies that man is basically viewed as a rational creature. This simply means that it belongs to man's essence to have the capacity of knowing, understanding, judging and willing. Although Maccovius acknowledges the distortion of man's intellect (and will) by sin¹³⁰, he does not endorse an irrationalist view of man. In this connection, it is important to note that sometimes he uses the term 'nature' (*natura*) in different senses. Basically, he uses 'nature' to refer to the whole set of essential properties of man; in a secondary sense, it can signify the accidental state of man after the fall in which man's nature is not destroyed but corrupted.¹³¹ Further, Maccovius uses the term 'soul' (*anima*). In modern ears, it may sound strange to describe the soul as the principle of action, but Maccovius did not intend to hypostasize the soul as a separate entity, but to indicate the relevant aspect of man's personality in the act of knowing and willing. Finally, some attention must be paid to the terms 'potency', 'disposition' and 'act' (*facultas-habitus-actus*). Herein, Maccovius, like the other Reformed scholastics, followed the traditional Aristotelian 'faculty psychology', according to which the term *facultas* refers to the capacity of knowing and willing, *actus* to the concrete act and *habitus* to the disposition, which is formed by repeated actions that result in a certain pattern of behavior.¹³²

In this context the term 'free choice' (*liberum arbitrium*) used by Maccovius should be understood. This term is of extreme import to understand Maccovius' anthropology. By way of example we can point to chapter VI on creation (*De Creatione*) and chapter IX on free choice (*De Libero Arbitrio*) in the *Distinctiones*. Here the terms 'choice', 'will' and 'intellect' are in the center of the discussion in which Maccovius explicitly identifies the intellectual and volitional components of free choice. In free choice, he insists, the will always follows (*sequitur*) the intellect. The intellect apprehends the object and attaches to it the true or false qualifier and passes a judgment concerning the goodness

130 *Distinctiones*, X, 14.

131 *Distinctiones*, VI, 12. See also *Distinctiones*, IX, 4.

132 For *facultas* see *Distinctiones*, VI, 12; X, 14; X, 29; for *habitus* and *actus* see X, 17; XIII, 9; XIV, 17; *Decuria* II, 1; *Decuria* X, 7.

or badness of the object or requisite action. The will follows this judgment of the intellect and makes its own choice freely. This implies that the will is not determined by the intellect when it follows (*sequitur*) the intellect: the will always keeps its own task of choosing.¹³³

The second perspective or the *accidental* level is formed by the famous four-state model. It describes the different situations in which man finds himself in relation to God and the good. The basic components of the model occur in Augustine. He expressed the spiritual state of the human will in a fourfold accidental freedom: able not to sin (*posse non peccare*) before the fall, not able not to sin (*non posse non peccare*) after the fall and before conversion, able to sin and not to sin (*posse peccare et non peccare*) after conversion, and not able to sin (*non posse peccare*) in the state of glory.¹³⁴ Bernard of Clairvaux gave it an influential elaboration by speaking of a threefold freedom.¹³⁵ The model is not only based on the historical sequence (*series historica*) of the biblical narrative, but it also contains an indication of the structural differences in man's situation. According to Maccovius, the first state is the state of integrity before the fall (*status integritatis*). In this state, man was created good by God but had the possibility to choose and will what is not good.¹³⁶ The second state is the state of the fall or the state of corruption (*status lapsus* or *status corruptionis*). It is exemplified in sinners who have not been renewed by God's grace. They can only sin and have no possibility in themselves to do the spiritual good. Still, they have not lost the essential freedom of choice: although they are bound to sin, they sin willingly and by their own choice.¹³⁷ The third state, the state of grace or renewal (*status reparationis*) is structurally characterized by God's grace, justification, and regeneration. Hereby, man is no longer a slave of sin, but receives a new principle of life, the Holy Spirit, by which he can start to do the spiritual good willingly, although his obedience in this state is partial. In the fourth state, the state of glory (*status glorificationis*), the habit of doing the spiritual good is so strong that human will has no longer the (actual) possibility of choosing the bad, but will be consistent in choosing the good.¹³⁸

133 *Distinctiones*, IX,8. Compare MACCOVIUS, *Metaphysica* (1660), 79: 'Libertas igitur facultatis consistit in eo, posse velle & non velle, agere & non agere' with 81: 'Haec [sic][actiones] quia sequuntur intellectum et voluntatem, dicuntur liberae.'

134 AUGUSTINE, *De correptione et gratia*, 915–946. See especially 936 (XII.33).

135 BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 606 (III.7): 'triplex sit nobis proposita libertas, a peccato, a miseria, a necessitate.' On Bernard's concept of freedom see: DEN BOK, 'Freedom', 271–295.

136 Cf. AUGUSTINE, *De Natura et Gratia*, 274 (XLIX.57).

137 *Distinctiones* X,14.

138 *Distinctiones*, VI,17. Cf. *Distinctiones*, IX, 1.

In regard of Maccovius' doctrine of free choice, this four-state model is of utmost importance for understanding the two basic concepts of freedom used by him. The first is called freedom of contrariety (*libertas contrarietatis*) and the second is called freedom of contradiction (*libertas contradictionis*). The freedom of contrariety is used by Maccovius to indicate the possibility of the will to choose this or that object. The freedom of contradiction refers to the possibility of the will to either choose or reject a certain object.¹³⁹ The crucial point Maccovius wants to make with this important distinction is that at all levels of the four state-model the will acts out of itself not being driven by an inward or outward determining cause (*coactione*), and that the freedom of contradiction cannot be lost. A sinner does not have the freedom to elicit good acts or good objects, but still his freedom of contradiction remains, either to choose between different evil acts or objects. In other words: man is always free, but not always good. So, Maccovius does affirm that there is some basic and essential freedom of the will after the fall. If this were not the case, the human will ceases to will. According to Maccovius, this would imply that the essential human property of willing itself would equal non-willing and thus (we add) the human being would (without a will) cease to be a human being.¹⁴⁰

These foundational discussions concerning necessity and contingency make clear that much of Maccovius' work counters both the typical contemporary misunderstanding of him as a proponent of an excessively deterministic theology and the equally typical misconception of his thought as a metaphysically controlled predestinarian system.¹⁴¹

6.3. Logical Distinctions

Logic in the sense of a philosophical discipline that studies the structure of propositions and arguments by investigating their formal validity plays a major role in Maccovius' way of constructing theology. All theologians were educated in the *artes* faculty first, including philosophical disciplines like logic, before they were admitted to the study of theology. Naturally, this preparatory knowledge was utilized in their theological education. Many concepts and terms discussed above contained or implied logical distinctions already. Maccovius' thought, therefore, cannot be understood without an awareness of their employment in logic.

A first example of a logical distinction used by Maccovius is that between first act (*in actu primo*) and second act (*in actu secundo*). According to Maccovius,

¹³⁹ *Distinctiones*, IX, 3.

¹⁴⁰ *Distinctiones*, IX, 6.

¹⁴¹ See also MULLER, *Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics* 1, 346.

this distinction parallels the distinction between essence and operation, between essential property and actual power.¹⁴² In respect of the will, it means the distinction between the will as faculty (the will in itself as a power or apart from its actual act) and a concrete volition (the will as actually willing). So the will in itself is capable of willing opposite acts. But involved in a concrete act, the will cannot simultaneously will opposite things.

A second example of Maccovius' use of logical distinctions is the distinction between the composite and divided sense of a proposition (*sensus compositus*, *sensus divisus*). This distinction became a basic instrument of syntactic analysis, which is generally associated with the medieval logic of necessity and possibility. From the thirteenth century on, it became standard when considering inferences, including syllogisms to utilize this distinction. Maccovius uses this distinction in the doctrine of providence in which he discusses the *quaestio* whether all things that happen happen necessarily. According to Maccovius, the problem can only be solved if the language of divine providence is not taken in its compounded sense but in its divided sense. The composite sense is at stake when a thing (*res*) is considered in relation to the decree and the providence of God. The divided sense is at stake when one speaks of things considered absolutely and in themselves: i.e., they could have been alternatively ordained by God. Therefore, Maccovius argues, a proposition formulated in a divided sense may not be identified with the same proposition set forth in a composite sense. Applied to the doctrine of providence, this means that *in sensu composito* you have to say that all things happen necessarily, but *in sensu diviso* you might say that all things outside God are contingent.¹⁴³ In this manner, Maccovius draws the medieval distinction between divided and composite sense into Christian doctrine in such a way as to render it distinct from the idea that divine providence implies an absolute necessity of all things outside God (*extra Deum*) that happen in this world.

A third example of a logical distinction used by Maccovius is that between *categoremata* and *syncategoremata*, a distinction developed by medieval terminist logicians consisting in a contextual approach to propositions and the analysis of how terms signify in different propositional contexts.¹⁴⁴ *Categoremata* are words such as nouns and verbs. They signify the things and actions they stand for by themselves. *Syncategoremata* are parts of speech such as prepositions, conjunctions, and adjectives. They have no signification standing alone and acquire meaning only within propositions where they modify *categoremata* or specify the relations between the other terms in the proposition. Maccovius

¹⁴² *Decuria* I, 8.

¹⁴³ MACCOVIUS, *Distinctiones*, VIII, 2.

¹⁴⁴ See DE RIJK, *Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte*, 91.100–101; COLISH, *Foundations*, 274–277.

illustrates this by discussing the term ‘solus’ that plays such an important role in the Protestant doctrine of justification. When taken as a *categorema* ‘solus’ means ‘separate’, taken as a *syncategorema* it means ‘only’ or ‘merely’ (*solum, dumtaxat*). Faith alone justifies in a syncategorematic sense, but in a categorematic sense faith does not justify, that is, faith separated from works. Maccovius compares the difference between a categorematic and a syncategorematic use of words with eyes that see alone (*solus*) but not separated (*solum*) from the body.¹⁴⁵

These few examples make clear what Maccovius was seeking to do in his *Distinctiones*. He presented to his students a broad technical apparatus by which they could traverse through all the topics of Reformed theology explaining all the basic concepts and building blocks of the Reformed system. He borrows a great number of them from the Aristotelian tradition, which can also be found in the logical and metaphysical textbooks of the seventeenth century by authors such as Keckermann, Alsted, Gochlenius, Timpler, and Burgersdijk. But, as we have seen, not all the terms and distinctions used were clearly Aristotelian. In the Middle Ages and during the Renaissance, logic was not only well expanded beyond the boundaries at which Aristotle had left it, but also its inner structure was transformed.¹⁴⁶ Maccovius used this modified ‘Christian Aristotelianism’ – a term recently revived by Richard Muller¹⁴⁷ – in a certain context and it was this context that not only supplied the meaning of the terms and distinctions but also Maccovius’ own intention in using them. It seems that Maccovius’ main intention in writing his *Distinctiones* was to endorse in an academic context the orthodox Reformed understanding of Scripture, especially in its soteriological meaning, the *veritas gratiae*, as Cocceius already observed. We should not forget that Maccovius had to face many opponents of the Reformed faith as he was growing up in Poland and while attending the various universities of Europe: Socinians, Jesuits, Lutherans, and Anabaptists. In Franeker, he felt the need to teach theology in a manner that was conducive to the contemporary situation and, at the same time, in continuity with the ongoing Augustinian tradition of the Christian Church.

Perhaps this was one of the reasons that some of his more conservative Reformed contemporaries rejected his project as being highly innovative by developing such an elaborated set of distinctions and rules for theology. But in confrontation with the strategies and the developed terminological apparatus of the Catholic, Socinian, and Arminian opponents, it was his deep conviction that Reformed theologians should also have definitional skills as a real practi-

145 *Decuria IX*, 10.

146 See VAN ASSELT, ‘Scholasticism’, 457–470.

147 See MULLER, ‘Reformation’, 306–325.

cal help for learning and utilizing theology on an academic level, as well as the ability to help the reader of Scripture. In more than one place in his *Distinctiones*, Maccovius insisted that logical distinctions were not only needed for maintaining the defensibility of Reformed doctrine and for refuting opponents, but also that these distinctions were needed for the sake of a better understanding of the biblical witness itself. In the *Distinctiones*, this intention was illustrated by many references to the exegetical tradition of his days and by the fact that the topic dealing with Holy Scripture as the cognitive foundation of theology is the very first and by far the largest chapter of this entire work, comprising 23 pages and 45 sections. True wisdom, he thinks, lies in the Christian revelation, given in Scripture, which he takes to govern all reflection on God and Christianity. Only ignorance of Maccovius' writings could lead us to castigate him for thinking that philosophy is superior to revelation.

7. The Present Translation of the *Distinctiones*

As we already said, the *Distinctiones* do not cover the whole of Maccovius' theological and philosophical enterprise. It was a classroom book for the brand new students in theology (*novicii*) who were encountering many of these theological and philosophical distinctions for the very first time. Accordingly, our aim with this critical bilingual edition (Latin-English) is only to present a first introduction to the thought of this Franeker professor. The English translation is based on the Latin text of the Oxford edition of 1656 edited by Arnoldus. Comparison with the other editions does not show any important textual variants except for pagination, some typographical errors, and wrong Scripture references some of which are already present in the Franeker edition. Apparently, Arnoldus did not check Maccovius' manuscript sufficiently on this point. The errors in the original Latin text have been corrected in the translation. The translation method is, as much as possible, concordant. The original punctuation is maintained except for some small changes in order to make the text understandable for the modern reader.

Maccovius' use of language is a multicolored composition of classical and vulgar Latin, sometimes interlaced with Greek technical terms. In this he is not an exception: it is the language of the academic world at that time. In this use of language the reader will look in vain for literary beauty. But this was not the aim of this genre of writing. It is mainly based on medieval scholastic Latin with its concise way of reasoning used in formal disputations. Notwithstanding this tight level of argument, Maccovius' use of examples in his commentaries, which are often derived from daily life, gives his discourse a vivid and colorful character. The same can be said about his quotations from classical authors. In

Dist. XVII, 9 for example he quotes Virgil (*Eclogae* III, 80): *Triste lupus stabulis, maturis frugibus imbres* (Baneful to the folds is the wolf, to the ripe crops the rain) in order to demonstrate the use of a neuter adjective (*triste*) coupled with a masculine noun (*lupus*) And in *Dist. XX, 3* he quotes the Latin poet Propertius: *vino forma perit, vino corrumpitur aetas* (Through wine beauty passes away, through wine life is in decay) in order to illustrate the meaning of the word *perire* (to perish totally). The *mus* (mouse) example in the introduction of the *Centuria*, section 6, is probably an inside joke used to ridicule some late medieval scholastic argument. One should remember that this work was most likely originally dictated somewhat extemporaneously as a classroom lecture and not revised by Maccovius for formal publication and thus has all the charm of a dynamic lecture with also some of its inherent flaws.

In the Latin text, the reader will find two different sets of critical and informational markings. First, one finds a set of symbols (as described below in the first and second set of tables) that show the differences in pagination between the various duodecimo and quarto versions of the *Distinctiones*. These show the exact differences between all extant printed versions of this work to the word level. (In the English translation the pages numbers of the 1656 Oxford edition are indicated).

Second, one finds the other set of symbolic notation (as described in the third set of tables below) which are used for any textual notes and parallels in Maccovius' other major and minor theological works. These cross-references serve several purposes. Where there is a direct parallel in another work by Maccovius, these give an exact reference to that parallel passage. There are, however, many places in the Maccovius corpus where the same topic is treated either in a similar way, an expanded manner, or in a very different but complimentary fashion. A large number of the cross-references provide this type of information. It is hoped that in this manner the reader who wishes further information on this topic or who wishes to compare Maccovius' thoughts in other theological works may easily do so. For the theological *opuscula* found in the work entitled, *Johannes Maccovius Redivivus*, we have used the 1659 Elzevir Amsterdam edition as the primary reference point and have placed the references for the 1654 Franeker edition of the same volume in brackets [] as described below. The same style of primary and secondary notation was also used to distinguish the two editions of the *Loci Communes* as edited by Arnoldus. This is the first published version of the Latin text in over 350 years and it is hoped that its value to the reader is enhanced by its consistent Latin orthography and its added corrections and sets of critical notations and cross-references.

7.1. Notations of Separately Published Manual Editions of the *Distinctiones*

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Publisher</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Format</i>
⁵² F	Franeker	Arcerius	1652	Duodecimo
⁵³ F	Franeker	Arcerius	1653	Duodecimo
⁵³ A ^{ELZ}	Amsterdam	Elzevir	1653	Duodecimo
⁵⁶ F	Franeker	Arcerius	1656	Duodecimo
⁵⁶ A ^{ELZ}	Amsterdam	Elzevir	1656	Duodecimo
⁵⁶ A ^{JNSN}	Amsterdam	Janzson	1656	Duodecimo
⁵⁶ O	Oxford	Hall	1656	Duodecimo
J	Geneva	Chouet	1661	Duodecimo

7.2. Notations of Compositely Published Editions of the *Distinctiones* in *Johannes Maccovius Redivivus*, edited by Arnold and published in 1647, and 1654 at Franeker and 1659 at Amsterdam

<i>Symbol</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Publisher</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Format</i>
⁵⁴ R	Franeker	Arcerius	1654	Quarto
⁵⁹ R	Amsterdam	Elzevir	1659	Quarto

7.3. Notations of Cross-Referenced Theological *Opera* and *Opuscula*

LCT	<i>Loci Communes Theologici</i>	Amsterdam	1658
LCT []	<i>Loci Communes Theologici</i>	Franeker	1650
CT	<i>Collegia Theologica</i>	Franeker	1641
TT	<i>Thesium Theologicarum</i>	Franeker	1641
TP	<i>Theologia Polemica</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
TP []	<i>Theologia Polemica</i> in JMR	Franeker	1654
TQ	<i>Theologia Quaestionum</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
TQ []	<i>Theologia Quaestionum</i> in JMR	Franeker	1654
TC	<i>Theologia per Consectaria</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659

ΠΨ-Pontificator	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Pontificiorum</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
ΠΨ-Pontificiorum []	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Pontificiorum</i> in JMR	Franeker	1654
ΠΨ-Socinianorum	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Socinianorum</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
ΠΨ-Socinianorum []	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Socinianorum</i> in JMR	Franeker	1654
ΠΨ-Lutheranorum	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Lutheranorum</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
ΠΨ-Lutheranorum []	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Lutheranorum</i> in JMR	Franeker	1654
ΠΨ-Arminianorum	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Arminianorum</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
ΠΨ-Arminianorum []	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Arminianorum</i> in JMR	Franeker	1654
ΠΨ-Anabaptistarum	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Anabaptistarum</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
ΠΨ-Anabaptistarum []	<i>Πρώτον Ψεῦδος-Anabaptistarum</i> in JMR	Franeker	1654
A-E	<i>Anti-Eckhardus</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
A-S	<i>Anti-Socinus</i> in JMR	Amsterdam	1659
A-S []	<i>Anti-Socinus</i> in JMR	Franeker	1654

In the English translation, the footnotes include short identifications of unknown terms and persons mentioned by Maccovius. However, it is not our aim to find out the identity or further information regarding the origin of all the distinctions or divisions discussed by Maccovius. This volume has only the restricted aim of alleviating in a small manner the dearth of an English translation of Maccovius' treatise in which he provided not only the main topics of (early) seventeenth-century Reformed theology but also its basic conceptual framework and tools. We believe that it may be very helpful for students of Post-Reformation theology to read the writings of theologians like Maccovius within the sphere of their own terms and in the light of their theological and philosophical concerns and context.

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DISTINCTIONES ET REGULÆ THEOLOGICÆ AC
PHILOSOPHICÆ.

Editæ Operâ ac Studiô

NICOLAI ARNOLDI,

SS. Theol. D. et Professoris in Academiâ Franekeranâ.

OXONIÆ,

Ex Officina Typographica HEN. HALL,

Impensis ROBERTI BLAGRAVII Bibliopol. *Oxon.*

M. DC. LVI.^b

JOHANNES MACCOVIUS

THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL DISTINCTIONS
AND RULES

Edited by Nicolaus Arnoldus

Doctor and Professor of Sacred Theology at the Academy of Franeker

[Dedicatio]

Nobili, ac Generosa Prosapia oriundis nec minori virtutum nobilitate conspicuis

VIRIS JUVENIBUS D. STANISLAO, de SBASZYN SBASKI.

D. CHRISTOPHORO, de GRUZEW GRUSEWZKI Judicidæ Samogitiensi.

D. JOHANNI MELCHIORI BIELEWICZ.

D. GEORGIO BIELEWICZ, Nobilibus Polonis.

Generosi, Magnifici, ac Nobilissimi Domini.^c

Omnes homines, ab uno originem traxisse, certum est, testatur Scriptura, Act. 17. 26. *fecitque ex uno sanguine totam gentem hominum*; subscribit ratio, quia, multitudinis principium Unitas. Virtus sola, nos æqualiter natos, distinguit: et quorum ope extollit, eos nobiles et claros reddit. ^dQuæ, quamvis moralis sit naturæ, et proinde traduce non transmittatur ad posteros; tamen *fortes fortibus creari*, experientia docuit, etsi à regula exceptionem faciant, *Heroum filii noxæ*. Quantumvis autem, dicente Seneca, iis, qui, non nati sunt nobiles, sed facti, nihil crudeliùs, juxta illud: *Asperiùs nihil est humili cùm surgit in altum*; attamen, *Gratior est^e Nobilif^f veniens è corpore virtus*. Gratior, inquam, ea est, quæ cum

[Dedication]

To the young men descended from a noble and generous race and distinguished by no less nobility of virtue,

Mr. Stanislaus de Sbaszyn Sbascki,
Mr. Christophorus of Gruzew Gruzewski, from the Duchy of Schamaiten,
Mr. Johannes Melchior Bielewicz,
Mr. Georgius Bielewicz,
Polish noblemen |¹

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Dear, great and most noble gentlemen,

According to Act 17,26 it is certain that all mankind is derived from one man and that God made out of one blood the whole race of mankind. This is assented by reason because unity is the principle of multitude. Virtue alone is what makes the difference between us who are equally born. Virtue is a product of human efforts and it is virtue that creates noble and famous men with their help. Although virtue is of a moral nature and therefore not a quality transmitted through heredity, nevertheless experience teaches that strong men are created by strong men,² even if some are an exception to the rule: 'great men's sons seldom do well.'³ Although for those who are not noble by birth but have become noble (Seneca says)⁴ there is nothing more cruel than to say: nothing is too rude for a man of low birth when he has higher aspirations; nevertheless, virtue coming from a (beautiful) body⁵ | is more graceful for a nobleman. Even more graceful (I say) is virtue when it is born together with

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1 Striking about Polish Protestantism was its elite nature. In the sixteenth century approximately one-sixth of the nobility of Poland embraced a form of Protestant belief. Despite the movement's success in winning converts within the upper classes and the substantial number of Reformed churches established in the sixteenth century, the Reformed faith remained restricted to a fairly small percentage of the population. See SCHRAMM, *Der polnische Adel*. See also BENEDICT, *Christ's Churches*, 358-359. The duchy of Samogitia (Latinized version of the name) or Schamaiten (German version) was the western part of Lithuania.

2 Quotation from HORACE, *Carmina* 4,4,29; the whole poem deals with virtue.

3 Quotation from ERASMUS' *Adagia* 1, 6, 32.

4 Here Arnoldus errs, for this is not a quotation from Seneca, but from CLAUDIANUS, *In Eutropium*, Book I, 181.

5 Quotation from VIRGIL, *Aeneid* V,344 and SENECA, *Epistulae* 66,2.

nobilitate nascitur, ac cum bonis, ad prolixam posteritatis seriem transmissa, hæreditario quasi possidetur jure. Eminent Nobilitas ea, quæ, quod natura largita est, arte excolere adninitur. Nam, ut rectè canit Pœta; *Ingenuas didicisse Fideliter artes, Emollit mores, nec sinit esse feros.*

Bis, imo ter nobiles sunt, quorum nobilitas generis, divinarum atque humanarum rerum scientia cumulatur: eaque tanquam gemmulis quibusdam radiantibus corusca, ^gomnes in amorem, omnes in desiderium rapit sui. Quia autem nobilitas *Soli* nulla est, nisi eam, ea quæ *Poli* est, in hac vita comitetur, in futura, subsequatur, ex præscripto planè^h divino mihi res suas instituisse, *omnéque punctum tulisse videntur, qui miscent utile dulci*, qui, inquam, cum studiis suis, quæ eos bonos Patriæ cives reddant, omnium scientiarum reginam, Theologiam dico, conjungunt. Ratio dictat, viros nobiles Ecclesiæ nutrisios, rerum earum, quæ Ecclesiam spectant cognitione imbutos esse debere. Ut enim *ignoti nulla cupido, ita cura illius nulla. Hinc illæ lachrimæ*, quibus Ecclesia multorum deflet Apostasiam. Quæ non aliunde, quàm quòd hi tales, rerum divinarum penitus ignari fuerint, profecta est. Trium Ordinum Reges Scriptura commendat, Melchisedechum, Regem et Sacerdotem;ⁱ Davidem, Regem et Prophetam, ^jRegésque alios tantùm. Coitio Politicæ dignitatis, cum sacris ordinibus, in iisdem personis, Doctorum calculo innuit, Viros nobiles, cura, studio, atque sollicitudine rerum sacrarum, teneri debere. Ipsa Gentilitas, lumine tantùm naturæ irradiata, de talibus sibi gratulata est: *Rex Anius, idem hominum Phœbique Sacerdos*. Virgil. Æneid. l. 3. Et Trismegistus *ter maximus* nuncupatus est, eò quod fuerit Philosophus maximus, Sacerdos maximus, Rex maximus. Alex. Neapol. lib. 2. cap. 6. Sed, in Gentium laudes, quod excurram, opus non est. Habuit Ecclesia Christiana Alphonsum Arragoniæ Regem, vel eo nomine celeberrim-

nobility,⁶ and when it is with riches transmitted to extended posterity and possessed, so to speak, through hereditary law. But outstanding is this nobility, which strives to improve by art what is given by nature. For, as the poet correctly sings, 'diligent study of the liberal arts creates gentle manners, and does not allow being uncivilized.'⁷

Twice, even thrice noble are they, whose nobility of their race is made perfect through the knowledge of human and divine things: and this knowledge shimmering, so to speak, with radiating precious stones, brings all men to the love and to the desire of it. Since the Sun has no excellence unless it is accompanied in this life by the excellence of the Polar Star and is followed by it in the future life, it seems to me that those people have taught me their subject matter on the base of a completely divine precept | and have received all approbation, who combine the pleasant with the useful⁸, and who, I say, join together their learned studies (which make them good citizens of their Fatherland) and theology, which in my opinion is the queen of sciences. Reason dictates that noble men, being the tutors of the church, must be steeped with knowledge of the things that concern the church. For when there is no desire for the unknown, there is no care for it.⁹ Hence the tears¹⁰ the church weeps over the apostasy of many. This apostasy originates from nothing else than the fact that such people have been completely ignorant of divine things. Scripture recommends kings of three ranks: Melchisedek, king and priest, David, king and prophet, | and others as kings only. The alliance of political dignity and holy orders in one and the same person is in accordance with the opinion of the doctors of the church arguing that noble men must be bound by care, zeal and anxiety regarding divine things. Even the pagans who are only enlightened by the light of nature rejoiced in such things: 'King Anius was at the same time king of the people and priest of Phoebus'.¹¹ And Trismegistus is called thrice the greatest, because he was the greatest philosopher, the greatest priest and the greatest king, according to Alexander of Naples, Book 2, chapter 6.¹² But there is no need to spend more time on praising the heathens. The Christian Church has had Alfonso, the king of Aragon, who became most famous by

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6 Already in IUVENAL, *Satires* VIII, 20 virtue and nobility are put together: '*Nobilitas sola est atque unica virtus.*'

7 Quotation from OVID, *Epistolae ex Ponto*, Book II, 19, 48.

8 Quotation from HORACE, *Ars Poetica*, 343. According to Horace this is a mark of good poetry.

9 Quotation (probably) from OVID, *Ars Amatoria* I, 295.

10 *Hinc illae lacrimae*: quotation from TERENCE, *Andria*, Book I, 1, 99.

11 VIRGIL, *Aeneid*, III, 80: '*rex Anius, rex idem hominum Phoebique sacerdos*'. Anius was king and priest in Delos.

12 Arnoldus refers to Alexander ab Alexandro (also known as Alessandro ALESSANDRI), a fifteenth century jurist (1461-1523) who was born in Naples and died in Rome. The reference is to the second book of his *Genialium Dierum Libri VI* which saw many editions. We thank dr. Frits Broeyer for this reference.

mum, quod decies Biblia Sacra cum^k glossa ordinaria à capite ad calcem evolve-
 rit, Theodosium Imperatorem, qui, non in eo, quod imperaret, sed quod Impe-
 rio Christi, 'quatenus membrum Ecclesiæ, subesset, gloriæ suæ partem maxi-
 mam collocavit. Nec est quod monumenta antiquitatis super hoc excutiam
 argumento. Celsissimus Transylvaniæ Princeps, GEORGIUS RAKOCI, cùm
 clavum Reipub. prudenter manu teneret, rebus divinis immori visus est, ut,
 attestantibus, Reverendo D. GEORGIO THULAI Superintendente in Transylva-
 nia, pro Concione Funebri, et Cl. Bisterfeldio in parentatione, vicies atque
 septies, codicem sacrum ab alpha ad omega perlegerit. Dignum Principe Chris-
 tiano^m factum, cui ne Diogenes ipso meridie tæda accensa parem inveniat.
 Illustrissimus et Generosus D. ZBYGNEUS de GORAY GORAYSKI, Castellanus
 Chelmensis, in Colloquio Thorunensi Charitativo, à parte Reformatorem tam
 dextrè administrato immortale sibi nomen, familiæ decus acquisivit; acuminis,
ⁿtum Politici, tum Theologici trophæum erexit.

Horum talium, Vos, Nobilissimi Viri-Juvenes, flos Polonicæ nobilitatis, estis
 propago, avitæque nobilitatis, et virtutis hæredes. Non infimæ laudis est, Vobis,

^k 53FA^{ELZ}-viii ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-viii ⁶¹G-viii | l ⁵²F-vii | m ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-ix ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-ix ⁶¹G-ix | n
⁵²F-viii

reading Holy Scripture ten times including | the *glossa ordinaria* from the beginning to the end.¹³ Theodosius was an emperor who sought the greatest part of his glory not in being an emperor, but in submitting himself to the empire of Christ as a member of the church.¹⁴ Nor is there any reason to investigate the monuments of antiquity on this subject. When the most illustrious prince of Transylvania, George Rakóczi, was at the helm of the republic in a prudent manner, one saw that he worked himself to death for divine things, so that he, as is attested in the funeral oration delivered by the reverend doctor George Thulai, superintendent in Transylvania and in a funeral oration of the famous Bisterfeld, read Holy Scripture twenty seven times from alpha to omega.¹⁵ This is a proper thing for a Christian prince, | whose equal even Diogenes cannot find when during mid-day he kindles his torch.¹⁶ During the charitable diet of Thorenburg¹⁷, so skillfully organized by the reformers, the most famous and noble minded Zbygneus of Goray Gorayski, castellan of Chelm¹⁸ acquired immortal fame for himself and honor for his family, when he erected a monument of both his political and theological sharpness.

Most noble men and young nobles, flowers of Polish nobility, of such men you are the offspring and so the heirs of ancient nobility and virtue. It is not the lowest praise, that, for you, the Titan shaped your minds from a better

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13 Probably, Alfonso II, king of Aragon, 1162–1195. He was buried in the monastery of Nuestra Señora, Poblet. The *Glossa Ordinaria* was an apparatus of annotations to the Latin Bible, which became standardized towards the middle of the twelfth century and remained standard until the eighteenth century. See SWANSON, 'The *Glossa Ordinaria*', 156-167.

14 This is Theodosius I the Great (c. 346-395). In 390, when the governor of Thessalonica was lynched by a circus mob, Theodosius invited the citizens into the circus, and had 7000 of them massacred. St. Ambrose, bishop of Milan, excommunicated Theodosius for eight months until he had done public penance.

15 György Rakóczi (1593-1648), member of a princely family of Hungary and one of the energetic rulers in Transylvania who embraced and favored the Reformed cause. Reformed ministers likened him and his successors to the kings of Old Testament Israel and urged them to take up the mantle of protecting faith. See BUCSAY, *Protestantismus*, 172-174.189.205.210.215; BENEDICT, *Christ's Churches*, 358-359. Johan Heinrich Bisterfeld (1605-1655) taught philosophy at Herborn and Weissenburg in Transylvania. See KVACSALA, 'Johann Heinrich Bisterfeld', 50-59.

16 Diogenes of Sinope (c.400-325 BC) was a Greek philosopher and the principal representative of the Cynic sect. He advocated and practised an ascetic life-style, based upon self-sufficiency and a rigorous training of the body to have as few needs as possible. Legend has it that he walked around in the middle of the day in the market place with a lighted torch, 'looking for a man' as he said.

17 This is a reference to the diet of Torda (Turda) held in 1550 that granted freedom of worship to the Protestants in Transylvania. In 1564, the diet of Torda made Calvinism an 'accepted religion.' See BUCSAY, *Protestantismus*, 84.

18 In the sixteenth century Chelm was located in the center of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, to the east of Lublin. Today Chelm is a city in the east of Poland near to the border with the Ukraine.

quod de meliore luto finxerit præcordia Titan; quod nobili prosapia clari sitis. At majoris est, quod ea, quæ naturæ^o sunt, Vestra exornetis Minerva. Quare mei muneris esse existimavi, Vobis, *in hoc stadio ultro decurrentibus, calcar addere*, atque Vos ad imitationem Illustrium Majorum Vestrorum lacescere. Visum est Deo, me peregrinum, his in oris Ecclesiæ et Academiæ præficere. Sed, *si obliviscar Ecclesiæ Patriæ, obliviscatur sui dextera mea; Adhæreat lingua mea palato meo, si non recorder tui, si non eveham Ecclesiam Polonicam*, quæ me in sinu suo per tot lustra fovit, *super caput lætitiæ meæ*. Cum Daniele Jerosolymam versus^o precante, ad orientem sæpius me converto, ingeminans Davidicum illud: *Sit pax in præmunitione tua*, o Polonia! *tranquillitas in palatiis tuis, propter fratres meos, et amicos^o meos propter domum Jehovæ Dei nostri*. Precibus ac voto, operam meam, quantilla illa sit, conatibus eorum piis, qui in spem Ecclesiæ Patriæ hic commorantur, promovendis, addo. Omnibus denique, cujuscunque sint Ordinis, Religionis Orthodoxæ, et studii Theologici cultum commendo. Quem etsi Vobis Nobilissimi Viri-Juvenes, probè commendatum compertum habeam; tamen non potui non Vobis hac parte spontaneis, stimulum hunc infigere, atque nomina Vestra, hac dedicatione manium Maccovianorum venerari. Animum Vestrum mihi affectum hactenus probastis, experiatur eundem et hoc nomini Vestro dicatum levidense munusculum. Deum supplex^s Veneror, studiis Vestris ex alto cumulatissimè benedicat, peregrinantibus Angelum tutelarem præficiat, Vosque tandem reduces, bonos Patriæ Cives, firmas Ecclesiæ columnas, efficiat! Ita vovet.

Generosité. Vest. addictis. simus Sympatriota.

Franekeræ 16. Aprilis 1652.

NICOLAUS ARNOLDUS V. D. M. SS. Theol. D. et Professor in Academia Franekerana.^t

o ⁵³FA^{ELZ-x} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-x ⁶¹G-x | p ⁵²F-ix | q ⁵³FA^{ELZ-xi} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-xi | r ⁶¹G-xi | s ⁵²F-x ⁵³FA^{ELZ-xii} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-xii ⁶¹G-xii | t ⁵²F-xi ⁵³FA^{ELZ-xiii} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-xiii ⁶¹G-xiii

clay¹⁹ and that you are distinguished by a noble race. But of greater importance is that you have embellished your capacities that belong to you by nature | with [the wisdom and arts] of Minerva. Therefore, I saw it as my duty to spur you as x
 already willing horses running in this stadium²⁰, and to stir you up in order to imitate your illustrious ancestors. It has pleased God to place me as a foreigner in these regions in authority of the church and academy. But, ‘when I forget the church of my fatherland, let my right hand forget herself, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth, if I do not remember you’, if I do not set the Polish Church, that fostered me in its bosom for so many years, ‘above my highest joy.’²¹ Like Daniel who was praying in the direction of Jerusalem, I frequently turn to the East repeating the words of David: ‘Peace be in thy walls, o Poland! And prosperity within thy palaces, for my brethren and companions’ | xi
 sake and because of the house of the Lord our God.²² To these prayers and wishes I add my work, how little it may be, in order to promote the pious efforts of those who stay here with hope for the church of our fatherland. Finally, to all from every rank I recommend the education in orthodox religion and theological study. Although I know quite well that this education, most noble young men, is in good hands with you, I could not but set this spur to your willingness and in particular honor your names with this dedication to the late Maccovius. Thus far you have showed me your affection, but I hope that this poor little present dedicated to your name may experience the same affection. I beseech God | that He most perfectly will bless from above your studies and provide you during your stay abroad with a guardian angel and, when you are finally home, brings about that you will be good citizens of our fatherland, as firm pillars of the church. That is the solemn wish of xii

Franeker, April 16, 1652.

Your compatriot who is most devoted to your nobility, Nicolaus Arnoldus, V.D.M., doctor and professor of sacred theology at the Academy of Franeker | xiii

19 Quotation from JUVENAL, *Satires*, 14, 35. The Titan is Prometheus.

20 A well known Latin proverb; see PLINIUS THE YOUNGER, *Epistolae*, I, 81.

21 Arnoldus refers to Ps 137,5-6.

22 Ps 122,7-8.

AD LECTOREM.

Non tibi hactenus tritas ac frequentatas in Theologia Sacra et Philosophia distinctiones, è manibus rapio; sed, ut his, penes alias sit locus, si quâ possum, contendo. Fortè, si quis in reliquis deprehendatur defectus, eum supplebunt; si quæ sit aliarum obscuritas, explicabunt. Non inusitatæ sunt, nec operâ rationis ratiocinantibus ad simplicioribus fucum faciendum confictæ; sed ex ipsis rebus natæ, ad breviter et perspicuè conceptus animi exprimendos, feliciter adhibitæ. Desideratæ et expetitæ hactenus à multis, quorum voto hâc editione satisfacere adlaboravi, ac placere studui. Exemplaria manuscripta^u varia cum meo contuli; errores, negligentîâ fortè describentium irreptitios, correxi; defectus^v unius ex omnibus supplevi, ut absolutum sit omnibus numeris hoc distinctionum compendium; ac pristino nitori dictantis restitutum, et Prodromus quasi Maccovii Redivivi recudendi. Cæterum, ut minima non curat Prætor, ita nec eorum curo mussitationes, qui non nisi cum livore hæc talia intuentur, et quibus nil nisi suum (ut Simiæ) pulchrum est. Tu Lector, si bonus sis, vale, et fave studiis,

Tui

ARNOLDI.^w

To the Reader

It is not my intention to snatch from your hands the hitherto common and frequented Distinctions in theology and philosophy, but I exert myself (as hard as I can) in order that for these *Distinctions* there is a place next to the other ones. If other works contain certain defects, these can perhaps fill them up, and, if other distinctions are obscure, these will explain them. They are not unusual, nor are they fabricated with the aid of mere reasoning to impose upon the more simple ones. They arose from the subject matter itself, and they are applied successfully in order to express briefly and clearly the concepts of the mind. Hitherto they were desired and asked for by many people.

In order to satisfy and fulfill their wishes I worked hard to publish this edition. I compared the various | manuscripts with the one I have; I amended errors that crept in probably due to the neglect of copyists. The defects of the one I made good by using all the other ones, so that this compendium of distinctions is complete in all parts and restored to the former brightness of the one who dictated them. It is - so to speak - a forerunner of the re-edition of the *Maccovius Redivivus*. For the rest, as a judge does not care for very little things,¹ I do not care for the mutterings of those who look upon this kind of things with envy and for whom (just like apes) nothing is beautiful but their own things.²

Good-bye my dear reader and favor your studies.

Yours truly,
Arnoldus|

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1 A well-known sentence from Roman law.

2 A quotation from CICERO, *Tusculanae Disputationes*, V 22,6.

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The End |

JOHANNIS MACCOVII DISTINCTIONES
THEOLOGICÆ.

The Theological Distinctions of Johannes Maccovius

CAPUT I.

De Sacra Scriptura.¹

I. Verbum Dei accipitur vel pro Scriptura, et dicitur verbum Propheticum, vel pro Filio Dei, quatenus est, et dicitur verbum ἔμφυτον internum, ut Johan. 1, 2, 3, 4. Illud verbum est verbum *accidentale*, hoc *essentiale*.²

II. Verbum Dei dicitur prima veritas, non *essentialis*: nam ita³ Deus est prima veritas; sed *normalis*, hoc est, est regula prima omnium credendorum et facientium.³

III. Verbum Dei dicitur immediatè à Deo profectum, *ratione ortus*, quia scilicet Deum immediatè autorem^b habet: non autem *ratione promulgationis*: nam Deus verbum suum per Prophetas et Apostolos promulgavit.⁴

IV. Verbum Dei ex accidente jam majorem jam minorem auctoritatem habet.

Nam si ex Verbo Dei commonefiat aliquis ab aliquo privato, qui hoc facit ex officio, peccat quidem ille quod non obtemperat: At magis peccat, si commonefiat ab aliquo, cui auctoritas ad hoc data est: verbi gratia, si non obtemperet Ministro Verbi divini. Maximè autem peccat, si ipse Deus sit, qui immediatè moneat. Atque hinc intelligitur illud Hebr. 2. 2, 3, 4. *Etenim si per Angelos dictus sermo fuit firmus, omnisque transgressio et contumacia justam mercedis retributionem retulit; quomodo nos effugiemus, si tantam neglexerimus salutem?* quæ quùm primum enarrari cæpit per ipsum Dominum,^c ab iis qui ipsum audierant, fuit nobis confirmata:

1 LCT, cc. 2-8, 10-56 [10-56]; TT, 6-42; TP, 61-82 [1-14]; TQ, 339-346 [1-10]; TC, 451-452; ΠΨ-Pontificiorum, 505-507 [3-5]; ΠΨ-Socinianorum, 549-551 [52-54]; ΠΨ-Lutheranorum, 577-579 [83-85]; ΠΨ-Anabaptistarum, 615-618 [127-130]; A-E, 633-634; A-S, 720-729 [28-38]. | 2 LCT, 10 [6]. | 3 LCT, 10 [6]. | 4 LCT, 11 [7].

Chapter 1

On Holy Scripture

1. The Word of God is understood either as Scripture and is then called the prophetic word or as the Son of God in as much as He is and is called the internal word, as in J 1,2-4.¹ The first is 'Word of God' accidentally, the second essentially.

2. God's Word is called the first truth, not as being the essential truth, since in that sense God alone is the first truth. It is called the normative truth, i.e. the first rule for all things that must be believed and done.

3. Regarding its origin the Word of God is said to proceed from God immediately, since it has God as its immediate author. | But regarding its promulgation it does not proceed immediately from God, because He promulgated his word through the agency of prophets and apostles. 2

4. The accidental Word of God has sometimes more, sometimes less authority.

For when someone is admonished from God's word by a private person who acts out of duty, then he is certainly sinning, when he does not obey. But he sins even more, if someone who has the authority to do this admonishes him, e.g. when he does not obey a minister of the divine word. The worst offense takes place, when it is God himself, who admonishes him immediately. Hence it becomes clear what is meant in Hbr 2,2-4: 'for if the Word spoken by angels was steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward; how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation? Which at the first began to be spoken by the Lord, and was confirmed unto us by them

¹ The word *emphyton* is not in the original Greek text of the gospel of John; Maccovius evidently wants to stress that these verses in John 1 are to be interpreted this way.

Testimonium illis præbente Deo et signis et prodigiis, variisque virtutibus et S. S. distributionibus pro sua voluntate.

V. Ecclesia dicitur columna veritatis *Politica*, non *Architectonica*.⁵

Hoc est, non dicitur columna quod innitatur ei tanquam fundamento veritas Verbi^d divini sed quòd Verbum Dei ipsi traditum sit, et in ipsa reperiatur, quemadmodum scilicet Principum edicta columnis affigi solent.^e

VI. Nemo tenetur credere Ecclesiæ, nisi cum Verbo Dei consentiat.⁶

VII. Scripturæ autoritas innotescit nobis *testimonio externo*, Spiritus^f Sancti, et *interno*, scilicet notis criteriis verbo insitis.⁷

Est autem testimonium Spiritus. S. non ecstasis vel entusiasmus; sed lux quædam ita mentem perfundens, ut eam leniter afficiat, ostendâtque rationes ipsi rei insitas, sed antea occultas.

Obj. 1. Si ex testimonio Spiritus Sancti constat, Verbum Dei esse Verbum Dei, cur ergo non omnes Evangelici in omnibus dogmatibus consentiunt? *Resp.* Quia non omnibus^g eadem Spiritus mensura admensa est.

Obj. 2. Circulum committi. Quaerenti enim quomodo Verbum Dei agnosci possit? *Resp.* Ex testimonio Spirit. S. Dum verò interrogamur, unde Testimonium Spiritus Sancti agnoscamus verum esse; ad Scripturam recurrimus.

Resp. Non utimur testimonio Spir. Sancti. *ut argumento*, sed id tantum proferimus, ut profiteamur cæcitatem nostram, et cui debeamus acceptum ferre, quòd veritatem^h verbi agnoscamus. Sicut si quis quærat ex sapiente viro consilii aut assensus sui rationem, non proferet is tanquam argumentum, animi sui motum, sed insita veritatis rei quam asserit, argumenta, quorum inventionem profitebitur profectam esse à mentis luce, cujus, nisi planè impius sit, Deum autorem agnoscet.

5 LCT, 31-32 [29-30]. | 6 LCT, 31-32 [29-30]. | 7 LCT, 25-30 [23-28]; TT, 19-22.

d ⁵³FA^{ELZ-3} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-3 ⁶¹G-3 | e ⁵⁹R-2 | f ⁵⁴R-2 | g ⁵²F-4 | h ⁵³FA^{ELZ-4} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-4 ⁶¹G-4

that heard Him; God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with diverse virtues and gifts of the Holy Spirit, according to his own will?’

5. The Church is called a pillar of truth, not in an architectonic but in a political sense.

I.e. it is not called a pillar [1T 3,15] because the truth of God’s Word is supported by it as being its foundation |, but because the Word of God is handed over to and found in the Church, just as the proclamations and edicts of rulers were fixed on pillars. 3

6. Nobody is obligated to believe the Church unless it agrees with the Word of God.

7. The authority of Scripture is made known to us through an external testimony, namely that of the Holy Spirit, and through an internal testimony, that is to say by the well known criteria innate to the Word itself.

The testimony of the Holy Spirit, however, does not consist of ecstasy or enthusiasm. It is a certain light that is sprinkling our mind in such a way that the mind is affected softly by it, while showing the reasons implanted in the Word itself, criteria that were previously hidden.

Objection 1. If from the testimony of the Holy Spirit it is established that Scripture is the Word of God, what then is the reason that not all Protestants are of one opinion on all doctrines? *Answer:* The reason is that not all of them are endowed with the same amount of the Spirit.

Objection 2. This involves a circular reasoning. When someone asks how God’s Word can be recognized, we answer: from the testimony of the Holy Spirit. But when we are asked: how do we know that the testimony of the Holy Spirit is true, then we recur to Holy Scripture.

Answer: we do not use the testimony of the Holy Spirit as a proof, but we advance it only in so far as to confess our blindness and to offer our gratitude to the Holy Spirit | for the fact that we recognize truth of his Word. As for instance when someone is asking a wise man for the reason of his judgment or assent, he will not advance his inner feelings as a proof, but the proofs are incorporated in the truth he claims. He will confess that the proofs he found proceed from the light of the mind of which he recognizes – unless he is completely impious – God as the author. 4

VIII. Probat ergo seipsam Scriptura, non argumento *interno*, sed *externo*, hoc est, non *authoritative*, sed *ratiocinative*; quia scilicet ipsi verbo insunt talia, ex quibus certò authoritatis divinæ esse agnoscitur. Sic gemma nobilis probat se suis effectis.⁸

Argumenta insita ista sunt: Cœlestis doctrinæ maiestas, Orationis simplicitas, divinitas, puritas; partium omnium inter se^l consensus, antiquitas, admiratio in quam nos rapit, tot et tam insignia miracula ad confirmationem Verbi facta; Vindicatio librorum sacrorum divina à rabie hostium et Sathanæ; mirabile prophetiarum complementum, consensus Ecclesiæ, sanguis Martyrum; ipsorum denique Scriptorum vilis conditio.

Obj. *Evangelio non crederem, nisi me Ecclesiæ moveret authoritas*. August. *Resp.* *Authoritas vel imperii est, vel dignitatis*. *Authoritas*^l *Ecclesiæ* quâ motus fuit Augustinus ad credendum Evangelio, non fuit imperium et ius quoddam; sed *Ecclesiæ dignitas*, magnis et illustribus divinæ providentiæ argumentis, in *Ecclesia conservanda comprobata*, ita ut in eo digittum Dei agnosceret.

IX. *Authoritas Sacræ Scripturæ cognoscitur ex iis, quas diximus notis; verùm non semper ex una aliqua, sed ex pluribus, aliquando etiam ex omnibus.*⁹

Adversarii Pontific. scil. dum agimus de notis ex quibus cognoscitur Scriptura esse verbum Dei, dilacerant istas notas, et sigillatim proponunt, et ita ad illas respondere volunt; sed hoc valde ineptè: Nam dum nos dicimus, notas istas esse verbi Divini, videl: *Miracula, Prædictiones futurorum, etc.*^k illa ita accipi debent, ut non seorsim accipiantur, sed conjunctim et ita ex illis iudicium fiat de authoritate verbi Dei.

X. *Quicquid in Verbo Dei est, habet authoritatem divinam, vel quia Deum autorem habet, vel quia divinitus ad usum adhibetur.*

Ita verbi gratia, doctrina Evangelii est à Deo, quia Deus autor ejus est: Ita relatio,^l quæ fit de sceleribus hominum, de dictis et factis, habet autoritatem

⁸ LCT, 26–28 [24–26]; TT, 19–22. | ⁹ LCT, 26–28 [24–26]; TT, 19–22.

i ⁵²F-5 | j ⁵³FA^{ELZ-5} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-5 ⁶¹G-5 | k ⁵²F-6 | l ⁵³FA^{ELZ-6} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-6 ⁶¹G-6

8. Scripture, then, proves itself not by an internal, but by an external proof, i.e. it does not prove itself authoritatively, but by logical reasoning. For the Word itself contains such things that it can be concluded with certainty from them that they have divine authority. Like a precious jewel proves itself by its effects.

The innate proofs are the following: the majesty of divine doctrine, the simplicity of speech, its divinity and purity; the agreement of all parts with each other, antiquity, the admiration to which it draws us and the miracles, as many as they are prominent, which confirm the Word of God; the divine vindication of the Holy Books against the rage of enemies and Satan; the marvelous fulfillment of prophecies, the agreement of the Church, the blood of martyrs and, finally, the bad conditions in which the authors themselves were involved.

Objection: Augustine says: 'I would not believe the Gospel if the authority of the Church did not move me.'² *Answer:* a distinction should be made between authority of command and authority of dignity. | The authority of the Church by which Augustine was moved to believe the Gospel, was not a command or some law, but it was the dignity of the Church established by great and illustrious proofs of divine providence in preserving the Church, so that therein the Church recognized God's finger.

9. The authority of Holy Scripture is known from those marks we discussed, yet not always from a single mark, but from several ones, sometimes from all of them together.

The popish adversaries reject these marks of which we argue that we know by them that the Scripture is the Word of God. They tear them to pieces and present them one by one and in this way they want to respond to them. But they do it in a completely foolish way. For when we assert that these marks, viz. miracles, foretelling of the future etc. are the marks of the Word of God, they must be taken not separately but jointly. And from them the authority of God's Word is to be judged in this way.

10. Everything contained in God's Word has divine authority, either because it has God as its author or because God uses it for a purpose.

For example, the doctrine of the Gospel is from God, because God is its author. The report | of the crimes of mankind, of words and facts, has divine authority

² AUGUSTINUS, *Contra Epistulam Manichaei*, 5–6: 'ego vero evangelio non crederem, nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas'. For the discussion on this dictum of Augustine, see FRAENKEL, *Testimonia Patrum*, 228–230; KANTZENBACH, *Das Ringen*, 104; BAKHUIZEN VAN DEN BRINK, *Traditio*, 34–37. Maccovius joins CALVIN's interpretation of Augustine's dictum in *Institutio* I, 7, 3.

divinam, quia à Deo refertur. Ita Ethnicorum poëtarum dicta, quia Deus ipsis utitur tanquam veris, ob usum istum, habent auctoritatem divinam.^m

XI. Aliud est nosse hunc vel illum librum esse canonicum, aliud ab hoc vel illo autore esse conscriptum.¹⁰

Pontificii solent ex nobis quærere; quomodo novimus Evangeliumⁿ Matthæi, esse Evangelium Matthæi? aut Lucæ, Lucæ? *Resp.* Si quæratur de eo, quomodo sciamus hos libros esse canonicos, tum dicimus ex argumentis insitis, quæ nim. istis insunt; Atque ita distinguere, nos fidem quâ credimus librum esse canonicum, et quâ credimus^o ab hoc vel illo autore scriptum. Nam hoc tantum est fidei historicæ; proinde nemo periclitatur de salute, si non credet à Matthæo scriptum; modò credat esse canonicum, à Spiritu Sancto profectum.

XII. Verbum Dei canonicum sive authenticum est, quoad *verba*, et quoad *res*; quoad *verba*, in lingua Hebræa et Græca; quoad *res*, in translationibus.¹¹

Est ergo authentia vel *verborum* vel *sensus*. *Illa* linguis, *hæc* translationibus respondet.^p Aliqui disputant, an Verbum Dei, quod in Translationibus est, sit verè Divinum. *Resp.* Certè est quoad *res*, nisi fortè alibi malè versum; attamen quoad *verba* non est: Deus enim Hebraicè et Græcè dictavit. Hinc Sacra S. omnes homines in Judæos et Græcos dispescit. Causa hujus rei nulla dari potest, quàm quod omnibus extra Judæos Verbum Dei sit Græcè scriptum.

XIII. Scriptura differt à Verbo Dei in se considerato, ut *accidens* à suo subjecto. Fuit enim Verbum Dei antequam Scriptura esset, et erat cum Scripturæ usus multus foret; Matth. 5. 18.¹²

XIV. Scriptura necessaria est^q non *absolutè*, sed ex *hypothesi* mandati Divini.

10 LCT, 33-34 [31-32]; TT, 6-14. | 11 LCT, 11-19 [8-15]; TT, 6-14. | 12 LCT, 10-11 [6-7].

m ⁵⁴R-3 | n ⁵⁹R-3 | o ⁵²F-7 | p ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-7 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}AJNSNO-7 ⁶¹G-7 | q ⁵²F-8

because God relates them. Thus, because God uses the words of pagan poets as being true, they have divine authority because of this use.

11. It is one thing to know that this or that book is canonical; it is another thing to know that this or that author wrote it.

The Papists usually *ask* us in what way we know that Matthew wrote the Gospel of Matthew and Luke wrote the Gospel of Luke. *Answer:* if it is asked how we know that these books are canonical, then our answer is: we know this by means of the innate proofs contained therein, and that, in this way, we distinguish the faith by which we believe that a book is canonical from the faith by which we believe that it is written by this or that author. For the last is just historical faith. Consequently, no one endangers his salvation if he would not believe that Matthew wrote it, as long as he believes that it is canonical and produced by the Holy Spirit.

12. The Word of God is canonical or trustworthy regarding both its words – the Hebrew and Greek languages – and its matter – in translations.

Therefore there is trustworthiness either regarding its words or its meaning. The first refers to the languages, the second to the translations. | Some discuss whether God's Word contained in translations, is truly divine. *Answer:* it is certainly divine regarding its matter, unless perhaps it is badly translated. But regarding the words it is not, for God dictated them in Hebrew and Greek. Hence Holy Scripture divided all humankind into Jews and Greek. For this there is no other reason than that for all people not belonging to the Jewish people the Word of God is written in Greek.

13. Scripture differs from the Word of God considered in itself just as an accident differs from its subject. For the Word of God preceded Scripture and it was there, when Scripture was fully used, Mt 5,18.

14. Scripture is not absolutely but hypothetically necessary, i.e. presupposing the command of God.³

³ For the meaning of hypothesis in Maccovius see *Decuria VIII,1*.

XV. Scriptura perfecta est tum quoad *materiam*, tum quoad *formam*.¹³

Forma dicitur methodus, materia autem res ipsa. Sciendum est, duplicem esse methodum Sacrae Scripturae, nim. *totius* Scripturae et *partium* quarundam. Totius scripturae est methodus *historica*; Partium autem, methodus *disciplinaria*, sive arbitraria. Solet enim Spiritus Sanctus in res tractare, ut ea afferat quae scit conducere rei isti explicandae,^r et probandae, aut etiam improbandae, item eo ordine quo ipsi placet, ut videre est in Epistolis Paulinis.

XVI. Perfecta est Scriptura, non quod res omnes perfectè, de quibus agit, quoad literam tradat; sed quòd eas in tantum exprimat, in quantum ad salutem nobis scitu necessariae sunt.¹⁴

Dici potest perfecta, non *adæquatè ad objectum*, sed *adæquatè ad finem*; nam sunt quaedam de quibus Scriptura agit, quae non possunt exprimi ad captum creaturae adæquatè, qualis est Deus, incarnatio Filii Dei, et quae talia, quae nobis refert^s Spiritus Sanctus, non ut sunt in se, sed ut à nobis capi possunt.

XVII. Perfectio Scripturae alia est *essentialis*, alia *accidentalis*.¹⁵

Quærent ex nobis Pontific. si aliqui libri Scripturae continent omnia dogmata fidei, et præcepta morum, quænam causa sit quod tot libri sint propositi? *Resp.* Quia non tantum necesse erat contineri ista, quae est *perfectio essentialis*, sed etiam oportebat ista contineri, ut diversimodè à diversis ita tractarentur, ut eo modo intelligi melius possent; tum etiam, ut consonantia tot diversorum hominum, quibus Deus usus est tanquam Amanuensibus in consignando^t verbo^u suo, divinitatem verbi patefaceret; et hæc est illa *accidentalis perfectio*.

XVIII. Dum Scripturam dicimus perfectam, non intelligimus, ac si ad literam omnia illa quae ad salutem sunt necessaria, continerentur, sed quod quaedam per certam consequentiam, ex illis quae clarè dicta sunt, deduci debeant.¹⁶

13 LCT, 35–36 [33–34]; TT, 30–34. | 14 LCT, 37–40 [35–39]; TT, 30–34. | 15 LCT, 35–36 [33–34]; TT, 30–34. | 16 LCT, 37–40 [35–39]; TT, 30–34.

15. Scripture is perfect regarding both matter and form.

The form is called method; matter is called the thing itself. One has to know that Holy Scripture contains a twofold method: one being the method of Scripture as a whole and the other the method of its parts. The method of the whole Scripture is historical, but the method of its parts is one of discipline or judgment. For the Holy Spirit usually deals with things in such a way, that He utters the things of which He knows that they are useful for the explanation, | proof or even rejection of that thing; and He does so in an order which pleases Him, as is seen in the letters of Paul.

8

16. Scripture is perfect, not because it transmits perfectly all things literally it deals with, but because it expresses those things in so far as they are necessary for us to know in order to be saved.

Scripture can be called perfect, not because it is adequately perfect in relation to its object, but because it is adequately perfect in relation to its goal. For Scripture deals with certain things that cannot be adequately expressed for the understanding of the creature: for instance God, the incarnation of the Son of God and other things like those which the Holy Spirit tells us, not as they are in themselves, but in such a way that they can be understood by us.

17. A distinction must be made between the essential and accidental perfection of Scripture.

The Papists want to know from us why there are so many books set forth while some books of the Scriptures contain already all the doctrines of faith and all the moral precepts. *Answer:* because it was not only necessary for Scripture to contain those doctrines that form an essential perfection, but that it also ought to contain those doctrines that diverse people could treat differently, so that in this way they could be understood in a better way. Moreover, the consent of so many different people used by God as his secretaries in recording his Word, | reveals the divinity of his Word; and this consent is that accidental perfection.

9

18. When we assert that Scripture is perfect, we do not mean as if it contains literally all things necessary for salvation, but we assert that from what is clearly said in Scripture some topics must be deduced by way of certain consequence.

Notum hoc ex Christo et Apostolis, qui ex illis quæ clarè dicta erant, multa per consequentiam deducebant: et quæ per consequentiam ex Mose, Davide, deduxerant,^v ea Mosen dixisse statuebant. Matth. 22. 29, *Dices: consequentias ab idiotis non posse intelligi. Sed duplices sunt consequentiæ; Remotæ, proximæ: de illis hoc verum est, quoad minus exercitatos, non de his. Oculus quæ remota sunt vel confusè tantum, vel omnino planè non videt; proxima videt accuratè. Necessaria ad salutem proximâ consequentiâ^w è Scriptura deducuntur, adeoque intelliguntur facillimè.*

XIX. Perfectio Canonis non æstimatur ex multitudine librorum, sed ex sufficientia dogmatum fidei, et præceptorum morum.^x

Urgent aliqui hunc canonem perfectum non esse, quia nonnulli libri perierunt; His autem hac distinctione occurrere solemus.

XX. Traditiones aliquando accipiuntur pro ritibus Ecclesiasticis adiaphoris, aliquando verò pro illis, quæ in Scriptura tradita sunt.

Quod ad posterius membrum vide 1. Cor. 11. 23. Et quoad primum, vide regulam traditam nobis à Spiritu Sancto, 1 Cor. 14. 40. *Omnia decenter et ordine fiant.* Unde etiamsi in particulari non præcipiantur in^y Scriptura, præcipiuntur tamen in genere.

XXI. Traditio alia est genuina, alia commentitia.

Genuinæ sunt istæ, de quibus egimus. Commentitiæ dicuntur istæ, quæ à Pontificiis obtrudi solent Ecclesiæ, quales sunt Missa, Purgatorium, et id genus aliæ nugæ. Notandum hîc est, ipsos in istis traditionibus sibi ipsis contradicere, nam asserunt illas non esse scriptas, et tamen ex Scriptura probare volunt.

XXII. Aliud est commemorare beneficium Dei, et aliud tempus quod Ecclesia instituit, ut illud commemoretur.¹⁷

17 LCT, 40–44 [39–43].

It is well known that Christ and the apostles deduced many things from what is clearly said in Scripture by way of consequence: they held that things deduced from Moses and David by consequence, were actually said by Moses [and David] themselves, Mt 22,29. You may *object* that illiterate persons cannot understand the consequences. But there are two kinds of consequences: remote and proximate. It is true: uneducated people are less trained in drawing the first ones, but not in drawing the last ones. The eye perceives remote things either confusedly or not at all. Things nearby it sees accurately. Things necessary for salvation can be deduced from Scripture by way of proximate consequence and are therefore easily understood.

19. The perfection of the canon is not determined by the multitude of books, but by the sufficiency of the doctrines of faith and moral precepts. |

10

Some urge that this canon is not perfect, because some books have perished. We usually answer them with this distinction.

20. Sometimes traditions are understood as ecclesiastical rites that are indifferent, but sometimes they are understood as traditions handed over in Scripture.

For an example of the last, see 1Co 11,23; for an example of the first, see 1Co 14,40, 'Let all things be done decently and in order.' Although they are not particularly prescribed in Scripture, they are prescribed in general.

21. Genuine traditions must be distinguished from fabricated traditions.

Genuine traditions are those, which we have dealt with. Fabricated traditions we call traditions, which the Papists have forced on the Church, such as mass, purgatory and all kind of other nonsense. Here, regarding those traditions, it should be noted that they contradict themselves, for they assert that these are not written and yet try to prove them from Holy Writ.

22. It is one thing to commemorate the benefice of God; but the time the Church has ordained for its commemoration is quite another thing.

Solent Pontif. ut imperfectionem Scripturæ^z arguant, dicere: Ubi præcipitur in Scriptura, hoc die celebrabis nativitatem Christi, illo Pascha, illo Pentecosten? *Atqui* dicunt, ista omnia sunt articuli Fidei: Ergo aliqui articuli Fidei in Scriptura non existent *Resp.* Ex distinctione data, Christum natum, resurrexisse, in cælum ascendisse, esse quidem articulos fidei; sed diem quo ista celebrari debent, non esse articulum talem, sed tantum ordinationem Ecclesiasticam, ita ut si placuisset Ecclesiæ, potuisset alios dies ad hanc commemorationem ordinasse.^a

XXIII. Perspicuitas Scripturæ alia est *subjectiva*, alia *objectiva*.

Egimus de ista distinctione in locis communibus. *Subjectivam* perspicuitatem summam esse Scripturæ, hoc est quatenus in se et per se perspicua est: *Objectiva* non item: idque non vitio Scripturæ, sed vitio hominum, et naturæ nostræ depravatæ. Quemadmodum homines, quorum oculi caligant, non possunt videre lucem Solis, hoc non fit vitio Solis, qui per se clarissimus est, sed vitio oculorum caligantium.^b

XXIV. Distinguunt Theologi inter *Scripturam* et rem *Scripturæ*.

Omne enim quod dicit Spiritus S. de rebus abstrusis in Scriptura, hoc est perspicuum,^c sed non omnia dicit de rebus obscuris, verùm ea tantum, quorum nos capaces sumus, et quæ nos scire expedit. Verbi gratia: Trinitas res est Scripturæ, de qua tamen Spiritus Sanctus in Scriptura perspicuè loquitur, et ad captum nostrum: non tamen omnia loquitur de Trinitate, quia omnium capaces non sumus. Res ergò Scripturæ obscura esse potest, sed Scriptura de illa re perspicua.

XXV. Aliud est loqui de perspicuitate^d dogmatum fidei et præceptorum morum, aliud de Prophetiis quæ sunt de eventibus incertis quoad nos.¹⁸

¹⁸ LCT, 41–44 [41–43].

^z ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-11 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-11 ⁶¹G-11 | ^a ⁵²F-12 | ^b ⁵⁴R-5 | ^c ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-12 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-12 ⁶¹G-12 | ^d ⁵²F-13

In order to argue the imperfection of Scripture the Papists | usually say: where does Scripture prescribe that you should celebrate the birth of Christ on this day, Eastern on that day and Pentecost on another day? But, they say, all these things are articles of faith. Ergo: some articles of faith are not contained in Scripture. *Answer:* the distinction we make implies that the birth of Christ, his resurrection and ascension are indeed articles of faith, but the day on which they have to be celebrated are not. They are an arrangement of the Church, so that the Church could have ordained other days for commemoration, if it had pleased her to do so. 11

23. The subjective perspicuity of Scripture is something else than its objective perspicuity.

We dealt with this distinction in the *Loci Communes*.⁴ Subjective perspicuity is the highest form of perspicuity in Scripture, i.e. the perspicuity in so far as Scripture is clear in itself and of itself. Not so with objective perspicuity: this is not due to a defect of Scripture, but to the fault of human being and our depraved nature. Just as the phenomenon that men with gloom before their eyes cannot see the light of the sun, is not the sun's fault – the sun being in itself most clear – but this is due to their gloomy eyes.

24. Theologians make a distinction between Scripture and the subject matter of Scripture.

Everything the Holy Spirit says about abstruse things in Scripture is clear, | but He does not explain everything about obscure things, but only what we can understand and what is useful for us to know. For example: in Scripture the Trinity is a reality of which the Holy Spirit speaks clearly and according to our understanding; but He does not tell us everything about the Trinity, for we are not able to grasp all things. Therefore, the reality to which Scripture refers can be obscure, while Scripture as such is clear about it. 12

25. It is one thing to speak about the perspicuity of doctrines of faith and moral precepts, another thing to speak about prophecies regarding events that are uncertain from our point of view.

4 See MACCOVIUS, *Loci Communes* (ed. Franeker 1641), 30-34.

Priora sunt perspicua in Scriptura, at posterius non item, antequam fuerit impletum; Secundum regulam illam Theologorum: Prophetiæ non intelliguntur ante complementum.

XXVI. Scriptura aliter atque aliter perspicua est, magis scilicet *adultis* quàm *infantibus*.

Distinguit Scriptura adultos et infantes; 1 Cor. 3. 1. Heb. 5. 13, 14. Distinctio ista ex eo est, quod alii aliis magis proficiant in cognitione veritatis divinæ. Cæterum hic duo sunt notanda circa distinctionem: quod^e utut alii aliis magis proficiant in cognitione veritatis, et alii aliis magis distinctè percipiant; omnes tamen in tantum percipiunt, in quantum illis sufficit ad salutem. Alterum quod hic notandum, sunt distinctiones quædam quæ emergunt ex distinctione^f hac: Ut, quod articuli fidei alii sint *Catholici*, alii *Theologici*. *Catholici* sunt illi, qui omnibus ad salutem scitu sunt necessarii, et sine quibus nemo salvatur; quales sunt isti qui in Catechesi proponuntur, nimirum Decalogus, Symbolum^g Apostolorum, etc. *Theologici* sunt illi, qui non omnibus scitu sunt necessarii, sed illis saltem, qui aliis docendis, sive in Ecclesiis, sive in Scholis præsent; quales sunt illi articuli, qui per consequentiam ex aliis deducuntur. Secunda distinctio emergit hinc ex præcedenti, in *fidem* nim. *implicitam* et *explicitam*. Accipimus autem hîc hæc vocabula alio sensu quàm Pontificii. Nam illi fidem implicitam vocant Fidem carbonariam, eamque definiunt per ignorantiam. At nobis fides explicita est ea fides quæ cadit in adultos, qui plura capiunt et magis distinctè, quàm infantes. Fides autem implicita est, quæ etiam in infantes cadit, quæ non tot capit quot adultorum, nec tam distinctè.

XXVII. Scriptura perspicua est^h nobis non *naturâ nostrâ*, sed *gratiâ Dei illuminantis*.¹⁹

Non *naturâ* nobis nota est, sed *ex gratiâ* quæ nos illuminat. Hîc quædam distinctiones quæ ex hac emergunt, nobis explicandæ sunt. Prima est, inter *cognitionem Legis* et *Evangelii*. Et dicitur à Theologis legem cognosci etiam ab hominibus irrogenitis, ratione *materialis*, h. e. ratione præceptorum; non autem ratione *formalis*, h. e. ratione *finis*; nam irrogeniti non norunt finem legis, scil. ut ex ea

¹⁹ LCT, 42–44 [41–43].

e ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-13 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-13 ⁶¹G-13 | f ⁵⁹R-5 | g ⁵²F-14 | h ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-14 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-14 ⁶¹G-14

Doctrines and precepts are clear in Scripture, but prophecies before their fulfillment are not; this is according to the theological rule: prophecies are not understood before their completion.

26. Scripture is clear in different ways: for adults it is clearer than for children.

Scriptures distinguishes between adults and children, 1Co 3,1 and Hbr 5,13-14. This distinction is based on the fact that some make more progress in the knowledge of divine truth than others do. For the rest, regarding this distinction two things should be noted. First, that | although some make more progress in the knowledge of truth than others do, they all perceive just so much as is sufficient for their salvation. The other thing that should be observed here is the fact that some distinctions emerge from the distinction between catholic and theological articles of faith. Catholic are those articles of faith that are necessary to know for every one in order to be saved and without which no one will be saved. Such are the articles of faith proposed in the Catechism, namely the Decalogue, the Apostles' Creed etc. Theological articles are those articles of faith that need not to be known by everyone but only by those who teach others either in the churches or in the schools. Of such a sort are those articles that are deduced from other articles by way of logical consequence. From the preceding distinction emerges a second one, namely between implicit and explicit faith. However, we take these words in a sense different from the Roman Catholics. For they call implicit faith the faith of the charcoal burners⁵ and define it as ignorance. With us, explicit faith occurs in adults who understand several things more distinctly than children. Implicit faith, however, can also be found in children, which neither understands so much as that of adults nor in such a distinctive way.

13

27. Scripture is clear | to us not by virtue of our nature but by the grace of God illuminating us.

14

We do not know Scripture by nature, but through grace, which illuminates us.

Here we must explain some distinctions arising from this one. The first one is the distinction between the knowledge of the Law and the knowledge of the Gospel. Theologians assert that in respect of its matter the Law is also known by people who are not regenerated, i.e. in respect of precepts, but not in respect of its essence, i.e. in respect of a goal or end. The unregenerate do not know the goal of the Law so that, on the strength of it, they acknowledge their

⁵ See TERTULLIAN, *De Carne Christi*, 6.

peccata et miseriam^l agnoscant, et ex ea liberationem desiderent. Secundò ratione *materialis* etiam non norunt perfectè; non enim omnia precepta naturâ nota sunt, ut liquet vel ex Pharisæis, qui nec omnia intelligebant, nec perfectè.

Secunda distinctio est cognitionis in *Apprehensivam* et *Dijudicativam*: In eam quæ est cum *persuasione*, et eam, quæ est cum *convictione* tantum. In *Disciplinarem* et *experimentalem*: In eam, quæ est *sub propria specie*, et quæ *sub aliena*. Cæterum, distinctiones istæ coincidunt. Est enim quædam scientia, quæ persuadet homini, qualis^j scientia est in fidelibus; et scientia, quæ convincit hominem de rei veritate, qualis cadebat in Pharisæos, et cadit in quosdam irrogenitos. *Disciplinaris* scientia est, quando aliquid per præcepta docetur. *Experimentalis*,^k quam per experientiam acquirimus. *Experimentalis* scientia rerum divinarum ac cœlestium, cadit in fideles. *Disciplinaris* autem aliquando etiam in reprobos: Scientia verò *sub aliena specie est*; Cum novi aliquid, sed tanti non æstimo, quanti æstimandum est, aut aliud esse arbitror, quàm est. Ut, verbi gratia, si quis Verbum Dei tanti non æstimet quanti in se est: Non absimilis illi, qui aurum orchalcum esse judicaret. Talis scientia rerum divinarum cadit in reprobos. At scientia *sub propria specie*, cadit in solos fideles. Hinc Scriptura irrogenitos, quia *sub aliena specie res divinas^l capiunt nobilissimas sub specie vilissimarum*, vocat stultos et insipientes.

XXVIII. Alia est cognitio in *Thesi*, alia in *Hypothesi*.

Quæritur; Quomodo homo sive fidelis, sive infidelis, sciens peccare possit, cùm nemo velit malum sub ratione mali. *Resp.* Scientia illa dicitur in *Thesi*, non in *hypothesi*: hoc est, scit talis in genere malum hoc esse, scortari, furari; at sibi illud putat esse bonum: unde illud Poëtæ ita explicandum erit; *Video meliora*

sins and misery, and, on the strength of it, long for liberation. Secondly, in respect of its matter, they do not even know the Law in a perfect way; for not all its precepts are known by nature, as is evident even from the Pharisees, who did not understand all precepts nor did they have a perfect understanding of them.

The second distinction is between apprehensive knowledge and judging knowledge: between knowledge consisting in persuasion and knowledge consisting only in conviction; between disciplinary knowledge and experimental knowledge or between knowledge of a proper sort and knowledge of an improper sort. For the rest, these distinctions coincide. There is in fact a certain knowledge that persuades humankind. Such is the knowledge present in the believer; and there is knowledge that convinces man of the truth of a thing, such as the knowledge of the Pharisees or the knowledge of unregenerated people. Disciplinary knowledge is knowledge taught by means of precepts. Experimental knowledge | is knowledge that we achieve by means of experience. Experimental knowledge of divine and heavenly things occurs in the believer, while, sometimes, disciplinary knowledge also occurs in the reprobate: then it is knowledge of an improper sort. This happens when I know something but do not estimate it as much as it should be estimated, or when I judge it to be something else than it is in reality. For example, when someone does not value the Word of God to be such as it is in itself. This is not unlike someone who would judge that gold is copper. Such knowledge of divine things occurs in the reprobate. But knowledge of the proper sort occurs only in the believer. Hence Scripture calls people who are not reborn foolish and unwise, because they improperly consider the most excellent divine things as being the cheapest.

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28. A distinction must be made between general knowledge or knowledge present in a thesis and particular knowledge or knowledge present in a hypothesis.

When it is *asked*: in what manner is it possible for mankind – believing or not believing – to sin knowingly, while nobody wills the bad, as far it is bad? The *answer* is that this is a knowledge in the thesis and not in the hypothesis, i.e. such a person knows in general that prostitution and stealing are bad things; but he thinks them to be good for him; whence the following word of the poet⁶: ‘I see and approve better things but I follow the worse’ should be explained like

6 OVID, *Metamorphoses*, VII, 20-21: ‘*Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor*’. Ovid puts these words into the mouth of Medea, bewitched by her love for Jason and poised between desire (*cupido*) and reason (*mens*).

probóque, deteriora sequor. Video scilicet meliora quoad Thesin, quoad Hypothesin non video, et ita sequor mala.

XXIX. Ratione, cognitionis dicuntur^m homines *perfecti et infantes*.

Est nonnemo qui putat hæc non posse consistere, perfectum esse ratione cognitionis Dei, et tamen inchoativè nos regenerari. Sed nulla inter hæc est pugna, nam perfectus dicitur ratione *infantium*, et tamen inchoativè dicitur ratione *complementi*; itaque non magis hæc pugnant quàm ista, quòd Scriptura adultos quosdam esse asserit, et interim tamen dicat, nos *ex parte scire, et ex parte prophetare*, 1 Cor. 13.

XXX. Interpretatio alia estⁿ *verbalis*, alia *realis*; vel alia est *verborum*, alia *sensus*. Interpretatio non debet esse propriæ explicationis. 2 Pet. 1. 20.²⁰

Quæritur, quomodo ista consistere possunt, quod quilibet dicitur debere scrutari Scripturas,^o et quod interpretatio non debeat esse propriæ explicationis.

Resp. Sciendum esse, propriam explicationem non opponi hîc explicationi, quæ à quolibet fit legitimè, per Scripturas; sed illi quæ à Scriptura alienissima est, et tamen Scripturæ obtruditur.

XXXI. Interpretatio alia est analogia *contextui*, alia analogia *fidei*.²¹

Distinctionis istius usus magnus est. Adferunt^p sæpe Theologi varias locorum Scripturæ interpretationes. Patres quoque sæpè non conveniunt in explicatione loci hujus vel illius, et afferunt illi quidem interpretationes *fidei analogas*, sed non semper *analogas contextui*; nam analogum contextui non potest esse nisi unum; quia plus uno verum esse nequit.

20 LCT, 44–45 [44–45]; TT, 34–39. | 21 TT, 34–39.

m ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-16 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}A^{JNSNO}-16 ⁶¹G-16 | n ⁵²F-17 | o ⁵⁹R-6 | p ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-17 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}A^{JNSNO}-17 ⁶¹G-17

this: I see what is good according to the thesis, but I do not see it according to the hypothesis; and therefore I follow the bad.

29. Regarding knowledge | men are called perfect and infants.

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There are some who think that it is not possible for us to be perfect in regard of knowledge of God and yet in the first stage of regeneration. But there is no contradiction between these two: someone may be called perfect in regard to infants, while his regeneration has just begun in regard of its completion. Therefore, there is no more contradiction here than in the assertion of Scripture that some are adults in faith, and that it nevertheless declares that we know in part and prophesy in part, 1Co 13,9.

30. A verbal interpretation differs from a real interpretation. The first one concerns words, while the second concerns meaning. Interpretation must not be a private explication, 2P 1,20.

The *question* is: in what manner can the assertion that anyone should scrutinize Scripture be consistent with the assertion that private explanation is not allowed? *Answer*: it should be known that private explication in this text (2P 1,20) is not opposed to the explication which is made by everyone in a legitimate way, when reading the Scriptures. But it is opposed to an explication that is most alien to Scripture but nevertheless obtrudes itself upon Scripture.

31. An interpretation analogous to context differs from an interpretation analogous to faith.

This distinction is of great importance. | Frequently, theologians present various interpretations of passages from Scripture. The Church Fathers also disagree in their explanation of several passages; and although they present interpretations analogous to the faith, yet these are not always analogous to the context. For analogous to the context can only be one: because more than one cannot be true.

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XXXII. Medium interpretationis Scripturæ primum est analogia fidei, hoc est, constans et aperta ac^q perpetua Scripturæ sententia, in apertis et minimè obscuris Scripturæ locis.²²

Ut sunt articuli fidei in Symbolo, Oratione dominica, Decalogo, et toto Catechismo, cujus singulæ partes expressâ Scripturâ confirmari possunt. Non tamen sola fidei analogia sufficiens est; quia interpretatio aliqua potest esse fidei analogâ, quæ tamen textu analogâ non est.^r Reliqua media interpretationis sunt: Frequens oratio, linguarum cognitio, fontium inspectio, argumenti atque scopi consideratio; vocum propriarum et impropriarum distinctio; Causarum, circumstantiarum, antecedentium, consequentium notatio; Logica analysis; Obscuriorum cum illustrioribus, similium cum similibus, dissimilium cum dissimilibus comparatio.^s Vide Exeg. Pisc. de scrip. Aphor. 16.

XXXIII. Media interpretandi Scripturam aliquando omnia adhibenda sunt ad locum aliquem explicandum, aliquando quædam.²³

Benè hoc observandum fuerit contra Pontif. Soph. qui ut eluderent media illa interpretandi Scripturam, quæ à nostris adhiberi solent, sigillatim illa examinant; Atqui nostra^t mens non est singula esse sufficientia; sed aut omnia, aut plerâque adhiberi debere. Imò notandum, non omnem Scripturæ partem egere interpretatione. Cum enim Scriptura per Scripturam sit explicanda oportet aliquam ita esse claram, ut nulla interpretatione indigeat; alioqui processus in infinitum daretur.

XXXIV. Etsi Ecclesia non det auctoritatem Verbo Dei, et etiamsi omnia ipsi examinanda sint ad Verbum Dei, tamen major est ejus autoritas, quam privati cujusvis.

Solent nobis objectare Pontificii, si, inquit, Scripturæ explicationes debemus accipere cum hac conditione, si consentiant cum Verbo Dei, tum omnibus privatis eandem reverentiam debemus, quam Ecclesiæ;^u quia si privatus cum Scriptura loquatur, etiam illum recipere debemus. Resp. Magis peccare eum qui non audit Ecclesiam, quam qui non audit privatum: Et ratio est; quia privatus quod facit, facit ex officio; At verò quod facit Ecclesia, id facit ex auctoritate.

22 LCT, 47–49 [48–50]; TT, 34–39. | 23 LCT, 47–49 [48–50]; TT, 34–39.

q ⁵²F-18 | r ⁵⁴R-7 | s ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-18 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-18 ⁶¹G-18 | t ⁵²F-19 | u ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-19
⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-19 ⁶¹G-19

32. The first means of interpreting Scripture is the analogy of faith, i.e. the constant, uncovered and universal meaning contained in clear and in no way obscure passages of Scripture.

Such are the articles of faith in the Apostles' Creed, the Lord's Prayer, the Decalogue and the whole Catechism of which the single parts can be confirmed by what is expressed in Scripture. The analogy of faith alone, however, is not sufficient. For it is possible that a certain interpretation is analogous to faith while not being analogous to the text. Other means of interpretation are: frequent prayer, knowledge of languages, inspection of sources, consideration of arguments and scope; distinction between words used in their proper and figurative sense; observation of causes, circumstances, antecedents and consequents; logical analysis, comparison of obscure passages with clear ones, similar with similar, dissimilar with dissimilar. | See Piscator, *Exeg. de scriptura*, Aphor. 16.⁷

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33. Sometimes all means for interpreting the Scriptures must be applied in order to explain a single passage, sometimes only a few.

This should be well observed against the popish sophists, who examine them one by one in order to ridicule the means of interpreting Scripture we usually apply. But our opinion is that they are not sufficient one by one, but that either all means or most of them must be applied. Or rather it should be noted that not every part of Scripture needs interpretation. For when Scripture is explained by Scripture it appears that one passage must be so clear that it is not in need of any interpretation. Otherwise the process of interpretation would go on endlessly.

34. Although the Church does not grant authority to the Word of God, and although all things should be examined by itself according to the Word of God, the authority of the Church is, nevertheless, greater than the authority of a private person.

The Papists *object* against us repeatedly by saying: if we must accept the explications of Scripture under the condition that they are in agreement with the Word of God, then we owe as much reverence to all private persons as to the Church. | For when a private person speaks according to Scripture we must admit him too. *Answer*: someone who does not listen to the Church commits a greater sin than someone who does not listen to a private person. The reason is that what a private person does, he does by virtue of an office but the Church

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7 See PISCATOR, *Aphorismi*, 13.

Gravius autem peccat iste qui non audit eum qui cum autoritate loquitur, quam qui ex officio loquitur.

XXXV. Aliud est esse alicujus^v quoad *inscriptionem*, aliud quoad *usum communem*.

Sic Epistola ad Romanos, Romanorum est, quoad inscriptionem; Ecclesiae verò universae, quoad usum communem. Dicitur enim Paulus omnibus fidelibus scripsisse quod scripsit Romanis. 2 Peter. 3. 15.

XXXVI. Modus operandi Scripturae non est *realis sive physicus, sed moralis*.²⁴

Obj. Per Scripturam regnimur, 1 Pet. 1. 23. Ergo agit realiter. *Resp.* Regeneratio est opus solius Dei, non minus ac creatio. Dum autem regeneratio Verbo Dei tribuitur, perinde tribuitur, ac Apostolis miracula, qui nihil ad patratiorem miraculorum contribuebant, nam Dei opus fuerunt: et tamen tribuuntur illis, quia sine interventu eorum^w non fiebant, ita ergo et regeneratio verbo Dei tribuitur, quia non fit sine interventu Verbi Dei.^x

XXXVII. Verbum Dei translatum in alias linguas non habet quidem eandem auctoritatem *originariam*, habet tamen auctoritatem *derivatam*.

XXXVIII Objectum Theologiae^y et Philosophiae sunt diversa et distincta,

Non tamen pugnant Theologia et Philosophia. Nam ars sutoria et sartoria, etsi diversa habeant objecta, tamen non pugnant inter se.

XXXIX. Verum cum vero non pugnat.^z

Sed tamen potest esse distinctum; itaque veritas Theologiae non pugnat cum veritate Philosophiae, et tamen sunt distinctae: v. g. Philosophia docet virginem parere non posse *naturaliter*, hoc verum est. Theologia docet virginem parere

24 LCT, 51–53 [51–53]; TT, 39–42.

acts in virtue of authority. So, it is a greater sin not to listen to a person who speaks with authority than to a person who speaks in virtue of an office.

35. A distinction must be made between a heading of something and its common use.

So according to its heading, the Epistle to the Romans is an epistle of the people of Rome, but according to its common use, it is an epistle of the universal Church. The things Paul wrote to the Romans are meant to be written for all believers, 2P 3,15.

36. The way Scripture operates is not real or physical but moral.

Objection: we are reborn by Scripture, 1P 1,23. *Ergo:* Scripture works in a real way. *Answer:* no less than creation, regeneration is a work of God alone. When regeneration, however, is attributed to God's Word, it is attributed to it in such a way as miracles are attributed to the apostles who contributed nothing to the accomplishment of miracles, for they were the work of God. Nevertheless, the miracles are attributed to the apostles, because they did not happen without their intervention. | In the same manner regeneration is attributed to the Word of God, because it does not happen without the intervention of the Word of God.

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37. The Word of God translated in other languages does not have the same original authority but has a derived authority.

38. The object of theology and the object of philosophy are diverse and distinct.

Theology and philosophy, however, do not conflict. Just as the art of the shoemaker and the art of a patcher do not conflict, although they have different objects.

39. Truth never runs counter to truth.

Nevertheless, a distinction is possible. Although the truth of theology does not conflict with the truth of philosophy, yet they are distinct. For example: philosophy teaches that it is impossible for a virgin to give birth in a natural way; and this is true. Theology teaches that a virgin can give birth in a supernatural

posse *supernaturaliter*, et hoc verum. Hæ veritates non sunt eædem, et tamen sunt veritates non pugnantes.

XL. Ratio sana non pugnat cum Theologia.^a

Sana dicimus, nam corrupta pugnat. *Obj.* Atque intellectus regenitus non capit divina perfectè. *Resp.* Aliud est *pugnare* cum re, aliud *non capere*.

XLI. Ratio requiritur ad Theologiam non ut *argumentum*, sed ut *instrumentum*.

Hoc est, non ut probemus ratione aliquid;^b sed ut capiamus et intelligamus divina, oportet ut rationem habeamus; neque enim vel infantes vel mente capti, Theologiam discere possunt.

XLII. A testimonio divino in rebus ad salutem necessariis, procedit argumentum et affirmatum et negatum.

Dicimus in rebus ad salutem scitu necessariis. Fluit autem ex eo, quia Scriptura continet omnia dogmata fidei, et præcepta morum perfectissimè. Cæterum in illis quæ ad salutem scitu necessaria non sunt, non obtinet hoc; tractat enim Scriptura de reliquis rebus extra Theologiam, sed non perfectè, sed obiter et incidenter.

XLIII. Quicquid per bonam consequentiam ex Scriptura deducitur, illud ipsum est Scriptura.

Sæpè homines dicunt talia ex quibus quædam^c deducuntur, quæ admittere nolunt, unde est deductio ad impossibile; Et ratio est, quia homines sæpè referunt talia pro veris, ex quibus postmodum eliciuntur alia quæ manifestè ostendunt non esse vera, atque adedò adigunt homines ad retractationem. At Deus sapientissimus, nihil dixit, quin omnia intellexerit, quæ ex his elici debuerant,^d unde etiam illud quod elicitur ex Scriptura, dicitur Scriptura: et quod elicitur ex Mose et Davide, dicuntur Moses et David dixisse. Vide Matth. 22. Luc. 20. Act. 2.

XLIV. In disputationibus accuratis impropria permutanda sunt propriis.

^a ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-21 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-21 ⁶¹G-21 | ^b ⁵²F-22 | ^c ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-22 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-22 ⁶¹G-22 | ^d ⁵²F-23

way; and this is true also. These truths are not the same, and yet they are truths which do not conflict.

40. Sound reason and theology do not conflict. |

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We speak here about sound reason, for corrupted reason and theology do conflict. *Objection:* but a reborn intellect does not grasp the divine in a perfect way. *Answer:* conflicting is something else than not grasping.

41. Reason is required for theology as instrument and not as proof.

That is to say, reason is not used in order to prove something. But in order to grasp and understand divine things, we need to have reason. For children and people without intellectual faculties are not able to learn theology.

42. From the divine testimony concerning things necessary for salvation proceed proofs by which things can be affirmed or negated.

We say: in things necessary to know for salvation. This arises out of the fact that Scripture contains all doctrines of faith and moral precepts in a most perfect way. Of course, this does not hold for doctrines that are not necessary to know for salvation. For Scripture does not deal with things beyond theology in a perfect way, but only in passing and incidentally.

43. Anything whatsoever that can be deduced from Scripture by means of good consequence is Scripture itself.

People often say things from which certain other things | can be deduced which they are not willing to allow because that would be a deduction to the impossible. The reason is that people often consider certain things to be true from which afterwards other things are drawn which appear plainly not to be true, and indeed they bring people to reconsideration. Yet omniscient God knows all the necessary consequences of all He has said. Hence everything that is deduced from Scripture is called Scripture too. Moreover, what is deduced from Moses and David is considered to be said by Moses and David. See Mt 22, Lc 20, Act 2.

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44. In well-ordered disputations improper words should be replaced by proper words.

Nobilissima est hæc regula, nam in disputationibus sæpè fit abusus Scripturæ, si illam impropriis verbis aliquis efferat. Qui autem accuratè disputat, ille debet opponentem adigere ad hoc, ut impropria verba permutet propriis; si non possit, dicendum nos in gratiam ipsius id præstare velle. Si verò opponens noluerit, repellendus est à disputationibus. Ratio regulæ hæc est, quia impropria obscura sunt, obscura non convincunt; Ergo nec impropria. Obscura non convincere certum est; nam quomodo quod non intelligitur, convincere potest aliquem ut hoc vel illud credat?^e

XLV. Argumenta ex parabolis deducta, nihil probant nisi ratione scopi.

Utilissima est hæc regula. Itaque semper videndum est quis sit scopus parabolæ, qui scopus etiam vocari solebat *Formale* parabolæ; unde etiam videre licet quam ineptè argumentantur Sociniani ex Matth. 18. Deum^f nullâ satisfactione acceptâ condonare nobis peccata, quia dominus iste, qui servo dimisit debita, nulla satisfactione acceptâ hoc præstat. Nam argumentum hoc non est à scopo; scopus enim est, Deum illis remittere peccata qui aliis remittunt; non autem scopus est, quemadmodum iste remisit,^g Deum remittere. Ita etiam malè argumentantur^h Arminiani, qui docent, Deum Beneficium justificationis renovare, quia hic Deus renovavit beneficium, hoc enim non est ex scopo parabolæ. Si autem liceret ex materiali argumentari, tum æquè possemus dicere, aliquem posse condonare alteri, Deo invito; quia hic dicitur coniecisse in càrcerem servum suum. Sed de utraque hac regula observandum est Axioma Scholast. *Theologia Symbolica non est argumentativa.*ⁱ

e ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-23 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-23 ⁶¹G-23 | f ⁵²F-24 | g ⁵⁹R-8 | h ⁵⁴R-9 | i ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-24
⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-24 ⁶¹G-24

This is a very famous rule. For in disputations Scripture is often abused when someone brings forth Scripture with improper words. Anyone who performs a well-ordered disputation, however, must force his opponent to replace improper words by proper words. If he is not able to do this, then we should answer that we are willing to do this for him. If the opponent refuses, he must be repelled from the disputations. The reason for this rule is that improper words are obscure. Obscure words do not convince. Ergo: neither do improper words. It is certain that obscure words do not convince, for how is it possible that something not understood convinces someone to believe either this or that? |

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45. Proofs taken from parables prove nothing save only something regarding the scope of the parables.

This is a very useful rule. Therefore, one must always look at the scope of the parable which is usually called the formal side of the parable. Hence it can be seen how absurd it is to argue as the Socinians do from Mt 18 saying that God can forgive our sins without receiving any satisfaction, because the lord [in the parable] dismissed the debts of his slave without receiving any satisfaction. This proof is not derived from the scope of the parable, for its scope is that God forgives the sins of those who forgive others. The scope is not that God forgives just as the lord of the parable did. Likewise poorly the Arminians argue that God renews the grace of justification, because, in this parable, God has indeed renewed the grace of justification. But this cannot be deduced from the scope of the parable. For if it were allowed to argue from the material side of the parable, it could be equally said that it is possible to forgive one another against God's will. For the slave is said to have thrown his co-slave in prison. Regarding both rules the following scholastic axiom must be observed: Symbolic theology has no argumentative value. |

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CAPUT II.

De Lege.¹

I. Lex divina alia est *generalis*, alia *specialis*.

Generalis est, quæ omnes et singulos obligat; Specialis est, quæ certum statum hominum. Ita Generalis est, non occides, non furaberis. Specialis, honora parentes, nolito provocare liberos ad iram; omnibus^j benefaciendum, sed maximè domesticis fidei.

II. Præcepta Legis alia sunt *affirmativa*, alia *negativa*.

Hæc distinctio summè necessaria est, nam negativa obligant semper et quosvis, ut, non occides, non mœchaberis. Affirmativa non item. Verbi gratia, Præceptum de Eleëmosynis dandis; neque enim quis potest, neque semper, neque omnes.

III. Præcepta alia sunt *imperii*, alia *indulgentiæ*.

Et hæc utilissima. Nam videtur Deus multa mandare in Scriptura, quæ tamen si non faciamus, non peccamus; et videtur quædam mandare, quæ si non faciamus, peccamus. Illa præcepta, quæ si non faciamus, peccamus, dicuntur *Imperii*. Illa autem quæ facere^k possemus, et possumus omittere absque peccato, vocantur *Indulgentiæ* præcepta: Qualia in V. Test. erant, de non danda in usuram pecunia proximo, de vocando proximo in ius, de dimittenda uxore in adulterio comperta. Hæc talia et fieri poterant et non poterant, utrumque absque peccato, quia præcepta erant, non *imperii* præcepta, sed *indulgentiæ*.

¹ LCT, cc. 9-13, 56-115 [57-120]; TT, 42-70; TP, 82-90 [15-24]; TQ, 346-350 [11-15]; TC, 452-455; ПΨ-Lutheranorum, 586-587 [93-94]; A-E, 657-659.

j ⁵²F-25 | k ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-25 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-25 ⁶¹G-25

Chapter II

On the Law

1. The divine Law contains a general and a special law.

The general law binds all mankind and every single person, the special law binds man in a certain state. Thus, 'thou shalt not kill' and 'thou shalt not steal' are general laws. 'Honor thy father and thy mother', 'do not provoke your children to wrath' and 'do good unto all men, especially unto them who are of the household of faith' are special laws.

2. Some precepts of the Law are affirmative, others negative.

This distinction is most necessary, for the negative ones bind everyone at any time, such as 'thou shalt not kill' and 'thou shalt not commit adultery'. Not thus the affirmative precepts. For example, the precept to give alms does not bind everyone, because not everyone is able to give alms, neither always nor all people.

3. Some precepts refer to a command, others to indulgence.

This is also a very useful distinction. For in Scripture, God seems to command many things in which we nevertheless do not sin, if we do not do them, and some things in which we indeed sin, if we do not do them. Precepts through which we sin by not doing them are called precepts of command. Precepts that we can do | and omit without sinning are called precepts of indulgence. Such were the precepts in the Old Testament not to lend money at interest to your neighbors, to sue your neighbors, to dismiss your wife when it is proved that she has committed adultery. Such things could happen or not happen, both without sinning, because they were precepts of indulgence, and not precepts of command.

IV. Quædam præcepta sunt quasi naturalia, adeo, quorum¹ contrarium nunquam jubet, quædam sunt quasi positiva, quorum aliquando contrarium iussit.²

Verbi gratia; nunquam contrarium iussit præcepto 1. 2. 3. 7. 9. At contrarium iussit 4. 5. 6. 8. 10. hoc est; nunquam præcepit Deos alienos habere; nomen Dei in vanum usurpare: At iussit parentibus debitum officium subtrahere: ut Abrahamum relinquere patriam, et ire in alias terras; occidere filium; voluit ut Israëlitæ acciperent mutuo, et non redderent.

V. Mandata alia sunt obedientiæ, alia explorationis, alia convictionis.³

Utilissima distinctio in multis controversiis Theologicis. Quæritur de vocatione externa; Anne quos Deus externè vocat, eos velit salvari? Scriptura negat, Matth. 22. *Multi^m vocati*, etc. Et vocatione jubentur homines obedire Deo, et tamen Deus non vult ut obediant omnes, alioqui hoc facturi fuissent. Ergo, Deus hoc proponit, eo fine, ut *convincat*, vel *explorentur*.

Secundus usus distinctionis est in multis Scripturæ locis explicandis. Exempli gratia; Quæritur, An Deus id voluerit, dum præciperet Pharaoni, ut dimitteret populum Israëliticum? *Resp.* Præcepit Deus præceptoⁿ *convictionis*, non *obedientiæ*: Item;^o Anne dum juberet Abrahamum immolare filium suum, illud etiam voluerit?

Resp. Voluit præcepto *explorationis*. *Quærit.* Quare Deus explorat, cum omnia noverit ab æterno? *Resp.* Deus non explorat propter se, sed propter nos, ut sciamus quid nos sumus, ut Job. 33. hoc est, vult nos nobismet ipsis reddere notos. Ita Petrum, cùm se ipsum non nosset, permisit Deus labi, ut infirmitatis suæ convinceretur, et sibi ipsi innotesceret, quam vera fuerit illa de constantia sua persuasio.

VI. Ad quæ lege obligamur, duplicis generis sunt; quædam quæ præcipit et docet, quædam quæ tantummodo præcipit.^p

2 LCT, 60–82 [61–84]. | 3 CT, 1–4.

1 ⁵²F-26 | m ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-26 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSN^O-26 ⁶¹G-26 | n ⁵⁴R-10 | o ⁵²F-27 | p ⁵⁹R-9

4. Some precepts are so to speak natural, because God never commands the opposite; other precepts are so to speak positive, because He sometimes commanded the opposite.

For example, God never commands the opposite of the first, second, third, seventh and ninth commandments. But He commands the opposite of the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth and tenth commandments. That is to say, He never prescribes to have other gods or to take the name of the Lord in vain. But He orders to renounce duties owed to parents by commanding Abraham to leave his country and to go to another land and to kill his son; He also wanted the Israelites to receive borrowed money without having to pay it back.

5. A distinction must be made between commandments of obedience, commandments of trial and commandments that convince.

This distinction is very helpful in many theological controversies. So the *question* whether God will save those who He has called in an external manner? is *answered* in the negative by Scripture, Mt 22: 'For many are called, | but few are chosen.' etc. And through calling people are commanded to obey God, but nevertheless God does not want all people to obey, otherwise they should have done so. Therefore, God proposes this in order to convince or test people.

26

The second use of the distinction concerns the explanation of many places in the Scriptures. For example, if the *question* is raised whether it was the will of God when he commanded Pharaoh to let the Israelites go, the *answer* is that God ordered this as a command of convincement and not of obedience. Likewise: was it God's will when he ordered Abraham to sacrifice his son?

Answer: it was God's command in terms of a trial. If it is *asked* why God puts us to the test, although He knows everything from eternity, the *answer* is that God does not put us to the test because of Himself, but because of us, in order to let us know what we are, Job 33. That is to say, it is his will that we should make ourselves known to ourselves. Thus God permitted Peter - not yet knowing himself - to fall in order to convince him of his infirmity and to bring him to a deeper understanding whether his persuasion about his own steadfastness were true.

6. There are two sorts of things the Law obliges us to do: things God prescribes and teaches and things He only just prescribes.

Utilissima distinctio, et quidem contra Socinianos et Arminianos; putant illi quædam opera esse *Evangelii*, cùm nos urgemus^q ex^r *operibus Legis* non justificari aliquem. Regerunt, ita quidem esse, sed tamen ex *operibus Evangelii* justificari posse, et alia esse *opera Legis*, alia *Evangelii*. Opera *Evangelii* esse, pœnitentiam agere, credere, etc. Nam illa non esse opera *Legis*, patet, quia *Lex* nihil aliud præcipit quàm hoc, *Fac hæc et vives*: Et, *Maledictus qui non manserit*, etc. De pœnitentia et fide, in *Lege* altum silentium.

Resp. Duplicia sunt quæ *Lex* præcipit. Quædam quæ *docet* et *præcipit*; qualia sunt, Non^s occides, Non mœchaberis, quædam quæ non *docet*, sed *præcipit*; ut, credere *Evangelio*; nam quod credendum sit *Evangelio*, ad hoc *Lex* obligat, quæ vult ut obediamus Deo quicquid nobis præceperit.

Finis *Legis* moralis alius est in statu lapsus et reparationis, alius in statu integritatis. In integritatis statu hunc finem habuit, ut homo per eam justificaretur: in statu lapsus finis est agnitio peccati. *Dices*; Nullum jam esse finem *Legis* moralis in statu reparationis; quia justo non est *Lex* posita. *Resp.* Non est illi *Lex* posita in *pœnam* et *condemnationem*, sed in *directionem*.⁴

VII. *Lex* ceremonialis quoad ritus Ecclesiasticos, facit speciem diversam à lege morali et forensi. Quatenus verò continet doctrinam de sacrificiis,^t Christi adventum adumbrantibus, eatenus est doctrina *Evangelii*.⁵

Gravissima est controversia inter Theologos, utrùmne *Lex* ceremonialis faciat contradistinctam speciem à *Lege* morali et judiciali: an verò ad doctrinam *Evangelii* pertineat. Aliqui, ut Pareus, simpliciter ad doctrinam *Evangelii* pertinere volunt, aliqui contra, ut Amesius; sed distinctio allata rem tollit, ac componit.^u

4 LCT, 94–97 [98–100]. | 5 LCT, 100–103 [104–107]; TT, 66–70.

q ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-27 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-27 | r ⁶¹G-27 | s ⁵²F-28 | t ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-28 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-28 ⁶¹G-28 | u ⁵²F-29

This is a very useful distinction, in particular against the Socinians and Arminians. They think that some works belong to the Gospel, whereas we argue | that the works of the Law justify nobody. They react by saying: 'this is certainly true, but it is still possible that someone is justified by the works of the Gospel, for the works of the Law differ from works of the Gospel. Works of the Gospel are such as doing penance and believing etc. For it is clear that these works do not belong to the Law, since the Law prescribes nothing but 'do this and live' [Rm 10,5] or 'cursed is everyone who does not continue in all things written in the book of Law' [G 3,10]. The Law is conspicuously silent as to penance and faith.'

27

Answer: the Law prescribes two kinds of things: things taught and prescribed such as 'thou shalt not kill', 'thou shalt not commit adultery'; and things not taught, but prescribed such as believing the Gospel. For that we have to believe in the Gospel is something the Law obliges us to do. The Law wants us to obey God in all that He commands us.

The purpose of the moral law in the fallen state and in the state of renewal differs from that in the state of integrity. In the state of integrity its purpose was to justify mankind, in the fallen state it was for the acknowledgment of sin. You could counter by saying that in the state of restoration moral law has no longer any purpose, because the Law is not made for justified persons. The *answer* is: the Law is not made in order to punish or condemn, but in order to direct justified persons.

7. The ceremonial law regarding ecclesiastical rituals presents a category, which is different from the moral and civil laws. In so far as it contains the doctrine of sacrifices, | which adumbrate the coming of Christ, it is the doctrine of the Gospel.

28

It is a very serious controversy between theologians whether the ceremonial law presents a category completely different from moral and judicial law or that it pertains to the doctrine of the Gospel. Some theologians like Pareus¹ think that it simply belongs to the doctrine of the Gospel; other theologians like Amesius² think the opposite. But the adduced distinction removes the problem and solves the case.

1 David Pareus (Wängler) (1548-1622), since 1598 professor of Old and New Testament at the university of Heidelberg. His exegetical works are included in PAREUS, *Opera theologica exegetica*.

2 AMES, *The Marrow of Theology*, I.39.10-16.

VIII. Ceremoniæ, quæ in Vet. Test. observabantur, erant umbræ rerum futurarum, si nimir. umbram pro typo accipias; non verò umbræ erant, si sumas pro re vana et nihilo. Hebr. 10. 1.⁶

Multi offenduntur quod vocemus sacrificia umbras, et dicunt, umbram accipi pro re vana, ut homo, umbra, pulvis; at illi malè faciunt; nam ipsa Scriptura vocat umbram, Hebr. 10. 1 Sed umbra accipitur pro typo.

IX. Sacrificium triplex est, ἱλαστικὸν, εὐχαριστικὸν, λύτρον .

Est distinctio Theologorum, quæ tamen non est satis accurata; nam potius ita debebat distingui. Sacrificium vel est ἱλαστικόν,^v vel εὐχαριστικὸν et ἱλαστικόν, *typicum* vel *reale*, quod λύτρον vocatur.

X. Sacrificia typica expiabant peccata *typicé*, non *realiter*.

XI. Sacrificia non placebant Deo ex opere operato: sed quatenus typi erant Christi.^w

Est distinctio notoria, quæ defendi debet contra Judæos, qui putant placuisse illa Deo ex opere operato; quod si verum est,^x etiam Messia exhibitio placerent; at hoc falsum. Esai. 66. 3.

XII. Absque sanguinis effusione non fit remissio. Spectando sacrificia collectivè sive simul sumpta, non autem separatim.

Multi ineptiunt ex Epist. ad Hebr. 9. et dicunt, omne sacrificium debere esse cruentum: Sed vide contrarium Levit. 5. 11, 12, 13. unde liquet dari sacrificium aliquod incruentum. Adeoque non satis accuratè eos ratiocinari contra Missam, Contradictionem esse, Missam esse sacrificium, et esse incruentum. Hinc etiam distinctio sacrificiorum apud Hebr. in ea quæ vocabantur זֶבַח *Zevach*, victima mactatio, à מִנְחָה mactavit:^y et ea quæ dicebantur מִנְחָה *Mincha* munus, donum,

⁶ LCT, 100–103 [104–107]; TT, 66–70.

v ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-29 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-29 ⁶¹G-29 | w ⁵⁴R-11 | x ⁵²F-30 | y ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-30 O-30

8. The ceremonials, which were observed in the Old Testament, were shadows of things to come, if, of course, you consider a shadow to be a type. They were no shadows at all, if you see shadows as empty realities or of no value, Hbr 10, 1.

Many are offended by our identification of sacrifices as shadows. They argue that the term 'shadow' refers to a vain reality, like man is a shadow or dust. But they are wrong for Scripture itself uses the word 'shadow' in Hbr 10,1. Here, shadow is interpreted as type.

9. Sacrifice is threefold: sacrifice of expiation, sacrifice of thanksgiving and sacrifice as ransom.

This distinction made by theologians, however, is not sufficiently accurate. It is better to make the following distinction: sacrifice refers either to expiation [alone] | or to thanksgiving and expiation [together]; furthermore, what is called a ransom is typical or real. 29

10. Typical sacrifices expiated sins typically, not in reality.

11. Sacrifices did not please God by the work performed, but in so far as they presented a type of Christ.

This is a famous distinction that must be defended against the Jews who assert that sacrifices pleased God, because of the work performed. If this were true, then the sacrifices should have been pleasing after the Messiah had come, but this is not true, Is 66,3.

12. There is no forgiveness without the shedding of blood. This is true if the sacrifices are viewed collectively or taken together, not by considering them separately.

From chapter 9 of the Epistle to the Hebrews many absurdly conclude that every sacrifice must be bloody. For the contrary, see Lv 5,11-13. Hence it becomes clear that there were sacrifices without bloodshed. Therefore, those who assert that it is a contradiction to say that mass is a sacrifice without bloodshed do not accurately argue against the mass. Hence the distinction of sacrifices made in Hebrews between sacrifices called *zevach* (which means: the slaying of the victim, and is derived from 'the one who slays') and the sacrifices

oblatio, sub quibus quoque sacrificia^z incruenta comprehendebantur. Dicendum ergo est: Nullum sacrificium, quod est victima, est vel potest esse incruentum. Atqui Missa Pontificia est sacrificium tale, quod victimam esse dicunt pro vivis et mortuis: Ergo non potest esse incruentum. Dicere autem simpliciter, sacrificium esse, et incruentum esse, contradictionem esse in adjecto,^a ineptum est, ut liquet ex dictis. Fuerunt quippe sacrificia quædam dapalia sacrificia, de quibus Levit. 5. vers.^b 11, 12, 13. quæ ad *Mincha* referuntur; unde sunt, quæ nequaquam cruenta fuerunt. Non itaque est absurdum, sacrificium esse incruentum, etiamsi alia ex causa necessariò sequatur, Christi sacrificium esse cruentum; quia omnia sacrificia collectivè sumpta, Christum unicum et solum referunt.

XIII. Sacrificia singula sunt typi Christi inadæquati, non adæquati.

Ita mactatio pecudis erat typus inadæquatus Christi, non enim omnia, quæ in Christo futura erant, adumbrabat; ita combustio erat typus inadæquatus Christi, quia mortem tantum gehennalem significabat, quia in Christo multa alia eveniebant.

XIV. Alii sunt typi absolutè dicti, alii typi sacrificia.

^c Non omnis typus est sacrificium, licet omne sacrificium sit typus: Verbi gratia, æneus serpens, Joh. 3. 14. fuit typus Christi, sic Jonas, Matth. 12. non tamen sacrificium.

XV. Alia sunt sacrificia ordinaria, alia extraordinaria.

Hæc distinctio partim pendet à circumstantiis loci, partim à causis, quod scilicet aliqua non peracta sint in templo; aliqua^d quod peracta sint non à Sacerdotibus, sed à Prophetis, aut aliis, ut à *Gideon*, Judic. 6. à *Manoach*, Judic. 13.

XVI. Sacrificandi vox dupliciter accipitur; 1. pro simpliciter mactare; 2. pro mactare in sacrificium, Gen. 31.

Propterea hæc distinctio annotatur, ut ostendatur agnum istum Paschalem, non fuisse sacrificium, etsi dicitur, quod sit immolatus; nam immolatio accipitur hic in prima significatione.

^z ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}_30 ⁶¹G-30 | ^a ⁵⁹R-10 | ^b ⁵²F-31 | ^c ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-31 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-31 ⁶¹G-31 | ^d ⁵²F-32

| called *mincha*, which is a gift, a present, an offering in which sacrifices without bloodshed are also included. Therefore, it must be stated that no sacrifice that involves a victim is or can be without bloodshed. The popish mass, however, is such a sacrifice, because they say that it is a victim for the living and the dead. Ergo it cannot be without bloodshed. Their simple assertion: ‘a bloodless sacrifice’ is a contradiction between noun and adjective, it is a foolish assertion, as becomes clear from what is said. For there were certain sacrificial banquets (see Lv 5,11-13) which were considered as *mincha* or gifts. Therefore there are some which were absolutely not bloody sacrifices. It is not absurd, then, to say that a sacrifice is without bloodshed, although from another cause it necessarily follows that Christ’s sacrifice was bloody, because all sacrifices taken together refer to the one and only Christ. 30

13. Single sacrifices are inadequate, not adequate types of Christ.

Thus the slaughtering of animals was an inadequate type of Christ, for it did not sketch all elements that would become future reality in Christ. The burning sacrifice as well was an inadequate type of Christ, because it only signified an infernal death. In Christ, however, many other things came forth.

14. Some types are called type in an absolute sense other types are sacrifices. | 31

Not every type is a sacrifice, but every sacrifice is a type. The copper serpent (J 3,14), for example was a type of Christ; as was Jonah (Mt 12), but they were no sacrifices.

15. A distinction must be made between regular and special sacrifices.

This distinction is depending partly on circumstances of place, partly on causes regarding the fact that some sacrifices were not accomplished in the temple and the fact that not priests but prophets or other people, such as Gideon, (Jdg 6), and Manoah, (Jdg 13), accomplished them.

16. The verb ‘to sacrifice’ is taken in a twofold sense: 1. Simple slaughtering; 2. Slaughtering in order to bring an offering, Gn 31.

This distinction is commented on in order to show that the paschal lamb was not a sacrifice, although it is said to be immolated, for, in this case, the immolation is understood in its first meaning.

XVII. Sacerdos dicitur summus, non quod imperium habeat in alios, sed quod summa obiret munia.

Hæc distinctio propter Pontif. adhibetur, qui putant in Veter. Test. fuisse unum caput visibile, visibilis Ecclesiæ, cui omnia subjacerent; at contrarium exstat Hebr. 9. et liquet^e cur dictus fuerit summus Sacerdos, nempe non quod fuerit caput Ecclesiæ imperans, sed tantum quod summa obiret munia.^f

XVIII. Sacerdos alius est *Aaronicus*, alius *Melchisedecianus*.

Christus Melchisedecianus, reliqui erunt Aaronici. Dicant Pontificii cujus sint ordinis: non prioris, quia Judæi essent;^g non posterioris, quia istius post Melchisedechum non nisi unicus Christus fuit.

XIX. Lex forensis, quoad ea quæ communia sunt omnibus, abolita; non est quoad ea quæ genti Judaicæ peculiaria, omnino.⁷

Vide de hoc Locos communes nostros.

⁷ LCT, 97–99 [101–104]; TT, 61–66.

e ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-32 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-32 ⁶¹G-32 | f ⁵⁴R-12 | g ⁵²F-33

17. The title 'high priest' does not refer to a person having power over other priests, but to a person who is engaged in the highest offices.

This distinction is made because of the Papists, who think that in the Old Testament there was only one visible head of the visible Church to whom everything was subjected. But Hbr 9 shows that the opposite was the case. | Here, it becomes clear why he was called a high priest: not because he was the commanding head of the Church, but only because he performed the highest offices.

32

18. A distinction should be made between a priest after the order of Melchisedek and a priest after the order of Aaron.

Christ is a priest after the order of Melchisedek, the others will be priests after the order of Aaron. Let the Papists explain how their priests must be classified. They do not belong to the order of Aaron since these were all Jews. Neither do they belong to the order of Melchisedek, for after Melchisedek it was only Christ who was priest after the order of Melchisedek.

19. The forensic law is abolished regarding things common to all, but it is not at all abolished regarding the particularities of the Jewish nation.

On this subject, see our *Loci Communes*.

CAPUT III.

De Evangelio.¹

I. Evangelium dupliciter accipitur in Scriptura, vel *latè* pro doctrina Evangelii prout opponitur legi; vel *strictè*, pro Evangelii doctrina de Christo jam exhibito, et hoc modo ad Rom. 1. 16.²

II. Evangelium est ministerium spiritus, Lex ministerium mortis.^{3h}

Distinctio habetur 2 Cor. 2. quare verò Spiritus ministerium vocatur? *Resp.* Propterea, quia in doctrina Evangelii Spirit. Sanctus omnes peccatores pœnitentes consolatur: Et Lex propterea dicitur ministerium mortis, quia omnes pronunciat maledictos. Deut. 27. vers. 26.¹

III. Evangelium docet pœnitentiam, non Lex.⁴

Lex nihil habet de pœnitentia, sed hæc est doctrina Evangelii, quod peccatorem docet, ut respiscat, si vivere velit. Lex tamen ad pœnitentiam obligat, etsi eam non docet.^j

IV. Evangelium non docet de peccato, sed Lex.⁵

Est nobis controversia cum Lutheranis de hac distinctione, illi enim putant quod Evangelium doceat de peccato: At verò hoc Legis est, quia ex Lege est agnitio peccati, Rom. 3. Interim tamen Evangelium accipit hoc principium à Lege, et illo utitur in misero peccatore informando. Quandoquidem Lex te

¹ LCT, c. 13, 100–115 [104–120]; TT, 70–76; TP, 91–95, [24–29]; TQ, 350–352 [15–18]; ПΨ-Lutheranorum, 586–587 [93–94]; A-E, 660. | ² LCT, 103 [107]. | ³ LCT, 112–113 [117–118]; TT, 74–76. | ⁴ LCT, 111–112 [115–116]; TT, 73–74. | ⁵ LCT, 111–112 [115–116]; TT, 73–74.

Chapter III

On the Gospel

1. In Scripture Gospel is understood in a twofold sense, either in a broad sense as the doctrine of the Gospel as opposed to the Law, or in a strict sense as the doctrine of the Gospel of Christ who is now revealed. In the latter sense it is used in Rm 1,16.

2. The Gospel is a ministry of the Spirit; the Law is a ministry of death. |

33

This distinction is made in 2Co 3,7-9. But why is it called a ministry of the Spirit? *Answer:* because in the doctrine of the Gospel the Spirit comforts all penitent sinners. And therefore the Law is called a ministry of death, because it proclaims that all men are cursed, Dt 27,26.

3. Penitence is taught by the Gospel, not by the Law.

The Law contains nothing about penitence; it is the doctrine of the Gospel that teaches the sinner to have repentance if he wants to live. Although the Law does not teach penitence, it nevertheless puts us under the obligation of penitence.

4. The Gospel does not teach about sin, the Law does.

On this distinction we disagree with the Lutherans. For they conclude that the Gospel teaches about sin. But this belongs to the Law, for by the Law is the knowledge of sin, Rm 3. Meanwhile, however, the Gospel takes over this principle from the Law by using it as a means to inform the miserable sinner.

convincit peccati, nec ulla spes emergendi quàm per Christum. Ergo tibi ad Christum accedendum, si salvari cupis.

V. Evangelii usus et finis est alius^k per se; alius, ex intentione autoris ipsius.

Evangelii finis ex se nihil aliud est quam illuminatio. At ratione ejus qui est autor Evangelii, potest esse ratione quorundam potius, excoëcatio: Ideo enim Christus vult sæpè prædicari Evangelii doctrinam, ut cœci magis fiant, Joh. 12. solet alias distingui in^l finem *operis*, et *operantis*.

VI. Nulla sunt opera Evangelii, sed omnia sunt opera Legis.⁶

Arminiani, qui putant nos justificari ex operibus, dum proferimus loca Scripturæ quæ hoc negant, dicunt, Scripturam loqui de operibus Legis, non Evangelii; dicunt opera Evangelii esse fidem, et usum Sacramentorum: Sed sciendum, opera Legis esse distinguenda. Quædam enim Lex docet et jubet, ut ea quæ sunt in Decalogo; quædam jubet, non autem docet, ut quæ sunt in doctrina Evangelii, Fides et Pœnitentia.^m

VII. Mandatum de credendo Evangelio universale est, at promissiones sunt particulares.⁷

Maxima est disceptatio inter nos et Lutheranos: illi enim docent, ad quos mandatum, ad et illos promissio pertinet: Sed falsum. Nam mandatum pertinebat ad omnesⁿ Israelitas, at promissio non item, ut Rom. 9. vers. 8. aliqui dicuntur esse filii promissionis.

VIII. Evangelii doctrina est propter Legis doctrinam.⁸

⁶ LCT, 111–112 [115–116]; TT, 73–74. | ⁷ LCT, 112–115 [117–120]; TT, 74–76. | ⁸ LCT, 112–115 [117–120]; TT, 74–76.

^k ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-34 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-34 ⁶¹G-34 | ^l ⁵²F-35 | ^m ⁵⁴R-13 | ⁿ ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-35 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-35
⁶¹G-35

Seeing that the Law convinces you of sin and that there is no other hope to get away than through Christ, you should come over to Christ, if you desire to be saved.

5. The use and the goal of the Gospel taken by themselves | differ from the use and goal of the Gospel when seen from the intention of its author. 34

The goal of the Gospel by itself is nothing else but illumination. In respect of its author, however, it is also possible that it results rather in the blinding of some people. Therefore, it is the will of Christ to preach the doctrine of the Gospel frequently so that their blindness would increase, J 12,40. Elsewhere, the usual distinction is that between the goal of a work and the goal of the author of a work.¹

6. There are no works of the Gospel; all works are of the Law.

The Arminians, who think that we are justified by works, assert - when we advance passages from Scripture that deny this - that Scripture speaks there about the works of the Law, and not about the works of the Gospel. They say that the works of the Gospel are faith and the use of sacraments. One should know, however, that the works of the Law must be distinguished. For the Law teaches and commands some works like those contained in the Ten Commandments; but other works the Law indeed commands, but without teaching them, like the works in the doctrine of the Gospel, namely faith and penitence.

7. The command to believe the Gospel is universal, but its promises are particular.

This is a point of very great disagreement between the Lutherans and us. For they teach that those who receive the commandment to believe do also receive the promise. But this is not true, because the commandment pertained to all Israelites, | but not so the promise, Rm 9,8. Only some of them are called the children of the promise. 35

8. The doctrine of the Gospel is because of the doctrine of the Law.

¹ Annotation in the margin of the Oxford edition: 'See Maccovius' *Metaphysics*, 80, c.9.'

Et Lex est propter Evangelium, et Evangelium propter Legem. Lex propter Evangelium, quia ducit ad Christum; Evangelium propter Legem, quia justificatio nostri^o est propter sanctitatem Christi, quam Lex exigebat à nobis.

IX. Aliter se habuit doctrina Evangelii in Veteri Testamento, atque se habet in Novo.⁹

1. Nam in Vet. Test. adjunctas habuit ceremonias multiplices, sacrificia, à quibus in Novo liberi sumus.
2. In Vet. Test. obscurius sonabat; in Novo clarius, quippe ibi de exhibendo, hic de exhibitio Christo.
3. Doctrina Evangelii, in Vet. Test. communiter et ordinariè pertinebat ad solos Judæos, Psal. 147. 19, 20. in Novo ad omnes gentes. Dicitur autem communiter et ordinariè ad solos Judæos pertinuisse; quia extra Judæos erant etiam Proseliti, quod extraordinarium fuit.

X. Evangelium etsi pertineat ad omnes gentes, non tamen ad omnes singulos.^p

Promissiones Evangelii universales sunt quoad *promulgationem*, sive *prædicationem*, Matth. 28. non verò quoad *applicationem*, quæ solis electis obtingit.

XI. Fœdus aliud est *commune*, aliud *speciale*.¹⁰

Fœdus commune est, quod vocari solet à^o Theologis, *mediatum*; quia mediante homine, contractum erat cum omnibus. Gen. 9. 11. de Iride.

XII. Speciale est vel *Legale*, vel *Evangelicum*.¹¹

9 LCT, 113–115 [118–120]; TT, 74–76. | 10 LCT, 500 [554]. | 11 LCT, 500 [554].

o ⁵²F-36 | p ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-36 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-36 ⁶¹G-36 | q ⁵²F-37

Both the Law is because of the Gospel and the Gospel is because of the Law. The Law is because of the Gospel for it leads to Christ; the Gospel is because of the Law, since our justification which the Law requires of us is because of the sanctity of Christ.

9. The way the doctrine of the Gospel was present in the Old Testament differs from the way it is present in the New Testament.

1. For in the Old Testament the doctrine of the Gospel had manifold added ceremonies and sacrifices, from which we are freed in the New Testament.
2. In the Old Testament it sounded more obscure, in the New Testament more clearly; the first dealt with the Christ as the Messiah yet to come, the second with the Christ who has come.
3. In the Old Testament the doctrine of the Gospel generally and ordinarily pertained to the Jews only, Ps 147,19–20. In the New Testament it pertains to all nations. The reason for saying that the Gospel had pertained generally and ordinarily to the Jews only is that besides the Jews there were also proselytes which was extraordinary.

10. Although the Gospel pertains to all nations, it does not pertain to each nation in particular. |

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The promises of the Gospel are universal in their promulgation or preaching, Mt 28. But they are not universal in their application, which is granted to the elect only.

11. A distinction must be made between a general covenant and a special covenant.

Theologians usually call the general covenant a mediated covenant, since through the mediation by a man it was established with all. See the covenant of the rainbow in Gn 9,11.

12. The special covenant [as opposed to the general covenant] is either a legal covenant or an evangelical covenant.

XIII. *Legale*, pro duplici statu hominum, duplex est, vel in statu *integritatis*, vel *lapsus*.¹²

In statu integritatis erat fœdus sancitum inter Deum et homines, ut homo Legi pareret: Deus homini parenti promiserat vitam æternam, et hoc stabiliverat signo arboris vetitæ. Post lapsum fœdus legale erat, in quo Deus postulat obedientiam, et promittit vitam æternam, sed hoc fœdus signo nullo stabilitum.^r

XIV. Evangelicum fœdus est vel *vetus*, vel *novum*.¹³

Vetus, quod Deus pepigit cum Abrahamo et ex ipso ortis. *Novum*, cum omnibus gentibus.^s

XV. Evangelicum fœdus non pertinet ad omnes, sed ad quosdam ex omnibus gentibus.

Probatur ex Epist. ad Rom. 9. ubi distinguuntur filii promissionis seu fœderis à reliquis,^t quod utique non fieret, si omnes et singuli pertinerent ad fœdus.

XVI. Soli fœderati sunt legitimi possessores mundi, reliqui verò usurpatores.

Probatur Rom. 4, 13. et hinc jam intelligitur illud, 1 Cor. 3. vers. 21. quod scilicet omnia sunt fidelium, quia ius habent in rem omnem.

XVII. A proprietate verborum non est discedendum absque necessitate.^u

Hæc regula est propter istos, qui omnia impropiè accipi volunt, quales sunt Sociniani; sed dum hæc agunt, ratio ab ipsis petenda est, quare discedant.

XVIII. Vox magis usitata præferenda est minus usitata, nisi certa ratio subsit.

¹² LCT, 500 [554]. | ¹³ LCT, 501–502 [555–556].

r ⁵⁹R-12 | s ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-37 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSS}O-37 ⁶¹G-37 | t ⁵²F-38 | u ⁵⁴R-14

13. In virtue of the twofold state of mankind, the legal covenant is twofold: either in the state of integrity or in the state of the fall.

In the state of integrity the covenant was established between God and mankind so that man should obey the Law. God had promised obedient man eternal life and He had supported this by the sign of the forbidden tree. After the fall it was a legal covenant in which God requires obedience and promises eternal life, but this covenant was not supported by any sign.

14. The evangelical covenant is either old or new.

The old covenant is the covenant God made with Abraham and his offspring. The new covenant is made with all nations. |

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15. The evangelical covenant does not pertain to all people but only to some from all nations.

This is proved from the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans in which the children of the promise or covenant are distinguished from the rest. This distinction would never have been made, if all people, one by one, belonged to the covenant.

16. Only the confederates are the legitimate possessors of the world, the rest are usurpators.

This is proved by Rm 4,13 and hence what is said in 1Co 3,21 is understood, namely that all things belong to the faithful, because they have a right to all things.

17. It is not allowed to deviate from the proper sense of words without necessity.

This rule is because of all those who want to understand all things in an improper way. That is what the Socinians do. But when doing so they should be asked for the reason of their deviation.

18. A more customary word must be preferred to a less customary word unless there is a certain reason for this.

Necessitas hujus regulæ eadem est quæ prioris.

XIX. Scriptura flagitium jubens^v aut prohibens virtutem, figuratè est intelligenda.

Ita dum jubet sibi eruere oculum, pedem absecare, etc.^w

The necessity of this rule is the same as that of the preceding one.

19. When Scripture commands a fault | or forbids a virtue, it must be interpreted figuratively. 38

For example, when God commands someone to pluck out his eye or to cut off his foot.

CAPUT IV.

De Deo.¹

I. Cognitio Dei est vel *naturalis*, vel *revelata*.

Cognitio Dei naturalis est, quæ se in adultis sanâ mente præditis, sponte exerit; ita ut nemine docente, persuasi sint, esse numen aliquod sapientissimum, potentissimum, quod mundum et quæ in eo sunt, condidit, gubernat, et quod id numen religiosè colendum sit. Primum membrum distinctionis habetur Rom. 1. 20. Secundum, in Evangelio Joh. 1. vers. 18. Cæterum sciendum est, naturalem cognitionem dici, non quòd, ut Vorstius nugatur, sit à natura, quemadmodum, verbi gratia, Visus, Auditus; sed quòd nullo docente ubi ad rationis usum devenitur, ex principiis innatis proficiscatur hæc ipsa cognitio.

II. Cognitio naturalis non salvat, sed inexcusabiles reddit homines.

Vide Rom. 1. vers. 20.^x

III. Cognitio Dei non est comprehensiva,^y sed apprehensiva.

Comprehendi dicitur, quod perfectè capitur. Deus perfectè capi non potest, quoniam infinitus non potest capi à finito.

IV. Deus apprehenditur cognitione analogica, non rei, sed conceptus.

¹ LCT, cc. 14–28, 116–236 [121–243]; TT, 76–129; TP, 95–109, 124–127 [29–45, 60+63]; TQ, 352–365 [18–33]; TC, 455–459; ПΨ-Socinianorum, 551–555, 558–560 [55–58, 62–64]; ПΨ-Lutheranorum, 579–580 [85–86]; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 595–601 [103–110]; A-E, 634–636.

x ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-39 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-39 ⁶¹G-39 | y ⁵²F-40

Chapter IV

On God

1. The knowledge of God is either natural or revealed.

The natural knowledge of God is a knowledge which of itself arises in grown up people endowed with a sound mind so that they – without being instructed by someone else – are persuaded that there is a most wise and almighty deity, who created and governs the world and all that is in it; and that this deity must be worshipped in a reverent way. The first part of this distinction is found in Rm 1,20, the second in the Gospel of J 1,18. Furthermore, one ought to know that this knowledge is called natural, not because it belongs to nature such as, for example, seeing and hearing (as Vorstius¹ chatters), but because this knowledge – not being taught by anyone – proceeds from innate principles, when someone comes to the use of reason.

2. Natural knowledge does not save, but it renders mankind without excuse.

See Rm 1,20. |

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3. Knowledge of God is not comprehensive, but apprehensive.

Comprehending refers to a perfect understanding of something. But it is impossible to understand God completely, for a finite creature cannot grasp the infinite God.

4. God is understood by analogical knowledge, which is not knowledge of the thing itself but of a concept.

¹ Conrad Vorstius (1569-1622) professor at Steinfurt, was seen as a protagonist of Remonstrant theology by Reformed orthodoxy. In 1612 he was appointed as successor of Arminius at Leiden University. Because he was suspected of Socinianism, king James I canceled Vorstius' appointment.

Analogia duplex est, *rei*, et *conceptus*; quæ analogæ sunt ratione rei, illa habent idem genus; Deus autem cum creaturis non habet idem genus; Ergo, hic intelligitur analogia conceptus: Quod scilicet Deum, qui infinitus; capiamus ad similitudinem conceptus eorum quæ finita sunt.

V. Dei vox ambigua est.

Sumitur enim propriè de solo Deo, impropriè, tum metaphoricè pro Angelis et Magistratu, tum Catachresticè pro idolis, diabolo et ventre.

VI. Vox Dei non notat potestatem, ut Sociniani volunt, seu officium, sed naturam.

Alias enim identificarentur hæ propositiones, Deus est Rex, et Rex est Rex.

VII. Vox Dei de vero Deo accepta, dupliciter capitur, οὐσιωδῶς^z et ὑπο-στατικῶς^a sive *essentialiter*, vel *personaliter*: *Essentialiter*, pro ipsa Dei essentia; *personaliter*, pro personis.

Duo sunt hic notanda ad istam distinctionem:^b

1. Quomodo non sequatur tres esse Deos, si vox Dei personaliter accipiatur?
2. Anne etiam vox Patris eodem modo distinguenda sit, ut scilicet accipiatur tum essentialiter, tum personaliter? Quod ad primum membrum attinet, sciendum est personam sumi *abstractivè* et *concretivè*: Dum dicimus vocem Dei accipi personaliter, non intelligimus abstractivè personalitatem; sed concretivè, personalitatem cum essentia; ac proindè cum una essentia tantum sit, quæ sumpta cum hoc vel illo modo subsistendi, constituit personam, hinc fit, ut non possint dici tres Dei, quia modi isti subsistendi tres unicam tantum habent essentiam. Quod ad vocem Patris attinet, eodem modo accipitur vel, οὐσιωδῶς vel ὑποστατικῶς; et οὐσιωδῶς accipi, certum est, in Oratione Dominica; ὑποστατικῶς in Symbolo Apostolico.

Analogy is twofold: it refers to the thing itself or to the concept of the thing involved. Things that are analogous by reason of the thing belong to the same category; God, however, cannot be classified in the same category as creatures. Ergo, in this case He is understood by conceptual analogy, that is to say: we understand God who is infinite because of a conceptual similitude with things that are finite.

5. The word 'God' is ambiguous.

Taken in its proper sense it refers to God alone. In its improper sense it can refer metaphorically both to angels and magistrates and incorrectly to idols, the devil and the belly.

6. The word 'God' does not denote a power – as the Socinians argue – nor a function, but it denotes a nature.

Otherwise the propositions 'God is king' and 'the king is king' would be identical.

7. The word 'God' used for the true God is conceived in a twofold sense: essentially and personally. | Essentially conceived it refers to God's own essence, personally conceived it refers to the three persons.

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With regard to this distinction two things should be noted:

1. how to avoid the conclusion that there are three Gods, if the word 'God' is conceived personally?
2. is it the case that the same distinction should be applied to the word 'Father', so that 'Father' can be taken in both an essential and a personal way? Concerning the first question one ought to know that 'person' can be taken in an abstract sense and in a concrete sense. When the word 'God' is used as reference to a person, we do not refer to personality in an abstract manner, but in a concrete manner: that is to say, we refer to a person together with its essence. And consequently, when there is only one essence which together with this or that mode of subsistence constitutes the person, then it is impossible to say that there are three gods, for the three modes of subsistence have but one essence. In regard of the word 'Father' the same distinction between 'essentially' and 'personally' can be used. It is certain that in the Lord's Prayer 'Father' is taken essentially; in the Apostles' Creed it is taken personally.

VIII. Vox Dei accipitur vel extra complexionem, vel cum complexione.

Distinctio ista diligenter observanda est^c contra Socinianos: dicitur autem Jehova in^d Complexione, quando conjungitur cum re aliqua; ut, cùm Jerusalem dicitur Jehovah, non absolutè id fit sed ac si diceretur, Civitas in qua Jehova habitat: item vexillum Jehovæ Dei mei, sed extra complexionem, non nisi soli Deo, ista vox tribuitur.

IX. Jehova dicitur in casu recto, non obliquo.²

In casu recto non dicitur nisi de Deo; in casu obliquo dicitur etiam de creaturis; ut cum dicitur, Mons Jehovæ.

X. Attributa Dei non differunt in Deo, nisi ratione modi nostri concipiendi.³

Quærent Scholastici anxiè quomodo differant attributa Dei in Deo? an *realiter*, an *formaliter*, an *modaliter*, an *ratione*, sive *distinctione rationis*. Dicimus *ratione*, et propterea solemus etiam hoc efferre istis terminis, differunt modo nostro concipiendi.

Obj. Attributa Dei definitione differunt: Ergo differunt inter se. *Resp.* Attributa Dei tum definiri in ratione ad creaturas et effecta, quæ edit circum creaturam; non in ratione ad Deum, qui absolutè unus est. Verbi gratia; aliter definitur misericordia,^e aliter justitia, propter scilicet diversa, in objectis diversis, effecta, etsi in Deo absolutè^f unum sint. In Deo enim, etsi sit *aliud* et *aliud*, non tamen est *alius* et *alius*.

XI. Causa, quare distinguimus in Deo attributa ab essentia, est inadæquatus noster conceptus.

² LCT, 116–119 [121–124]; TT, 76–82. | ³ LCT, 120–121 [126–127]; TT, 83–84.

^c ⁵²F-42 | ^d ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-41 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-41 ⁶¹G-41 | ^e ⁵²F-43 | ^f ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-42 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-42 ⁶¹G-42

8. The word 'God' is used either without combination or in combination with other words.

This distinction must be diligently observed against the Socinians. For God is called Jehovah | in combination with another word, when He is related to some other reality. When, for example, Jerusalem is called 'Jehovah'², this phrase should not be taken in an absolute sense, but as if it were saying: 'the city in which Jehovah dwells.' Likewise: 'the banner of Jehovah my God.' But without such a combination this word 'God' is attributed to God alone.

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9. God is called 'Jehovah' in the nominative or vocative case and not in the indirect or other than the nominative case.

In the nominative case 'Jehovah' is only uttered in respect of God. In the indirect case it can also be said of creatures, like 'the mountain of Jehovah'.

10. The attributes of God do not differ in God, but they differ only according to our way of conceiving.

The scholastics anxiously inquire in what manner the attributes differ in God: in a real way, a formal way, a modal way or in a conceptual way (by rational distinction). We say: in a conceptual or rational way and therefore we usually assert this by the phrase: the attributes differ according to our way of conceiving.

Objection: the attributes differ in definition. Therefore, they are different among themselves. *Answer:* the attributes are defined with respect to the creatures and the effects, which He works in creature; not with respect to God himself, who is absolutely one. For example: God's mercy is defined in another way than God's justice, because of their different effects in varied objects, although in God they are absolutely one. | For although in God something may be other than something else, it is not the case that in God someone is other than someone else.

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11. The reason why we distinguish in God the attributes from the essence lies in our inadequate conception.

2 See for example 2Ch 32,19.

Rusticus aliquis crassus, non capit valorem numismatis aurei vel argentei, nisi ipsi per nummulos fuerit divisus. Tales et nos in hac cognitione de Deo sumus: Deus enim infinitus est, et unum omnia; sed nos ista omnia quæ unum sunt, non capimus, nisi partiamur quasi: et hinc omnia ista quæ Deo tribuuntur, et in Deo non nisi unum sunt, tanquam distincta percipimus.

XII. Sunt attributa Dei alia *absoluta*, alia *relata*.⁴

Obvia est hæc distinctio apud Theologos, sed quæ non ita explicatur, et quæ difficultatem habet aliquam quoad membrum posterius; Nam Vorstiani semper ex hoc argumentantur, hæc attributa non esse Deum, quia poterant non esse. Verbi gratia; dum de decretis disputant, dicunt, Poterat decretum non esse, quia Deus poterat non decrevisse, et tamen Deus non poterat^g non esse. At verò in his, talia argumenta proficiscuntur ex ignorantia attributorum Dei relatorum: Nam duo significant; *essentiam*^h Dei et *denominationem* aliquam à re externa sive nomenclaturam. Denominatio Dei poterat non esse, hoc est, poterat voluntas Dei non vocari decretum, et tamen ipsa non poterat non esse. Sic Deus poterat non esse creator, et non habere hoc nomen, at non poterat non esse Deus.

XIII. Attributa Dei alia *communicabilia*, alia *incommunicabilia* sunt.⁵

Incommunicabilia dicuntur, quorum nihil simile reperitur in creaturis, ut esse infinitum, æternum, immensum. Communicabilia sunt, quorum aliquid analogi reperitur in creaturis, ut sapientia, voluntas, justitia, misericordia, essentia. Cæterum hoc analogum quod est in creaturis, vel *vestigium Dei*, vel *imago Dei* est.ⁱ Vestigium Dei, vocatur τὸ esse, sive essentia, item vita, quod vestigium etiam est in rebus viventibus extra homines et Angelos constitutis. Imago autem Dei, illa dicitur similitudo cum Deo, ratione intellectus, voluntatis, integritatis, justitiæ, domini in creaturas, quæ in solos homines et Angelos cadit.

XIV. Deus est immutabilis ratione^j *essentiæ*, *loci*, *voluntatis*.⁶

⁴ LCT, 131 [138]; TT, 86–87. | ⁵ LCT, 131 [138]; TT, 86–87. | ⁶ LCT, 130–131, 137–138 [137–138, 143–145].

g ⁵²F-44 | h ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-43 ⁵⁴R-16 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INNS}O-43 ⁶¹G-43 | i ⁵⁹R-14 | j ⁵²F-45

A less educated peasant does not grasp the value of golden or silver coins, unless it is divided for him into separate smaller coins. When it comes to our knowledge of God, we are in the same position; for God is infinite, one and everything; but we do not understand a being that is everything and one, unless we divide it – so to speak – into parts. This is the reason why we perceive as distinct all those things attributed to God, which are one in God.

12. Some attributes of God are absolute; others are relative.

For theologians this distinction is obvious, but it is not likewise explained and there is a problem in the second part of the distinction. Of this second part [the relative attributes] the followers of Vorstius always argue that these are not God, because it would have been possible they were not. For example, when they discuss the eternal decrees, they assert that there could have been no decree, because God could have not made a decree and yet God cannot not-be. But such arguments proceed from ignorance of the relative attributes of God. For such attributes signify two things: the divine essence, | and a certain denomination or nomenclature arising from an external reality. The denomination of God is contingent, which is to say, God's will could not be called a decree and yet his will itself cannot not-be. Thus it would have been possible that God did not create and did not bear the name of Creator, but it would have been impossible for Him not to be God.

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13. Some attributes are communicable; others are incommunicable.

Incommunicable attributes refer to those attributes, which do not have any likeness in creatures, such as being infinite, eternal and immeasurable. Communicable attributes are those attributes, which have some analogy in creatures, such as wisdom, will, righteousness, mercy and essence. But this analogous thing in creatures is either a vestige or an image of God. Being and essence are called vestiges of God; likewise life, which is also present in living things created next to human beings and angels. The image of God refers to a likeness shared with God regarding intellect, will, integrity, righteousness, dominion over creatures, which occurs in human beings and angels alone.

14. God is immutable in respect of essence, place and will.

Essentia enim si mutari debeat, à potentiore deberet mutari, quem Deus nullum^k habet. Nec ratione *loci*, quia ubique est. Blasphemè hic ab Atheis obiicitur, Qui ubique est, nusquam est, quia hoc non de Deo, sed de hominibus, variis locis atque occupationibus distractis, verificatur. Non etiam ratione *voluntatis*, quia ille eam non mutat. Nomina vero quæ Deo in tempore accesserunt, ut Creator, non mutationem in Deo sed in creatura denotant.

XV. *Æternum* dicitur dupliciter, *proprie* et *improprie*. *Proprie* illud, quod principio et fine, omni denique successione caret. *Improprie* æternum est, initium et successionem habens, sed quod finem nullum habiturum est, quale cadit in homines et Angelos.⁷

Apud Philosophos distinguuntur tempus, ævum, et æternitas. *Tempus* est, quod habet principium, finem et successionem. *Ævum*, quod quidem non caret principio et successione, sed fine caret, quæ dicitur æternitas à *parte post*. *Æternitas* vero est, quæ caret principio, fine et successione, et dicitur æternitas à *parte ante* et à *parte post*.¹

XVI. *Æternitati* res coexistunt non *adæquatè*, sed *inadæquatè*.^{8m}

Hoc est, in Deo nulla datur successio, præsentis, præteriti et futuri, sed omnia illi præsentia.

XVII. Infinitum dicitur dupliciter, vel ut opponitur determinato, et Græcis vocatur ἄοριστον, quasi dicas, *non definitum*. Verbi gratia: Quantitas discreta, potentia non definita. Vel ut opponitur illi quod est limitatum, et dicitur τὸ ἄπειρον. Et hoc modo Deus est infinitus, quia non habet terminos essentiæ suæ.⁹

XVIII. Deus est ubique ut causa conservans in effectis.¹⁰

⁷ LCT, 131–134 [138–141]. | ⁸ LCT, 134 [141]. | ⁹ LCT, 134–137 [141–143]. | ¹⁰ LCT, 143–145 [151–152].

k ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-44 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-44 ⁶¹G-44 | l ⁵²F-46 | m ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-45 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-45 ⁶¹G-45

If his essence would be changed, then it would be changed by a being more powerful than God. But there is no being more powerful than God. | Neither does God change in respect of place, because He is everywhere. Here, atheists object with a blasphemy: 'someone who is everywhere is nowhere.' But this assertion is not verified of God, but of human beings, who are distracted in different places and occupations. God is also immutable in respect of his will, because He does not change it. The names assigned to God in temporal reality as Creator do not denote a change in God, but in creature.

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15. The term 'eternal' is predicated in two ways: in a proper and improper sense. In its proper sense it is said of things without beginning and end, and without any succession. In its improper sense 'eternal' is said of things that have a beginning and succession, but are without end: as such it applies to human beings and angels.

Philosophers make a distinction between time, everlastingness and eternity. Time has beginning, end and succession. Everlastingness does not lack beginning and succession, but it is without end and is called eternity extending after [time]. Eternity, however, is without beginning, end, and succession; it is called eternity extending before and after [time].

16. Things coexist with eternity, but they not do so in an adequate manner, but in an inadequate manner. |

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That is to say: in God there is no succession of past, present and future, but all things are present to Him.

17. The term 'infinite' is predicated in two ways: either it is opposed to something determined – which the Greeks call 'indefinite' (*aoriston*), as if you were saying 'not implying definiteness', for example, a determinate quantity which is potentially non-definite.³ Or it is used as opposed to something limited and then it is called 'the infinite' (*apeiron*). In this way God is infinite, because his essence does not have any limits.

18. God is everywhere as preserving cause in all that is brought about.

3 For *quantitas discreta* confer MULLER, *Dictionary*, 236. Probably a flock is an example of a determinate quantity which is potentially non-definite, with a definite number of sheep which number we nevertheless do not know.

Non certe ut locatum in loco; alioqui caperetur à re aliqua. Proindè approbanda non est ista distinctio Scholasticorum quoad primum membrum, quâ dicunt: Deus est in loco *repletivè*, spiritus *definitivè*, corpus *circumscriptivè*.

XIX. Deus ubicunque est, totus est.¹¹ⁿ

Obj. At partes non habet; et si totus in^o una re non est totus in altera. *Resp.* Totum vel pro perfecto sumitur absolutè, vel relatè quoad partes. Priori modo non posteriori Deus dicitur totus. Deinde aliud est *totum^p esse*, aliud, *totaliter esse*. Nam *totaliter esse*, significat ita esse alicubi, ut alibi extra eum locum non sit. Deus ergo dicitur ubicunque est, totus esse, non totaliter: quia totaliter non nisi in se ipso est.

XX. Deus est immortalis, invisibilis, negativè, non privativè.

Etiam Angeli negativè sunt invisibiles, non autem immortales, sed privativè. *Obj.* Atque in Angelos mors cadere non potest; Ergo possunt dici privativè immortales. *Resp.* Immortale non tantum opponi *mortali*, sed etiam *annihilationi*, ita, utut Angeli prima significatione non sint mortales, posteriori tamen sint annihilabiles.

XXI. Dei visio quintuplex est; 1. in somniis; 2. in signis; 3. in carne; 4. per fidem; 5. ex creatione et effectis. Rom. 1. 19, 20.

Vorstius contendit, Deum videri oculis corporeis, sed absurdè: Nam Deus est spiritus; oculis corporeis videri non potest.

¹¹ LCT, 145 [152].

Certainly He is not located in a place; otherwise He would be included by something else. Therefore, one should not agree with the first part of that distinction of the Scholastics according to which they assert: God is present at a certain place in a repletive way, whereas a spirit is present in a definitive way and a body is present in a circumscriptive way.⁴

19. Wherever God is, there He is totally present.

Objection: God has no parts, and if He is totally present in one thing, He is not totally present in another thing. *Answer:* the whole can be considered either absolutely as referring to being perfect or relatively as related to parts. God is said to be whole in the first manner, not in the second one. Furthermore, a distinction | must be made between being present as whole being and being entirely present. For being entirely present means being present at some place without being somewhere else. Therefore, God is said to be everywhere as a whole being, but He is not entirely present, because He is only entirely present in Himself.

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20. God is immortal and invisible in a negative manner and not in a privative manner.⁵

Likewise, angels are negatively invisible, but they are not negatively, but privatively immortal. *Objection:* it is not possible for angels to die. Therefore it is possible to say that they are privatively immortal. *Answer:* immortality is not only opposed to mortality, but also to annihilation. So although angels are immortal in the first sense, yet they can be annihilated in the second sense.

21. Vision of God is fivefold: 1. In dreams. 2. In signs. 3. In physical existence. 4. Through faith. 5. From creation and its effects, Rm 1,19-20.⁶

Vorstius alleges that God can be seen through physical eyes, but this is absurd. For God is spirit and cannot be seen by physical eyes.

4 Repletive presence is being present by filling the things. The definite presence is the mode of being present of an immaterial but finite being, which by its nature is not confined dimensionally to a given place, but which in its power and operation is defined. Circumscriptive presence is a bodily presence: in a finite physical shape within physical boundaries. See MULLER, *Dictionary*, 239-243.

5 Privative denotes the loss or removal of a quality, while negative denotes the absence of a quality. So a human beings lacks wings in a negative way, while a bird without wings lacks them in a privative way. See MULLER, *Dictionary*, 246-247.

6 Annotation in margin: 'See what the author says in his *Metaphysics*: cap. 11, p. 104 & sqq.'

XXII. *Potentia Dei non propriè,^q sed impropiè de Deo dicitur.*^{12r}

Deus est actus purissimus; cùm ergo dicitur posse aliquid, non potentiam in ipso designat, sed potentiam passivam in subjecto,^s qua actum Divinæ actionis subire potest, quæ nihil aliud est quam non repugnantia, ut res fiat potentiâ Dei.

XXIII. *Potentia Dei distinguitur in ordinariam et absolutam.*¹³

Ordinaria est, quæ est ex consilio definito Dei. *Absoluta*, quæ in se consideratur absolutè. De hac quæritur, an sit in Deo? Calvinus videtur negare, sed malè: nam loca ista Scripturæ explicari non poterunt commodè; *Potest Deus ex lapidibus filios Abrahæ excitare; Annon possem rogare Patrem meum, et dabit mihi duodecim legiones Angelorum.*

XXIV. *Potentia et Potestas distinguuntur in Christo.*

Potestas *officium*, potentia *naturam* notat.

XXV. *Scientia in Deo duplex est; Visionis, et simplicis intelligentiæ.*¹⁴

Visionis, dicitur scientia futurorum, quæ^t nititur decreto Dei. Ideo enim Deus scit futura, quia decrevit. *Simplicis intelligentiæ* dicitur scientia possibilium, ut quando Deus scit quid sibi possibile est, etiamsi hoc non sit factururus, et innititur potentiæ absolutæ. Cæterum sciendum est, Arminianos confinxisse tertiam speciem scientiæ Divinæ, et vocare illam *scientiam mediam*, sive *conditionatam*, quando scilicet Deus novit aliquid^u eventurum quod nunquam decrevit. Sed absurda illa est. Nam nihil evenit quod Deus non decrevit. Thren. 3. vers. 37.

XXVI. *Contingentia non est determinata veritas.*¹⁵

12 LCT, 138–139 [145–146]; TT, 93–95. | 13 LCT, 139–140 [145–146]; TT, 93–95. | 14 LCT, 145–146 [153–154]; CT, 24–28; TT, 101–102. | 15 LCT, 146–149 [154–157].

q ⁵²F-48 | r ⁵⁹R-15 | s ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-47 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INNSN}O-47 ⁶¹G-47 | t ⁵²F-49 | u ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-48
⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INNSN}O-48 ⁶¹G-48

22. Potency is attributed to God in an improper and not in a proper manner.

God is purest act. Therefore, when He is said to have power, it does not refer to potency in Himself, but to a passive power in the subject | by which potency the subject can undergo the act of the divine acting, which is nothing else than non-resistance so that things happen by God's power.

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23. The power of God is distinguished in ordained power and absolute power.

Ordained power is the power based on his determined counsel. Absolute power is power considered absolutely in itself. The *question* arises whether this power is in God? Calvin seems to deny this, but this is wrong.⁷ For in that case the following passages in Scripture could not be explained: 'God is able to raise up children of Abraham out of these stones' [Lc 3,8] and 'Could I not pray to my Father and He shall give me more than twelve legions of angels?'

24. In Christ there is a distinction between power and authority.

Authority denotes an office; power a nature.

25. The knowledge in God is twofold: knowledge of vision and knowledge of simply understanding.

The knowledge of vision is a knowledge of future things, which rests on the divine decree. For that reason God knows future things, because He decreed them. The knowledge of simply understanding is called knowledge of possible things such as his knowledge of what is possible for Him to do, although He is not going to do it; it rests on his absolute power. Furthermore, one ought to know that the Arminians have fabricated a third category in the divine knowledge; they call this knowledge middle or conditioned knowledge according to which God knows a certain event | He has never decreed. But this is absurd. Because nothing happens what God did not decree, Thr 3,37.

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26. Contingency is not a determined truth.⁸

7 For Calvin's sharp declaration against the distinction between *potentia absoluta* and *potentia ordinata*, see CALVIN, *Institutio*, III.23.2. See also: CALVIN, *Sermons*, col. 339: 'Et de fait, quand ces docteurs Sorboniques disent, que le Dieu a une puissance absolue, c'est un blaspheme diabolique qui a esté forgé aux enfers.'

8 Something is determinately true because it is not false, but it is contingently true when it could have been false whereas it has never been false. Cf. ALTENSTAIG, *Lexicon Theologicum*, 940: '*Verum contingenter & verum determinate differunt. Nam determinate verum est, quod est verum, sic quod non*

Scilicet respectu *intellectus creati*, non *increti*. Hinc Philosophi dicunt, quod intellectus divinus sit mensura, norma et regula intellectus creati.

XXVII. Res sunt, quia Deus scit; scientiâ nimirum practicâ et visionis, (quæ decreto Dei nititur) non verò scit, quia sunt.¹⁶

Alias enim conformaretur intellectus Dei ad rem et ita haberet potentiam passivam, ad perfectionem acquirendam à re: et perficeretur à re, quod est absurdissimum.^v

XXVIII. Voluntas Dei alia^w est permissiva, alia effectiva.¹⁷

XXIX. Permissio duplex, Physica, vel Ethica.¹⁸

Physica est τὸ non impedire. Act. 14. 16. Matth. 19. 8. Non impedita Deus permittit peccata dupliciter, vel *subtrahendo gratiam*, non inhærentem sed assistentem, 2 Chron. 32. vers. 31. quod fit in peccato omissionis; vel *promovendo* creaturam malam ad operandum,^x quod fit in peccato commissionis.

XXX. Distinctio voluntatis in signi et beneplaciti, non est distinctio, sed tantùm vocis ambiguæ explicatio.¹⁹

Voluntas enim signi nihil aliud est quam Verbum Dei: Verbum autem Dei est effectum voluntatis Dei, non ipsa voluntas.

XXXI. Voluntas beneplaciti et voluntas signi non pugnat, si voluntas signi ex fine judicatur.²⁰

Adversarii dicunt, nos pugnantes in Deo Voluntates statuere, quia dicimus, Deum non omnes velle servare quos vocat; nam quosdam vocat, non ut salvet, sed ut reddat inexcusabiles.^y

¹⁶ LCT, 149–157 [1158–166]. | ¹⁷ CT, 15–22. | ¹⁸ LCT, 194–199 [206–211]; CT, 15–22. | ¹⁹ LCT, 199–201 [212–214]; CT, 4–8. | ²⁰ LCT, 199–201 [212–214]; CT, 4–8.

That is to say, in respect of a created intellect, but not in respect of an uncreated intellect. Hence philosophers assert that the divine intellect is the measure, norm and rule of the created intellect.

27. Things exist, because God knows them, namely by a practical knowledge or knowledge of vision (which rests on God's decree), and not: because they exist He knows them.

Otherwise the intellect of God would be fashioned by an actual thing and thus He would have a passive potency in order to obtain perfection from that actual thing. Then He would be made perfect by an actual thing, which is most absurd.

28. God's will is either permissive or effective.

29. Permission is twofold: physical and moral.

Physical permission is a not preventing, Act 14,16, Mt 19,8. God permits not-prevented sins in a twofold way: either by removing grace (not inherent but assisting grace, 2Ch 32,31), which happens in sins of omission, or by moving the bad creature | towards acting, which happens in sins of commission.

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30. To distinguish in the [divine] will between the will of the sign and the will of the decree is not to make a distinction, but only an explication of the ambiguous word 'will'.

For the will of sign is nothing else than the Word of God; the Word of God is an effect of God's will and not the will itself.

31. The will of the decree [or: the will of good pleasure] and the will of the sign do not conflict, if the will of sign is judged according to its goal.

Opponents assert that we establish conflicting wills in God, because we assert that He does not will to save all those who He calls. For God calls some people not in order to save them, but in order to remove all excuses.

est falsum, est tamen contingenter verum, quia potest esse falsum, & nunquam fuisse verum, Gab[riel Biel] d.38.q.unica,art.1.lib.1.'

XXXII. Voluntas beneplaciti non dicitur talis ratione objecti circa quod occupatur, sed ratione causæ impulsivæ, sive ex modo volendi, quod scil. agat ita, ex eo quod ipsi placet.²¹

Cùm dicimus voluntate beneplaciti omnia evenire, non dicimus Deo placere omnia quæ eveniunt, atque adeo etiam peccatum, quod falsum est.

XXXIII. Distinctio voluntatis² Dei in absolutam et conditionatam, vanissima est.^{22a}

Quia sicut Deus non potest distingui, ita nec Voluntas. Voluntas enim Dei Deus est.

XXXIV. Item in antecedentem et consequentem vana est.²³

Quia in Deo ponit mutabilitatem: Ponit enim Deum voluisse omnes salvos fieri, postmodum cùm vidisset non omnes credituros, mutasse sententiam, et nullos voluisse servari, nisi credentes; qualis mutatio in Deum non cadit. Jacob. 1. 17.

XXXV. Voluntatis Divinæ distinctio in approbantem tantum, vel^b approbantem et efficientem simul, nulla est.²⁴

Solent quidam ex nostratibus uti istâ distinctione; Deus, inquirunt, vult approbative omnes salvos fieri, sed non effective; sed ineptè: Nam quod Deus approbat, illud vult. Psal. 115. 3. Omnia, quæ voluit Deus, sive quibus delectatus est, fecit.

XXXVI. Sic voluntatis efficacis et inefficacis distinctio vana est.²⁵

Quia omnis voluntas Dei impletur, nec Deus mutat voluntatem suam, ut liquet Esai. cap. 46. vers. 10. nec quisquam irritam reddere potest voluntatem Dei. Esai. 49.^c

21 LCT, 171–172 [181–182]; CT, 4–8. | 22 LCT, 172 [182]; CT, 8–11; TT, 119–124. | 23 LCT, 178–184 [189–194]; CT, 11–13. | 24 LCT, 184–186 [195–197]; CT, 13–15. | 25 LCT, 186–193 [197–204]; CT, 13–15; 22–24.

z ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-50 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-50 ⁶¹G-50 | a ⁵⁹R-16 | b ⁵²F-52 | c ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-51 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-51 ⁶¹G-51

32. The will of good pleasure is not called so for the reason of the object it is related to, but for the reason of the impelling cause or mode of willing, namely that He acts according to whatever pleases Him.

When we say that everything happens by his will of good pleasure, we do not assert that everything that happens pleases God, so even sin, which is not true.

33. The distinction in God's will | between an absolute and conditional will is completely useless.

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For just as there are no distinctions in God, so his will does not have them. For the will of God is God.

34. Likewise, the distinction between an antecedent and consequent will in God is useless.

For this distinction places mutability in God. It implies that God has willed that all be saved, and that He after having seen that not all will believe, changed his decision and would save none except those who believe. Such a change does not take place in God, Jc 1,17.

35. The distinction of the divine will in a merely approving will and an approving and simultaneously efficient will is of no account.

Sometimes, some of our theologians are using this distinction. It is God's approving will, they say, that all will be saved, but this is not his effective will. But this is foolish. For what God approves, He wills, Ps 115,3. All the things God willed or in which He had delight, He did.

36. So the distinction between an effectual will and an ineffectual will is useless.

For every will of God is realized. Neither does God change his will, as is evident from Is 46,10. Nor can anyone frustrate the will of God, Is 49. |

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Obj. At Deus non omnia quæ vult, efficit. *Resp.* Efficax non dicitur, ab efficiente, nec significat efficiens, sed idem quod non irritum; ut sensus sit: nulla voluntas Dei est irrita.

XXXVII. Consilium non tribuitur Deo *proprie*, sed *improprie*.

Consilium in illo locum habet, qui consultat; qui consultat, ille ignorat: in Deo autem nulla ignorantia est. Ergo, nulla consultatio. Tribuitur ergo Deo κατ' ἀνθρωποπάθειαν desumptam ab homine sapiente, qui nihil sine consilio agit.^d

d ⁵²F-53 ⁵⁴R-19

Objection: but God does not execute all the things He wills. *Answer:* being effectual is not called so after the one who effects nor does it mean the one who effects, but it means not being frustrated. So that the meaning is: no will of God is frustrated.

37. The concept of a counsel is not properly but improperly predicated of God.

Someone who takes counsel deliberates. Someone who deliberates is ignorant of something. But in God there is in no way any ignorance and therefore no consultation. It is attributed to God by way of anthropopathy derived from a wise man, who never acts without counsel.

CAPUT V.

De Deo Patre.¹

I. Pater est principium personarum in SS. Trinitate originis, non naturæ, vel temporis.

Dicitur Pater principium, sed nec Filius, nec Spiritus Sanctus principiata.

Obj. Socin. Posito uno relatorum ponitur alterum. *Resp.* Ista propriè non sunt relata prædicamentalia, de quibus hoc enunciatur, sed sunt transcendentalia. Non autem relatorum quorúmvis uno posito, ponitur alterum; ut fit in relatis secundum dici; non enim ibi si unum est, statim etiam alterum est.^e

II. Filius est à Patre ratione modi subsistendi in essentia, non ratione essentiæ.²

Est egregia distinctio apud Theolog. ubi dicitur, Filius non est ἀυτόσοιος sed ἀυτόθεος. Sciendum magnam disputationem ortam inter Arminianos, Vorstium, et nostras Ecclesias, quia Arminiani et Vorstius dicebant Filium esse à Patre quoad essentiam, atque ita non ἀυτόθεον à se deum: quod si sic, E. est dependens Deus, creatura ergo.^f

III. Generatio quæ est in Deo, est æterna, et tamen perfecta.³

¹ LCT, cc. 29–35, 236–336 [243–374]; TP, 109–124 [45–60]; TQ, 368–370 [37–40]; TC, 459–46; ΠΨ-Socinianorum, 555–558 [59–62]; ΠΨ-Anabaptistarum, 618–619 [130]; A-S, 729–748 [38–58]. | ² CT, 518–521. | ³ LCT, 296–298 [329–330]; TT, 192–196.

e ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-52 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-52 ⁶¹G-52 | f ⁵²F-54

Chapter V

On God the Father

1. The Father is the principle of origin of the persons of the Holy Trinity: He is not a principle of nature or time.

The Father is called principle, but neither the Son nor the Spirit has had a beginning.

The Socinians *object*: if one of the extremes of the relation is posited, then the other one is posited. *Answer*: in a proper sense the extremes of the relation of which this is said are not things that are predicated, but they are transcendentals. However, this does not imply that if whichever one of the extremes of the relation is posited, the other is posited, as happens in extremes considered according to predication. For whenever there is one, there is not immediately the other. |

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2. The Son originates from the Father in respect of the mode of subsistence in the essence, not in respect of the essence itself.

This is an excellent distinction of theologians, who state that the Son is not 'self-being', but 'himself God'. One should know that this issue has been hotly debated between Arminians, Vorstius and our churches, because the Arminians and Vorstius asserted that the Son regarding his essence originates from the Father and is, consequently, not himself God or God in himself. But if this were true, the Son would be a dependent God and, therefore, a creature.

3. The generation, which is in God, is eternal and yet perfect.

Disputant aliqui an Filius desinat generari nec ne; dicunt enim, si desiit, Ergo est mutatio; si non, Ergo imperfecta. At nos ex Adversariis vicissim possumus quærere, an. Sp. S. procedat adhuc à Patre, nec ne; si desiit, Ergo mutatus; si adhuc, Ergo imperfectus. Vanitas ergo istius argumenti liquet ex eo, quod etiam in natura sint aliqui actus permanentes, qui tamen simulac sunt, perfecti sunt. Verbi gratia, Lux manat è Sole perpetuo, et tamen perfecta simulac emanat. Sic visio nostra simulac fit, perfecta est, tamen non cessat.

IV. Generatio quæ in Deo est non est *physica*, sed *hyperphysica*.⁴

Hinc liquet quam ineptè argumentantur^g Sociniani, qui ut tollant generationem quæ est in Deo, Argumenta sua proferre solent ex generatione physica; at hæc nihil præter nomen cum hyperphysica commune habet; ergo argumentatio illorum non procedit. Quod autem sit hyperphysica, liquet; quia Deus natura non est, sed aliquid supra naturam.

V. Generatio quæ in Deo est, etsi sit hyperphysica,^h tamen non estⁱ metaphorica, sed propriè dicta.⁵

Adversarii dicunt eam non propriè dictam esse generationem, quia non est generatio physica; at quam ineptè? nam hic etiam dici posset, Deus non habet esse physicum; ergo Deus non habet esse propriè dictum.

VI. Invocatio Dei duplex est; *Absoluta*, vel *relativa*.

Subiicimus hanc distinctionem, quia pendet ab istis, quæ modo diximus. Socinus ridet hanc distinctionem, et dicit omnem invocationem esse relativam. *Resp.* Adorationem sumi vel *natura sua*, vel *ratione objectorum*. Naturâ suâ omnis invocatio est relativa; at ratione objectorum est vel *absoluta*, vel *relativa*. *Absoluta* illa vocatur, quâ tota SS. Trinitas invocatur; *Relativa*, quâ Pater per Filium invocatur.^j

4 LCT, 296–298 [329–330]; TT, 192–196. | 5 LCT, 296–298 [329–330]; TT, 192–196.

g ⁵³FA^{ELZ-53} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INNSNO-53} ⁶¹G-53 | h ⁵⁹R-17 | i ⁵²F-55 | j ⁵³FA^{ELZ-54} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INNSNO-54} ⁶¹G-54

Some debate the issue whether the Son could stop with being generated, or not. For if He could stop, they say, this would imply change; if not, this would imply an imperfect generation. But we, in our turn, can ask our opponents whether the Holy Spirit is still proceeding from the Father or not. If not, He is changed; if He still proceeds, He is imperfect. The uselessness of this kind of argumentation becomes evident from the fact that in nature also there are some permanent acts, which as soon as they are, are yet perfect. Light, for example, constantly flows from the sun and yet it is perfect as soon as it flows. Likewise, our sight is perfect as soon as it sees and yet it does not cease.

4. The generation, which is in God, is not a physical , but a hyperphysical generation.

Hence it is evident how foolishly the Socinians argue, | who – in order to remove generation from God – produce arguments against it in terms of a physical generation. But this has nothing in common with hyperphysical generation except the name. Their argumentation, therefore, does not succeed. The hyperphysical character of the generation is evident from the fact that God is not nature, but something above nature.

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5. Although the generation in God is hyperphysical, it should not be interpreted metaphorically but properly.

Our opponents say that that generation is not a generation in its proper sense, because it is not a physical generation. But how foolish! For in that case it would also be possible to say: God has no physical being and, therefore, God does not have being in its proper sense.

6. The invocation of God is twofold: absolute or relative.

We add this distinction, because it depends on the ones we already discussed. Socinus ridicules this distinction and asserts that all invocation is relative. *Answer:* worship can be considered either according to its own nature or according to its objects. According to its nature all invocation is relative; but according to its objects it is either absolute or relative. It is called absolute when the whole Holy Trinity is invoked; it is called relative when the Father is invoked through the Son. |

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VII. Deus gignit filium voluntate et intellectu.^k

Ratio est, quia unum idémque sunt in Deo.

Obj. At quæ Deus vult, poterat non velle; unde illa quæ vult, quodam modo contingentia sunt. *Resp.* Duplicia sunt quæ Deus vult; quædam ad intra, et illa non possunt non fieri et non velle; quædam ad extra, et illa potuissent non velle, atque adeò potuissent non fieri.^l

VIII. Communicatio Dei alia est necessaria absolutè, alia necessaria ex hypothesi voluntatis suæ.

Quæritur. Quomodo illud axioma intelligendum est. *Bonum est communicativum sui, et an etiam ad Deum referri debeat?* *Resp. Aff.* Sed de Deo etiam dici istam communicationem vel ad intra; ita communicat Filio modum subsistendi in essentia; Ita pater et Filius communicant Spirit. Sancto modum subsistendi in essentia Divina. At vero illa communicatio quæ ad extra est, et secundum quam se communicat creaturis, est communicatio quæ poterat non esse; poterat enim nihil istarum fecisse quas fecit, atque adeo non creaturis se communicasse.

Communicationem ad intra, vocant Scholastici *formalem*, eam vero quæ ad extra est *effectivam*.^{6m}

IX. Activa et passiva generatio non inserunt in Deo compositionem.⁷

Sociniani hoc urgent, cùm illi interim súsque déque ferant, an in Deo compositio datur nec ne. Cæterum non dari in Deo compositionem, sive hanc distinctionem non efficere compositionem in Deo probatur. Neque enim quatenus ad se referuntur, [sic enim inter se sunt opposita]ⁿ neque quatenus ad essentiam pertinent [sic enim sunt idem cum essentia] ita ut in priori consideratione oppositio compositionem impediatur, in posteriori autem identitas cum essentia eam non admittat.

6 We read here quas in stead of quæ and we add non. | 7 LCT, 296–298 [329–330]; TT, 192–196.

k ⁵⁴R-20 | l ⁵²F-56 | m ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-55 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}INSNO-55 ⁶¹G-55 | n ⁵²F-57

7. The Father generates the Son both through will and intellect.

The reason is that both are one and the same in God.

Objection: God could have not-willed what He wills; therefore, all the things He wills are in some way contingent. *Answer:* the things God wills are twofold: some things He wills inwardly and it is impossible for them not to happen and not willing them is impossible; other things He wills outwardly and it could have been possible for Him not to will them; and therefore, it was possible that they did not happen.

8. The communication of God should be distinguished in a communication, which is absolutely necessary, and a communication that is necessary on account of the hypothesis of his will.

The *question* is in what manner the axiom: *the good communicates itself* must be understood and whether it must also be applied to God? Our *answer* is affirmative. But this communication of God can also be applied *ad intra* so that the Father communicates to the Son the mode of subsistence in the [divine] essence. Likewise, the Father and the Son communicate to the Holy Spirit the mode of subsistence in the divine essence. But the communication *ad extra* according to which God communicates himself to the creatures could have not happened. For it was possible that God had made none of the creatures He made, and that He so much the less had communicated himself to the creatures.

Whereas the communication *ad intra* is called by the scholastics an essential communication, the communication *ad extra* is called an effective communication. |

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9. Active and passive generation do not introduce a composition in God.

The Socinians urge this, although in the meantime they constantly change their opinion whether there is composition in God or not. But it is proved that in God there is no composition and that this distinction does not introduce composition in God. For neither in so far as they are related to one another (for then they are mutually opposed), nor in so far as they pertain to the divine essence (for then they are identical with the divine essence), a composition is introduced, so that in the first case opposition impedes composition, while in the second case the identity with the essence does not admit composition.

X. Filius Dei dicitur quasi unigenitus; ubi particula *quasi* non est assimilativa veri, sed expressiva veri.

Accipitur enim vel ut *similitudinem*, vel ut *veritatem* notat. Cùm autem dicitur, Filius *quasi* unigenitus, veritatem rei notat: sic et cùm dicitur Luc. 22. Et sudor ejus erat *quasi* grumi sanguinis.

XI. Proprium dicitur multis modis.

Proprium dicitur,

1. quod opponitur *alieno*; ita dicitur proprius Dei populus, hoc est, qui non est alterius:
2. Proprium accipitur prout opponitur illi quod non est alicui naturale,^o ita proprius sanguis.
3. Proprium accipitur prout opponitur accidenti communi. Ita divinæ naturæ proprium est, esse ubique.
4. Prout opponitur adoptivo. Et ita Christus filius proprius dicitur, Rom. 8.

XII. Filius Dei multipliciter dicitur; vel Filius qui est ex essentia^p Patris genitus, vel jure creationis, quales Angeli, Job. 1. vel jure adoptionis, et ita omnes fideles sunt filii Dei.⁸

Quæritur, An etiam humana Christi natura dici possit Dei Filius? Commentarii in Catechesin hoc volunt, esse Filium ratione unionis hypostaticæ; sed in Scriptura, nihil tale, imo, contrarium; nam semper distinguitur Filius Dei à^q Christo quatenus homo; at Rom. 1. *de Filio suo qui ex semine Davidis secundum carnem*, et passim.

XIII. Filius Dei non potest operari à se ipso, nisi quod Patrem viderit operantem.

Socinus putat hunc locum demonstrare^r Christum non esse Deum; at ineptè: Nam hoc ibi non dicitur ex *defectu potentiae*, sed ob *inseparabilitatem naturæ*, quoniam unius essentiæ est filius cum Patre; quare etiam ibidem Joh. 5. dicitur,

⁸ LCT, 298–305 [331–338]; TT, 196–202.

^o ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-56 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-56 ⁶¹G-56 | ^p ⁵²F-58 | ^q ⁵⁹R-18 | ^r ⁵⁴R-21

10. When the Son is indicated 'as the Only Begotten Son' the particle 'as' does not refer to a resemblance of truth, but it is an expression of truth.

For 'as' is taken either as noting similitude or truth, but when 'as the only begotten' is said of the Son, it refers to the truth of the thing itself, in such a way as it is said in Lc 22,44 'And his sweat was as great drops of blood.'

11. The term 'proper' can be used in many ways.

'Proper' can be used

1. as opposed to alien. So God's people is called his own people, i.e. it does not belong to another.
2. 'proper' can also be understood in so far as it is opposed to something that does not belong to one's nature, | such as 'one's own blood'.
3. 'proper' can be understood as opposed to an accidental property. So it is proper for the divine nature to be omnipresent.
4. as opposed to adoptive. In this way Christ is called God's proper Son, Rm 8.

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12. The term 'Son of God' is used in many ways: either as referring to the Son born from the essence of the Father or one can be called 'a son of God' by virtue of creation such as the angels, Job 1; or one can be called a 'son of God' by virtue of adoption; and in this way all the faithful are called sons of God.

The *question* is whether the human nature of Christ can also be called Son of God? The commentators on the Catechism maintain this by virtue of the hypostatic union [of the two natures in the person of Christ], but in Scripture no such thing is found, even the contrary; for the Son of God is always distinguished from Christ in so far as He is man, like in Rm 1,3: 'Concerning his Son who is, according to the flesh, from the seed of David, and passim.'

13. The Son of God can do nothing by himself but what He has seen the Father does.

Socinus thinks that this passage [J 5,19–20] proves that Jesus was not God. But this is incorrect. For this is said of Christ not on account of a lack of power, but because of the inseparability of their nature, since the Son is of one essence with the Father. Therefore, in the same place in J 5, He is said to be working in

quod pariter operetur ac^s Pater, quod non posset esse, nisi esset ejusdem naturæ cum Patre.

XIV. Primogenitus dicitur duobus modis: 1. Propriè sumitur pro eo, qui ante alios omnes sui similes natus est; 2. Impropriè,^t Metonymiâ antecedentis pro consequente, ille dicitur primogenitus, qui est dominus et hæres omnium paternorum bonorum. Dum Christus dicitur primogenitus creaturarum, posteriori significatione accipitur. Sic David dicitur primogenitus Regum, Ps. 89. vers. 27. quia præcipuus et primarius inter Reges fuit.⁹

XV. Filius est minor patre, Joh. cap. 14. vers. 18.

1. Ratione humanæ naturæ:

2. Ratione officii mediatorii. Hinc regula Theologorum; *Inæqualitas officii, non facit inæqualitatem naturæ.*

XVI. Spiritus Sanctus accipitur vel pro donis, vel pro autore donorum, 1 Cor. 12.

XVII. Spiritus Sanctus procedit tam à Patre, quam à Filio.^{10u}

Græci negant hoc, et dicunt eum à Patre tantum procedere. Verum procedit quidem a Patre, at non ita, ut Filius excludatur.^v

XVIII. Dum Spiritus Sanctus dari alicui dicitur, non notat præsentiam ejus localem, sed certam operationem.

Quia Spiritus Sanctus est ubique; dum igitur dicitur venire et dari, intelligitur per hoc operatio, quam ibi edit.

XIX. Processio Spiritus Sancti duplex est, *Æterna et Temporaria*.¹¹

Æterna significat modum subsistendi in essentia divina. *Temporaria* autem nihil aliud quam operationem.

⁹ LCT, 298–305 [331–338]; TT, 196–202. | ¹⁰ LCT, 335–336 [371–373]; TT, 218–220. | ¹¹ LCT, 335–336 [371–373]; TT, 218–220.

^s ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-57 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-57 ⁶¹G-57 | ^t ⁵²F-59 | ^u ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-58 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-58 ⁶¹G-58 | ^v ⁵²F-60

the same degree | as the Father. This could not be possible unless He was of the same nature as the Father. 57

14. The term 'Firstborn' is used in two ways. 1. In its proper sense it is used of Him who is born before all his equals. 2. In its improper sense it is a metonym of the antecedent for the consequent: firstborn is called he who is lord and heir of all the paternal goods. When Christ is called the firstborn of all creatures, it must be understood in the latter sense. Likewise, David is called the firstborn of kings, Ps 89,27, because he was the first and principal of the kings.

15. The Son is less great than the Father, J 14,28.

1. According to his human nature.
2. According to his mediatorial office. Hence the rule of theologians: Inequality of office does not imply inequality of nature.

16. The term 'Holy Spirit' refers either to gifts or to the author of gifts, 1Co 12.

17. The Holy Spirit proceeds both from the Father and the Son. | 58
The Greeks deny this and assert that the Spirit only proceeds from the Father. Indeed, He proceeds from the Father, but in such a way that the Son is not excluded.

18. When the Holy Spirit is said to be given to somebody, this does not indicate a local presence but a certain operation of the Spirit.

For the Holy Spirit is everywhere. Therefore, when He is said to come and to be given, this is understood as an operation He produces at that place.

19. The procession of the Holy Spirit is twofold, eternal and temporal.

The eternal procession indicates the mode of subsistence in the divine essence. The temporal procession, however, indicates nothing but the Spirit's operation.

XX. Spiritus Sanctus dicitur interpellare pro nobis, non *proprie*, sed *improprie*.

Rom. 8.

Non interpellat, sed facit nos interpellantes, et Deum rogantes. Interpellat pro nobis non *formaliter*, sed *efficaciter*, ut Scholæ loquuntur.

XXI. Spiritus Sanctus ita in Deo Patre et Filio est, ut Pater et Filius sint in Spiritu Sancto.

Vocant hoc Theologi per ἐμπεριχωρησιν quod est, si Latinè vertas, *immediate*. Cæterum^w Sociniani contendunt Spiritum Sanctum non^x esse Deum et personam, quia est in persona; at hoc pacto negant Patrem et Filium esse Personas. Pater enim est in Filio, Filius autem etiam in Patre; ut Joh. 14. 10, 11.

XXII. Deus et creatura nihil habent commune præter nomen.¹²

Si enim habent aliquid commune, illud aut foret finitum, aut infinitum. Si finitum; ergo Deus finitus: Si infinitum; ergo creatura infinita.

XXIII. De Deo magis verificantur abstracta, quam concreta.

Hoc est; Deus potius essentia est, quam^v ens, sapientia, quam sapiens, immensitas, quam immensus. Sed sciendum est, verum hoc esse in attributis *absolutis*; nam in *relatis* quæ actionem notant, concreta magis verificantur; melius enim quadrat, dicere Deum creatorem, quam creationem.

XXIV. Infinitum plus uno esse non potest.

Hoc etiam Ethnici agnoverunt: non enim possunt esse plura entia independentia, quam unum. Probatur; quia si hoc, aut infinita illa^z se invicem caperent, et tum non essent infinita; aut non, et sic etiam definitos^a terminos haberent essentiæ, quia^b unum ab altero distaret.

¹² LCT, 337–338 [373374]; CT 65–89; TT, 220–223.

w ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-59 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSNO}-59 ⁶¹G-59 | x ⁵²F-61 | y ⁵⁴R-22 | z ⁵⁹R-19 | a ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-60
⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSNO}-60 ⁶¹G-60 | b ⁵²F-62

20. The Holy Spirit is said to pray for us, not in a proper but in an improper sense, Rm 8.

He does not pray himself but makes us pray and beg God. As the scholastics say, He prays for us not essentially [himself] but he prays effectively for us .

21. The Holy Spirit is in such a way in God the Father and the Son, as the Father and the Son are in the Spirit.

Theologians indicate this by means of the term *emperichoresis* that is translated in Latin: coinherence. | Apart from that, the Socinians maintain that the Holy Spirit is neither God nor a person, because He is in the person. But in this way they also deny that the Father and the Son are persons. For the Father is in the Son and the Son is also in the Father, as in J 14,10-11.

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22. Except the name 'God' God and creature have nothing in common.¹

For if they would have something in common this would be something finite or infinite: if finite, then God would be finite; if infinite, then creature would be infinite.

23. The truth about God is proved more by abstract terms than by concrete terms.

I.e. God is essence rather than a being, wisdom rather than wise, immensity rather than immense. But note that this is true for the absolute attributes; for regarding the relative attributes, which refer to actions, concrete terms present more truth; for it is more fitting to say that God is Creator rather than creation.

24. It is impossible that more than one thing is infinite.

The heathens also recognize this. For it is impossible that there are more independent beings than one. This is proved, because if this were the case, these infinities would in turn enclose each other, and thus they would not be infinities; or if they would not enclose each other, these infinities would have | defined boundaries regarding their essence, because they are separated from each other.

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¹ Cf. Ps 82,1.

XXV. Ab omnipotentia non est argumentandum ad id, cujus contrarium exstat in Scriptura.

Verbi gratia, si quis ita vellet; Deus potest condemnare fideles; ergo condemnabit. Contrarium enim exstat.

XXVI. Ab omnipotentia Dei non est argumentandum, nisi etiam constat de voluntate.

Ineptum enim esset, si dicerem, Deus potest me facere Regem, Ergo faciet.

XXVII. Voluntas Dei est regula omnis boni.

Dupliciter hoc capi potest, vel quod sit causa omnis boni, vel quicquid Deus vult, esse bonum. Sciendum autem hic, quædam justa esse, quia Deus vult; quædam verò eum velle, quia justa sunt.

XXVIII. Affectus in Deo non est, nisi effectus et voluntas Dei.

Ita ira, odium, significant voluntatem Dei puniendi.^c

c ⁵²F-63 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-61 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-61 ⁶¹G-61

25. God's omnipotence cannot be used in order to prove something of which the opposite is stated in Scripture.

For example, when someone would like to say that it is possible for God to condemn the faithful and that He, therefore, will condemn them. For the contrary is read in Scripture.

26. God's omnipotence cannot be used as an argument unless it corresponds with his will.

For it would be foolish to say: God can make me a king, and, therefore He will do it.

27. God's will is a rule for all that is good.

This can be understood in two ways: either He is the cause of all good, or whatever God wills is good. But it should be known that some things are just, because God wills them, but that He wills other things, because they are just.

28. In God there is no affection but effect and His will.

So wrath and hatred indicate God's will to punish. |

CAPUT VI.

De Creatione.¹

I. Creatio duplex est; *Mediata*, et *Immediata*. *Mediata* est, quæ fit ex re inhabili. *Immediata*, quæ fit ex nihilo.²

Deum ex nihilo omnia fecisse, liquet Roman. 4. 17. Qui vocat ea quæ non sunt, tanquam sint: et ad Heb. 11. 3. Per fidem intelligimus mundum non ex apparentibus factum.

II. Particula ista, *per*, quâ utitur Sp. S. in opere creationis, aliquando absolutè notat causam efficientem, aliquando ordinem in agendo.

Causam notare Rom. 11. 6. patet; Ex quo, per quem, et ad quem sunt omnia. Ordinem, dum Filio tribuitur Joh. 1. Per quem facta sunt omnia, et sine quo factum est nihil.

III. Dicitur Deus finis omnium, non indigentiae, sed perfectionis et assimilationis.^{3d}

Dicitur Prover. 41. Deum omnia condidisse propter se, hoc quomodo intelligendum, quæritur, *Resp.* De fine perfectionis, quia Deus creaturis opus non habuit, neque earum indigus fuit: Ergo creavit omnia^e propter^f se, tanquam finem *assimilationis*, ut se communicaret creaturis. Job. 33.

IV. Deus quæcunque fecit, non^g fecit tractu temporis, sed in momento.

¹ LCT, cc. 36-45, 337-389 [374-430]; TT, 220-249; TP, 135-148 [72-86]; TQ, 370-375 [40-45]; TC, 464-467; ПΨ-Pontificiorum, 530-532 [31-34]; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 604-606 [114-115]; A-S, 749-762 [59-73]. | ² LCT, 338-339 [375-376], 344 [381]; TT, 224-227. | ³ LCT, 341 [377]; TT, 224-227.

d ⁵²F-64 | e ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-62 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-62 | f ⁶¹G-62 | g ⁵⁴R-23

Chapter VI

On Creation

1. Creation is twofold: mediate and immediate. Mediate creation is creation out of unformed matter, immediate creation is creation out of nothing.

From Rm 4,17 it is clear that God made everything out of nothing: 'He who calls into existence the things that do not exist.' Hbr 11,3: 'Through faith we understand that the world was not made of things that appear.'

2. The particle 'through' which the Holy Spirit uses in the work of creation, sometimes refers in an absolute sense to an efficient cause, sometimes it refers to the order of working.

The reference to a cause is evident in Rm 11,36: 'For from Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things.' The order of working is indicated, when it is attributed to the Son as in J 1,3: 'All things were made by Him, and without Him was not anything made that was made.'

3. God is said to be the goal of all things, not because He is in need of something, but as an expression of perfection and [the goal for] likeness.

The *question* is in what manner the statement in Prv 16,4 that 'God has made all things for Himself', is to be interpreted. *Answer*: it indicates the goal as perfection because creatures were not necessary for God nor did He need them. Therefore, He created all things | for himself as being the goal for likeness in order to communicate himself to the creatures. Job 33.

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4. Whatever God has made, He did not make it during a course of time but in one moment.

Psal. 33. *Dixit, inquit, et facta sunt.* Interim hîc conciliatio est adhibenda; nam dicitur Deum sex diebus operatum esse, quod ita accipiendum, sex momentis condidisse, ita ut quæ singulo die dicuntur facta, momento istius diei facta esse censenda sint.

V. Deus quievit ab operibus, et tamen operatur.

Prius habetur in libro Geneseos: posterius Joh. 5. conciliantur ista sic; quievit à speciebus novis creandis, sed non quievit à speciebus creatis conservandis et propagandis. Conservatio enim est quasi creationis continuatio.

VI. Deus fecit omnia valde bona, et tamen mutabilia.⁴

Quæritur: Quomodo hoc verum esse^h possit? *Resp.* Bonitas duplex est; entis independentis, et dependentis. Illa est simplex immutabilis, hæc autem mutabilis, imo ita creaturam sequitur, ut sit proprium ejus quarti modi; nec est defectus privativus hæc mutabilitas in creaturis, sed est defectus negativus, qui in creatura rationali non est peccatum.ⁱ

Quæritur deinde: Quomodo hinc Theologi nostri deducant bonitatem hominis moralem, cùm hîc agatur de bonitate rerum communi, quæ certe moralis esse non potest, nisi elicere velimus, morale bonum cadere in omne quod est. *Resp.* Agitur hîc^j non de bonitate aliqua generali, sed de ea, quæ unicuique speciei est propria: cùm ergo bonitas moralis homini propria sit, hoc loco quoque intelligenda est.

VII, Noxium est vel ab ipsa prima creatione, vel à lapsu.

Quæritur: An bestię etiam noxię creatę sint; item herbę venenatę? *Resp.* Neg. Nam quæ hominibus nocere solent, in statu integritatis non erant nocitura, sed quod in nos sæviant, hoc ex culpa accessit, ut sit nobis pœna.

VIII. Confusum quicquid est, vel est tale ratione causę secundę, vel primę.

⁴ CT, 70–73.

Ps 33,9: 'For He spoke and it was done.' However, here a reconciliation should be applied. For it is said that God has done his work in six days. This should be interpreted as being six moments, so that what is said to be created in one single day must be considered as being created at one moment of that day.

5. God rested from his works and yet He still works.

The first is stated in the book Genesis, the second in J 5. These two are reconciled as follows: He did rest from producing new species, but He did not rest from preserving and propagating the newly created species. For conservation is a kind of continuation of creation.

6. God made all things very good; yet all things were changeable.

The *question* is: in what manner can this be true? *Answer*: goodness is twofold; first the goodness of an independent being, secondly the goodness of a dependent being. The first one is simply immutable, the second one, however, is mutable. Rather this mutability accompanies creature in such a way that it is a property of its fourth state [the state of glorification]. Moreover, this mutability in creatures is not a privative defect but a negative defect, which is no sin in creatures endowed with reason. |

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Next *question*: in what manner do our theologians deduce from this the moral goodness of man, when here the common goodness of things is discussed through which it is not possible to be moral unless we want to draw the conclusion that moral goodness applies to all that exists. *Answer*: what is discussed here is not some general goodness, but the goodness characteristic of every individual species. And because moral goodness is proper to man alone, it should be interpreted likewise on this point.

7. Harm originates either from the first creation or from the fall into sin.

Question: are beasts and poisonous plants also harmful creatures? The *answer* is negative. For things that are usually harmful to human beings were not harmful in the state of integrity; but the fact that they rage at us is due to our guilt so that for us it is a punishment.

8. Whatsoever is confused is confused either in respect of the second cause or the first cause.

Dicuntur omnia à Deo in certo numero,^k pondere et mensura facta esse; posset jam inferri, nullam fore confusionem in rebus, quod falsum esse, experientia docet. *Resp.* Confusa videntur ratione nostri, quæ ratione Dei ordinatissima sunt:

1. omnia enim ad certos fines diriguntur;
 2. per certa media.
- Utrumque hoc liquet ex doctrina de providentia.^l

IX. Peccatum Angelorum est vel objecto primum, vel motu primum.⁵

Valde disputant Theologi nostri de eo, quodnam fuerit primum peccatum. Et quidem si de *motu primo* quæramus, hoc facile scitur: nam omne peccatum actuale habet istos gradus;

1. dubitatio cum deliberatione conjuncta;
2. propositum faciendi;
3. factum ipsum.

Diabolorum ergo peccatum *motu primo* erat, dubitatio, infidelitas. *Objecto* vero primum quod sit, non facile cognoscitur; probabile tamen est, fuisse superbiam.

X. Inter Angelos datur ordo, non ratione naturæ, sed ratione officiorum.⁶

Hoc est, quod aliis majora, aliis minora demandata sint.

XI. Angelus alius est creatus,^m alius increatus.

Nam Angelus dicitur Filius Dei, qui est Deus æternus, Exod. 3. Nam ille qui hîc dicitur Angelus Jehovæ, dicitur Deus Abrahami,ⁿ Isaaci, Jacobi, et dicitur Jehova, Genes. 22. Item Angelus faciei Dei. An vero hîc idem Angelus vocetur Michæl, de eo controvertitur ex Scriptura. Nos negamus; Michaël enim ille non ausus est Sathanæ impingere notam maledictionis; sed dixit:^o *inrepet^o te Dominus*. Christus autem Sathanæ maledictionis notam impingere ausus est. Marc. 1. 25.

5 LCT, 357–358 [396–397]; TT, 235–237. | 6 TT, 229–231.

k ⁵²F-66 | l ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-64 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-64 ⁶¹G-64 | m ⁵²F-67 | n ⁵⁴R-24 | o ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-65
⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-65 | p ⁶¹G-65

All things are said to be made by God in a certain number, weight and measure. From this the conclusion could be drawn that there is no confusion at all in created things. Experience, however, teaches that this is not true. *Answer*: things seem to be confused for us. For God they are supremely well ordered.

1. All things are directed to certain ends.
2. By certain means.

Both ends and means are evident from the doctrine of providence. |

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9. The first sin of angels is either caused by an object or by a movement.

Our theologians hotly debate the character of the first sin. If we look at the first movement of sin, the question is easy to answer. For every actual sin has the following grades:

1. doubt connected with deliberation;
2. the intention to act;
3. the act itself.

Therefore, the first sin of the devils was caused by movement, namely doubt and faithlessness. But it is not easy to find out what their first sin was regarding its object. Probably, it has been pride.

10. Among angels there is an order, not in respect of their nature but in respect of their office.

I.e. some angels are entrusted with greater duties, others with smaller.

11. Angels are created or uncreated.

For the Son of God who is the eternal God is called an angel, Ex 3. For in this passage He who is called the Angel of Jehovah, is also called the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, and Jehovah, Gn 22. Likewise, He is called the angel before God's countenance. Whether this angel could be identified with Michael is a point of debate arising from Scripture. Our *answer* is negative. For Michael did not dare to produce a word of malediction against Satan, but he said: | 'The Lord may blame you' [Jd 9]. Christ, however, has dared to rebuke Satan with a word of malediction, Mc 1,25.

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XII. Hominis tantum duæ sunt partes essentielles. Corpus scilicet et anima.⁷

Liquet hoc Matth. 10. ubi Christus dicit: Ne timete eos qui trucidant corpus, etc. Eccles. 12. Corpus redit ad terram, spiritus ad Deum.

Obj. Ex Psal. 5. 23. Heb. 3. ubi tres nominantur, corpus, anima et spiritus. *Resp.* Dum anima et spiritus corpori contradistinguuntur non intelliguntur duo diversa, sed una eadémque res per diversas facultates expressa. Nam per animam, 1. intelligitur anima sensitiva, per spiritum facultas rationalis, ut hoc prolixè probatur à Theodor. Beza in annotat. Maj. N. T.⁹

XIII. Homo in integritatis statu potuit non mori. In statu lapsus non potest non mori; in statu glorificationis non poterit mori.⁸

In statu integritatis potuit non mori, quia potuit non peccasse. In statu lapsus omnibus semel constitutum est mori. Hebr. 9. *quia stipendium peccati est mors.* In statu gloriæ *erunt similes Angelis,* Luc. 10. *immortales.*^f

XIV. Homo in statu integritatis erat corruptibilis naturâ. Non verò corrumpendus gratiâ et beneficio Dei.⁹

Corruptibilem fuisse natura liquet.

1. Erat ex quatuor elementis compositus:

2. edebat, bibebat, nec tamen moriturus erat; quia mors est propter peccatum.

Obj. Quodcunque propter peccatum est, pœna est; at mortalitas propter peccatum est: Ergo per consequens, homo non fuit mortalis. *Resp.* Non dicimus hominem fuisse mortalem proximâ potentia; sed dum dicimus potuisse mori, intelligimus potentiam remotam, sive possibilitatem moriendi, quam alii vocant, non repugnantiam.

XV. In statu integritatis intellectus^s hominis^t erat bonus mutabiliter, voluntas bona mutabiliter.¹⁰

7 TT, 239–241. | 8 CT, 79–82. | 9 CT, 70–73. | 10 CT, 70–73.

q ⁵²F-68 | r ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-66 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSNO}-66 ⁶¹G-66 | s ⁵²F-69 | t ⁵⁹R-21

12. Man consists of nothing more than two essential components, body and soul.

This is clear from Mt 10, where Christ is saying: ‘Fear not them who kill the body’ etc. and Qoh 12,7: ‘The body shall return to the earth, and the spirit shall return unto God.’

Objection taken from 1Th 5,23 and from Hbr 4,12, where three parts are mentioned: body, soul, and spirit. *Answer*: when soul and spirit are distinguished from the body, this should not be understood as two different entities, but as one and the same thing expressed by means of different faculties. For the soul is understood as the sensitive soul, and the spirit as rational faculty. Theodore Beza extensively proved this in his *Annotationes Majores in N.T.*¹

13. In the state of integrity it was possible for man not to die. In the state of the fall he could not but die. In the state of glorification it will not be possible for him to die.

In the state of integrity man could not die, because he was able not to sin. In the state of the fall all mankind is appointed to die once, Hbr 9,27. For death is the recompensation of sin. In the state of glory they will be like angels, Lc 20, and therefore immortal. |

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14. In the state of integrity man was perishable by nature. But thanks to God’s grace and benefaction he did not need to perish.

That he was perishable by nature is evident.

1. He was composed out of the four elements;
2. he used to eat and drink, but he was not going to die; for death is because of sin.

Objection: whatever exists because of sin, is a penalty. Well, mortality is because of sin. Consequently, [in the state of integrity] man has not been mortal. *Answer*: we do not say that man has been mortal by virtue of a proximate potency, but when we say that he could have died, we refer to a remote potency or the possibility of dying that other [theologians] call a non-inconsistency.

15. In the state of integrity intellect and will of man were changeably good.

¹ BEZA, *Annotationes*, 620 (1Th 5,23) and 664 (Hbr 4,12).

Quæritur: Cùm homo fuerit bonus in statu integritatis, ane ergo arbor bona potest malos fructus ferre? *Resp.* Bona arbor, quæ immutabiliter bona est, non potest malos fructos ferre; at quæ mutabiliter, potest; mutari enim potest, et ex bona mala fieri.

XVI. Ignorantia earum rerum,^u quas scire non debemus, non est peccatum; at earum quas scire debemus, est peccatum.

Quæritur; An hoc peccatum fuerit, quòd Eva ignoraverit serpentem loqui posse? *Resp.* Non: Erat enim ex istis, quæ non tenebatur scire, sed experientia demum fuerat assecutura: sed hoc peccatum erat, quod putabat isti arbori vetitæ vim inesse scientiæ boni et mali, cùm fuerit tantum Sacramentum.

XVII. Aliter se habuit liberum arbitrium in statu integritatis, aliter in statu lapsus, aliter in statu reparationis, aliter in statu glorificationis.

In statu integritatis potuit velle et non^v velle; erat enim naturâ suâ ad utrumque habile, ac proinde liberum erat à miseratione^w et coactione. In statu lapsus ita se habet, ut non possit bonum spirituale velle, nec morale benè, potest tamen bonum spirituale reicere et morale non facere, itaque liberum est à coactione, non autem à miseriâ. In statu reparationis habet se homo ad utrumque quidem, sed ex parte liberum, à miseria et coactione. In statu glorificationis non potest nisi bonum; Liberum itaque erit omni modo à miseria et coactione.^x

XVIII. Imago Dei consistit in *natura, rectitudine et dominio*.¹¹

In *natura*, Gen. 9 6. qui effundit sanguinem, etc. in *rectitudine*, Eph. 4. 20, 21, 22, 23. Col. 3. 8, 9, 10. in *dominio* Gen. 1. 26.

XIX. Omnis creatio novitatem sapit, atque adeo non poterat esse ab æterno.

¹¹ LCT, 381–389 [422–430]; CT, 76–79; TT, 242–249.

^u ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-67 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-67 ⁶¹G-67 | ^v ⁵²F-70 | ^w ⁵⁴R-25 | ^x ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-68 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-68
⁶¹G-68

Now the *question* is: when man has been good in the state of integrity, how, then, is it possible that a good tree bears bad fruits? *Answer*: a good tree that is immutably good cannot produce bad fruits. But a tree that is changeably good can produce bad fruits. For it can change from good into bad.

16. Ignorance of things | we do not have to know is no sin. But ignorance of things we must know, is sin.

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The *question* arises: should the fact that Eve did not know that the serpent was able to speak be accounted for as sin? *Answer*: no. For it concerned things she was not supposed to know, but things she was going to learn by experience. But it was sin to think that the forbidden tree contained a power to make good and bad known, while it was no more than a sacrament.²

17. The constitution of free choice is different in the various states of man: in the state of integrity, in the state of fall, in the state of renewal and in the state of glorification.

In the state of integrity free choice was able to will and able not to will; for by virtue of its nature it was able to do both and, consequently, it was free from misery and coercion. In the state of the fall its condition was such that it was not able to will the spiritual good, neither the moral good in a right way; yet it was able to reject the spiritual good and able not to perform the moral good. Thus, it was free from coercion but not from misery. In the state of renewal man is indeed free to do both [to will and not to will], but only partially, with a freedom from misery and from coercion. In the state of glorification free choice is only able to do the good. Then it will be completely free from misery and coercion.³ |

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18. The image of God consists in nature, rectitude and dominion.

In nature, see Gn 9,6: 'who sheds man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God He made man.' For 'in rectitude', see E 4, 20-23; Kol 3,8-10. For 'in dominion', see Gn 1,26.

19. All creation has a taste of newness, therefore it cannot have been in existence from eternity.

2 E.g. a sacrament of the covenant of works in paradise.

3 Confer BERNARDUS OF CLAIRVAUX, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, 606 (III.7): '*triplex sit nobis proposita libertas, a peccato, a miseria, a necessitate.*'

Sunt aliqui absurdi Philosophi qui docent, Deum ab æterno potuisse condere omnia, quod ita urgent: *Quær.* An non Deus semper potuisset facere mundum? si ita, ergo etiam ab æterno. *Resp.* Potuit semper in tempore cum tempore, non tamen absque tempore; contradictio enim est.^y

XX. Creatio activa ipse Deus est.

Alii Scholasticorum negant, alii affirmant; sed aliqui distinguunt inter creationem activam et passivam. Nota autem, illa regula est, quod verbalia in *io* ab activis descendunt, et actionem, et passionem significant. *Activè* ergo voce creationis sumptâ, damus esse Deum ipsum, non *passivè*; et hoc ita esse ostenditur. Ista creatio activa aut creatione creatâ, aut non; Si creatione creatâ, iterum pergamus quærere, quid sit, an creatura, an Deus? si creatura, creatione creata, et sic processus in infinitum.^z

XXI. Omnium rerum creatarum idem est finis et causa efficiens.¹²

Causa efficiens agit propter finem: Cùm ergo rerum creatarum fuerit efficiens, ut extra creaturas nulla dari possit præter Deum, etiam Deus ipse erit finis omnium.

XXII. Deus nunquam frustratur suo fine.

Causa secunda fine suo frustrari potest; at non causa prima;

1. quia quod frustratur suo fine est ignorans; at Deus nullius rei est ignorans.
2. Quia qui frustratur suo fine, hoc non est in ejus potestate, ut fiat; at omnia sunt in Dei potestate.^a

XXIII. Ex intellectu humano res divinæ non sunt judicandæ.

Utilissima est hæc regula. Habetur Esa 59. *Non sunt viæ meæ sicut viæ vestræ, etc.* Affertur autem hæc regula eò, quod multi putant, cùm Deus condiderit omnia in mensura, pondere et ordine, quod hoc non consistere possit, quod hæc

¹² TT, 224–227.

^y ^{52F-71} | ^z ^{53FA^{ELZ}-69} ^{56FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-69} ^{61G-69} | ^a ^{52F-72}

There are some silly philosophers who teach that God could have created all things from eternity. They urge this by asking the following question: was it not always possible for God to create the world at any time? If so, then He was able to create the world from eternity too. *Answer:* God could always create in time with time, but not without time; for that is a contradiction.

20. Active creation is God himself.

Some scholastics deny this, other scholastics affirm it. But there are some who distinguish between active and passive creation. According to the well-known rule, however, [Latin] words ending on *-io* and derived from *activa*, signify both action and passion. When the word 'creation' is taken in an active and not in a passive sense, we concede that creation is God himself. That this is the case can be proved as follows: this active creation is either by a created creation or not. If it is by a created creation, I can proceed by asking what it is: a creature or God? If it is a creature, then it is by a created creation, and in this way it can proceed *ad infinitum*. |

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21. The goal and the efficient cause of all created things are identical.

The efficient cause works because of a goal. Because there has been an efficient cause of all created things and because beyond creatures there can be no efficient cause except God, God himself will also be the goal of all things.

22. God is never frustrated in accomplishing his goal.

The goal of a second cause can be frustrated, but not the goal of the first cause.

1. For being frustrated in one's goal implies ignorance. But in God there is no ignorance of anything.
2. Someone who is frustrated in his goal, does not have the power to make it happen. All things, however, are in God's power.

23. Divine things are not be judged according to human intellect.

This is a very useful rule that is found in Is 55: 'For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, says the Lord.' This rule is reported here, because many people think that if God created all things in their measure,

regula dicit, quia sunt confusa multa. *Resp.* Ex hac regulâ, quod confusa non sint æstimanda ex intellectu humano, sed divino.

XXIV. Aliquid quod est absolutè^b dignius, potest certo respectu esse indignius.

Dignitas est vel absoluta, vel relata. Sic Angeli relatè considerati, quatenus missi sunt ad^c ministerium electorum, indigniores sunt electis: At absolutè in naturâ suâ considerati, electis digniores sunt. Sic Christus quatenus medium salutis, indignior est Ecclesiâ. At absolutè naturâ suâ consideratus, infinities Ecclesiam dignitate suâ excedit.^d

XXV. Inter bonos Angelos est ordo, non naturæ præstantiâ, sed officiorum eminentiâ.¹³

Disputatur inter Theologos, in quâ re nitatur iste ordo? dicimus nos niti non præstantiâ^e naturæ, sed officiorum eminentiâ.

XXVI. Imago Dei non dicitur univocè de Christo et nobis.

Nam Christus *essentialis* imago est, nos verò *accidentalis*; et quidem accidentalis analogica, ut dici solet.

13 TT, 231–235.

b ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-70 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-70 ⁶¹G-70 | c ⁵⁹R-22 | d ⁵²F-73 | e ⁵⁴R-26

weight and order, this rule is inconsistent, because many things are in disorder. *Answer:* from this rule it follows that disorder should be estimated not by human but by divine intellect.

24. It is possible that something that has greater dignity in an absolute sense, | 70
has less dignity in some other respect.

Dignity is either absolute or related. Thus, angels considered relatedly in so far as they are sent to serve the elect, have less dignity than the elect. But considered absolutely in their nature they have more dignity than the elect. Likewise, Christ as a means of salvation has less dignity than the Church. But considered absolutely in his nature, He exceeds the Church infinitely in dignity.

25. Among the good angels there is an order, non according to the excellence of their nature, but because of the prominence of their offices.

Among theologians the question is disputed on which reality this order is based. We say that it is not based on an excellence of nature but on a prominence of offices.

26. The image of God is not predicated univocally of Christ and us.⁴

For Christ is the essential image of God, but we are an accidental image of God, to wit an analogical accidental image, as it is usually called.

⁴ For univocal en equivocal, see MULLER, *Dictionary*, 28.320.

CAPUT VII.

De Prædestinatione.¹

I. Prædestinatio est vel hominum, vel Angelorum.^{2f}

Hominum, Rom. 8. 30. *Quos prædestinavit.* Angelorum, 1 Tim. 5. 21. *Et electorum Angelorum.*

II. Prædestinatio est vel electio vel reprobatio.³

Graviter de eo disputatur, an Prædestinatio possit tribui utrique. Nos affirmamus quod vel unico argumento ostendimus. Si peccata dicuntur in Scripturâ prædestinata, ergo et homines ad illa patrandâ: Ergo, pertinet ad reprobationem Prædestinatio. At verum prius, Act, 2. 23. et cap. 4. 27, 28. Si ergo peccata dicuntur prædestinata, et homines ad illa, cur non reprobationi quoque tribui possit vox Prædestinationis? et quidem ratione longè potiori; quia reprobatio est destinatio^g ad pœnam, quæ bona est moraliter, quia fit secundum leges justitiæ Dei: peccata verò mala sunt, et tamen iis vox Prædestinationis accommodatur; quidni ergo et reprobationi quæ bona est? quippe actus justitiæ Dei.

III. Prædestinatio est absoluta à causa impulsiva, quæ extra Deum est.⁴

Si enim esset causa impulsiva, quæ moveret Deum ad hoc vel illud agendum, Deus esset causa dependens. Non autem absoluta est à mediis: Verbi gratia;

1 LCT, cc. 25–27, 205–235 [219–241]; CT, 1–65; TT, 129–142; TP, 127–135 [63–72]; TQ, 365–368 [34–37]; TC, 462–464; ΠΨ-Lutheranorum, 587–589 [95–96]; ΠΨ-Arminianorum, 602–604 [112–114]; A-E, 662–671. | 2 LCT, 205 [219]; TT, 129. | 3 LCT, 205–207 [219–220]; CT, 37–41; TT, 129–130. | 4 LCT, 207–208 [221–222]; CT, 30–34; TT, 130–132.

f ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-71 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-71 ⁶¹G-71 | g ⁵²F-74

Chapter VII

On Predestination

1. Predestination is of men or angels. |

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For the predestination of men, see Rm 8,30: 'Whom he did predestinate'. For the predestination of angels, see 1T 5,21: 'The elect angels'.

2. Predestination is either election or reprobation.

It is vehemently disputed whether the act of predestination can be attributed to both. We affirm this, and in order to prove it we offer one single argument: if Holy Scripture says that sins are predestinated, then human beings are also predestinated to commit them. Therefore, predestination also applies to reprobation. That the first premise is true is evident from Act 2,23 and Act 4,27-28. If therefore sins are called predestinated, and if it follows from this that human beings are predestinated to commit them, why could the word predestination not be attributed to reprobation? In fact, there is a much better reason for this: reprobation is a destination to punishment, which is morally good, because it is according to God's laws of righteousness. Sins, on the contrary, are bad; nevertheless, the word predestination is applied to them. Why not, then, apply predestination to reprobation, which is good, for it is an act of God's righteousness.

3. Predestination is free from an impulsive cause outside God.

If an impulsive cause would be moving God to act in one-way or another, He would be Himself a dependent cause. Nevertheless, predestination is not

decrevit salvare^h fideles, sed per et propter Christum, sicⁱ decrevit reprobos damnare propter peccata.

IV. Objectum prædestinationis est aliud ratione finis, prout est in intentione, aliud prout est in executione.⁵

Ratione finis, prout est in intentione est homo creabilis; Ratione finis, qui est in executione, est homo condendus, conditus, permittendus in lapsum, lapsus;

et ratio prioris est, quia finis non est de nihilo, sed de aliquo; jam ille de quo est finis, consideratur ut qui fieri possit, et hoc respectu Dei non potest considerari ut quod futurum sit, nam decrevisset Deus aliquid futurum incerto fine.^j

Posterioris probatio hæc est: quia Deus finem hunc quem sibi præstituit in ostensione justitiæ vindicativæ et misericordiæ, non potest assequi (non defectu *potentiæ*, sed *objecti*) nisi hominem decrevisset condere, condidisset, permisisset in lapsum. Ergo hoc erit etiam objectum ratione finis prout est in executione.

V. Electio alia est ad gratiam, alia ad gloriam.

Alii ita; electio alia est ad finem, alia ad media; interim sciendum non distingui ita^k nisi objectis: Deus enim unico actu omnia vult, ita elegit omnia; et quod dicitur electio ad gratiam posterior esse electione ad gloriam, id ita intelligendum est, quod nim. sit posterior *naturâ* non *tempore* et ratione; quia utut Deus unico actu simplicissimo elegerit nos ad utrumque, tamen^l elegit nos ad unum propter aliud, hoc est, elegit nos ad gratiam, propterea quia elegerat ad gloriam.

5 LCT, 208–210 [222–223]. 211–218 [Appendix in editio 1650, 901–915]; TT, 132.

h ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-72 O-72 | i ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}-72 ⁶¹G-72 | j ⁵²F-75 | k ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-73 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-73 ⁶¹G-73
| i ⁵⁴R-27

without means; for example: God decreed to save the faithful, | but He did so through and because of Christ. Likewise, He decreed to damn the reprobate because of their sins. 72

4. In respect of its goal it is one thing to consider the object of predestination in so far as it exists in intention, but it is another thing to consider the object of predestination in so far as it exists in execution.

Regarding the goal, with respect to the intention, the human object of predestination is creatable man. Regarding the goal with respect to execution, the human object of predestination is man to be created and created, man being permitted to fall and fallen.

The first is proved, since there is no goal for nothing, but for something. But someone for whom there is a goal is considered as what he might become, and this¹ in respect to God cannot be considered as something that will be in the future, for then God would have decreed something to be in the future with an uncertain goal.

The second can be proved as follows: the goal which God has appointed beforehand for himself in order to show his vindictive righteousness and his mercy, He is not able to obtain (not because of lack of power, but because it lacks an object) unless He had decreed to create man, and, indeed, created man and permitted him to fall into sin. Ergo: this will be the object of predestination in respect of its goal in so far as it exists in execution.

5. Election unto grace is one thing, election unto glory is another thing.

Other theologians think likewise: one is election to a goal and another is election to means. Yet one should know that these distinctions only | apply to the objects of predestination: for God wills all things in one single act. So He elects all things in one single act. The fact that election unto grace is said to be later than election unto glory, must be understood as referring to a natural and not to a temporal structure and to reason. For although God has elected us to both [grace and glory] in one simple act, yet He has elected us to the one because of the other, i.e. He has elected us unto grace for the reason that He had elected us unto glory. 73 |

¹ Namely: the goal, with respect to the intention, the human object of predestination is creatable man (*homo creabilis*).

VI. Electi sumus, ut simus in Christo, non quod eramus.⁶

Torquet locus iste aliquos Eph. 1. *Elegit nos in ipso*; sed nulla hîc difficultas est, nam elegit^m nos esse, ita ut sensus sit, elegit nos, non quod eramus, sed ut essemus. Vid. locum parallelum Jac. 2. vers. 5. *nonne elegitⁿ Deus pauperes hujus mundi divites fide*, certè non qui erant, sed qui essent, quemadmodum exsequenti themate liquet, nam eodem modo elegit divites quo hæredes; at hæredes non qui erant, sed qui essent.

VII. Voluit nobis Deus salutem, non in respectu ad Christum ratione intentionis; at voluit in respectu ad Christum ratione finis in executione.⁷

Obj. Adversarii: Si Deus Christum nobis^o misit propter salutem, ergo salutem prius^p voluit quam Christum, ergo non voluit in respectu ad Christum; Nam certè propter Christum in nobis salus confertur, nec est in alio quoquam salus. Act. 4.

Resp. Si istud voluit, ratione intentionis accipiatur, verum est quod non in respectu ad Christum; si non, sed in executione ad Christum, tum certè propter Christum, παραφραστικῶς hoc dicimus: Deus salutem nobis dat et constituit ut propter Christum nobis salutem eam conferret.

VIII. Reprobatio est vel negativa vel positiva.⁸

Negativam dicimus, non esse electum; quod scriptura istis verbis effert, *non esse scriptum in libro vitæ; non esse datum Christo*.⁹ Positiva est ordinatio ad pœnas, et ad ea, propter quæ pœna infligitur.

IX. Reprobatio positiva, est vel absoluta vel comparata.⁹

Absoluta est ordinatio ad interitum, efferi solet his phrasibus *præscriptum esse ad æternam damnationem; vasa compacta esse ad interitum*. Rom. 9. Comparata autem est ordinatio non ad pœnam tantùm, sed ad majorem pœnam, verbi

⁶ LCT, 219–221 [225–227]; CT, 28–30. | ⁷ LCT, 219–221 [225–227], 208–210 [222–223]]; CT, 28–30.

| ⁸ LCT, 234–235 [241–242]. | ⁹ LCT, 234–235 [241–242].

6. We are elected in order to be in Christ, not because we were in Christ.

Some are torturing themselves with the passage in E 1: ‘He has chosen us in Him’. But there is no problem here, for He has chosen us ‘to be in Him’. Thus the meaning is: He has chosen us not because we were in Christ, but He has chosen us so that we should be in Christ. See the parallel passage in Jc 2,5: ‘Has God not chosen the poor of this world to be rich in faith?’ This certainly does not refer to those who were [rich], but to those who will be [rich] in faith, as this is also clear from the next passage. For He has chosen the rich in the same manner as the heirs: not because they were heirs, but in order to be heirs.

7. God has willed that our salvation would be in relation to Christ – yet not regarding his intention; but regarding the execution towards the goal.

Opponents *object*: if God did send us Christ | because of salvation, then He has willed salvation before Christ, and, therefore, He did not will salvation in relation to Christ. Certainly, salvation is granted to us only because of Christ, neither is there salvation in anyone else, Act 4,12.

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Answer: if the phrase ‘He has willed’ is taken as referring to his intention, it is true that salvation is not willed in relation to Christ. If it is interpreted as referring to the execution in relation to Christ, then, by way of periphrasis we may say that God gives us salvation and that He has decided to grant us this salvation, because of Christ.

8. Reprobation is either negative or positive.

Negative reprobation is equal to ‘not being elected’, which Holy Scripture expresses with these words: ‘not being written in the book of life’ or ‘not being given to Christ’. Positive reprobation is an ordination to punishment and to all those things because of which punishment is inflicted.

9. Positive reprobation is either absolute or comparative.

Absolute [positive] reprobation is an ordination to destruction and is usually expressed by the phrases: ‘ordained unto eternal damnation’, ‘vessels made to dishonor’, Rm 9,22. Comparative [positive] reprobation is an ordination, not to punishment as such, but to greater punishment; for example: those who will

gratia, illi qui graviore pœnas subituri sunt, reprobati sunt comparatè ad majores pœnas.^r

X. Vocabulum Electionis sumitur vel pro decreto, vel pro temporali electione.¹⁰

Pro decreto Eph. 1. Elegit nos in Christo; pro temporali electione, 1 Cor. 1. Deus enim quæ sunt infirma elegit.

XI. Reprobatio itidem accipitur vel pro *decreto*, ut cum dicimus compacta esse ad interitum; vel pro temporali rejectione, ut liquet in Judæis Rom. 10. 11.¹¹

XII. Odium duplex est, negativum vel privativum.¹²

Negativum dicitur, quando Deus^s non amat aliquos, et hoc odio dicitur odisse Esauum antequam quicquam mali fecisset. Odium positivum est, quo persequitur peccatores, Psal. 5. 6. posterius odium est propter peccatum, non prius.

XIII. Amor duplex est benevolentia et complacentia.

Amor benevolentia vocatur à Scholasticis amor *ordinativus* et hoc amore etiam amat peccatores, quibus vult benefacere. Joh. 3. 16. *sic Deus dilexit mundum* etc. Et Rom. 5. ostendit Deus charitatem suam. Amor complacentia est quo grati ipsi sumus,^t de quo ad Eph. 1. *Gratos nos facit in suo dilecto*. Vocatur à Scholasticis *amor collativus*.^u

XIV. Prædestinatio nihil ponit in prædestinato.

XV. Deus ita prædestinavit ad finem, ut etiam prædestinet ad media.¹³

Ineptè ergo ratiocinantur qui dicunt: Si Deus me prædestinat ad vitam, ergo sive credam, sive non credam, salvabor tamen. Nam Deus qui prædestinat, non

10 LCT, 205–207 [220–221]. | 11 LCT, 205–207 [220–221]. | 12 We read positivum instead of privativum. | 13 LCT, 207–208 [222–223]; CT, 30–34; TT, 130–132.

r ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-75 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-75 ⁶¹G-75 | s ⁵²F-78 | t ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-76 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-76 ⁶¹G-76 | u ⁵⁴R-28

suffer more serious punishments are comparatively reprobated unto greater punishments. |

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10. The word 'election' is considered either as decree or as temporal election.

For election as decree, see E 1,4: 'He has chosen us in Christ.' For temporal election, see 1Co 1,27: 'For God has chosen the weak things of the world.'

11. Likewise, reprobation is considered either as decree, as when we say that things are framed unto destruction; or as temporal rejection, as is evident with respect to the Jews, Rm 10-11.

12. Hatred is twofold, negative or positive.

Hatred is called negative, when God does not love someone. It is with this hatred that God is said to have hated Esau before he had done anything bad. Hatred with which God pursues the sinners, is positive, Ps 5,6. The last one, not the first one, is because of sin.

13. Love is twofold: either it is love of benevolence or of good pleasure.

The love of benevolence is called an ordaining love by the scholastics and with this love God also loves the sinners to whom He wants to do good, J 3,16: 'For God so loved the world' etcetera. And Rm 5,8: 'God showed his love'. The love of good pleasure is the love through which we are pleasing to Him. | On this love, see E 1,6: 'He has accepted us in the Beloved'. The scholastics call this love a conferred love.

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14. Predestination assumes nothing in those who are predestinated.

15. God has predestinated to the goal in such a way that He also predestinated to the means.

Therefore, it is a foolish argumentation to say: if God predestinates me unto life, therefore I will be saved, whether I believe or not. For God who predesti-

tantum ad vitam prædestinat, sed etiam ad media, per quæ ad vitam pervenitur: verbi gratiâ: Deus Hiskia regi prolongavit vitam ad annos^v 15. hic interim monetur Hiskias ab Esaia ut ulceri, ex quo decumbebat, palatham ficuum applicet. 2 Reg. 20. Sic Paulus acceperat promissionem, quod nullus ipsorum cum quibus vehebatur, in mari esset periturus: attamen, cum videret fugituros nautas, dicit; *si hi abierint, non poterimus servari*; sciebat enim, ut ad finem, ita ad media esse destinatos à Deo.

XVI. Malum pœnæ est bonum moraliter, malum physicè patienti.^w

Est usitata hæc regula in scholis, et ex ea refellitur Keckermanus, qui arbitratur, prædestinationem de reprobatione non posse^x rectè dici, eò quod prædestinatione ratione finis dicitur, damnatio autem finis esse non potest, quia mala est. *Resp.* Non est mala, quatenus consideratur ut pœna, fit enim secundum leges justitiæ Dei.

XVII. Deus unico actu volendi omnia vult, ita tamen ut unum velit propter aliud.

Quærit. Quid sit electio, quid reprobatio? *Resp.* Quod sit definita Dei voluntas. Ergo, inquires, diversæ sunt voluntates in Deo. *Resp.* unus tamen actus simplicissimus, dicitur jam reprobatio, jam electio, ob relationem ad objecta certa et effecta circa^y hæc objecta. Verbi gratia, dum dico Creator, Redemptor, Conservator, unum dico esse Deum, sed varia sortitur nomina, quia diversa effecta edit.

XVIII. Electio immutabilis est.¹⁴

Regula certissima Theologiæ; Cum enim Deus nullo modo mutabilis sit, etiam voluntatis ratione immutabilis erit, quia voluntas Dei est ipse Deus.

¹⁴ LCT, 219–223 [225–228].

nates, predestinates not only unto life but also unto the means through which life is attained; for example, God prolonged the life of king Hezekiah with fifteen years, but meanwhile Hezekiah was admonished by Isaiah to take a hump of figs and lay it on the ulcer which caused his disease, 2R 20. Likewise, Paul had received the promise that no one of his fellow travelers would perish in the sea. However, when he saw that the sailors were about to flee out of the ship, he said: 'Except these abide in the ship, we cannot be saved' [Act 27,31]. For he knew that God ordained them to both goals and means.

16. The evil of punishment is morally good, but physically bad for the sufferer.

This is a useful rule in the schools, and by this rule Keckermann is refuted, who asserted that it is not possible to call reprobation predestination, | because predestination is predicated in respect of a goal; damnation, however, cannot be a goal because it is bad.² *Answer*: damnation is not bad in so far as it is considered as punishment, for punishment is according to the laws of God's righteousness.

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17. God wills all things in one single act of willing, yet in such a way that He wills one thing because of the other thing.

The *question* is: what to say, then, of election and what of reprobation? *Answer*: it is God's definite will. Ergo (you might say): there are several wills in God. *Answer*: yet this single and most simple act is sometimes called reprobation, sometimes election, because of its relation to certain objects and to the effects regarding these objects. For example, when I call God Creator, Redeemer and Preserver, I say that He is one God, but that He obtains varied names because He brings about different effects.

18. Election is immutable.

This is the most certain rule of theology. For if God is in no way mutable, He will also be immutable with respect to his will, because God's will is God himself.

² See KECKERMANN, *Systema Theologiae* (Hannover 1610), 296. According to Keckermann it is improper (*non commode*) to say that God predestined some to damnation. He saw reprobation as opposed to God's election and defined it as 'God's decree to leave certain men in sin and to damn them to eternity on account of sin.' *Ibid.* 308. Unlike election reprobation is not an absolute act but contains a consideration of the condition of sin ('continet respectum ad conditionem peccati', *ibid.* 310). See SINNEMA, 'The Issue of Reprobation', 101.

XIX. Electio absoluta est.¹⁵

Obj. Armin. Si absoluta est, ergo absque mediis. *Resp.* Absoluta est non à mediis, nec à fine; sed à causâ impulsivâ extra Deum, nulla enim causa impulsiva est extra Deum, quâ^z movetur Deus; daretur enim in Deo potentia passiva: et sic mutabilis et imperfectus esset.

XX. Deus vult hoc esse propter hoc, non autem propter hoc vult hoc.

Utilissima hæc Scholasticorum regula est in doctrina de prædestinatione, modo intelligatur. Hoc autem vult, non esse assignandam causam divinæ voluntatis ex parte actus volendi, quamvis possit assignari ratio ex parte volitorum, in quantum scil. Deus vult esse aliquid propter aliquid.^a

XXI. Reprobatio est antecedens necessarium condemnationis et peccatorum.

Piscator, qui aliàs quidem solidè disputat de doctrina prædestinationis, errorem non parvum erravit. Quod scilicet statuerit peccata esse effecta reprobationis, quod falsum est; essent enim effecta voluntatis divinæ, esset hoc pacto Deus autor peccati. Non est ergo reprobatio causa, sed antecedens peccati. Deus elegit fideles non terminativè qui erant, sed objectivè qui futuri essent.^b

¹⁵ LCT, 219–223 [225–228]; TT, 135–136.

^z ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-78 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSN}O-78 ⁶¹G-78 | ^a ⁵²F-81 | ^b ⁵⁴R-29

19. Election is absolute.

The Arminians *object*: if election is absolute, it is, therefore, without means. *Answer*: absolute does not mean free from means or goal; but it means free from an impulsive cause outside God, for there is no impulsive cause outside God by which | God is moved. For then there would be a passive power in God and thus He would be mutable and imperfect.

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20. God wills one thing because of another thing, but not: because of one thing He wills another thing.

If correctly understood, this is a very useful rule of the scholastics in the doctrine of predestination. Its meaning is as follows: regarding the act of willing no cause is to be assigned to the divine will, although a reason can be assigned in respect of the willed things, in so far, namely, God wills that one thing is because of another thing.

21. Reprobation is a necessary antecedent of condemnation and sins.

In this respect, Piscator, who otherwise solidly discusses the doctrine of predestination, errs enormously. For he has stated that sins are effects of reprobation, which is false.³ For then they would be effects of the divine will and thus God would be the author of sin. Therefore, reprobation is not the cause, but the antecedent of sin. God chose the faithful, but not because they could be termed as such, but as the object of his election in terms of who they will be.

³ See, for example, PISCATOR, *Disputatio de praedestinatione*. For a discussion of Piscator's view on reprobation see BOS, *Johann Piscator*, 194-196.206-208.

CAPUT VIII.

De Dei Providentia.¹

I. Providentia Dei occupatur in efficiendo, conservando, agendo,^c promovendo ad agendum, et cum agente concurrento.²

Hi sunt actus providentiæ divinæ circa bonum, nam fecit, conservat, promovet ad agendum et concurrat in agendo, quod Sp. Sanctus expressit his verbis Rom. 11. ult. *Ex quo, per quem; et in quem sunt omnia;*^d Cæterum notanda hic venit distinctio Scholastica, quæ fit ratione motionis: dicunt, Deus præcurrit, concurrat et succurrit cum creatura; et sic Deus est præcursor, concursor et succursor in bonis.

II. Omnia sunt necessaria in sensu composito, non in sensu diviso.³

Quæritur: An quæ eveniant necessariò eveniant? Respondent aliqui ratione causæ primæ non secundæ, sed responsio ista nulla est; Nam quod ratione causæ primæ necessarium est, illud ratione secundæ. Quia causa secunda subordinatur primæ; nec agit nisi mota à prima. Ergo meliùs et accuratiùs respondent Scholastici, in sensu composito esse omnia necessaria, in sensu diviso contingentia. Sensus compositus est, quando considero rem in ordine ad decretum et providentiam Dei cujus respectu omnia fiunt necessariò. In sensu diviso dicuntur res absolutè in se consideratæ ratione habilitatis, secundum quam ad hoc vel illud à Deo^e ordinari poterant. Ita verbi gratia, in ossibus Christiabilitas erat secundum quam poterant divinitus^f ordinari ut frangerentur vel non. Et hoc pacto omnia extra Deum sunt contingentia.

¹ LCT, cc. 46–48, 389–415 [431–459]; CT, 89–128; TT, 249–255; TP, 152–158 [92–99]; TQ, 378–379 [49–50]; TC, 467–469; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 606 [116]. | ² CT, 89–93; ПΨ-Socinianorum, 560–563 [64–67]. | ³ LCT, 396–405 [439–447]; CT, 89–93; 97–100; TT, 252–255.

c ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-79 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-79 ⁶¹G-79 | d ⁵²F-82 | e ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-80 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-80 ⁶¹G-80 | f ⁵⁹R-25

Chapter VIII

On Divine Providence

1. The providence of God consists in effecting, preserving, acting, | moving forward to act, and in concurrence with the agent.

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These are acts of divine providence concerning the good, for God created, sustains, moves forward to act and concurs in acting, which is expressed by the Holy Spirit at the end of the epistle to the Romans chapter 11: 'For of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things.' But the distinction of the scholastics regarding motion should be kept in mind here. They say that God precedes the creature, concurs with creature and succors it. And so God is the One who precedes, concurs and succors in what is good.

2. In the composite sense all things are necessary, but not in the divided sense.

The *question* is being posed: do all things that happen, happen necessarily? Some answer this question by saying that things happen necessarily in respect of the first cause, but not in respect of the secondary cause. But this is no answer at all. For what is necessary in respect of the first cause, is also necessary in respect of the secondary cause, because the secondary cause is subordinated to the first cause and does not act, unless moved by the first cause. Therefore, the scholastics respond in a better and more accurate manner by saying that all things are necessary in the composite sense, but contingent in the divided sense. The composite sense is at stake when I consider a thing in relation to the decree and the providence of God. In this respect all things happen necessarily. The divided sense is at stake when one speaks of things considered absolutely and in themselves, in respect of their aptitude according to which they could have been ordained by God for this or for that. | Thus, for example, in Christ's bones was the aptitude according to which the divine ordination could have been either that they should be broken, or not. In this way all things outside God are contingent.

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III. Alia est necessitas immutabilitatis,^g alia coactionis.⁴

Fluit distinctio hæc ex priori, utimur autem eâ potissimum contra eos, qui negant aut contingentiam aut libertatem consistere posse cum necessitate.

IV. Necessitas alia est absoluta, alia ex hypothesi voluntatis divinæ.⁵

Absoluta est ratione operum Dei ad intra. Ex hypothesi est ratione operum Dei ad extra. Distinctio hæc occurrit apud omnes fere Scholasticos; Cæterum hîc facilè potest corrigi error eorum, qui putant libertatem non posse consistere cum necessitate; quoniam Deus omnia quæ ad extra facit, facit necessariò ex hypothesi decreti sui, et tamen liberè.

V. Dicuntur quædam curæ non esse Deo non quod omninò non sint, sed quod ita curæ non sint ut alia, adeoque id dicitur non absolutè sed comparatè.⁶

Deus curat omnia, sed tamen unum magis^h quam aliud, quia unum curat propter aliud; et in comparatione dicitur non curare ea, quæ minus curat, ut liquet, 1 Cor. 9. *Num boves curæ sunt Deo?* quasi diceret non sunt curæ Deo; quod autem res ita se habet, liquet ex passerulis et capillisⁱ capitis nostri. Nam si hos et illos curat, quidni etiam boves?

VI. Dicitur Deus nescire aliquos,^j non quod ignoret aut non curet illos, sed quod non approbet illos.

Aliqui ἄθεοι inde volunt extruere Deum non omnia curare, quia dicitur Deus suos tantum nosse, 2 Tim. 2. *Novit Deus qui sint sui.* Item improbos non nosse, quia Christus Matth. 7. dicit. *non novi eos.* Jam dicunt, si non novit, quomodo potest eos curare? *Resp.* Ex distinctione datâ, cognitionem Dei aliam esse nudam, aliam approbantem. Novit illos Deus cognitione *nuda*, erit enim illorum

4 LCT, 396–405 [439–447]; TT, 252–255. | 5 LCT, 396–405 [439–447]; TT, 252–255. | 6 CT, 93–97.

g ⁵²F-83 | h ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-81 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSN^O-81 ⁶¹G-81 | i ⁵²F-84 | j ⁵⁴R-30

3. A distinction must be made between the necessity of immutability and the necessity of coercion.

This distinction flows from the preceding one. We use it especially against those who deny that either contingency or freedom can be consistent with necessity.

4. There is a distinction between absolute necessity and necessity on the presupposition of the divine will.

Absolute necessity regards God's internal works. Necessity on the presupposition of the divine will regards his external works. This distinction occurs in almost all scholastics. It can easily correct the error of those who think that freedom is not compatible with necessity. For all things God works outside of Him, He does with the necessity on the presupposition of his decree, and yet He does them freely.

5. God is said not to take care of certain things. But this is not to be understood in the sense that He does not care at all, but in the sense that He cares for one thing more than for another thing; and that this, therefore, is not meant absolutely but comparatively.

God takes care of all things, but of one thing more | than another, because He cares for one thing because of another thing. So it is by way of comparison when it is said that He does not take care of things of which He takes less care, as is clear from 1Co 9,9: 'Does God take care of oxen?' As if he [Paul] was saying: God does not take care of them. That this is the case is evident from the little sparrows and the hairs of our head. For if God takes care of sparrows and hairs, why not of oxen too?

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6. God is said not to know some people. This does not mean that He ignores them or does not take care of them, but that He does not approve of them.

Some ungodly men want to conclude from this that God does not care for all things, because He is said to know only those who are his own, 2T 2,19. Likewise, He is said not to know the godless, because in Mt 7,23 He said: 'I never knew you.' Now at once they say: if He does not know them, how can He take care of them? *Answer:* from the distinction made it is evident that there are two sorts of divine knowledge: a bare knowledge and an approving knowledge. For those whom He knows with a bare knowledge He will be a judge. He does not

judex; at non novit approbatione de qua Psal. 1. vers. ult. *Novit Deus viam justorum.*

VII. Circa mala culpæ Dei Providentia occupatur diversimodè. 1. Illa decernit. 2. Permittit. 3. Ad finem certum efficacissimè dirigit, adeo ut ex malis bonum eliciat: denique terminos^k malis ponit, ne ultra vadant quam Deus vult; ultimo punit.⁷

Hi sunt actus providentiæ divinæ circa^l mala; decernit illa, quæ enim eveniunt decrevit; et permittit illa, si enim non permetteret non evenirent; et dirigit illa ad finem ut liquet ex peccatis, Iosephi nimirum venditione, Christi crucifixione. Et finem ponit ne ulterius pergant peccatores quàm ille permittit, Iosephum enim vendere, non trucidare poterant: Judæi Christum quidem trucidare poterant non autem frangere ossa ejus.

VIII. Permissio duplex est, Physica et Ethica, Ethica est concessio, Physica tò non impedire, quæ spectatur circa peccatum.⁸

IX. Physica consistit vel in subtractione gratiæ Dei, vel in promotione ad agendum.⁹

Aliqui angustè definiunt permissionem esse subtractionem gratiæ; Sed latius patet ut jam audiemus. Cæterum subtractio gratiæ vocatur etiam derelictio à Deo 2 Chron. 32 vers. 31. *Dereliquit ipsum Jehova.* Promotio vero spectatur in peccato commissionis; nisi enim Deus commoveret creaturam peccatricem, non moveretur atque adeò non^m peccaret, quemadmodum nisi quis claudum equum impellat ad cursum, ut non ambulabit, ita non claudicabit. Interim tamen sciendum est duo esse inⁿ peccato, ipsum motum et ἀταξίαν sive irregularitatem; motus Deus autor est sed non ἀταξίαν.

X. Deus est causa cur peccatum existat, sed non cur sit.¹⁰

⁷ LCT, 405–407 [448–450], 410–415 [454–458]; CT, 103–120; TT, 255–258. | ⁸ LCT, 405–407 [448–450], 410–415 [454–458]; CT, 103–120; TT, 255–258. | ⁹ LCT, 405–407 [448–450], 410–415 [454–458]; CT, 103–120; TT, 255–258. | ¹⁰ LCT, 405–407 [448–450], 410–415 [454–458]; CT, 103–120; TT, 255–258.

^k ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-82 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-82 ⁶¹G-82 | ^l ⁵²F-85 | ^m ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-83 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-83 ⁶¹G-83 | ⁿ ⁵²F-86

know them with an approving knowledge. On approving knowledge, see Ps 1 (the end): 'God knows the way of the righteous.'

7. Divine providence is engaged in the evil produced by sin in different ways. 1. He decrees it; 2. He permits it; 3. He directs it most efficaciously to a certain goal, so that He produces good things out of bad things; 4. He sets limits | to evil, so that it extends no further than God wills. 5. Ultimately, He punishes it.

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These are the acts of divine providence regarding evil. God decrees it, for what happens He has decreed. He permits it, for if He did not permit it, it would not happen; He directs it to a goal, as is evident from sins such as the selling of Joseph and the crucifixion of Christ. And He sets a limit, lest sinners go any further than He permits. He permitted the selling Joseph, but not his slaughtering. The Jews could kill Christ, but they could not break his bones.

8. Permission is twofold: physical and moral. Moral permission is a conceding, physical permission is not-prevention with regard to sin.

9. Physical permission consists either of a subtraction of divine grace or of moving in order to act.

Some define permission as a subtraction of grace in a narrow sense. But it should be understood more broadly as we shall see. However that may be, subtraction of grace is also named a dereliction by God, 2Ch 32,31: 'God has left him' [Hezekiah]. But moving to action is seen in the sin of commission; for if God did not move the sinning creature, it would not be moved and, therefore, | it would not sin: just as a limping horse will not run nor limp, unless somebody would set it into motion. Meanwhile one has to know that in sinning there are two things: motion itself, and disorder or irregularity. God is author of the movement but not of the disorder.

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10. God is the cause why sin exists, but He does not cause sin itself.

Quemadmodum qui agit equum claudum causa est cur existat claudicatio, sed non cur sit; nam pes claudi equi est causa cur sit, ac proinde,^o pes equi est causa claudicationis: non vero ille qui impellit equum ad cursum. Ita etiam creatura est nutrix peccati; non Deus, quia creatura ipsa deficit in operando.

XI. Bonis nunquam malè, et malis nunquam benè fit in hac vita. Psal. 37. et 73.¹¹

Super hac re elegantem Historiam ad hoc probandum adfert *Bradwardinus de Causa Dei*: quæ sive vera, sive ficta, clare tamen rem ob oculis ponit. Erat, inquit, aliquis *Eremita*, qui cum crederet, malis benè et bonis malè fieri, fluctuare cœpit cum animo suo an Deus esset, et si esset an justus esset, cum res humanæ perverso planè ordine procederent. Ac proinde desertâ vitâ Eremiticâ,^p cœpit vagari per orbem terrarum. Dum ita agit, adjungit se ei angelus, in specie viri, qui una cum ipso peragrarè^q provincias cœpit, venerunt itaque^r uterque ad quendam qui ipsos humaniter et accepit, et tractavit, huic media nocte surgens angelus, aufert scyphum aureum, et ita cum Eremita discedit. Venerunt postea ad quendam, qui illos etiam humaniter excepit, et humaniter habuit, angelus media nocte surgens cum Eremita, accedit ad cunas, et infantulum in iis suffocavit. Venerunt tertio ad quendam qui illos sub tectum recipere noluit, sed sub dio pernoctare sivit, mane ergo facto, pulsat angelus fores et poculum illud aureum, quod abstulerat viro illi bono, malo tradit, addens, hoc tibi do pro hospitio, quo nos excepisti commodo; Ultimo pervenerunt ad quendam qui eos humanissimè habuit, angelus jam abiturus petit ab eodem, ut secum servum mittat, qui viam ipsis ostenderet. Hoc facto cum ad pontem devenissent qui stratus erat super fluvium rapidum; Angelus accepto servo præcipitem eum egit in fluvium. Eremita his visis atque perpensis, jam inquit divortium à te faciam quia sceleratus homo es, at verò angelus illi, expecta, inquit, dicam tibi quis sim, et ista quæ facta sunt, iussu Dei justè facta esse te edocebo. Sum inquit angelus Dei missus ad te docendum^s multa, quæ videntur homini injusta^t justissima esse et optima.

¹¹ LCT, 405–407 [448–450].

o ⁵⁹R-26 | p ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-84 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-84 ⁶¹G-84 | q ⁵⁴R-31 | r ⁵²F-87 | s ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-85
⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-85 | t ⁶¹G-85

Just as somebody riding a limping horse is the cause why its limping exists; but he is not the cause of the limping itself. For the cause why it is, is the foot of the limping horse and, therefore, the foot of the horse is the cause of limping, but surely not the one who sets the horse in motion. Likewise, the creature, not God, is the breeding place of sin, because the creature itself is deficient in working.

11. In this life, what happens to good people is never bad and what happens to bad people is never good, Ps 37 and Ps 73.

On this subject [Thomas] Bradwardine, in his *Causa Dei*, reports a fine story which – true or fiction – places things very clearly before our eyes.¹ Once upon a time, he says, there was a hermit who was thinking that the wicked received the good and the righteous received evil. Therefore, he began to doubt the existence of God and whether He, should He exist, was a righteous God, because human affairs continued to be in a completely perverse order. He gave up his solitary life | and wandered through the world. While he was doing this, an angel in the shape of a man joined him in traveling through the country. Together they met somebody who received them politely and treated them very well. Rising at midnight, the angel took a golden cup from him and went away with the hermit. Next, they met and stayed with someone else who, equally polite, received and treated them. Rising at midnight together with the hermit, the angel went to the cradle and strangled the baby lying in it. For the third time they went and met somebody who was not willing to receive them in his house, but let them pass the night in the open air. Early in the morning, the angel knocked on the door and presented to the wicked man the golden cup which he had stolen from the good man, and said to him: I give you this cup for the kind hospitality with which you received us. Finally, they came to a man who treated them most kindly. When the angel was about to leave, he asked him to send his servant in order to show them the way to go. So it happened. When they reached a bridge over rapid waters the angel threw the servant into the river. The hermit, seeing all this and thinking about it, said: now I want to leave you, because you are a villainous man. But the angel said to him: wait a moment. I will tell you who I am and teach you that everything that has been done, has happened justly by virtue of God's order. He said: I am an angel of God and I am sent | to teach you that many things that seem unjust to human kind, are very just and good.

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1 BRADWARDINE, *Causa Dei*, 281. Bradwardine tells he found the story himself in Jacques de Vitry (1160/70-1240), bishop of Saint - Jean d'Acre.

Accessimus ad primum istum cui abstuli poculum aureum, isti viro in hoc profui, nam vir iste timebat^u Deum antequam poculum hoc habuisset, postquam accepisset, inebriabatur in singulos dies, ergo misit me Deus ut auferrem istud incitamentum ad ebrietatem, ne vir bonus periclitaretur de salute æterna. Isti alteri inhumano cui dedi poculum, non profui hoc poculo, sed nocui multum, nam poculo hoc invitatur ad vitium id, quod antea vir bonus exercebat, hoc est, ad potandum, propterea voluit ei Deus dare aliquid in hac vitâ, cum post hanc vitam nihil habiturus sit.

Cujus infantem interfeci, fuit vir liberalis in pauperes, antequam prole iste beatus esset. At postquam natus illi esset infans, retraxit manus à pauperibus, Ergo ne et iste in discrimine salutis propterea versaretur verum ad pristinam rediret liberalitatem, iussu Dei infantem percussi. Quod famulum istum attinet quem miserat nobiscum dominus ad viam nobis monstrandam, instituerat sceleratus iste hac nocte trucidare dominum et dominam cum liberis; quia autem Deus amat familiam istam, misit me ut hoc malum præcaverem.

Abi, inquit, et noli de Providentia divina, quia bonis malè, et malis benè fit, perversè judicare.^v

XII. In providentia divina fines nobis sæpè sunt occulti.

Certè multi occulti, et inde fit quod nos^w providentiam divinam potius adorare debemus, quam scutari.

XIII. Cum providentia Dei efficaci consistit contingentia et libertas.

Quia lapsus passeris contingens est et tamen non fit sine Dei providentia. Ita quod Rehoboam responsum dedit Senioribus minus gratum contingens fuit et tamen ratione Dei provisum. 1 Reg. 12. 15.^x

The first man we met and from whom I took away the golden cup profited from this, because, before possessing this cup, he feared God. But after having received the cup he was drunk every day. Thus God sent me in order to remove this incentive to drunkenness, so that this good man would no longer endanger his eternal salvation. To the other inhumane man to whom I gave the cup I was not good but I did much harm to him. For through this cup he was induced to the same fault committed before by the other man, i.e. drinking. Therefore, God decided to give him something else in this life, because after this life he will have nothing at all.

Before he was blessed with offspring the man whose child I killed was generous to the poor. But after the child was born, he washed his hands off the poor. Therefore, by order of God, I killed his child, so that this man would no longer endanger his eternal salvation, but, in fact, would return to his previous generosity. Regarding the servant sent to us by the landlord in order to show us the way: that night he was about to murder the lord, the landlady and their children. But because God loved this family, He sent me to prevent this evil.

Then the angel said: 'Off you go and stop judging divine providence in the wrong way, because you see bad things happen to good people and good things to bad people.' |

12. The ends of divine providence are often hidden from us.

Indeed, many ends are hidden; therefore we must worship divine providence more than examine it in detail.

13. Contingency and freedom are compatible with divine effective providence.

Although the fall on the ground of a sparrow is contingent, yet it does not happen without the providence of God. Likewise, the unkind answer Rehoboam gave to the old men was contingent, and yet it was foreseen by God. 1R 12,15.

CAPUT IX.

De Libero Arbitrio.¹

I. Liberum arbitrium aliter se habet in statu integritatis, aliter in statu lapsus,^y aliter in statu reparationis, aliter in statu glorificationis.²

In integritate potuit homo stare et non stare; in statu lapsus, non poterat non peccare, liberrimè tamen peccabat; in statu reparationis pronus est partim ad bonum, partim ad malum, pro modulo scil. regenerationis; In statu glorificationis, non poterit peccare. Explicatiùs hoc ipsum jam supra deductum est.^z

II. Homo in statu integritatis non poterat non labi in sensu composito, poterat non labi in sensu diviso.

Disputant de hoc Theologi, an homo poterat non labi in statu integritatis, sed distinctione tollitur difficultas. Nam si decretum Dei spectes, non poterat non labi homo, id est, necessariò lapsus est et hoc est hominem considerare *in sensu composito*. Si verò in se ipso id est in sensu diviso spectes hominem, prout aptus erat ad standum vel cadendum, poterat vel labi vel non labi.

III. Libertas est vel contradictionis, vel contrarietatis.³

Contrarietatis est, quæ se habet ad bonum vel malum; Contradictionis est, quæ se habet ad unum idémque objectum vel acceptandum vel reiiciendum.

IV. Libertas alia est à jure, alia à miseria, alia à coactione.

¹ TT, 252-255; TP, 148-152 [87-91]; TQ, 375-378 [45-48]; TC, 469-470; ПΨ-Pontificiorum, 538-54 [40-43]; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 606-607 [116-117]; ПΨ-Anabaptistarum, 621 [134]; A-E, 653-654. | ² CT, 65-68; TT, 252-255. | ³ CT, 50.55.

^y ⁵⁹R-27 | ^z ⁵²F-90 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-87 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{IN}SN^O-87 ⁶¹G-87

Chapter IX

On Free Choice

1. Free choice is different in the state of integrity, in the state of the fall, in the state of renewal and in the state of glorification.

In the state of integrity man could remain standing or not. In the state of the fall, he was not able not to sin, yet he sinned most freely. In the state of renewal he is inclined partly to the good, partly to the bad, viz. according to the measure of regeneration. In the state of glorification he will not be able to sin. Above I have already explained this more extensively.¹ |

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2. In the composite sense it was impossible for man in the state of integrity not to fall, but in the divided sense it was possible not to fall.

Theologians discuss the question whether it was possible for man not to fall in the state of integrity, but this distinction solves the problem. For if you consider God's decree, it was impossible for man not to fall, i.e. he fell necessarily. In this case man is considered in the composite sense. But if you consider man in himself, i.e. in the divided sense, as being able to stand or fall, it was possible for him to fall or not to fall.

3. Freedom is either freedom of contradiction or freedom of contrariety.

Freedom of contrariety is freedom related to good or bad. Freedom of contradiction is related to one and the same object that can be chosen or rejected.

4. There is a difference between freedom from law, freedom from misery and freedom from coercion.

¹ Cf. *Distinctiones*, VI, 17.

A *jure* in solum Deum cadit, et inde dicitur esse absolutæ potestatis. Libertas à *miseria* cadebat in hominem in statu integritatis, cadit in angelos bonos, cadet etiam in nos glorificatos.^a A *coactione* cadit in omnem creaturam rationalem.^b

V. Quædam actiones liberæ sunt, quædam invitæ.

Liberæ actiones sunt quando quis libenter agit. Invitæ quando invitus: verbi gratia, si quis à latrone cogatur bona sua tradere, si quis in mare ad elevandam navem, cogatur merces eiicere.

VI. Voluntas cogi non potest.

Si enim cogeretur, vel quod vellet nollet, vel quod nollet vellet. Et sic voluntas esset noluntas.

VII. Voluntas semper fertur in bonum sub ratione boni.⁴

Sed bonum duplex est, *verum* vel *apparens*, nam sæpè videtur bonum intellectui quod malum aliàs est, et in illud fertur voluntas sub specie veri.

VIII. Voluntas sequitur intellectum.⁵

Nam si non sequatur ductum intellectus, tum vel fertur in ignotum, quod est contra naturam, quia ignoti nulla cupido; vel fertur in malum sub ratione mali, quod etiam erit contra naturam, nam quodlibet seipsum amat instinctu naturali.^c

IX. Voluntatis actiones multiplices^d sunt, et non ejusdem generis.

Hæc regula est Ethica, sed quæ usum magnum habet in Theologia. Dantur enim actiones quædam *elicitæ*, quædam *imperatæ*. Elicitæ sunt internæ, ut amare, odisse. Imperatæ sunt quæ jam extra subjectum sunt, ut amplecti, reicere.

4 CT, 454–466. | 5 CT, 454–466.

a ⁵²F-91 | b ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-88 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-88 ⁶¹G-88 | c ⁵²F-92 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-89 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-89 ⁶¹G-89 | d ⁵⁴R-33

Freedom from law belongs to God alone and therefore He is said to have eternal power. Freedom from misery applies to man in the state of integrity, to the good angels and it will also belong to us when we are glorified. Freedom from coercion applies to all rational creatures. |

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5. Some actions are free, others are against one's will.

Free actions happen when one acts freely. Actions are unwilled if they are against one's will; for example, if someone is forced by a criminal to hand over his possessions or when someone at sea is forced to throw overboard his commodities in order to lighten the ship.

6. The will cannot be coerced.

For if it could be coerced, it would not will what it does will and would will what it does not will. And, thus, willing would equal non-willing.

7. The will is always directed to the good as far as it is good.

But the good is twofold: true or seemingly true, for the intellect often considers something to be good which is, in fact, bad and then the will is directed to it under the appearance of its being good.

8. The will follows the intellect.

For if the will would not follow the lead of the intellect, then either the will would be directed to the unknown which is against its nature, because there is no such thing as desire for the unknown; or the will is directed to the bad as far as it is bad which is also against its nature, because by natural instinct everything loves itself. |

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9. The acts of the will are manifold, but they are not of the same sort.

This is a rule of ethics, but it is often useful in theology too. For some acts are elicited, others are commanded. Elicited acts are internal, such as loving and hating. Commanded acts are external to the subject, such as accepting and rejecting.

CAPUT X.

De Peccato.¹

I. Peccatum est vel originale vel actuale.²

Originale est in quo et cum quo nascimur, quod incipit eo ipso momento quo incipimus fieri homines.

II. Originale peccatum vel imputatum est vel inhærens.³

Imputatum est defectio Adami nobis à Deo imputata, ac si à nobismet ipsis esset commissa, ac ea propter æquè rei habemur. Inhærens est depravatio naturæ nostræ atque inclinatio ad omne malum, ex imputato peccato ortum, tanquam ex matrice trahens,^e quo peccato inhærente^f Deus illud prius imputatum in nobis punit. At contra imputationem peccati inferri potest, nos ipsos in^g Adamo peccasse, adeoque imputatione non opus esse. *In quo peccavimus*, inquit, Apostolus Rom. 5. 12. *Resp.* istud *in quo* non *subjectivè* sed *Causaliter* accipiendum esse. Ita nimirum quemadmodum in Adamo dicimur mortui. Atqui hoc ineptum esset *subjectivè* explicare; quia mortui fuisset priusquam nati. Ergo mortui sumus in Adamo explicandum est, morimur quia per Adamum mors ingressa est in mundum. Sic etiam illud, *in quo omnes peccarunt*. Omnes peccamus, quia nos Adam peccare fecit, sive ipsius causâ peccamus, quia ille peccavit.

III. Imputatur autem non tantùm Adami sed et Evæ peccatum.⁴

1 LCT, cc. 49–52, 415–443 460–490]; TT, 255–265; TP, 158–169 [99–111]; TQ, 379–386 [50–58]; TC, 471–474; ПΨ-Pontificiorum, 532–538 [34–40]; ПΨ-Lutheranorum, 585–586 [92–93]; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 607–608 [117–119]; ПΨ-Anabaptistarum, 622 [134–135]; A-E, 654–657; A-S, 762–776 [74–88]. | 2 LCT, 415 [460]; TT, 256. | 3 LCT, 415 [460]; TT, 256–257. | 4 LCT, 415–418 [460–462].

e ⁵²F-93 | f ⁵⁹R-28 | g ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-90 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}INSNO-90 ⁶¹G-90

Chapter X

On Sin

1. Sin is either original sin or actual sin.

Original sin is the sin in which and with which we are born and which begins at the moment that we are becoming human beings.

2. Original sin is either imputed or inherent sin.

Imputed sin is the defection of Adam, imputed to us by God as if we ourselves had committed it; and for that reason we are considered to be equally condemned. Inherent sin is a depravation of our nature and an inclination to all bad things arising from imputed sin as if it gets it from the womb. By this inherent sin God punishes in us the previous imputed sin. But against imputation of sin it can be *objected* that we ourselves | have sinned in Adam and, therefore, that imputed sin is not needed. 'In whom we have sinned', says the apostle in Rm 5,12. *Answer*: the words 'in who' must not be understood in a subjective but in a causative sense, namely in the same manner as we are said to have died in Adam. For it would be foolish to explain this subjectively, because then we would have been dead before we were born. Therefore, 'having died in Adam' must be explained as follows: we die because through Adam death has entered the world. The phrase 'in whom they all have sinned' should be explained likewise: we all sin, because Adam made us sin; or: we all sin because of him, for he committed sin.

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3. Not only Adam's sin is imputed but also Eve's.

Probatur hoc ex pœna mulieri inflicta. Gen. 3. vers. 16. quæ omnibus mulieribus infligi non potuisset, si illis Evæ peccatum non fuisset imputatum. Scharpius et alii contrarium probant ex Rom. 5. *unius offensa*, etc. *Resp.* Illud eodem modo explicari debere, quo maritus et uxor dicuntur unum corpus, et vir uxoris caput. Proinde Adamus ibi consideratur ut caput, non tamen excluditur Eva tanquam altera illius pars.^h

IV. Imputatio non est actus Physicus sed moralis.⁵

Proinde non requiritur ut objectum sit præsens, sed tantum ut sit certo futurum.ⁱ Itaque dicimus, propagatione naturali imputari omnibus ex Adamo nascituris peccatum; sicuti ex pacto Dei justitia Christi imputatur omnibus in eum credituris.

V. Dum dictum est, morte morieris, quadruplicem mortem Deus intellexit.⁶

Mortem temporariam; mortem spiritualem peccati; mortem calamitatum; mortem denique æternam. Ad dictam, *inquies*, quo die comederis morte morieris, unde videtur sequi non posse hanc comminationem verificari de morte temporaria, atque æterna. (De reliquis quippe duabus mortis speciebus nulla lis est, eo ipso siquidem die primus homo mortuus est spiritualiter morte peccati, morte etiam calamitatum, quandoquidem ab eo ipso momento morbis,^j laboribus etc. fuit subjectus.) Non enim Adamus eo die quo comedit de fructu vetito vel morte temporaria vel æterna mortuus est. *Resp.* Phrasis illa; *quo die comederis, morte morieris*, explicanda est, per obnoxius fies morti; reus fies mortis, in mortis temporariæ et æternæ potestatem^k devenies, quæ etsi tibi ad tempus parcent, tamen certò certius te manebunt, different non auferent juris sui exercitium, atque potestatis.

VI. Videtur peccatum Originale^l non tantum imputatum, sed etiam inhærens.⁷

⁵ LCT, 415–418 [460–462]. | ⁶ LCT, 436–443 [483–490]; TT, 262–265. | ⁷ LCT, 418–419 [462–463]; TT, 256–259.

^h ⁵²F-94 | ⁱ ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-91 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-91 ⁶¹G-91 | ^j ⁵⁴R-34 | ^k ⁵²F-95 | ^l ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-92
⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-92 ⁶¹G-92

This is proved from the punishment inflicted upon the woman, Gn 3,16. This punishment could not have been inflicted upon all women, if the sin of Eve were not imputed to them. Scharpius¹ and other theologians prove the contrary from Rm 5,18: 'By the offence of one judgment came upon all men' etc. *Answer:* this must be explained in the same manner as husband and wife are said to be one flesh and the husband is said to be the head of his wife. Accordingly, in this passage Adam is considered as head, and yet Eve as his other part is not excluded.

4. Imputation is not a physical, but a moral act.

Consequently, it is not required that the charge is present, but that it certainly will be there in the future. | Therefore, we assert that as by natural propagation sin is imputed to all who will be born out of Adam, so by virtue of God's covenant the righteousness of Christ will be imputed to all who will believe in Him.

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5. When it is said: 'You will surely die', God pointed to a fourfold death.

Temporal death, spiritual death (the death of sin), the death of disaster and eternal death. But you may say: from the words 'in the day you eat thereof you will surely die', it seems to follow that it is impossible that this threat is actually verified of a temporal and even eternal death. (Regarding the two other kinds of death there is no dispute, since indeed on that very day the first man died spiritually the death of sin, and also the death of disaster, because from that moment on he was subjected to sickness and hard labor etc.). For on the day that Adam ate of the forbidden fruit, he neither died the temporal nor the eternal death. *Answer:* the phrase: 'in the day you eat thereof you will surely die' should be explained as follows: you will be exposed to death; you are liable to death, you will arrive at the power of temporal and eternal death. Although for the moment they will spare you, yet they will certainly befall you; they will delay but they will not take away the exercise of their right and power.

6. It seems that original sin | is not only imputed but also inherent.

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¹ John Sharp (Scharpius) (1572–1648) was born in Edinburgh. Sharp went to France, and in 1608 he was appointed professor of theology in the college of Die in Dauphiné. He stayed in France until his protestant teachings brought him into conflict with the French government. In 1630 he became professor of Divinity in Edinburgh. He was a prolific author. Cf. WELLS, 'Sharp'.

Tres observantur actus in generatione hominis, conceptio, formatio, nativitas. In omnibus his jam peccatum præstò est. De prioribus duobus clarissima sunt verba Davidis Psal. 51. 7 de ultimo. Eph. 1. 3.

VII. Peccatum originale inhærens pœna est peccati imputati.⁸

Nam Deus propter peccatum morte spirituali afficit, quæ etiam continetur in comminatione illa, *morte morieris*; quæ mors sita est in privatione imaginis divinæ, et perversitate naturæ.

VIII. Peccati hujus duæ sunt partes, altera positiva, altera privativa.⁹

Theologi dicunt posteriorem istius peccati partem privativam scil. efferri in scriptura dum dicitur: quod homo non sit capax eorum quæ sunt spiritus Dei; quod non subiiciatur legi Dei; quod non possit benefacere.^m Jer. 13. 23. Positivam verò cum homo dicitur ad malum ferri omni die Gen. 6. dicitur autem hæc qualitas positiva, non *Ethicè*, esset enim bonum quid, virtus; nec *Physicè*, quia et sic boni quid esset. Sed *Logicè*, quia hoc de homine affirmatur, quod talis sit.ⁿ

IX. Peccatum Originale omnium actualium causa est.¹⁰

Cur ergo, inquis, actualia peccata non in omnibus æqualia? hic altero magis ad peccatum pronus, nec pronus tantum, sed et peccat alter^o altero magis? *Resp.*

1. ratione regenitorum, quia mortificatio veteris hominis in iis inæqualis.
2. Ratione irregenitorum, unum altero magis gratiâ Dei, quam Theologi *cœrcitionis* vocant, inhiberi ne præceps in omne scelus ruat. Cum ergo unus altero magis à Deo cœrceatur, non mirum est, dari gradus sceleratorum.

X. Peccatum Originale omnium gravissimum est, cum ex illo actualia fluant.

⁸ LCT, 418–419 [462–463]; TT, 256–259. | ⁹ LCT, 419–421 [461–463]; TT, 256–259. | ¹⁰ LCT, 419 [461].

^m ⁵²F-96 | ⁿ ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-93 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-93 ⁶¹G-93 | ^o ⁵⁹R-29

In the generation of man three acts are to be observed: conception, formation and birth. In all these three sin is already at hand. The words of David in Ps 51,7 include very clearly the first two acts. On the last one, see E 2,3.

7. Original inherent sin is punishment for imputed sin.

For it is because of sin that God punishes with spiritual death, which is also contained in the threat: 'You will surely die'. This death consists in the privation of the image of God and the distortion of nature.

8. Original sin has two parts: one positive, the other privative.

Theologians assert that the last, privative part of this sin is expressed in Scripture in saying that man does not understand the things which are of God's Spirit; that he does not subject himself to God's law; that he is not able to do well. [See also] Jer 13,23. But the positive part is expressed, when in Gn 6 man is said to do evil continually. This is called a positive quality, but not in an ethical sense, for then it would be something good: a virtue. Neither it is meant in a physical sense, for then it would also be something good. But it must be taken in a logical sense, since this is asserted about man that he is such. |

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9. Original sin is the cause of all actual sins.

Perhaps you will say: why is it that actual sins are not equally present in all human beings? Is one person more inclined to sin than another person, and, what is more, does one person commit more sins than another person does?

Answer:

1. With respect to the reborn: the mortification of the old man is unequal in them.
2. With respect to the unregenerate: one person more than another person is inhibited by the grace of God (which theologians call the grace of restraint) to rush into all kind of crimes. So because God keeps one person from sin more than He does another person, one should not wonder that there are degrees of criminals.

10. Of all sins original sin is the gravest sin, because from this sin actual sins emerge.

Maximum est *extensivè*; non *intensivè*; Nam peccatum in Spir. Sanct. est maximum *intensivè*.

XI. Peccatum actuale, (quod est omnis actus legi Dei repugnans) est vel per se, vel per accidens.^{11p}

Peccatum *per accidens* est omne opus quod lex prohibet si fiat absque fide. Talia sunt opera gentilium, quæ alioqui cum materiali legis conveniunt. Peccatum per se est omne opus Dei prohibitum.^q

XII. Peccatum per se distinguitur vel ex objecto, vel ex accidenti, vel ex gradibus.¹²

Ex objecto aliud est *omissionis*, quod committitur contra præcepta affirmativa; aliud *commissionis*, quod contra negativa committit ut præcepta. Ex accidenti, aliud *regnans* est, cum auscultamus peccato. Rom. 6. aliud *non regnans*, cum carnem crucifigimus cum ejus concupiscentiis. Gal. 5. *Illud* in irrogenitos tantum cadit. *Hoc* etiam in regenitos.

Ex gradibus, aliud est peccatum *per ignorantiam*, aliud quod *scienter* et ultrò committitur. Posterius priore gravius est. Prius à *tanto*, non à *toto* excusat. Ex gradibus etiam peccatum aliud est quod committitur *in legem Dei in genere*, aliud quod *in doctrinam Evangelii cognitam in specie*. Posterius priore gravius est. Utut enim prius quandoque imò semper in electis remittatur; posterius tamen nunquam, et vocatur peccatum in Spiritum sanctum.

XIII. Peccatum gradus suos habet.^{13s}

Vulgo recensentur quatuor.

1. Deliberatio.
2. Propositum peccandi.
3. Factum ipsum.
4. In facto sibi complacere.

11 LCT, 420–423 [464–467]; TT, 258–262. | 12 LCT, 421–423 [465–467]; TT, 258–262. | 13 LCT, 419–420 [463–464].

It is the greatest sin extensively, not intensively. For sin against the Holy Spirit is the greatest sin intensively.

11. Actual sin (which is every act repugnant to God's law) is sin either by itself or by accident.

Sin by accident refers to all works that God's law prohibits, if done without faith. Such are the works of the gentiles that are otherwise in agreement with the contents of the law. Sin by itself is all work prohibited by God. |

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12. Sin by itself is distinguished according to its object, accident or degrees.

According to its object it is sometimes a sin of omission, since it is committed against affirmative precepts; sometimes it is a sin of commission, since it is committed against negative precepts. According to its accidents it is sometimes a reigning sin, if we listen to it and obey it, Rm 6. Sometimes it not a reigning sin, if we crucify our flesh and its desires, G 5. The first is only present in the unregenerate, the second also in the reborn.

According to its degrees, it is sometime a sin out of ignorance, sometimes it is a sin committed with full knowledge and of one's own accord. The last is more serious than the first. The first He excuses to some extent, not totally. According to its degrees it is also possible to distinguish between a sin committed against God's law in general and a sin committed against the well-known doctrine of the Gospel in particular. The last is more serious than the first. For although the first is usually and, indeed, always forgiven in the elect, yet the second is unforgivable and is called sin against the Holy Spirit.

13. Sin has its degrees.

Usually, four degrees are listed:

1. deliberation;
2. the resolution to sin;
3. the act itself;
4. a certain pleasure in performing the act.

Hi gradus ita se habent ut posterior gravior sit priore. Addunt aliqui quintum, gloriationem^t scilicet, quod peccatum non humanum, sed diabolicum est.

XIV. Peccatum non tantum in voluntatem cadit, sed etiam in intellectum.¹⁴

Sunt aliqui ex Theologis qui putant non cadere peccatum, nisi in voluntatem. At ineptè.

Nam error mentis etiam peccatum est, at hic est in intellectu.

2. Deliberatio intellectus est; at deliberatio de eo quod est prohibitum, ne facias, est primus peccati gradus;

accedit quod homo totus, quantus quantus est, regignitur, unde etiam non tantum voluntas, sed etiam intellectus regignitur, quod utique futurum non esset, si peccatum in intellectum non caderet.

Obj. Omne peccatum debet esse voluntarium, quod autem est in intellectu non est voluntarium, quia intellectus præcedit voluntatem. Ergo. *Resp.*

Majorem falsam esse, nam quædam sunt quæ etiam per ignorantiam committuntur. Num. 6. Gen. 26. et hæc non possunt dici voluntaria, et tamen sunt peccata.

2. Dicimus voluntarium dupliciter dici, vel terminativè, vel^u efficienter; priori modo peccata possunt dici voluntaria, ratione voluntatis, à qua determinantur; posteriori, ratione intellectus, à quo prima dubitatio procedit.^v

XV. Peccatum aliud fit ex ignorantia, aliud quod scienter committitur.¹⁵

Ex ignorantia dupliciter committitur peccatum, vel quando ignoratur, quod sit peccatum in *Thesi* vel in *hypothesi*, hoc est, quando ignoratur an liceat furari, an scortari, necne; vel quando committitur ex ignorantia in *hypothesi*, hoc est, quando in genere scio non esse furandum, sed puto mihi conducere ut furer; et hæc ignorantia quæ est ex *hypothesi* peccatum est, quando à sciente committitur. Prior excusat à *tanto* non à *toto*.

14 LCT, 419–420 [463–464]. | 15 LCT, 419–420 [463–464].

t ⁵³FA^{ELZ-95} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-95 ⁶¹G-95 | u ⁵²F-99 | v ⁵³FA^{ELZ-96} ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-96 ⁶¹G-96

These grades are such that the last one is more serious than the first one. Some add a fifth grade, namely boasting. | But this is not a human but a diabolical sin.

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14. Sin does not only occur in the will, but also in the intellect.

There are some theologians who think that sin only occurs in the will. But this is wrong.

1. For a mental error is a sin too and it occurs in the intellect.

2. Deliberation belongs to the intellect, but deliberation proceeding to forbidden things, constitutes the first degree of sinning.

3. Further, the whole person is regenerated, albeit in a small degree. It follows that not only his will, but his intellect too is regenerated. This would not happen, if sin did not occur in the intellect.

Objection: every sin must be voluntary; but what is in the intellect is not voluntary, because the intellect precedes the will. Ergo ... *Answer:*

1. The first premise is false, for there are some sins committed by ignorance, Nu 6,8, Gn 26,9. These sins cannot be called voluntary and yet they are sins.

2. We assert that the term 'voluntary' can be used in a twofold way: determinatively or efficiently. Sins in the first way can be called voluntary with respect to the will by which they are determined. Sins in the second way can be called voluntary with respect to the intellect from which the first doubt arises.²

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15. Sin is sometimes committed out of ignorance, sometimes deliberately.

Sin out of ignorance can be committed in two ways: when one ignores what sin is, either in the thesis or in the hypothesis. Ignorance in the thesis occurs, when one does not know whether stealing, or adultery is allowed or not. Ignorance in the hypothesis occurs, when, in general, I know that stealing is not allowed, while thinking at the same time that it will be profitable to me to become a thief. This ignorance in the hypothesis is a sin when it is committed by someone who has the knowledge [of the thesis]. Ignorance concerning the thesis is partly excusable, not totally.

² Probably Maccovius means that in this second case sin is not coming forth directly from the will but from the intellect; nevertheless, because the will effects the sin, sinning is still voluntary. So we could add at the end of the statement: 'and the will is voluntarily efficient in executing'.

XVI. In Peccato commissionis distinguendus est motus et defectus motûs.¹⁶

Solent Theologi dicere, distinguendum esse^w materiale in peccato commissionis à formali. Materiale bonum est, est enim motus. At formale sive defectus et deformitas (nam utroque nomine indigitatur) mala est.

XVII. Peccatum omissionis refertur^x ad peccatum actuale, non quod actu sit, (est enim omissio actionis debitæ) sed quod tanquam privatio referatur ad suum habitum, et ille ad actionem.^{17y}

Benè hoc animadvertendum, nam digladiantur de hoc multi: quomodo hoc peccatum ad actuale referri possit, cum sit potius actionis omissio.

XVIII. Peccatum aliud est in Deum, aliud in proximum. Matth. 18. 15.

Verum quidem est, omne peccatum in Deum committi, atque adeò nullum peccatum potest dici, quod non in Deum committatur: verum hæc distinctio non fundatur^z in eo, quod omne peccatum non sit contra Deum, sed in hoc, quod non omne contra Deum immediatè committatur, quædam enim, mediante proximo. Hinc etiam, quia omne peccatum in Deum committitur, sive illud immediatum sit sive mediatum, nemo etiam peccata authoritative remittere potest; est enim id ius solius Dei, in quod nemo involare nec potest nec debet. Quod verò nos dicimur remittere proximo, id non de *culpa* intelligendum est, sed de *noxa* tantùm, sive de^a injuria quæ in nos per peccatum proximi commissa est.

XIX. Peccatum aliud est regnans, aliud non regnans. Rom. 6.¹⁸

Posterius cadit etiam in regenitos, prius autem non, sed in solos irrogenitos.^b

Obj. Rom. 7. Mente servio legi peccati, quod Paulus dicit de regenitis. *Resp.* Aliud est servire *coactè*, aliud *ultrò*: peccatum non in iis regnat, qui serviunt coacti, sed qui serviunt ultrò.

16 LCT, 419–420 [463–464]. | 17 LCT, 419–420 [463–464]. | 18 LCT, 422–423 [468].

w ⁵⁹R-30 | x ⁵²F-100 | y ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-97 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-97 ⁶¹G-97 | z ⁵⁴R-36 | a ⁵²F-101 | b ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-98 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-98 ⁶¹G-98

16. In sins of commission a distinction should be made between movement and the defect in the movement.

Theologians usually assert that in sins of commission a distinction should be made between the material and formal aspect. The material aspect is good, for it is the movement. But the formal aspect, the defect and deformation (for both words indicate this aspect) is bad.

17. A sin of omission refers to actual sin, not because it is actually done (for it is the omission of an indebted act), but because as a privation it refers to the sin's habit, and the habit refers to sin as an act. |

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Careful attention must be paid to this, for many quarrel about the issue how it is possible to relate this sin to actual sin, because it is rather an omission of an act.

18. Sin against God is different from sin against our neighbor, Mt 18,15.

Of course it is true that all sins are committed against God and that, therefore, it is impossible to say that there is any sin, which is not committed against God. But this distinction is not based on the fact that all sins are not directed against God, but it is based on the fact that not all sins are immediately committed against God; for some are committed, the neighbor being their medium. It is for that reason too, that no one can forgive sins with authority, because all sins are – immediately or mediately – committed against God. This right is due to God only which cannot and must not be attacked by anyone. If we are said to forgive our neighbor, then this does not relate to his guilt, but only to the harm or the injustice that through the sin of our neighbor has been done to us.

19. A reigning sin is something else than a not-reigning sin. Rm 6.

The last also occurs in the reborn, the first does not: it is only present in the unregenerate. |

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Objection: In Rm 7, Paul speaks about the regenerate when saying: 'In my mind I serve the law of sin'. *Answer:* there is a difference between serving sin by coercion and serving sin by one's own accord. Sin does not reign in those who serve sin by coercion, but in those who serve sin voluntarily.

XX. Aliud est peccatum in se, aliud in alium.¹⁹

Peccatum in se gravissimum est, ut liquet 1 Cor. 5. et 6. Et ratio est, quia nobis ipsis debemus gradum maximum amoris, si ergo in nos ipsos peccemus, maximè peccamus.

XXI. Peccatum aliud est quod committitur ex infirmitate, aliud quod ex pleno appetitu.²⁰

Distinctionem hanc rident Arminiani, et dicunt; an non sceleratus etiam peccat ex infirmitate, cum peccat, quia natura ipsius non potest bonum? *Resp.* Non. Nam dicimus eos ex infirmitate peccare, qui viribus quidem resistunt peccatis, sed viribus imperfectis, undè fit ut labantur; tamen quia^c sciunt quid ipsorum sit officium, quia à Sp. sancto regenerantur, dolent ob admissa peccata. Illi verò non possunt dici infirmi, qui planè mortui sunt in peccatis, sed illi qui vivunt vitâ spirituali, quod in sceleratos non quadrat.

XXII. Graviùs peccant fideles, quam infideles.^d

1. Quia cognitionem majorem habent.
2. Quia habent vires resistendi, etiam si imperfectas, hi verò nullas.
Vicissim gravius peccant infideles.
1. Quia illi pleno appetitu feruntur in peccata, fideles autem fracta voluntate.
2. Fideles dolent ob admissa peccata, hi verò sibi placent ob commissa peccata.

XXIII. Illuminatio duplex est, convincens in tantum ut quis convincatur, et talis cadit in irrogenitos; et Persuadens quâ quis gratia afficitur ut ipsi persuadeatur, et hæc sola est Fidelium. De prima agitur, Heb. 6.

XXIV. Peccatum in hac vitâ tollitur in fidelibus. 1. ut ex parte non sit. 2. ut planè non imputetur.^e

Sunt ergo peccata in fidelibus, sed non imputantur.

¹⁹ LCT, 422 [468]. | ²⁰ LCT, 423 [469].

20. There is a difference between sin against oneself and a sin against someone else.

Sin against oneself is the most serious, as is clear from 1Co 5-6. The reason is that to ourselves we owe the highest degree of love. Therefore, if we sin against ourselves, we sin in the highest degree.

21. There is a distinction between sin committed out of weakness and sin committed out of full desire.

The Arminians ridicule this distinction by saying: if a criminal sins, does he not sin out of weakness too, because by his nature he is not able to do any good? *Answer:* no. For we assert that only they sin out of weakness, who resist sins with all, though imperfect power. Yet because it is an imperfect power, they fall. And they grieve because of their committed sins, for they know what their duty is, because they are regenerated by the Holy Spirit. For those, who are completely dead in their sins, cannot be called weak, but only those who possess a spiritual life which does not square with criminals.

22. True believers sin more seriously than unbelievers. |

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1. Because they have greater knowledge;
2. because they have powers - though imperfect - to resist. Unbelievers do not have such powers.

In their turn unbelievers sin more seriously:

1. because they rush into sin with great desire, believers with a broken will;
2. the faithful feel sadness about their committed sins, unbelievers are pleased by them.

23. Illumination is twofold: convincing illumination in so far as someone is convinced; such an illumination occurs in the unregenerate. Persuasive illumination is an illumination by which someone is affected by grace, so that he is persuaded; this only occurs in the faithful. On the first illumination, see Hbr 6.

24. In this life sin is abolished in the faithful: 1. since it is partly absent; 2. since it is certainly not imputed.

Therefore, there are sins in the faithful, but they are not imputed.

XXV. Peccatum nullum datur veniale, sed omne suâ naturâ mortale est.

Ex eventu quædam sunt venialia, quæ remittuntur propter gratiam Domini nostri Jesu Christi.^f

XXVI. In peccato est aversio à bono, et conversio ad malum.

Nam in omni peccato avertit se homo à^g Deo, ad creaturam, sive ad usum creaturæ illicitum.

XXVII. Peccatum Adæ non inest nobis inhærenter.^{21h}

Quia est actus transiens: nobis autem imputatur.

XXVIII. Qui peccat in uno omnium est reus.

Regula Scripturæ, cujus intellectus paulò obscurior. Sciendum ergo est, reum teneri omnium, non quod pœnam eam laturus sit, quæ sit adæquata omnibus istis, sed pœnam laturus sit talem, quam ferunt ob singula ista peccatores, videlicet mortem æternam. Clariùs, meretur talis maledictus pœnamⁱ æternam, sed non eo gradu, quo is, qui contra multa deliquit.

XXIX. Peccati locus est in hac vitâ.

Quæerunt aliqui; an post hanc vitam in inferno improbi peccent; aliqui affirmant, sed scholastici negant.

1. Quia lex nulla in inferno erit, ubi autem nulla lex ibi nulla transgressio.
2. Etiamsi lex esset, non tamen futurum esse peccatum, quia omnes facultates hominum ita erunt defixæ ad pœnas, quas perferent, ut non sit occasio aut locus peccandi ipsis.^j

XXX. Peccatum afficit hominem morte æternâ, non efficienter, sed meritoriè.

21 LCT, 415–418 [460–462].

f ⁵⁹R-31 | g ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-100 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-100 ⁶¹G-100 | h ⁵⁴R-37 | i ⁵²F-104 | j ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-101
⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-101 ⁶¹G-101

25. There is no venial sin, but every sin is by its nature a mortal sin.

Some sins are venial, namely those which are forgiven through the grace of Jesus Christ, our Lord.

26. In sin there is an aversion from the good and a turning to the bad.

For in every sin man turns himself away from God | to a creature or to an unallowed use of a creature. 100

27. The sin of Adam is not inherently present in us.

This is because Adam's sin is a transient act; but it is imputed to us.

28. Who sins in one thing, is guilty of all sins.

This is a somewhat more obscure rule of Scripture. Therefore, one has to know that to be held guilty of all sins does not mean that one will suffer the punishment, which is adequate to all those sins, but that one will suffer the punishment that the sinner will suffer because of those sins separately, and consequently, eternal death. More clearly said: such a cursed person deserves eternal punishment, but not in such a degree as he who commits many wrongs.

29. Sin takes place in this life.

Some raise the *question* whether, after this life, the godless could sin in hell. Some affirm this, but the scholastics deny this:

1. because there is no law in hell and where is no law, there is no transgression;
2. even if there were a law, there will be no sin, because all human faculties are so firmly focused on the punishments they will suffer, that there will be no opportunity or place for them to sin.³ |

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30. Sin affects man with eternal death, not efficiently, but meritoriously.

³ Surprisingly, in *Distinctiones*, XXII, 5 Maccovius will say the opposite.

Hoc est, peccatum est causa meritoria, sed ipsum non infligit, sed Deus propter hoc; itaque Deus inflicturus est pœnam peccatoribus propter peccata, et merita ipsorum.

XXXI. Deus peccata non potest non odisse.

Pugnat enim cum natura Dei, nim. sanctitate, ut Iosuae 24. Deus fortis sanctus est, non fecit defectionem vestram. Habac. 1. Purior est oculus ejus quam ut videat malum.^k

XXXII. Peccatum meretur ex eo, quia est in debitum, infinitam autem pœnam, quia in infinitum Deum committitur.

Scholastici solent vocare in malo demeritum, ita ut dicant demeritum esse, quia quò quid bonum magis est, eò magis meretur amari; maius ergo peccatum committitur, quanto melius est subjectum in quod committitur. At cum bonum infinitum; reatus quoque infinitus indè emergit.

XXXIII. Consequens peccati est vel *reatus*, vel *pœna*, vel *macula*.

Reatus est meritum, ut persona quæ peccavit^l puniatur, Deut. 27. *Maledictus* etc. qui reatus in fidelibus tollitur. Rom. 8. 1. At *inquis*, ubi peccatum ibi reatus. In fidelibus est peccatum. Ergo reatus. *Resp.* Ubi est peccatum, quod imputatur, ibi reatus. Atque sic negatur Minor. Quia utut sit in fidelibus peccatum, tamen iis non imputatur; quia Christus pro iis est peccatum factus. 2. Cor. 5.

XXXIV. Aliud est pœna, aliud est castigatio.

Castigatio enim semper à Deo tanquam Patre amante proficiscitur, et in bonum^m ejus, qui castigatur vergit. Pœna verò ab irato Deo et iudice in malum ejus qui punitur. *Ille* est virga in manibus Dei patris, filios suos quos diligit, bono eorum, castigantis. *Hæc* est sceptrum ferreum, malo eorum, tanquam ollam fictilem conterentis.

XXXV. Malum culpæ maius est malo pœnæ.

I.e. sin is a meritorious cause, but it does not itself inflict eternal death, but it is inflicted by God because of sin. So God will inflict punishment to sinners because of their sins and merits.

31. It is impossible for God not to hate sin.

For it is contrary to God's nature, namely his sanctity, as is evident from Jos 24,19: 'The mighty God is holy, He did not cause your transgression.' Hab 1,13: 'His eye is purer than to behold evil.'

32. Sin deserves punishment for its shortcomings: it deserves an infinite punishment, for it is committed against the infinite God.

The scholastics are used to calling it a demerit in evil. They call it a demerit, because the more something is good, the more it deserves to be loved; therefore, how better the subject against whom it is committed, the greater is the sin. And if the subject is the infinite good, then the guilt emerging from it is infinite too.

33. The consequence of sin is guilt, punishment or defilement.

Guilt is merited, involving that the person who sinned | is punished, Dt 27,26: 102
'Cursed be he that confirms not to all the words of this law.' In the faithful, this guilt is abolished, Rm 8,1. But you may say: where sin is present, there is guilt. In the faithful there is sin. Ergo: there is guilt [in them]. *Answer:* where sin is present that is imputed there is guilt. But then the minor is negated. Although sin is present in the faithful, yet it is not imputed to them, because Christ has been made to be sin for them, 2Co 5,21.

34. Punishment is something else than castigation.

For castigation always proceeds from God as a loving father and it is to the benefit of him who is castigated. Punishment, however, comes from a wrathful God and Judge, involving evil for him who is punished. Castigation is a rod in the hands of God the Father, castigating his children whom He loves to do them good. Punishment is an iron scepter of God who shatters them as an earthen vessel to do them evil.

35. The evil of guilt is greater than the evil of punishment.

Ideo homini quidvis potius agendum esset, priusquam peccato sese coinquinaret, priusquam minimam culpam admitteret.

XXXVI. Ministri remittunt peccata *ministerialiter et declarativè*,ⁿ non *authoritative*.

Quia habent tantùm clavem ministerialem, non herilem, quæ solius Christi est.^o

ADDITUM.

Quæritur: Cum Deus homini qui peccavit mortem minatus sit, annon mutaverit sententiam, dum Christum vice ejus punivit, qui vice Adami et fidelium mortem sustinuit.^p

Resp. Deus sententiam nunquam mutat, etsi videatur contrarium facere rei quam prædixerat se facturum; quia quod tali casu prædixit, conditionatum erat,^q etsi conditionem reticuerit. Exemplum in Ninivitis. Alii dicunt Deum non omnia dixisse illâ comminatione, *morte morieris*, sed quædam quæ facturus erat reticuisse eum, quod ex eventu patuit. Verbi gratia, in hunc sensum; *quo die comederis, morieris*; hoc prolatum fuit, tacitum verò, *aut in propriâ personâ aut in persona Redemptoris*. Huic responsioni Martyris adstipulamur.

Therefore, man must do anything he can do before he pollutes himself with sin and before he commits the smallest degree of guilt.

36. Ministers forgive sins as servants and by way of proclamation, but not as persons having full authority.

Because the key they possess is only the key of a servant and not the key of a lord, which belongs to Christ alone.]

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ADDITION

The *question* is: if God has threatened man who sinned with death, did He not change his decision by punishing Christ in stead of him; for Christ suffered death in stead of Adam and the faithful?

Answer: God never changes his decision, although He seems to do the contrary of what He has declared to do. But in such a case his declaration was a conditional declaration, although the condition itself was kept silent. An example can be found in the people of Nineveh. Other theologians assert that God did not express all things when uttering the threat: 'You will surely die', but that He kept silent certain things He was going to do. This is evident from the result. For example, in this sense: this was said 'in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die', but it is kept silent whether this regards one's own person or the person of the Savior. We agree with this answer given by [Petrus] Martyr.⁴

⁴ See VERMIGLI, *In Genesis*, fols. 9v-10v on Gn 2,7 (§§ 22-23); ET McLELLAND, *Philosophical Works*, 37-40.

CAPUT XI.

De Persona Christi ejusque Officio.¹

I. Aliud est totus Christus, aliud totum Christi.

Usus hujus est in hoc,

1. Quod totus Christus dicitur esse ubique, non autem totum Christi.
2. Quia totus Christus à nobis^r adorari dicitur, non totum Christi, hoc est humana natura.

II. Aliud est in Christo *humana*, aliud *divina* natura.²

III. Christus mediator est ratione divinæ naturæ *efficienter*, ratione^s humanæ *meritoriè*.

Usus hujus maximus est, dicitur Christus vivificare, resuscitare, Sp. Sanct. mittere; at hic semper distinguendum est inter efficienter mediatorem et meritoriè.

IV. Aliud est objectum *adorationis*, aliud *considerationis* in adoratione.³

Quæritur. Quoddam sit objectum cultus religiosi, dicimus *formale objectum* esse Deum; at verò objectum *considerationis* in hoc ipso cultu, est humana Christi natura et officium mediatorium, hoc est, Deum quidem adorari et invocari à nobis, sed causam meritoriam istius, cur adoramus eum, aut adorare possumus, esse penes Christum mediatorem, et humanam naturam, juxta illud Dan. 9. *Domine exaudi nos propter dominum.*

¹ LCT, cc. 31: 53–57; 59–62, 254–296 [263–329]; 443–500 [491–554]; 503–587 [559–586]; CT, 179–396; TT, 265–309; TP, 172–190 [115–131]; TQ, 387–398 [61–74]; TC, 475–480; ПΨ-Pontificiorum, 507–508 [5–6]; ПΨ-Socinianorum, 563–565 [67–69]; ПΨ-Lutheranorum, 580–585 [86–91]; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 601–602 [111]; ПΨ-Anabaptistarum, 619–621 [131–133]; A-E, 636–652; A-S, 777–810 [89–126]. | ² LCT, 484–486 [536–538]; CT, 206–216; TT, 268–269. | ³ LCT, 279–288 [288–300]; CT, 369–396.

Chapter XI

On the Person and Office of Christ

1. A distinction must be made between the whole Christ and the whole of Christ.

The usefulness of this distinction consists herein:

1. The whole Christ is said to be omnipresent, but not the whole of Christ;
2. The whole Christ is said to be worshipped by us, | but not the whole of Christ, i.e. not his human nature.¹

2. In Christ the human nature is one thing, his divine nature is another thing .

3. In respect of his divine nature Christ is Mediator in an effectual sense; with respect to his human nature He is Mediator in a meritorious sense.

This distinction is very useful. Christ is said to quicken, resuscitate and send the Holy Spirit. But here, always a distinction must be made between being a Mediator in an efficient sense and being a Mediator in a meritorious sense.

4. The object of adoration must be distinguished from the object of consideration in this adoration.

The *question* is: what is the object of religious worship? *Answer*: we call God the formal object of worship, but the object of consideration in this worship is the human nature of Christ and his mediatorial office, i.e. we adore and invoke God, but the meritorious cause why we adore Him or are able to adore Him, is to be found in Christ the Mediator and his human nature, as according to Da 9,19: 'O Lord hear us for the Lord's sake.'

¹ On this point Maccovius had a fierce debate with his fellow professor in Franeker, William Ames. Ames put forward that Christ is to be worshipped not only in His divine nature, but also as Mediator. Maccovius opposed this opinion, saying that Christ is *obiectum fidei propter quod*, but not *in quod* the faithful have to believe. See KUYPER, *Maccovius*, 366-396.

V. Aliud est *concretum*, aliud *abstractum* in doctrina de persona Christi.⁴

Hîc aliter sumitur abstractum et concretum ac in Logicis. Nam per *concretum* hoc intelligitur *persona*, per *abstractum natura*. Tenendæ autem sunt quædam regulæ ad hanc distinctionem, ex quibus benè intelligitur.^u

1. Persona denominatur ab alterutrâ naturâ in concreto, ut homo Christus, non significat humanitatem tantum, sed totam personam, humanam scilicet et divinam naturam. Christus Deus non significat deitatem tantum, sed Christum Deum et hominem.

2. Abstracta efferentur vel *absolutè*, ut humanitas Christi, divinitas^v Christi, vel *limitatè*. Verbi gratia, Christus homo, quatenus homo, Christus Deus, quatenus Deus.

VI. Communicatio proprietatum alia est *verbalis*, alia *realis*.⁴

Realis est in *concreto*, verbalis in *abstracte*. hoc est, quod tribuitur naturæ alterutri, hoc tribuitur toti personæ in concreto *realiter*, at verò ratione naturæ à qua denominatur concretum, tantummodò *verbaliter*. Verbi gratia: Cum Deus dicitur proprio sanguine redemisse Ecclesiam, de personâ Christi hoc dicitur in concreto realiter. At verò verbaliter, de natura à qua persona denominatur. Ita Job. 3. *Nemo ascendit in cælum* etc. Dicitur realiter de persona hac quæ est filius hominis, quod sic in cœlo^w in terra. At verò verbaliter tantum de humana natura, quæ ubique non est.

VII. Alia est communicatio *transitiva*, alia *intransitiva*.⁵

Lutherani perpetuò obiiciunt, eodem modo divinam naturam communicasse proprietates suas humanæ, quomodo se ipsam communicavit. *Resp.* Divinam naturam intransitivè se communicasse naturæ humanæ, hoc est, ut divina natura maneat divina; humana, humana; per istam enim communicationem humana Christi natura non est deificata.^x

4 LCT, 492–494 [546–548]; TT, 270–273. | 5 LCT, 492–494 [546–548]; TT, 270–273.

t ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-105 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-105 ⁶¹G-105 | u ⁵²F-109 | v ⁵⁴R-39 | w ⁶¹G-106 et ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-106
⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-106 | x ⁵⁹R-33

5. In the doctrine of Christ's person a distinction must be made between the concrete and the abstract. |

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Here, we interpret the terms 'abstract' and 'concrete' otherwise than in logic. For here we understand 'concrete' as referring to person and 'abstract' as referring to nature. Together with this distinction some rules must be observed in order to understand that:

1. The person of Christ is named according to one or the other of the two natures concretely. Thus, the man Christ does not only signify his humanity, but his whole person, namely his human and divine nature. Christ the God does not only signify his deity, but Christ, God and man.

2. The abstractions are expressed either absolutely such as: the humanity of Christ, the deity of Christ; or limitedly, for example: Christ the man in so far as He is man, Christ the God in so far as He is God.

6. The communication of properties is sometimes a verbal, sometimes a real communication.

Real communication takes place in the concrete thing, verbal communication in the abstract thing, i.e. what is attributed to the one or the other of the two natures, is in a real way attributed to the whole person in the concrete; but in respect of the nature after which the concrete is named, it is only verbally attributed. For example: when God is said to have redeemed the Church with his own blood [Act 20,28], then, in a real way, this is predicated of the person of Christ concretely. But verbally, it only refers to the nature according to which the person is named. As in J 3,13: 'And no man has ascended up to heaven' etc. That He is in heaven | and on earth is in a real way attributed to the person who is the Son of Men. But it is verbally attributed only to the human nature, which is not omnipresent.

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7. There is a difference between transitive and intransitive communication.

The Lutherans constantly *object* that the divine nature has communicated its proper qualities to the human nature in the same manner as the divine nature has communicated itself. *Answer:* the divine nature has communicated itself intransitively to the human nature, i.e. the divine nature remains divine and the human nature remains human. For human nature is not deified through this communication.

VIII. Aliud est *potentia*, aliud *potestas* in Christo.^y

Lutherani itidem argumentantur: Christo data est *omnis potentia*, ergo et *omnipotentia*. Sed inepte; Nam *potestas* aliud est quam *potentia*, potestas enim est ἐξουσία Græcis. At verò *potentia* Græcis est δύναμις, prius notat *officium*, posterius *vim*, *robur*; ita ut in diversis etiam sint prædicamentis. Nam *potestas* est in relatione, *potentia* autem in qualitate; nim. in secunda specie, *potentia* naturali. At *Obiicit*: Christo data est δύναμις, κρατος ut Apoc. 5. 14. et 7. 12.

Respond. esse metonymiam Antecedentis et Consequentis adeo ut ponatur antecedens, et consequens intelligatur. Dicitur ergo robur^z tradi, quia cognoscitur ipsi traditum, antecedens pro consequente. Quemadmodum Joh. 17. *glorifica me eâ gloriâ quam habui*, antecedens ponitur, et consequens intelligitur, nam hîc^a nihil aliud intelligitur quam manifestatio gloriæ.

IX. Aliud est in Christo *Persona*, aliud adjunctum ἐνυπόστατον.

Persona est sola divina natura; Non enim sentiendum est personam Christi quasi constari ex humanâ et divinâ naturâ, ac quasi ex partibus constitui; sed quod divina natura sit sola persona, quæ in suam personalitatem assumpsit humanam naturam; humana verò natura est adjunctum ἐνυπόστατον.

X. Aliud est Prophetam esse Dominum, aliud simpliciter esse prophetam.⁶

Christus est propheta *dominus*, nemo reliquorum prophetarum est propheta *Dominus*, sed minister ac famulus, Prophetæ Domini in obliquo casu, non Domini in recto, sunt omnes Prophetæ. Heb. 3. 5, 6.

XI, Aliud est *immediatè* docere, aliud *mediatè*.⁷

Christus in carne exhibitus docuit *immediatè* externè, sed *mediatè* docuit ab iniitio mundi. Hinc 1 Petr. Spiritus Christi^b dicitur fuisse in prophetis. At hinc dicitur Christus prædicasse temporibus Noë per Spiritum Suum. 1 Pet. 3.^c

6 LCT, 507–510 [563–566]; TT, 282–285. | 7 LCT, 507–510 [563–566]; TT, 282–285.

y ⁵²F-110 | z ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-107 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-107 ⁶¹G-107 | a ⁵²F-111 | b ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-108 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-108 ⁶¹G-108 | c ⁵²F-112

8. A distinction must be made between Christ's power and authority .

Likewise, the Lutherans argue that all power is given unto Christ and therefore also omnipotence. But this is wrong, for authority is something else than power. For in Greek authority is *exousia* and power *dunamis*. The first refers to an office, the second to force or strength. They also belong to different categories. For authority refers to relation, power refers to quality, viz. a quality in the second category, i.e. natural power. But they [the Lutherans] *object*: according to Apc 5,14 and 7,12: Christ is given *dunamis, kratos*.

Answer: this is a metonym substituting the antecedent for the consequent, so that the antecedent is asserted but the consequent is meant. Therefore, it is said that the power is given to Him, because it is known to be given unto Him. Thus the antecedent is substituted for the consequent. | Like in J 17,5: 'Glorify thou me with the glory which I had.' Here the antecedent is stated and the consequent is meant. For what is meant here is nothing else than the manifestation of glory.

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9. In Christ, the person must be distinguished from the enhypostatic adjunct.

Person is only the divine nature. For one should not think that the person of Christ is a kind of conflation of human and divine nature - as if the person was composed out of parts. But because the divine nature, which assumed the human nature into the divine personality, is alone person, human nature is an enhypostatic adjunct.

10. Being a Lord-prophet is something else than being an ordinary prophet.

Christ is the Lord-prophet and none of the remaining prophets was a Lord-prophet but they were minister and servant. All prophets have been prophets of the Lord (in the possessive case), but not Lord-prophets in the nominative case, Hbr 3,5-6.

11. There is a difference between immediate and mediate teaching.

The external teaching of the incarnated Christ was immediate, but it was mediate from the beginning of the world. For that reason, 1P 1,11 declares that the Spirit of Christ | was in the prophets. And hence Christ is said to have preached through His Spirit in the days of Noah, 1P 3,20.

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XII. Aliud est *internè* docere, aliud *externè*.⁸

Christus suòs fideles internè docuit indè ab initio mundi. Et hoc solius Dei est. Externè etiam infideles docentur, etiam ab infideli Mercenario.^d

XIII. Illuminare omnes homines dupliciter dicitur; vel illuminare omnes singulos, sic Christus non illuminat singulos, vel illuminare eos qui illuminantur.⁹

Dantur enim tales propositiones in scriptura, quorum subjectum limitandum est per suum prædicatum, verbi gratia. Psal. 145. 14. *Deus suffulcit omnes cadentes et erigit omnes incurvatos*. Hic certè non omnes singuli cadentes et incurvati à domino dicuntur suffulciri et erigi, quot enim sunt, qui cadentes non suffulciuntur? incurvati qui non eriguntur? saltem de iis non procedit hoc pronunciatum, de quibus Psal. 36. 13. *Ceciderunt operarii iniquitatis, et non potuerunt surgere*. Sensus ergò est. Deum erigere omnes lapsos qui scilicet eriguntur, nemo enim erigitur nisi à Deo, ut dicitur^e Psal. 37. 24. *Cum ceciderit justus, non proculcabitur, quia Dominus sustentat manum ejus*. Sic etiam Christus illuminat omnem hominem venientem in mundum. Id si de^f omnibus singulis accipias, etiam *naturaliter* non procedit, quia dantur cæci nati. Joh. 9. qui nunquam illuminati fuère. Multo minus *spiritualiter*, cum ne externa quidem media illuminationis omnibus singulis à Deo concedantur. Ergo illuminat omnes *qui illuminantur*; quia nemo qui illuminatus est, cuiquam illuminationem acceptam ferre potest, præterquam soli Deo.

XIV. Aliud est in Christo *satisfactio*, aliud *meritum*.¹⁰

Satisfactio respondet debito pœnæ, undè per satisfactionem liberamur à pœnâ, per meritum, respondens officio debiti, acquirimus ius vitæ æternæ. Satisfactio facta est morte; meritum autem sanctâ vitâ ejus.

XV. Dicitur Christus liberare seu redimere vel *propriè*, vel *impropriè*.^{11g}

⁸ LCT, 507–510 [563–566]; TT, 282–285. | ⁹ LCT, 507–510 [563–566]; TT, 282–285. | ¹⁰ LCT, 527–554 [586–615]; TT, 290–294. | ¹¹ LCT, 527–554 [586–615] TT, 290–294.

d ⁵⁴R-40 | e ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-109 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSNO}-109 ⁶¹G-109 | f ⁵²F-113 | g ⁵⁹R-34

12. There is a difference between internal and external teaching.

From the beginning of the world Christ has taught his faithful in an internal way. This comes from God alone. Unbelievers were taught in an external way, even by an unbelieving mercenary.²

13. Illumination of all men is said to take place in a twofold way: either it is an illumination of all single persons; in this way Christ does not illuminate single persons; or it is an illumination of those who are already illuminated.

In Scripture there are several propositions the subject of which must be limited by its predicate. For example, Ps 145,14: 'God upholdeth all that fall and raiseth up all those that be bowed down.' Here it is certainly not asserted that all who fall and are bowed down are supported and raised up by the Lord, one by one. For how many fall without being supported and how many are bowed down without being raised? Surely, to them does not apply the proclamation in Ps 36,13: 'The workers of iniquity are fallen; they are cast down, and have not been able to rise.' Therefore, the meaning is that God raises up all who are fallen, namely those who are being raised, for no one is raised except by God, as is said in | Ps 37,24: 'Though he [the righteous] fall, he shall not be utterly cast down, for the Lord upholdeth his hand.' So Christ also illuminates every human being that enters the world. But if you take this as dealing with every single person, then, taken in its natural sense, even this would not apply, for many people are born blind, J 9, who have never been illuminated. So much the less in a spiritual sense, since God did not even grant the external means of illumination to all, one by one. Therefore, God illuminates all those who are being illuminated; for no one who is illuminated can receive illumination from someone else, except from God alone.

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14. A distinction must be made between satisfaction in Christ and merit in Christ.

Satisfaction has to do with the debt of punishment. For that reason we are liberated from punishment by means of satisfaction. Through merit that responds to the obligation of debt, we obtain the right to eternal life. Satisfaction is brought about by Christ's death, merit by his holy life.³

15. Christ is said to liberate or to redeem, either in a proper or in an improper sense.

² Here Maccovius is perhaps referring to Mohammed, the founder of the Islam.

³ Cf. *Distinctiones*, XI, 20.

Improprie dum simpliciter liberat sine interventu pretii. 2. Petr. 2. Abnegantes Dominum qui ipsos *mercatus* est aliquando; vel proprie interventu pretii, ita Christus redemit oves suas. Joh 10. pro quibus dicit se ponere vitam suam.^h

XVI. Aliter nos morimur pro fratribus, aliter Christus pro nobis.ⁱ

Phrasis ista est 1 Joh. 3. Aliter autem nos mori quoad finem principalem liquet, nos enim non morimur pro fratribus in remissionem peccatorum, sicut Christus pro nobis mortuus est, sed in talem finem ut 2 Cor. 1. 6, 7.

XVII. Aliud est adimplere passionibus Christi quod illis deest pro *ecclesiâ ædificandâ*, aliud pro *redimendâ*.¹²

Locus habetur Col. 1. 24. Solent autem hoc loco abuti Pontificii, sed si quæramus quomodo Paulus dicat se adimplere passiones Christi, an pro ædificandâ, an verò pro redimenda ecclesia, tum hærent.

XVIII. Distinctio quâ Christus dicitur mortuus *sufficenter* non *efficaciter*, vanissima est.¹³

Nam si dicitur propterea *sufficenter* mori, quia mors suffecisset omnibus redimendis, si Deo visum fuisset eam pro iis fieri, tum certe pari ratione posset dici, Christum justificasse *sufficenter* omnes et singulos, sed non *efficaciter*; item glorificasse omnes et singulos, sed non *efficaciter*.

XIX. Intercessio quâ Christus^j pro nobis intercedit non est *formalis*,^k sed *objectiva*.¹⁴

Hoc est, non erat amplius pro nobis Christus, ut Joh. 17. provolutus quasi ad pedes Patris, adeo ut nihil aliud sit ipsius intercessio,^l quam sui ipsius coram facie Dei præsentatio.

12 LCT, 527–554 [586–615]; TT, 290–294. | 13 LCT, 527–554 [586–615]; TT, 290–294. | 14 LCT, 554–558 [615–620]; CT, 283–292; TT, 300–303.

h ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-110 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-110 ⁶¹G-110 | i ⁵²F-114 | j ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-111 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-111 ⁶¹G-111 | k ⁵²F-115 | l ⁵⁴R-41

Improperly, when He simply liberates us without paying a price, 2P 2,1: 'They were denying the Lord who once bought them.' Properly, when He does liberate us through intervention of paying a price. So Christ redeemed his sheep, J 10, for whom He says to lay down his life. |

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16. Christ's dying for us is different from our dying for our brethren.

This is phrased in 1J 3,16. Regarding the principal goal, it is evident that we die in another way. For we do not die for the brethren in order to forgive sins as Christ has died for us, but we die to such an end as is written in 2Co 1,6-7.

17. Completing what was lacking in Christ's afflictions for the sake of building the Church is different from for the sake of redeeming the Church.

The passage is Kol 1,24. The Papists usually abuse this passage. But if we ask them what Paul means by saying that he completes the afflictions of Christ, whether it is for the sake of building the Church or for the sake of redeeming the Church, then they are perplexed.

18. The distinction indicating that Christ died sufficiently but not effectually is completely pointless.⁴

For when it is said that Christ died sufficiently for that reason that his death would have been sufficient to redeem everyone if it had pleased God that his death should happen for them, then, for the same reason, it would be possible to say that Christ has sufficiently but not effectually justified all men and every single person. Likewise, it would be possible to say that He has glorified all men and every single person, although not effectually.

19. The intercession through which Christ | intercedes for our sake is not an essential intercession, but an intercession appropriate to the object.

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I.e. Christ was no longer humiliated for us, J 17, as it were to the feet of the Father. Therefore, his intercession is nothing else than his presentation in front of God's face.

⁴ For the meaning of *efficax*, see *Distinctiones*, IV, 36.

XX. Aliud est debitum *officii*, aliud *pœnæ*.¹⁵

Debitum pœnæ tollitur per mortem Christi, debitum officii impletione legis.

XXI. Satisfactio Christi non est iustitia, etiamsi imputatur ad justificationem.¹⁶

Iustitia non est, quia est satisfactio; imputatur tamen ad justificationem; quia propter eam homo à peccatis absolvitur.

XXII. Aliud est luere pœnam, aliud implere legem.¹⁷

Adversarii *Obj.* Quia Christus expiavit peccata nostra, tàm commissionis, quam omissionis, quod propterea debemus censi pro iis, ac si legem ipsimet implevissemus. Sed falsum hoc. Nam si quis propterea, quod scortatus est, virgiscæsus sit, non tamen proinde habetur ac ille qui à scortatione abstinuit; Nam si res ita habeat tum non esset^m amplius infamis ille qui virgiscæsus est, sedⁿ haberetur eodem loco quo ille qui nunquam est scortatus.

XXIII. Homo post lapsum tenetur ad pœnam et ad obedientiam.¹⁸

Catech. nostra tractat hanc quæstionem: et dicit quod homo obligetur vel ad pœnam vel ad obedientiam; quod quidem ut intelligatur sciendum est, non posse responderi commodè ad quæstionem hanc, nisi distinguendo statum hominum. Est enim alius status *ante lapsum*; et in hoc tenebatur tantùm ad obedientiam; *In statu vero lapsus* ante regenerationem homo tenebatur ad utrumque; ad pœnam propter præcedens peccatum, ad obedientiam, ut non peccaret. Quod si autem non obligaretur ampliùs ad obedientiam, etiam non ampliùs peccaret; atqui homines peccatores dicuntur peccata peccatis cumulare. Implete, inquit Christus, mensuram patrum. Matt. 24. Tertius status est *post regenerationem*, et in hoc statu tenetur homo obedientiam, non ad pœnam; quia *nulla condemnatio iis est qui sunt in Christo Jesu.* Rom. 8. 1.

15 LCT, 527–554 [586–615]; TT, 290–294. | 16 LCT, 527–554 [586–615]; TT, 290–294. | 17 LCT, 527–554 [586–615]; TT, 290–294. | 18 LCT, 527–554 [586–615]; TT, 290–294.

20. There is a distinction between the debt of obligation and the debt of punishment.

The debt of punishment is removed by the death of Christ, the debt of obligation by fulfilling the law.

21. Christ's satisfaction itself is no righteousness, although it is imputed unto justification.

It is no righteousness, because it is a satisfaction. It is, however, imputed unto justification, since because of this man is set free from sins.

22. There is a difference between doing penance and fulfilling the law.

The opponents *object*: because Christ expiated our sins of commission and omission, therefore, we must be counted as having fulfilled the law ourselves. But this is not true. For when somebody who has associated with prostitutes is scourged, he cannot be put on a par with someone who has abstained from association with prostitutes. For if this were the case, | then the scourged man would not be more disreputable but would be considered as being in the same position as the one who never associated with prostitutes.

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23. Man after the fall is kept to punishment and obedience.

Our Catechism deals with this question by saying that man is obliged to either punishment or obedience.⁵ But in order to understand this, one should know that it is not easy to answer this question, unless a distinction is made between the several states of man. For the state of man before fall differs from his state after the fall. In the state before the fall he is only obliged to obedience; in the state after the fall, before the regeneration, man is kept to both: to punishment because of the preceding sin and to obedience in order not to sin. For if he would not longer be obliged to obedience, then, as a matter of fact, he would no longer sin. But sinners are said to pile up sin after sin. 'Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers', says Christ in Mt 23,32. The third state is the state after the regeneration. In this state man is obliged to obedience but not to punishment, 'for there is now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus', Rm 8,1.

⁵ See *Heidelberg Catechism*, Questions and Answers 12-14.

XXIV. Sola obedientia activa est nostra justitia.¹⁹

Dupliciter obedientia distinguitur à^o Theol. in activam et passivam. *Passiva* est, quâ^p Christus satisfecit comminationibus legis pro nobis, hoc est, factus est execratio pro nobis, quæ et *satisfactio* vocatur. *Activa* est, quâ perfectè legem implevit, et vocatur *meritum*, et hæc dicitur justitia nostra.⁹

XXV. Consummat Christus suos passione suâ à *peccatis absolvendo*, non verò justos constituendo.²⁰

Heb. 10. legitur, quod Christus unicâ oblatione consummaverit eos qui consummantur. Hinc adversarii inferunt, ergo sunt perfecti. *Resp.* Certè quoad absoluti-
onem à reatu, non verò quoad hoc quod justitiam perfectam habeant. Nam Justitia perfecta est justitia imputata Christi, quam ille præstitit legi, sanctè vivendo.

XXVI. Christus est rex jure *creationis* et *redemptionis*.²¹

Alii ita. Regnum Christi duplex est, aliud *essentiale* aliud *mediatorium*.

XXVII. Christus est *naturale* caput ecclesiæ, politicum verò angelorum bonorum, malorum et reproborum.²²

Distinctio hæc benè observanda. Præposuit enim eum Deus omnibus, sed alio atque^r alio modo. Ecclesiæ tanquam caput naturale, ex quo per commissuras certas defluit^s vis in membra. Eph. 4. dicitur naturale, non quod propriè naturale sit, sed quod similitudinem gerat cum corpore naturali. Et politicum, non quod sit, sed quod similitudinem gerat cum politico.

XXVIII. Regnum Christi aliud est *gratiæ*, aliud *gloriæ*.²³

19 LCT, 527–554 [586–615]; CT, 292–302. | 20 LCT, 527–554 [586–615]. | 21 LCT, 565 [627]. | 22 LCT, 561–576 [623–640]; TT, 303–309. | 23 LCT, 561–576 [623–640]; CT, 317–322.

o 52F-117 | p 53FA^{ELZ}-113 56FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-113 61G-113 | q 59R-35 | r 52F-118 | s 53FA^{ELZ}-114
54R-42 56FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-114 61G-114

24. Only active obedience is our righteousness.

Theologians distinguish a twofold obedience: active and passive obedience. Passive obedience is the obedience | through which Christ complied with the threats of the law on our behalf, i.e. he has been made a curse for us, which is also called satisfaction. Active obedience is the obedience through which Christ perfectly fulfilled the law. It is called a merit, and this is said to be our righteousness.

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25. Through his passion Christ brings his people to perfection by setting them free from sin. He does not bring them to perfection by making them just.

In Hbr 10,14 one reads that by one offering Christ has perfected forever those who are perfected. For that reason opponents infer that they are perfect. *Answer:* certainly, they are perfect regarding the acquittal of guilt, but this does not imply that they possess a perfect righteousness. Since perfect righteousness is the imputed righteousness of Christ, which He showed to the law by living a holy life.

26. Christ is king by right of creation and redemption.

Likewise, other theologians distinguish a twofold rule or kingdom of Christ: an essential rule and a mediatorial rule.

27. Christ is the natural head of the Church, but He is the political head of the good and bad angels, and of the reprobate.

This distinction should be carefully observed. God presented Christ to all mankind, but He did so in a different manner. To his Church He presented Him as the natural head out of which through a certain union strength flows down | into the members, E 4. It is called natural; not because of its being natural in a proper sense, but because it bears a similarity to a natural body. And it is called political, not because it is political in a proper sense, but because it bears a similarity to a political body.

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28. Christ's kingdom of grace differs from his kingdom of glory.

Gratiæ dicitur ecclesiæ in hac vitâ: Gloriæ dicitur ecclesiæ in cœlis.

XXIX. Regnum Christi est æternum et tamen cessabit.²⁴

Videtur contradictio quædam inter Lucam et Paulum, Lucas enim dicit cap. 1. Regni ejus non erit finis. Paulus 1 Cor. 15. quod regnum tandem traditurus sit patri; atque adeò finem futurum. *Resp.* Apud Lucam loqui de regno *essentia*, quod Christi est jure creationis, Paulum de *regno mediatorio*, sive de modo administrandi hoc regnum; qui modus administrandi consistit in externo ministerio.

XXX. Judicabit Christum aliter secundum divinam, aliter secundum humanam naturam.

Secundum divinam naturam cognoscendo peccata, secundum humanam, sententiam^t pronunciando et judicia Dei approbando.^u

XXXI. *Christus Rex* adoratur cultu religioso, sed non *quatenus Rex* et mediator.²⁵

Hoc est, non quatenus mediator est; alioqui humana Christi natura etiam esset adoranda. *Obj.* ex Apoc. 4. Dignus es ut accipias gloriam quia mactatus es. *Resp.* *Quia et quatenus* in Theologia non recipiuntur. Nam mittitur Spiritus Sanctus nobis, non *quatenus* est mortuus Christus, sed quia mortuus est, non enim potest mitti à creaturâ. Remittuntur nobis peccata quia Christus mortuus est, non verò quatenus mortuus est. Distinguimus hic inter *objectum formale*, ut supra. Objectum considerationis cultûs est natura humana et officium mediatorium, objectum formale est ipsa natura divina.

XXXII. Inæqualitas officii non tollit æqualitatem naturæ.

Hæc regula etiam certa in humanis. Nam Petrus, qui reliquis Apostolis par erat, aut etiam superior, (si credere fas est superior) ille à reliquis Apostolis missus fuit in Samariam. Act. 8. 14.

24 LCT, 561–576 [623–640]; CT, 317–322. | 25 LCT, 561–576 [623–640]; CT, 317–322.

t ⁵²F-119 | u ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-115 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-115 ⁶¹G-115

The kingdom of grace refers to the Church in this life, the kingdom of glory to the Church in heaven.

29. The kingdom of Christ is eternal, and yet it will cease to exist.

Here, there seems to be a contradiction between Luke and Paul. For in his first chapter [verse 33] Luke asserts that Christ's kingdom 'will be without end'. Paul, in 1Co 15,24, however, says that He shall deliver up the kingdom to the Father and, therefore, it will have an end. *Answer:* in Luke the angel refers to the essential kingdom, which belongs to Christ by right of creation. Paul speaks about the mediatorial rule or about the manner in which this kingdom is administered. This way of administration consists in an external service.

30. According to his divine nature Christ will judge in another way than according to his human nature.

According to his divine nature, He will judge by identifying sins; according to his human nature by proclaiming the sentence and by approving God's judgments. |

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31. In religious worship Christ the King is adored, but not in so far as He is King and Mediator.

I.e. Christ is not worshipped in so far He is Mediator; otherwise, Christ's human nature had also to be worshipped. *Objection* from Apc 4,11; 5,12: 'Thou art worthy to receive glory, because thou art slain'. *Answer:* in theology the words 'because' and 'in so far' are not interchangeable. For the Holy Spirit is sent to us, not in so far but because Christ has died: it is not possible that the Spirit is sent forth by a creature. Our sins are forgiven, because Christ has died, not in so far as He has died. As we did earlier, we distinguish a formal object. In religious worship the object of consideration are the human nature of Christ and his mediatorial office, the formal object is the divine nature itself.

32. Inequality of office does not abolish equality of nature.

In human affairs too, this is a certain rule. For Peter, who was equal to the rest of the apostles or even superior to them (if it is allowed to believe that one of the apostles was superior), was sent to Samaria by the rest of the apostles, Act 8,14.

XXXIII. Christus est mediator^v hominum tantùm.

1 Tim. 2. 5. Ibi dicitur, quod Christus sit mediator Dei et hominum; hoc facit contra^w eos qui statuunt Christum etiam angelorum mediatorem esse; sed ineptè, angeli etiam non peccarunt ut reconciliatione opus haberent, sed homines duntaxat. Unde etiam Sp. Sanctus Christum dicit mediatorem eorum, quorum naturam assumpsit.

XXXIV. Christus in statu exinanitionis seipsum exinanivit.

Sunt gradus statûs Christi exinanitionis et exaltationis. *Quæritur*. In quo constiterit ista exinanitio. *Resp.* In duobus. 1. In assumptione formæ servi, de quo Phil. 2. 2. In occultatione^x naturæ divinæ, occultatione dico, quia natura divina non ita in Christi carne manifesta erat ut postmodum.

XXXV. Quæcunque Christo dicuntur data in tempore, dantur ratione utriusque naturæ.

Lutherani hoc negant, et dicunt, data sunt humanæ naturæ, quia divinæ nihil dari potest. *Resp.* Falsum hoc, si simpliciter sumatur. Annon Matt. 22. dicitur, Date Cæsari quæ sunt Cæsaris et Deo Dei? et Apoc. 14. Date Deo gloriam, qui fecit cœlum et terram. At *dices*, habet omnia,^y ergo nulla re eget. *Resp.* Ita est, nec hæc ipsi dantur, quin prius ab ipso ista obtineamus, et non dantur quin iterum in nostri commodum referantur ab ipso.^z

XXXVI. In Christo habitat omnis plenitudo divinitatis.

Colos. 2. 9. Cæterùm *quæritur*: quomodo habitet in illo? *Resp.* Per unionem Hypostaticam, quâ scil. humana Christi natura assumpta est in unionem τοῦ λόγου . 2. Non *typicè* sed *verè* et *realiter*, confer versum 17.

XXXVIII. Divini Christi natura ubique est.

v ⁵²F-120 | w ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-116 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-116 ⁶¹G-116 | x ⁵⁹R-36 | y ⁵²F-121 ⁵⁴R-43 | z
⁵³FA^{ELZ}-117 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-117 ⁶¹G-117

33. Christ is Mediator of mankind only.

1T 2,5. Here, Christ is said to be a Mediator of God and men. This is contra those | who assert that He also was the Mediator of angels. But this is not true. For only men have sinned. For angels have not sinned, so that they need reconciliation, but only men have sinned. Therefore the Holy Spirit calls Christ the Mediator of those whose nature He assumed.

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34. In the state of humiliation Christ has emptied himself.

There are two degrees in the state of Christ: the state of humiliation and the state of exaltation. The *question* arises: of what does humiliation consist? *Answer*: of two parts: 1. Assumption of the form of a servant, on which see Ph 2,5-11. 2. Concealment of the divine nature; a concealment, I say, because in the flesh of Christ the divine nature was manifested in no such degree as afterwards.

35. Whatever is said to have been given to Christ in time, is given to both natures.

The Lutherans deny this and say that they have been given to his human nature, because it is impossible to add something to the divine nature. *Answer*: this is false, if taken simply. Does not Mt 22,21 say: 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's?' And Apc 14,7: 'Give glory to God who made heaven and earth.' Perhaps you will say: God does not need anything because He has everything. *Answer*: this is true, but these things are given to Him no sooner than we obtain them from Him. And they are not given without receiving them anew from Him for our convenience. |

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36. In Christ dwells all the fullness of the Godhead, Kol 2,9.

Apart from that, the question is: in what manner does it dwell in Him? *Answer*: 1. By means of a hypostatic union by which the human nature of Christ is assumed into union with the Logos or the Word. 2. It must not be understood figuratively, but truly and real. Confer verse 17.

37./38.⁶ The divine nature of Christ is omnipresent.

⁶ In the Oxford edition section 37 is left out, in the Amsterdam editions section 38.

Hoc probè tenendum contra Lutheranos. sciendum est triplicem esse præsentiam, 1. *Generalem*, quâ eadem omnibus creaturis, eas conservando, regendo, adest. 2. *Specialem*, quâ adest electis, illos conservando, et illis dona Spirituality suppeditando. 3. *Specialissimam* præsentiam scilicet, *per unionem*, et ita adest Christo homini. Distingui ita solet à Theolog. adest *omnibus rebus*, generali assistentiâ, *electis*, per gratiam, *humanæ Christi naturæ*, per unionem.

XXXIX. Nomen dum Christo datum dicitur, intelligitur autoritas.^a

Nomen non significat nomen, ut Pontificii et Lutherani volunt, unde etiam videas, dum nominatur nomen *Jesus*, eos pileis depositis genua flectere, in quo tantò major absurditas liquet, quod dum Christus aut Deus appellatur, nemo illorum^b pileum attingat, quasi *Jesus* quid maius esset quam *Christus* aut *Deus*. At per nomen, ut diximus, intelligitur autoritas. Hinc Act. 4. quærunt sacerdotes, *quâ potestate aut quo nomine vos hoc fecistis*.

XL. Cum Christus dicitur dari in Sacris literis, sæpe per (dari) notatur manifestari.

Dicitur res dari cum manifestatur, ita Christus Joh. 16. dicit, *glorifica me pater eâ gloriâ quam habui apud te, antequam mundus esset*. Non petit sibi dari, sed manifestari talem qualis fuerat gloriam.

XLI. Christus quâ Deus miracula edebat.²⁶

Qua Deus dicimus, in quo ipsos Pontificios habemus assentientes, Becanus certè ita in sua Theologiâ Scholasticâ sentit. *Dices*: quid ergo humana Christi natura faciebat? *Resp.* Declarabat quid divina faceret, unde etiam humana Christi naturæ dicitur à Theologis instrumentum miraculorum patrandorum, et instrumentum non^c *Physicum*, sed *morale*; Alii dicunt esse signum interveniens ad cuius præsentiam Deus sive Divina natura miracula edebat.

²⁶ LCT, 295–296 [328–329].

a ⁵²F-122 | b ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-118 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-118 ⁶¹G-118 | c ⁵²F-123

This must be well maintained over and against the Lutherans. One should know that there is a threefold presence of the divine nature of Christ: 1. a general presence through which He is present to all creatures by preserving and governing them; 2. a special presence to the elect that consists of preserving them and in granting to them the gifts of the Holy Spirit; 3. a most special presence, viz. the presence by union, and in this manner the divine nature is present to the man Christ. Such is the usual distinction made by theologians: the divine nature is present to all things by general assistance, to the elect by grace, to the human nature of Christ by union.

39. When it is said that a name has been given to Christ it means authority.

This name does not signify the name as the Papists and Lutherans hold. Hence, you see them kneel down with uncovered heads, when the name 'Jesus' is pronounced. The absurdity of this is the more evident as no one | touches his hat when 'Christ' or 'God' is named: as if the name 'Jesus' is greater than the name 'Christ' or 'God'. But, as we already said, name means authority. For that reason the priests in Act 4,7 ask: 'By what power or by what name have you done this?'

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40. When Holy Scripture says that Christ is being 'given', this phrase often means that He is 'made known.'

A thing is said to be given, when it is made known. Thus, Christ says in J 17,5: 'Glorify thou me with the glory I had with thee before the world was.' He does not ask that glory is given to Him, but He asks that this glory He had before should be made known.

41. In so far as Christ is God, He performed miracles.

We say: in so far He is God. In this respect the Papists are in agreement with us. Becanus, in his *Theologia Scholastica*, is certainly of this opinion.⁷ Perhaps you will ask: what then did the human nature of Christ do? Answer: his human nature proclaimed what the divine nature was doing. For that reason, theologians call the human nature of Christ the instrument of working miracles: it is not a physical but a moral instrument. Others say that his human nature was an intervenient sign through the presence of which God or the divine nature performed miracles.

⁷ Martinus Becanus (1563-1624), born in Hilvarenbeek, The Netherlands. He was a Jesuit theologian and professor of philosophy in Cologne and professor of theology in Würzburg, Mainz and Vienna. Maccovius refers to BECANUS, *Theologiae Scholasticae*.

XLII. Ubiunque redemptionis sit mentio, et additur pretium quo redempti^d sumus,^e ibi redemptio propriè dicta intelligitur.

Contrariæ sententiæ est Socinus, dicens, non esse propriè dictam redemptionem, sed metaphoricam. At nos propriè dictam dicimus, quia ubi quis dicitur esse liberatus, et illud, quo interveniente liberatus est, pretium dicitur, ibi intelligi oportet propriè dictam redemptionem.

XLIII. Sacrificia Veter. Testament. non offerebantur pro delictis capitalibus privatim, offerebantur tamen in anniversario sacrificio.²⁷

Socinus putat non pro omnibus peccatis fuisse sacrificia instituta, quia non instituta fuerunt pro capitalibus delictis, quod quis clam insciis planè omnibus commiserat; At^f dicimus, privatim non fuisse instituta, quia Deus, qui misericors^g est, et clementissimus, noluit imponere necessitatem cuiquam (nam in sacrificio privato quisque confitebatur suam culpam) seipsum accusandi,^h ac propterea in vitæ periculum præcipitandi. Attamen omnia peccata condonabantur in sacrificio anniversario, nam ibi confessio privata non requirebatur, sed generalis omnium peccatorum quorumcúnque.

XLIV. Christus nobis per omniaⁱ similis est, secundum *naturam*, non secundum *omnes naturæ infirmitates*.

Infirmitates enim sunt vel *culpabiles*, ut peccata, in his non est nobis similis; vel *inculpabiles*, quales sunt affectus tristitiæ, doloris, lachrymarum, famis, lassitudinis, in his nobis similis est. Deinde infirmitates sunt vel communis pœna peccati, ut potuisse mori, vel particularis, ut morbi: *illas non has*, prioris non posterioris generis infirmitates assumpsit.

XLV. Personalitas divinæ Christi naturæ est *per se*, humanæ verò *per assumptionem*.

Quia divina et humana Christi natura non æque faciunt ad constitutionem personæ. Quia hoc repugnat æternitati et immutabilitati naturæ divinæ. Nam

27 LCT, 517-527 [574-586]; TT, 288-290.

d ⁶¹G-119 | e ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-119 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-119 | f ⁵⁴R-44 | g ⁵⁹R-37 | h ⁵²F-124 | i ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-120 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-120 ⁶¹G-120

42. Wherever redemption is mentioned, and if the ransom is added | through which we are redeemed, then redemption is understood in its proper sense. 119

Socinus has a contrary opinion by saying that this is not redemption in a proper sense, but in a metaphorical sense. But we assert that it is redemption in its proper sense, because where someone is called liberated, and if that through the intervention of which he is liberated is called a ransom, there it ought to be understood as redemption in its proper sense.

43. The sacrifices of the Old Testament were not offered privately for capital sins. Nevertheless they were only offered during an annual sacrifice.

Socinus thinks that not for all sins sacrifices were instituted. For there were no sacrifices for capital sins, because someone could have committed capital delicts secretly, without anybody knowing them. However, we assert that they were not privately offered, because God who is merciful and most gentle, did not want to impose on anyone the necessity to accuse himself (for in a private sacrifice everyone confessed his guilt) and therefore to endanger one's life. Nevertheless all sins were remitted during an annual sacrifice. In this case, a private confession was not required; a general confession of all sins of whomsoever sufficed.

44. Christ is similar to us in all things, | according to nature, but not according to all the weaknesses of nature. 120

These weaknesses are either culpable such as sins: in these things He is not like us; or they are inculpable, such as the affects of sorrow, grief, tears, hunger, weariness: in these things He is like us. Next, weaknesses are either a general punishment of sin, such as the possibility to die, or they are a particular punishment, such as becoming ill. Christ did take up the weaknesses of the first category, not those of the second.

45. The personality of the divine nature of Christ is by or in itself; the personality of his human nature is by assumption.

The reason is that the divine and human nature of Christ do not equally constitute the person of Christ, because this would be opposed to the eternity and

quod ab æterno subsistit ad ejus subsistentiæ constitutionem nihil potest facere id, quod in tempore^j demum factum est.

XLVI. Per assumptionem naturæ humanæ in ὑπόστασιν divinæ, nulla facta est mutatio in divinâ sed tantùm in humanâ naturâ.²⁸

Omnis enim mutatio est vel generatio vel corruptio, vel augmentatio, vel diminutio,^k vel alteratio vel motus localis; horum autem nihil in divinam naturam cadit.

XLVII. Unio naturarum Christi nobis est incomprehensibilis.²⁹

Quia unio est rei finitæ cum infinitâ. Et si unio inter Christum et Ecclesiam nobis est incomprehensibilis, multò magis hoc mysterium.

XLVIII. Sacerdos vel est propriè dictus vel metaphoricè talis.

Propriè dictus vel typicus est vel realis. Typici vel Aaronici vel Melchisedechiani. Realis est solus Christus. Adeoque si Pontificiorum sacrificuli jactitent se pro Sacerdotibus propriè dictis, dicant oportet, cujus sint ordinis. An Aaronici, et sic Iudæi erunt; an verò Melchisedechiani: at hujus ordinis non nisi unicus Christus fuit. Impropiè dicti Sacerdotes sunt omnes fideles. Apoc. 16. et 5. 10. 1 Petr. 2. 5.^l

28 LCT, 492–500 [544–554]; TT, 269–273. | 29 LCT, 492–500 [544–554]; TT, 269–273.

j ⁵²F-125 | k ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-121 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSNO}-121 ⁶¹G-121 | l ⁵²F-126

immutability of the divine nature. For it is impossible that something that happened in time, constitutes the existence of something that exists from eternity.

46. The assumption of the human nature in the divine hypostasis did not cause any change in the divine nature, but only in the human nature.

For all change is either generation or corruption or augmentation or diminution | or alteration or local motion. Nothing of this kind, however, takes place in the divine nature. 121

47. The union of both natures of Christ is incomprehensible to us.

The reason is that it is a union of the finite with the infinite. Even if the union between Christ and the Church is incomprehensible to us, all the more this mystery.

48. The word 'priest' can be used in a proper or in a metaphorical sense.

Its proper sense is typical or real. Typical priests are all those after the order of Aaron or Melchisedek. Only Christ is a real priest. If therefore the popish sacrificers give themselves out as priests in a proper sense, they should also explain to which order they belong. If they belong to the order of Aaron, they must be Jews. Or do they belong to the order of Melchisedek? But to this order only Christ belonged. Figuratively speaking, one may say that all the faithful are priests, Apc 16,5, 1P 2,5.

CAPUT XII.

De Fœdere.¹

I. Fœdus inter Deum et creaturas non est propriè dictum fœdus, sed analogicè tantùm.^m

Estque pactum, quo Deus promittit aliquid homini, et vicissim aliquid ab ipso stipulatur.ⁿ

II. Promissio ex parte Dei est, Stipulatio verò ex parte nostrâ.

III. Fœdus vel *Spirituale* est, vel *corporale*.²

Illo cœlestia bona promittit, vitam æternam, et quæ ad eam tum obtinendam tum possidendam pertinent; *Hoc* corporalia Deut. 27. et 28.

IV. Spirituale fœdus duplex est vel *Legale*, vel *Evangelicum*.³

Legale quo Deus vitam æternam promittit præstantibus legem. Levitic. 18. 5. *Qui fecerit ea vivet in eis*, quod iniit Deus in paradiso cum homine integro. Quo primi parentes nostri violârunt, adeoque rei facti sunt mortis æternæ. Deinde post lapsum^o repetiit Deus idem fœdus. Deut. 5. 1 Reg. 8. 21.

1. Ut ostenderet quid nostri sit officii.
2. Ut nos obedientiæ nostræ commonefaceret.
3. Ut omne os obstruatur, et totus mundus condemnationi obnoxius fieret. Rom. 3. 19.
4. Ut ex lege esset cognitio peccati. Rom. 3. 10.

¹ LCT, cc. 58, 500–503 [554–558] TT, 273–279; TP, 169–172 [111–115]; TQ, 386–387 [58–60]; TC, 475.

² LCT, 500 [554]; TT, 273. | ³ LCT, 500 [554]; TT, 273.

Chapter XII

On the Covenant

1. The covenant between God and the creatures is not a covenant in a proper sense but only in an analogical sense. |

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It is a pact by which God promises man something and in turn stipulates something that must be done by him.

2. The promise is on the part of God, the stipulation is on our part.

3. The covenant is either spiritual or corporal.

In the first sense God promises us celestial goods: eternal life and all that pertains to the obtainment and possession of eternal life. In the second sense God promises corporal things, Dt 27 and 28.

4. The spiritual covenant is twofold: either legal or evangelical.

In the legal covenant God promises eternal life to those who fulfill the law, Lv 18,5: '(You shall keep my statutes and my ordinances): by doing which a man shall live in them.' God established this covenant in paradise with innocent man. Our first parents have violated this covenant and, therefore, they have become guilty of eternal death. Next, after the fall, God repeated the same covenant, Dt 5,1, 1R 8,12,

1. by showing us what our duty is;
2. by reminding us clearly of our obedience;
3. in order that 'every mouth be stopped and all the world may become guilty and worthy of condemnation before God', Rm 3,19;
4. by showing that through the law there is knowledge of sin, Rm 3,20.

Evangelicum fœdus est, quo Deus promittit se fore Deum nostrum in Christo, id est, benedicturum omni benedictione spirituali,^p et vicissim à nobis postulat, ut ambulemus integrè coram ipso.

V. Fœdus Dei Evangelicum cum hominibus non est *universale*, sed *particulare*.⁴

Quia Christus non est omnium mediator, nec omnes sunt fœderati ejus. In V. T. non fuit universale. Quia ibi distinctio inter semen mulieris et serpentis, quod sanè posterius non fuit in fœdere Et Deus cum Abrahamo et familiâ ejus pepigit Gen. 17. nec cum omnibus illis qui ex Abrahami familiâ sunt quoad carnem sed fide Abrahami præditis. Rom. 2. et 9. Non fecit sic ulli genti. Psal. 147. Hinc sanguis Christi dicitur sanguis fœderis, quod eo expiata sint peccata fœderatorum. Dum etiam quia convertuntur electi cum fœderatis, et hi cum illis. Rom. 11. per totum. Ut verò non omnes electi; ita non omnes fœderati.^q Hinc etiam illa distinctio inter filios *carnis* et *promissionis*. Rom. 8. 9.

VI. Fœdus Evangelicum vel *vetus* est vel *novum*.⁵

Hoc est vel veteris, vel Novi Testamenti. Quod tamen utrumque idem est quoad *substantiam*, etsi *circumstantiis* variet. Quia utriusque testamenti objectum Christus est,^f etsi in veteri *exhibendus*, in novo *exhibitus*; etsi vetus obscurius, novum clarius; etsi vetus signa habuerit magis molesta, quàm novum. Pascha enim non sine sumptibus, circumcisio non sine dolore celebrari potuit. Baptismus et Coena Domini (quæ signa sunt novi fœderis, ut Pascha et circumcisio veteris,) absque utroque.

VII. Fœdus vel *operum* est vel *fidei*.⁶

4 LCT, 500 [554]; TT, 273-274. | 5 LCT, 501-502 [555-556]. | 6 LCT, 500-501 [554-555].

p ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-123 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSNO}-123 ⁵⁹R-38 ⁶¹G-123 | q ⁵²F-128 | r ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-124 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSNO}-124
⁶¹G-124

In the evangelical covenant God promises to be our God in Jesus Christ, i.e. that He will bless us with every spiritual blessing | and in return requires from us that we walk honestly before his eyes.

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5. The evangelical covenant between God and men is not a universal but a particular covenant.

The reason is that Christ is not a mediator of all mankind and not all men are his confederates. In the Old Testament it was not universal. For there the distinction is applied to the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent, which clearly implies that the last one was not included in the covenant. And when God established the covenant with Abraham and his family, Gn 17, He did not include all the seed of Abraham according to the flesh, but only those who are endowed with the faith of Abraham, Rm 2 and 9. 'He has not dealt so with any other nation', Ps 147. Hence the blood of Christ is called the blood of the covenant, because through this blood, the sins of his confederates are expiated. For at that very moment the elect are converted (counted) together with (as) confederates and confederates together with (as) elect, Rm 11, the whole chapter. But as not all are elect, so not all are confederates. Hence a distinction must be made between the children of the flesh and the children of the promise, Rm 8 and 9.

6. The evangelical covenant is either old or new.

I.e. it is either of the Old or of the New Testament. However, both covenants are identical in substance, although they differ regarding the circumstances. Christ is the object of both testaments |, although in the old He is about to come and in the new He has come. But the old covenant is more obscure and the new covenant is clearer; the old covenant had more troublesome signs than the new. For the Passover could not be celebrated without costs, the circumcision not without pain. Baptism and the Lord's Supper (which are signs of the new covenant as Passover and circumcision are signs of the old covenant) are free from both.

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7. The covenant is either a covenant of works or a covenant of faith.

Coincidit distinctio cum illâ, quâ fœdus aliud *legale*, aliud *Evangelicum* dicebatur. *Illud* fuit cum stipulatione *operum*; *hoc fac et vives*. *Hoc* cum stipulatione *fidei*: *crede et salvaberis*. Requiritur equidem et in hoc opera, verùm non primariò, ut scilicet ex iis homo justificaretur, sed *consequenter*, ut signum sint gratitudinis, experimentum fidei non fictæ, atque adeò ædificatio proximi.^s

^s ⁵²F-129 ⁵⁴R-46

This distinction coincides with that between the legal and the evangelical covenant. The first included a stipulation of works: 'Do this and you will live.' The second included a stipulation of faith: 'Believe and you will be saved.' Indeed, in this covenant too works are required, but not primarily, as if man is justified through them; but they are required as a consequence, as a sign of gratitude, as a proof of an unfeigned faith which in this way also edifies the neighbor.

CAPUT XIII.

De Justificatione.¹

I. Justificatio alia est *activa*, alia *passiva*.²

Verbalia in *io*, plerumque ita accipiuntur, justificat enim Deus, et nos justificamur.^t

II. Justificatio passiva posterior est fide.³

Posterior est fide passivâ; quia per fidem accipimus remissionem peccatorum. Act. 26. 18.

III. Aliter nos justificat Deus, aliter Christus mediator, aliter Sp. Sanctus, aliter fides, aliter bona opera.⁴

Deus justificat nos *imputando* nullo modo peccata, et imputando justitiam Christi. Christus *merendo*, Sp. Sanct. *applicando*, bona opera *declarando*. Illa posteriora duo à Th. ita efferri solent. Fides justificat *effectivè*, bona opera *declarativè*.

IV. Justificatio est actus Dei^u *moralis*, non *realis*.⁵

Duplex est actio Dei in peccatore. Una *moralis*, quæ est justificatio, Altera *realis* quæ est regeneratio. *Moralis*, ut diximus, consistit in eo, ut nobis non imputet peccata, sed imputet justitiam Christi. *Realis* in sublacione reali peccati.

¹ LCT, cc. 69; 72, 602–626 [669–696]; 713–719 [791–796]; CT, 128–179; TT, 309–312; 336–340; TP, 190–1194 [131–136]; TQ, 398–400, 405–407 [75–76. 83–85]; TC, 481; ПΨ-Pontificiorum, 541–545 [43–48]; ПΨ-Socinianorum, 574–575 [78–80]; ПΨ-Lutheranorum, 589 [96–97]; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 608–610 [119–120]; ПΨ-Anabaptistarum, 622–623 [135]; A-E, 671–672; A-S, 810–812, 826–827 [126–128, 143–144]. | ² LCT, 602 [669]; CT, 126–131; 153–156; TT, 309. | ³ LCT, 602 [669]. 713–716 [791–794]; TT, 309. | ⁴ CT, 144–149. | ⁵ LCT, 602 [669]; CT, 144–149; TT, 309–310.

Chapter XIII

On Justification

1. Active justification differs from passive justification.

In Latin, the nouns ending in *-io* are generally interpreted in this way [as active and passive]. God justifies and we are justified. |

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2. Passive justification is later than faith.

Passive justification follows after passive faith, because it is through faith that we receive the remission of sins, Act 26,18.

3. God, Christ the Mediator, the Holy Spirit, faith, and good works justify in different ways.

God justifies us by in no way imputing sins and by imputing the righteousness of Christ. Christ justifies by acquiring merit, the Holy Spirit by application, good works by declaration, and faith by accepting. Theologians usually express the last two by saying that faith justifies effectively and good works declaratively.

4. Justification is a moral and not a real act of God.

The action of God in the sinner is twofold: one is moral, which is justification. The other is real, which is regeneration. As we have already said, the moral action consists in not imputing our sins but in the imputation of Christ's righteousness. The real action consists in a real removal of sin.

V. *Justificatio nostri non fit gradatim.*⁶

Quia simul et semel omnium nostrorum peccata coniecta sunt in Christum. Cæterum hoc intelligendum est de justificatione^v *activá*; nam *passiva* justificatio toties fit, quoties homo pœnitentiam agens, per fidem apprehendit remissionem peccatorum.

VI. In oratione dominica, dum petimus remissionem peccatorum, non petimus *actum* ejus, sed *applicationem* et sensum.

Disceptant Theologi, si, inquit, remittuntur nobis peccata unico actu, cur ergo petimus^w remissionem fieri in oratione dominica. *Resp.* Petimus quoad *applicationem* et sensum, non quoad *actum*.

VII. Per justificationem nostri tollitur *reatus*, at non tollitur *peccatum de facto*.^x

Pontificii disputant, ane possit tolli reatus et non peccatum? *Resp. Affirmatur*, quia potest esse peccatum in homine, et tamen reatus ipsi non imputatur.

VIII. Fides *sola* justificat, non *solitaria*.⁷

Distinctio est in solum et solitarium: ita *solus* oculus videt, sed non est *solitarius* cum videt, hoc est, non est sejunctus ab aliis partibus et membris. Ita *solus* pes ambulat, sed non *solitarius*.^y

IX. Fides *actualis* justificat, non *habitualis*.⁸

Testatur hoc Sp. Sanctus Act. 26. per fidem, inquit accipimus remissionem peccatorum, et sortem inter sanctos. *Obj.* Atqui fides cessat in dormiente. Ergo cessabit etiam justificatio. *Resp.* Negando, nam fides est actus moralis in justificatione, et actus^z moralis non necesse est ut perpetuò sit, sed sufficit fuisse vel aliquando fieri.

⁶ LCT, 622–624 [691–693]; CT, 149–150. | ⁷ LCT, 713–719 [791–796]; CT, 156–158. | ⁸ LCT, 713–719 [791–796].

v ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-126 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-126 ⁶¹G-126 | w ⁵⁹R-39 | x ⁵²F-131 | y ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-127 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-127 ⁶¹G-127 | z ⁵⁴R-47

5. Our justification is not by degrees.

For the sins of all of us are cast upon Christ, at the same time and once and for all. But this only applies to active justification; | for passive justification happens so often as man is repenting his sins and seizes the remission of sins by means of faith.

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6. In the Lord's Prayer, when we ask for the forgiveness of sins, we do not ask for the act of forgiving but for its application and its awareness.

Theologians discuss this *question* by asking: if our sins are remitted by one single act, for what reason, then, do we still ask for the remission of sins in the Lord's Prayer? *Answer*: we only ask for the application and awareness of it, and not for the act itself.

7. By means of our justification the guilt of sin is taken away; not actually sin itself.

The Papists discuss whether it is possible to take away the guilt but not the sin. *Answer*: we affirm, for it can be that sin is in man and that yet the guilt is not imputed unto him.

8. Faith alone justifies, but not a solitary faith.

The distinction is between 'alone' and 'solitary'. An eye does see alone but when seeing it is not solitary, i.e. it is not separated from other parts and members. Likewise, a foot walks, but it does not walk on its own. |

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9. Actual faith does justify, habitual faith does not.

The Holy Spirit testifies in Act 26,18: 'By faith we receive forgiveness of sins and inheritance among those who are sanctified.' *Objection*: faith ceases in someone who sleeps. Therefore justification will cease too. *Answer*: no, for in justification faith is a moral act and it is not necessary that a moral act continues, but it suffices that it has happened or happens one time.

X. *Justificatio nunquam tollitur in fidelibus, sed sensus ipsis tollitur aliquando, ut fit in tentationibus.*⁹

Legitur sæpè in S. literis fideles ita consternari, ut putent se abjectos à faciè Dei, hoc est, destituuntur sensu gratiæ justificationis,^a quæ tandem redit; non enim finit Deus suos tentari ultra hoc, quod ferre possint. 1 Cor. 10. 13.

XI. *Alia est justificatio imputata, alia imputativa.*

Pontificii dum audiunt à nobis, justitiam nostram non esse nisi imputatam, calumniantur nos, justitiam nostram esse putativam; sed ista distinctissima sunt, ut quilibet videre potest.

XII. *Justitia nobis imputata est moraliter, non physicè.*^{10b}

Quæritur an justitia sit in nobis? *Resp.* Non *Physicè*, hoc est *inhærenter*; sed *moraliter*, hoc est per imputationem.

XIII. *Justitia alia est personæ, alia causæ.*

Justitia personæ est quâ stamus coram facie Dei. Justitia causæ est, quæ etiam cadit in reprobos; potest enim quis habere bonam causam, qui etiam alienus est ab ecclesia. Et de hac justitiâ loquitur David, *Domine judica me secundùm justitiam meam, et secundùm integritatem meam pronuncia de me.*

XIV. *Justificatio est actus forensis Dei.*^{11c}

Disceptant nobiscum Pontificii quid sit justificare, et illi inquirunt justum facere per infusionem justitiæ. Nos negamus et dicimus nihil aliud esse et significare, quam absolvere à peccato, ut ad Rom. 4 et 5.

XV. *Justificatio talis est actus Dei, qui nunquam revocatur.*¹²

⁹ LCT, 713–719 [791–796]. | ¹⁰ LCT, 602 [669]; TT, 309. | ¹¹ LCT, 602 [669]; TT, 309. | ¹² LCT, 624–626 [693–696]; CT, 150–153.

a ⁵²F-132 | b ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-128 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-128 ⁶¹G-128 | c ⁵²F-133

10. In the faithful justification will never be abolished, but the awareness of it sometimes disappears, as happens in temptations.

Often one reads in Holy Scripture that the faithful are so terrified that they think that God has abandoned them, i.e. they feel themselves devoid of the awareness of the grace of justification, which, however, ultimately, returns. For 'God will not suffer his own to be tempted above they are able to bear', 1Co 10,13.

11. There is a distinction between imputed justification and supposed justification.

When the Papists hear from us that our righteousness is only imputed righteousness, they misrepresent us by asserting that our righteousness is only supposed. But these two are sharply distinguished, as anybody can see.

12. Righteousness is imputed to us, morally but not physically. |

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The *question* is: is righteousness present in us? *Answer*: not physically, i.e. inherently, but morally, i.e. by means of imputation.

13. Righteousness sometimes refers to a person, sometimes to a case.

The righteousness of a person is the righteousness with which we stand before God. The righteousness of a case can also be present in the reprobate, for one who is not related to the Church can certainly have a good case. About this righteousness of case David speaks: 'O Lord, judge me according to my righteousness and speak of me according to my sincerity.'

14. Justification is a forensic act of God.

The Papists discuss with us about what justification is and they assert that it is 'to make righteous' by the infusion of grace. We deny this and say that justification is and signifies nothing but the absolution of sin, as is clear in Rm 4 and 5.

15. Justification is an act of God of such a kind that it can never be revoked.

Hoc est qui semel est justificatus, semper manet. *Obj.* ex Matt. 18. Ubi dicitur, gratiam retraxisse, cui condonaverat. *Resp.* Ex parabolis non deducendum argumentum nisi ratione scopi.

XVI. Bona opera non præcedunt^d justificandum, sed sequuntur justificatum.¹³

Est regula Augustini, quæ nititur scriptura; nam qui non est justificatus, est mala arbor, illa autem non potest bonos fructus ferre. Matt. 7.^e

¹³ CT, 170–173.

d ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-129 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-129 ⁶¹G-129 | e ⁵²F-134

I.e. someone who is once justified always remains justified. An *Objection* is taken from Mt 18,34 saying that God has withdrawn grace from someone to whom He had given it. *Answer*: it is not allowed to draw arguments from parables without keeping their scope in mind.

16. Good works do not precede | a person who is yet to be justified, but they follow a person already being justified.

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This is a rule of Augustine, which rests on Scripture; for someone who is not justified is like a bad tree; it cannot produce good fruits, Mt 7,18.

CAPUT XIV.

De Regeneratione.¹

I. Regeneratio aliter se habet ratione *primi momenti*, aliter ratione *progressûs*.²

Ratione primi momenti homo se habet *merè*^f *passivè*, ratione progressus cooperatur cum Deo.

II. Regeneratio est perfecta *partibus*, non *gradibus*.³

Distinctio hæc maximi usus est: nam sæpè occurrunt voces istæ, *perfecti*, *integri*, at hæ non notant perfectionem *graduam*, sed *partium*.^g

III. Perfectum vel integrum aliquando accipitur prout opponitur hypocritico, aliquando prout opponitur imperfecto. Dum pii dicuntur perfecti, intelligendi sunt perfecti^h primâ significatione, non posteriori.

IV. Regeneratio non daturⁱ perfecta in hac vitâ, sed obtingit demum in solutione animæ à corpore.⁴

Liquet hoc ex istis quos dies Domini repertura est in vivis; nam hi antequam rapiuntur in occursum, à Christo mutabuntur: pari ratione anima fidelis dum à corpore dissolvitur, regeneratur, et ita ad Deum transfertur.

1 LCT, cc. 70-71, 626-713 [696-791]; TT, 312-314; TP, 194-208 [136-151]; TQ, 400-405 [77-83]; TC, 481-483, 491-492; ПΨ-Pontificiorum, 541-545 [43-48]; ПΨ-Socinianorum, 565-567 [69-71]; ПΨ-Lutheranorum, 587, 589 [94, 96-97]; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 610-613 [120-124]; A-E, 660-662, 671; A-S, 813-826 [129-143]. | 2 LCT, 643-652 [715-724]; TT, 312-314. | 3 LCT, 643-652 [715-724]; TT, 312-314. | 4 LCT, 643-652 [715-724].

Chapter XIV

On Regeneration

1. In respect of its first moment regeneration comes about in another way than in respect of its progression.

Regarding the first moment of regeneration man is purely passive; regarding its progression man cooperates with God.

2. Regeneration is perfect in its parts, not in degrees.

This distinction is very useful; for the words 'perfect' and 'integer' often occur. However, they do not note a perfection of grades but a perfection of parts.

3. Sometimes the words 'perfect' or 'integer' are used as opposed to 'hypocrite', at other times as opposed to 'imperfect.' When godly people are called perfect, it should be understood | as referring to perfection in the first sense and not to perfection in the second sense.

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4. In this life there is no perfect regeneration, but it is finally obtained when soul and body are separated.

This is evident in those whom the day of the Lord will find alive; for before they are caught up to meet the Lord, they shall be transformed by Christ [1Th 5,17]. Likewise, when the faithful soul is separated from the body, it is regenerated, and so it is transferred to God.

V. Dum in decalogo jubemur diligere Deum ex toto corde, non intelliguntur vires istæ *quæ sunt* in regenito imperfectæ, sed *quales esse debebant*.

Pontificii hinc inferre volunt quod homo Deum perfectè colere possit, quia, inquit, habet vires. *Resp.* Non postulat Deus id tantùm ab homine quod habet, sed etiam quod habere debet. Adeò ut decalogus non ostendat quid homo possit, sed quid debeat, et ad quid divinitùs obligetur.

VI. Renati sive regeniti non peccant voluntate *plenâ*, sed voluntate reluctante et fracta.⁵

Hinc in scripturâ dicuntur *non dare operam*^j peccato, item *non peccare*; At vero ratio irregenitorum alia est, nam illi sistunt^k membra sua arma injustitiæ, et operam dant peccato.

VII. Fideles regeniti peccant non *ex malitiâ*, sed *ex infirmitate*.⁶

Sunt qui hoc rident. Et quæritur, an infirmitas, cujus quis sibi causa existit, excusari possit. *Resp.* Certè non, at verò dum dicimus non intelligimus accersitam illam infirmitatem, sed cui homo fidelis repugnat quantum potest, et repugnando aliquando succumbit.

VIII. In regenitis *manet* peccatum, dum in hac vitâ sunt, sed non *regnat*.⁷

Habitat non regnat. Nam Rom. 7. dicitur habitare; Rom. 6. dicitur non regnare in regenitis.

IX. In regenitis potior est caro quam Spiritus *malo*, Spiritus *virtute*.

Comparant Theologi carnem Goliatho, Spiritum Davidi.

5 LCT, 643–652 [715–724]. | 6 LCT, 643–652 [715–724]; TT, 312–314. | 7 LCT, 643–652 [715–724].

j ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-131 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-131 ⁶¹G-131 | k ⁵²F-136

5. When in the Decalogue we are commanded to love God with all our heart, then this does not refer to those powers which are imperfect in the regenerate, but to powers as they have to be.

From this the Papists want to infer that man can perfectly worship God, because – as they say – he has the power to do this. *Answer:* God does not only postulate from man what he does have but also what he has to have. To this end the Decalogue does not set forth what man can do, but what he has to do and to which he is obliged by God.

6. The reborn or regenerate do not sin with a complete will but with a reluctant and broken will.

For that reason Scripture says that they do not serve | sin, even that they do not sin. But for the unregenerate the situation is quite different; for they use their members as weapons of unrighteousness and serve sin. 131

7. Regenerated faithful do not sin because of badness, but they sin because of weakness.

Some ridicule this. They *question* whether it is possible to excuse the weakness caused by one self. *Answer:* certainly not! But by saying this we do not refer to a self-inflicted weakness, but a weakness against which a faithful man will fight as much as he can and in which struggle he sometimes succumbs.

8. Sin remains but does not reign in the regenerate as long as they live.

Sin dwells, but it does not reign in the regenerate. For in Rm 7 sin is said to dwell in the regenerate, and in Rm 6 it is said not to reign in them.

9. In the regenerate the flesh is stronger than the spirit because of evil, but the spirit is stronger than the flesh because of virtue.

Theologians compare flesh and spirit with Goliath and David.

X. Spiritus superior est carne, non quod *semper vincat*, sed quod *semper pugnam redintegret*, et tandem in fine vincat.^{8l}

Vincit aliquando caro Spiritum, sed ita vincit ut Spiritus continuò pugnam redintegret, et tandem vincat, non quidem viribus propriis, sed in Christo Jesu, in quo plus quam victores sumus, ut Rom. 8. Dicit solet à Theologis: Vincit sæpè caro *prælio*; sed Spiritus *bello*.

XI. Homo unus idémque quoad easdem facultates, est *reginitus* et *caro*.

Quâ parte reginitus est, dicitur *homo novus*, quâ parte irreginitus, dicitur *vetus homo*.

XII. Homo reginitus perfectus est in hac vitâ *desiderio et voto*, non autem *re ipsâ*.^{9m}

Hoc est, homo quidem desiderat et optat perfectam regenerationem, at re ipsâ non consequitur.

XIII. Regenerationis gradus dantur in hac vitâ, non tantùm in se, verum etiam in subjectis.¹⁰

Magis reginitur unus quam alter, hinc magis adulti quam infantes.

XIV. Lucta adversus peccatum duplex est, vel carnis adversus Spiritum, vel contrâ.ⁿ

Arminiani, dum nos proferimus luctam ex Epist. Rom. 7. *Spiritus adversus carnem*, dicunt eandem luctam reperiri in hominibus irreginitis, sed inepte. Nam in illis caro horret peccare non *virtutis amore*, sed *formidine pœnæ*. At vero ubi luctatur caro cum spiritu tam *formidine pœnæ*, quam *amore boni et amore Dei* id fieri certum est.

8 LCT, 652-674 [724-748]. | 9 LCT, 643-652 [715-724]; TT, 312-314. | 10 LCT, 643-652 [715-724].

l 52F-137 53FA^{ELZ}-132 56FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-132 61G-132 | m 54R-49 | n 52F-138 53FA^{ELZ}-133
56FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-133 59R-41 61G-133

10. The spirit is superior to the flesh, not because of the fact that the spirit always gains the victory, but because it always revives the struggle, and, finally, conquers. |

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Sometimes, the flesh conquers the spirit, but in such a manner that the spirit continually revives the struggle and, finally, it gains the victory: certainly not through its own powers but in Jesus Christ, through whom we are more than conquerors, Rm 8,37. Theologians usually say that the flesh often conquers in [a single] combat, but the spirit in war.

11. According to the very same faculties, one and the same man is reborn and flesh.

In so far as he is reborn man is called a new man; in so far as he is not reborn he is said to be the old man.

12. In this life regenerate man is perfect in desire and in hope, but he is not perfect in reality.

I.e. man does desire and hope for a perfect regeneration, but he does not achieve this perfect regeneration.

13. In this life regeneration is by degrees: these degrees do not only concern regeneration by itself but also the subjects.

Some people are more regenerate than others; hence older people are more regenerated than the young ones.

14. The struggle against sin is twofold: it is either the struggle of the flesh against the spirit or the contrary. |

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When we advance the struggle of the spirit against the flesh from the Epistle to the Romans chapter 7, the Arminians assert that this very struggle can also be found in the unregenerate. But this is wrong. For in the unregenerate it is not the love of virtue that hinders the flesh from sinning, but fear of punishment. However, when the flesh struggles against the spirit this is certainly because of fearing punishment as well as because of loving the good and God.

XV. Aliud est *captivare* aliquem, aliud *captivum habere*.

Caro captivat spiritum, sed non tenet captivum, quia perpetuò pugnam restaurat.

XVI. Aliud est, esse subjectum peccato, aliud esse servum peccati.

Subjectum esse nihil aliud est quam obnoxium esse, quod etiam in regenitos cadit. At verò servum esse peccati, non tantum est obnoxium esse peccato, sed etiam ultrò se offerre ad peccandum, et carnis concupiscentias tanquam imperatoris leges adimplere, quod irrogenitorum est.

XVII. Fides alia est *habitualis*, alia *actualis*.¹¹

Habitualis est pars regenerationis, actualis est effectus habitualis.

XVIII. Regeneratio est actus^o Dei realis.^{12p}

Dicitur realis, ut sit contradistincta justificationi, quae est actus moralis.

XIX. Regeneratio est opus solius Dei.¹³

Quia non minorem potentiam requirit regeneratio, quam creatio: At creatio solius Dei est. Ergo.

XX. Regeneratio nunquam cessat in regenito.

Qui enim geniti sunt non ex carne neque ex sanguine, illis dedit potestatem filios Dei vocari. Joh. 1.

XXI. Regenerati in hac vitâ carnales ex parte sunt.

Habetur hæc regula. 1 Cor. 3. Undè distinctio ista, quod alii sint carnales ex toto, quales sunt homines irrogeniti, alii ex parte.

¹¹ LCT, 686 [761]. | ¹² LCT, 626–643 [696–715]; TT, 312–314. | ¹³ LCT, 626–643 [696–715]; TT, 312–314.

15. There is a difference between capturing someone and holding someone in bondage.

The flesh does capture the spirit but it does not hold it in bondage, because the spirit perpetually resumes the struggle.

16. There is a difference between being subjected to sin and to be a slave of sin.

Being subjected to sin is nothing else than being exposed to sin, which also occurs in the regenerate. But being a slave of sin is not only being exposed to sin but it is, moreover, to deliver oneself to sinning and to obey the desires of the flesh as if they were the laws of a master, which is characteristic of the unregenerate.

17. A distinction should be made between habitual faith and actual faith.

Habitual faith is a part of regeneration, actual faith is an effect of habitual faith.

18. Regeneration is a real act of God. |

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It is called a real act in order to distinguish it from justification, which is a moral act.

19. Regeneration is a work of God alone.

For regeneration requires no less power than creation: but creation is the work of God alone. Ergo.

20. Regeneration never stops in the regenerate.

For He gave the power to become the sons of God to those who are not born of flesh nor out of blood, J 1,12-13.

21. In this life the regenerate are partially carnal.

This rule is found in 1Co 3,1. Hence the distinction that some are totally carnal such as the unregenerate, and others are partly carnal.

XXII. Regeneratio quoad primum momentum fit in instanti.¹⁴

Solent Theologi regenerationem à justificatione in eo distinguere, quod scilicet regeneratio sit simul et semel tota, justificatio non sit simul et semel tota.^q

¹⁴ LCT, 652 [724].

q ⁵²F-140 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-135 ⁵⁴R-50 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-135 ⁶¹G-135

22. Regarding its first moment regeneration happens instantaneously.

Theologians usually distinguish regeneration from justification in this respect that regeneration is realized at once and in one moment, while justification is not. |

CAPUT XV.

De Bonis Operibus.¹

I. Bona opera in hac vitâ sunt imperfecta.²

Qualis enim fons, tales rivuli.

II. Homines irrogeniti faciunt aliquando bona opera *quoad substantiam* sed non *quoad circumstantias* operis.³

Substantia operis dicitur, quando faciunt illud quod lex præcipit. Circumstantiæ operis tres à Theologis nominantur.

1. ut fiat ad mandatum Dei.
2. ut fiat ex fide.
3. ut fiat tendâtque ad gloriam Dei.

III. Bona opera necessaria sunt ut *antecedens* ad *consequens*, non ut *causa* ad *effectum*.⁴

Docet hoc passim Sp. sanctus, cum negat propter opera nostra vitam æternam contingere. Et interim etiam docet, sine sanctimoniâ non posse videri Deum. Heb. 12. 14.

IV. *Benè operantibus* dabitur vita^r æterna, sed non *propter bona opera*.

Liquet Mat. 25. ubi dicitur Esurivi. etc.⁵

¹ LCT, c. 73, 719–723 [797–802]; TT, 344–347; TP, 208–213 [152–155]; TQ, 407–415 [85–94]; TC, 484–487; ПΨ-Pontificiorum, 545–548 [48–51]; ПΨ-Arminianorum, 613–614 [124–125]. | ² LCT, 720 [798]; TT, 345. | ³ LCT, 719 [797]; TT, 344. | ⁴ LCT, 719–720 [797–798]; TT, 312–314.

^r ⁵²F-141 | ^s ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-136 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-136 ⁶¹G-136

Chapter XV

On Good Works

1. In this life good works are imperfect.

For such as the fountain is, so are the brooks.

2. Unregenerate men sometimes perform good works if you consider the substance of the work, but not if you consider its circumstances.

The substance of a work is at stake when they do what the law prescribes. According to the theologians the circumstances of a work are threefold:

1. When it is according to the command of God.
2. When it is done by faith.
3. When it is done and intended to glorify God.

3. Good works are necessary as a consequent that follows from its antecedent, not as an effect that follows from its cause.

The Holy Spirit teaches this everywhere, because He denies that eternal life is attained by means of our good works. At the same time, He also teaches that it is impossible to see God without holiness, Hbr 12,14.

4. Eternal life will be given to those who are performing good works, but it is not given unto them because of their good works.

This is evident from Mt 25,35, where it is said: 'For I was hungry and you gave me food' etc. |

V. Bona opera sunt *moralia et spiritualia*.

Distinctio ista observanda est, eò quod homo irrogenitus adiutus Dei gratiâ, quæ est *gratia cœrcitionis, et directionis*, bona opera moralia facere quoad substantiam, at nullo modo spiritualia præstare potest.^t

VI. Bona opera sunt interna vel externa, ut peccatum est internum vel externum.

VII. Bonis operibus datur merces improprie dicta.

Datur enim ex *gratiâ*, non ex *debito*, Rom. 4. Meritum ut aliquid sit, oportet ut habeat quatuor requisita.

1. ut sit indebitum.
2. ut proficiscatur ex viribus ejus qui meretur.
3. ut vergat in ejus commodum de quo quis mereri se putat.
4. ut non sit merces major quam meritum.

VIII. Bona opera quæ præstant gentiles placent Deo, in tantum, ut propterea justificatus sit ex parte et *in tantum* sed non *in totum*, in extremo judicio; secundò^u quia illa remuneratur bonis temporaneis.^v

Propterea pœnas leviores toleraturi sunt in inferno, et remunerantur bonis temporalibus, ut liquet in obstetricibus Exod. 1.

IX. Bona opera gentium dicuntur peccata *per accidens*, non per se.

X. Non nomina sed adverbia faciunt bona opera.

Hoc est, quod non tantum bonum est, sed quod benè quoque fit; benè autem illud fit quod fit ex fide ad gloriam Dei, ex mandato Dei.

XI. Non persona propter opera, sed opera propter personam Deo placent.

Probatur. Gen. 4. Respexit Deus Abelum et sacrificium ejus.^w

5. Good works are moral and spiritual works.

This distinction should be observed because an unregenerate man - being helped by God's grace which is a grace of restraint and direction - is able to do morally good works but in no way spiritually good works.

6. Good works are internal or external, as sin is internal or external.

7. In an improper sense you may say that good works will be rewarded.

They are rewarded by virtue of grace, not by virtue of obligation, Romans 4. In order to call something a merit, four things are required:

1. It must be something that is not owed.
2. It should proceed from the powers of the one who deserves it.
3. It must be of use to him of whom someone thinks that he deserves something.
4. The reward must not be greater than the merit.

8. The good works performed by the gentiles are pleasing to God in so far as because of them, He will partially but not totally justify them in the last judgment; secondly, because He will remunerate them with temporary goods. |

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In hell, therefore, they will bear lighter punishments; they will also be remunerated with temporary goods, as is evident from the midwives in Ex 1.

9. The good works of the gentiles are called sins by accident and not sins by itself.

10. Nouns do not constitute good works, but adverbs.

That means that it is not so much good as such, but because it was indeed well done. What was well done has been done through faith to the glory of God because God commanded it.¹

11. Not because of his works a person pleases God, but the works please God because of the person.

As is demonstrated in Gn 4. God had respect unto Abel and to his offering.

¹ Confer *Heidelberg Catechism*, Question and Answer 86.

CAPUT XVI.

De Ecclesia.¹

I. Ecclesia est visibilis et invisibilis.²

Non hæc distinctio est generis in species,^x sed vocis. Ecclesia enim quatenus notas habet ex quibus cognoscitur, eatenus dicitur visibilis, quatenus verò in istâ ecclesiâ sunt electi invisibiles et soli Deo noti, eatenus invisibilis est.^y

II. Ecclesia alia est *triumphans*, alia *militans*.³

Distinctio hæc fundamentum habet in scripturâ; sunt enim jam aliqui salvati, et hi dicuntur ecclesia triumphans; aliqui verò adhuc in terris militant contra diabolum, carnem et mundum, et hi dicuntur ecclesia militans.

III. Ecclesia alia est *universalis*, alia *particularis*.⁴

Universalis quæ est per totum orbem terrarum dispersa. Particularis quæ est in uno aliquo loco.

IV. Regimen ecclesiæ internum est *Monarchicum*, externum *Democraticum*, *Aristocraticum*.⁵

Internum solum caput Christum agnoscit; externo⁶ verò potestas pertinet ad ecclesiam, exercitium pertinet ad Doctores.

¹ LCT, cc. 68; 74–76; 81–85, 587–602 653–669]; 723–737 [802–818]; 756–776 [839–862]; TT, 347–358, 378–388; TP, 213–241 [156–169]; TQ, 415–420, 428–437 [94–100. 109–120]; TC, 487–491, 497; ПΨ-Pontificiorum, 512–514, 519–521 [11–13, 19–21]; ПΨ-Socinianorum, 567–568 [72–73]; ПΨ-Anabaptistarum, 623–624 [136–137]; A–S, 827–835 [145–153]. | ² LCT, 728–729 [808]; TT, 351–352. | ³ LCT, 723 [802]; TT, 347. | ⁴ LCT, 729 [808]; TT, 352. | ⁵ LCT, 595–597 [661–664]. | ⁶ We read externa instead of externo.

Chapter XVI

On the Church

1. The Church is visible and invisible.

This is not a distinction of a genus in two species but a verbal distinction. For in so far as the Church has marks from which it can be known, in so far it is called visible. But as far as the invisible elect are present in this Church, known by God alone, in so far it is invisible. |

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2. The Church triumphant differs from the Church militant.

This distinction has its basis in Scripture. For those already saved are called the Church triumphant. But those who until now are fighting on earth against the devil, the flesh and the world, are called the Church militant.

3. The universal Church differs from the particular church.

The universal Church is spread all over the world. The particular church is the church at one certain place.

4. The internal government of the Church is monarchical in character, the external government democratic-aristocratic.

The internal government only acknowledges Christ as head; the external power pertains to the Church and the exercise of external power pertains to its doctors.

V. Excommunicatio alia major est, alia minor.⁷

Major est quæ propriè excommunicatio² vocatur. Minor est suspensio ab usu cœnæ ad tempus, propter culpam aliquam commissam.

VI. Regimen ecclesiasticum differt à Politico.^{8a}

Differt

1. Objecto, quia potest esse membrum politicum bonum, qui non est membrum ecclesiæ.
2. Quia magistratus punit reos sive pœnitentiam agant, sive non: at magistratus ecclesiasticus non punit eos qui agunt pœnitentiam.

VII. Ecclesia particularis tota deficere potest sed Catholica non.⁹

Liquet hoc ex Ecclesiis istis Apocalypticis; deficit autem dupliciter, tum quia fideles evocantur ad mortem; tum quia aliò migrant.

VIII. Ecclesia deficere potest tum ratione fidei, tum ratione morum.^b

De moribus nihil dubii est: de fide certum est. Errârunt enim Apostoli in doctrinâ de resurrectione Christi, de regno Christi, quæ sunt articuli fidei.

IX. Ecclesia etiam errare potest in fundamento, sed non pertinaciter neque finaliter.^c

Liquet hoc in Apostolis qui errarunt in fundamentali capite doctrinæ de resurrectione.

X. Ecclesia est columna veritatis *politica*, non *architectonica*.^d

XI. Ecclesia agit ex *autoritate*, privatus ex *officio*.

7 LCT, 769–774 [854–859]; TT, 383–388. | 8 LCT, 595–597 [661–664]. | 9 LCT, 729 [808]; TT, 352.

z ⁵²F-144 | a ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-139 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSN}O-139 ⁶¹G-139 | b ⁵⁹R-43 | c ⁵²F-145 | d ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-140
⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSN}O-140 ⁶¹G-140

5. Excommunication has its degrees of major and minor.

The major degree is excommunication in its proper sense. The minor degree is a temporary suspension of participation in the Lord's Supper because of a committed crime.

6. Ecclesial government differs from political government. |

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It differs regarding

1. Its object; because it is possible to be a good member of the political community without being a member of the Church.
2. The magistrate punishes the guilty whether they repent or not; but the ecclesial government does not punish those who repent.

7. A particular church can completely disappear, but the Catholic Church can not.

This is evident from the churches mentioned in the Revelation of John. A particular church disappears in a twofold way: partly because the faithful are called up for death, partly because they migrate to other places.

8. The Church can fail in respect of its faith or its morals.

Regarding morals there is no doubt and regarding faith it is certain. The apostles erred in the doctrine of Christ's resurrection and Christ's kingdom, which are both articles of faith.

9. It is also possible that the Church errs in its foundation, but it does not err tenaciously or until the end.

This is evident in the apostles, who erred in the fundamental doctrine concerning the resurrection.

10. The Church is a political, not an architectonic pillar of truth [cf. 1T 3,15]. |

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11. The Church acts by virtue of its authority, a private person acts according to his function.

Gravius igitur peccat qui non audit ecclesiam;^e quam privatum aliquem, privatus enim agit tantum ex officio.

XII. Ecclesiae non credendum nisi ex scriptura loquatur.

Liquet Gen. 17. si ex praestituto legis loquutus fuerit. Matth. 28. ite et docete etc. quae praeecepi vobis.

XIII. Non est ipsi in caelis pater cui non est in terris ecclesia mater.

Non est hic sensus regulae, quod oporteat cum necessitate salutis esse in Ecclesia particulari, nam possunt aliqui esse captivi soli, quibus non datur facultas sese aggregandi ecclesiae; sed hic sensus est, quod oportet esse membrum ecclesiae *catholicae* qui salvari velit; et ratio est, quia debet esse membrum Christi, quod est ecclesia.^f

XIV. Ecclesia est visibilis, vel invisibilis.¹⁰

Invisibilis ratione formae, hoc est, fidei; visibilis ratione materiae, hoc est, hominum.

XV. Propter ecclesiam Deus mundum tolerat.^g

Liquet Esai. 1. nisi reliquisset nobis Deus semen benedictum, omnes facti fuissimus sicut Sodoma et Gomorra.

¹⁰ LCT, 728–729 [808]; TT, 351–352.

e ⁵⁴R-52 | f ⁵²F-146 | g ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-141 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INNSNO}-141 ⁶¹G-141

Therefore, he who does not listen to the Church sins more seriously than someone who does not listen to a private person. For a private person only acts according to his function.

12. The Church is only to be believed when she speaks according to Scripture.

This is clear from Gn 17 [sic]: 'When she shall speak according to the statutes of the law', and Mt 28,19: 'Go and teach all nations etc. teaching them whatsoever I have commanded you.'

13. He, who does not have the Church on earth as his mother, does not have God in heaven as his Father.

The meaning of this rule is not that for the necessity of salvation one should be a member of a particular church, for it possible to be in lonely captivity without having the opportunity to join a church. But the meaning of this rule is that whosoever wants to be saved ought to be a member of the universal Church. The reason is that he must be a member of Christ and that is the Church.

14. The Church is either visible or invisible.

Regarding its form, i.e. faith, the Church is invisible; in respect of its matter, i.e. the people, the Church is visible.

15. Because of the Church God tolerates the world. |

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This is clear from Is 1,9: 'Except the Lord has left unto us a blessed seed, we all should have been like Sodom and Gomorrah.'

CAPUT XVII.

De Sacramentis.¹

I. Sacramenta Novi Test. dicuntur *antitypa* veterum, non quod vetera fuerint typi, sed quod nova successerunt in locum veterum.²

De eo nobiscum contendunt Pontificii, an vetera fuerint typi nostrorum: illi affirmant, sed refelluntur, quia corporea res non potest esse antitypus rei corporeæ.

II. In sacramento distinguendum^h est *materiale* et *formale*.³

Materiale sunt Symbola, formale significatio Symbolorum.

III. In Sacramento distinguendum *signum* à re *signata*.⁴

IV. Baptismus et circumcisio sunt sacramenta *initiationis* et assumptionis in ecclesiâ. Agnus paschalis et cœna dominica sunt *nutritionis* et continuationis in Ecclesiâ.¹

V. Baptismus est alius *flaminis*, alius *fluminis*, alius *sanguinis*.

¹ LCT, cc. 77–80, 738–756 [818–839]; TT, 358–371; TP, 241–269 [169–186]; TQ, 421–428 [101–109]; TC, 492–497; ΠΨ-Pontificiorum, 522–530 [23–31]; ΠΨ-Socinianorum, 568–573 [73–78]; ΠΨ-Lutheranorum, 587, 589–594 [94, 97–102]; ΠΨ-Arminianorum, 614 [125]; ΠΨ-Anabaptistarum, 624–626 [137–139]; A-E, 672–694. | ² LCT, 739 [818]; TT, 358–359. | ³ LCT, 738–739 [818–819]; TT, 358–359. | ⁴ LCT, 738–739 [818–819]; TT, 358–359.

Chapter XVII

On the Sacraments

1. The sacraments of the New Testament are called the antitypes of the old sacraments; not because the old ones were types of the new ones, but because the new ones substituted the old ones.

On this subject the Papists dispute with us by asking whether the old sacraments have been types of our sacraments. They affirm this, but they are refuted by the fact that one corporal thing cannot be the antitype of another corporal thing.

2. In the sacraments a distinction must be made between the formal and the material aspects.

The matter concerns the signs and the form concerns the signification of the signs.

3. A distinction must be made between the sign and the thing signified.

4. Baptism and circumcision are sacraments of initiation and assumption into the Church. The paschal lamb and the Lord's Supper are sacraments of nutrition and continuation in the Church. |

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5. Baptism is with fire or with water or with blood.

Ita distinguere solent antiqui scholastici et patres; et quidem ipsa scriptura distinguit in baptismum aquæ et spiritûs. Joh. 3. Quod verò dicant de sanguine, est allusio quædam, sanguinem verò baptismi vocant martyrium.

VI. In cœnâ Domini nulla est transmutatio signorum in res signatas aut existentia rerum signatarum in signo, sed signa vocantur res signatæ metaphoricè, non propriè.⁵

Contra Pontificios et Lutheranos, illi^j enim panem transmutari in corpus, hi vero corpus esse in pane statuunt, ut qui non expendunt locutionem sacramentalem, qualem etiam habemus. Gen. 17. ubi circumcisio vocatur fœdus, agnus paschalis transitus.^k

VII. Mutatio elementorum in cœnâ non est *naturæ*, sed *usus*.⁶

Verbi gratiâ. Est quidem panis, sed adhibetur in alium usum, sic etiam de vino.

VIII. In cœna domini tropus est nec in subjecto, nec in prædicato, sed in copulâ.⁷

Disceptant valdè inter se Theologi ubinam tropus sit in verbis istis, *Hoc est corpus meum*. Nos dicimus in copulâ, quemadmodum in istis: septem vaccæ sunt septem anni, item semen est verbum Dei; ibi enim copula est accipitur pro significare, sic etiam in illo.

Obj. Copula copulat res, ergo non est tropus. *Resp.* Copulat res vel propriè, vel impropiè.

IX. Aliquando de masculino pronomen neutrius generis prædicatur.

Ut, triste lupus stabulis, maturis frugibus imbres.^m

X. Non *privatio* sacramentorum, sed *contemptus* damnat.

⁵ LCT, 751–54 [832–837]; TT, 368–371. | ⁶ LCT, 751–54 [832–837]; TT, 368–371. | ⁷ LCT, 751–54 [832–837]; TT, 368–371.

^j ⁵²F-148 ⁵⁴R-53 | ^k ⁵⁹R-44 | ^l ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-143 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-143 ⁶¹G-143 | ^m ⁵²F-149

In this manner the old scholastics and Church fathers used to distinguish. Scripture, however, distinguishes between baptism by water and Spirit, J 3. What they say about the blood is a kind of allusion, for, in fact, they call martyrdom the blood of baptism.

6. In the Lord's Supper there is no transmutation of the signs into the things signified, or an existence of the things signified in the sign. But the signs are called the things signified in a metaphorical and not in a proper sense.

Contra Papists and Lutherans. The Papists assert that the bread is changed into the body [of Christ], the Lutherans assert that the body is in the bread. They do not estimate the sacramental style of speech as found in Gn 17 where circumcision is called a covenant. And the paschal lamb is called a passing over.

7. The mutation of elements taking place in the Lord's Supper is not a change of nature but of use.

For example, the element is bread but it is used for another purpose. This is also true of the wine.

8. In the Lord's Supper the trope or figurative use is not in the subject nor in the predicate but in the copula (the verb *to be*). |

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Theologians hotly debate where the trope is in these words: 'This is my body'. We say: it is in the copula, similar to expressions as 'seven cows are seven years' or 'the seed is the Word of God.' For there, the copula 'is' means 'to signify'. In the Lord's Supper it is like that. *Objection*: the copula joins things: therefore it is not a trope. *Answer*: it joins things in a proper sense, or it joins things with things in an improper or figurative sense.

9. Sometimes a neuter pronoun is predicated of a masculine word.

Such as [in Latin]: 'Baneful to the folds is the wolf, to the ripe crop the rains.'¹

10. Not the absence of sacraments condemns but the contempt of them.

¹ Quotation from VIRGIL, *Eclogae*, III, 80: '*Triste lupus stabulis, maturis frugibus imbres*'. With this quotation Maccovius explains how a copula (*est*) can even join the masculine 'lupus' with the neuter 'triste'. Probably, this was a classroom example drawn from rhetoric.

XI. Nihil habet rationem sacramenti nisi intra usum legitimum.

XII. Nullum signum est sacramentale, nisi habeat analogiam cum re signatâ.

Hoc Augustini est, fundatum in naturâ sacramentorum; nam dicitur analogia esse in effectis, verbi gratia.

Sicut panis pascit corpora nostra ad vitam hanc temporariam; ita etiam corpus Christi per fidem acceptumⁿ pascit animas nostras ad vitam æternam.^o

2. Sicut panis transit in naturam nostram ut unum sit nobiscum; ita corpus Christi per fidem acceptum unitur nobiscum, ita ut unum quodammodo simus.

11. Nothing has sacramental meaning unless it is used in a legitimate manner.

12. No sign has sacramental value if it does not have an analogy with the thing signified.

This is a rule of Augustine based on the nature of sacraments.² For the analogy is said to be present in the effects. For example:

1. As the bread feeds our bodies on behalf of this temporary life, so the body of Christ received by means of faith feeds our souls on behalf of eternal life.

|

2. As the bread passes over into our nature and becomes one with us, so the body of Christ received by faith is united with us so that, in a certain manner, we are one.

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² E.g. AUGUSTINE, *Contra Adimantum*, 12, 3; AUGUSTINE, *Sermo*, 227, 1; AUGUSTINE, *De doctrina christiana*, II, ii, 3- iii, 7.

CAPUT XVIII.

De Statu Animarum Ante Resurrectionem.¹

I. Duo duntaxat loca sunt quo deferuntur animæ post^p mortem, Infernus et cœlum.

Ut passim scriptura hoc testatur, sic etiam Matt. 7. de lata et angusta via. Joh. 5. docetur, quod is qui credit habet vitam æternam, qui verò non credit jam condemnatus est. Limbus igitur patrum, infantum, et purgatorium damnantur, tanquam traditiones hominum præter scripturam loquentium.

II. Animæ quæ in cœlis sunt nondum fruuntur perfecta felicitate; prout nec animæ quæ in inferno sunt, debito cruciatu torquentur perfecto.

De animabus fidelium certum est.

1. Quia cum corporibus nondum sunt conjunctæ,^q atque adeo, quod non omnes hostes ita devinctos videant, ut amplius nihil possint in ipsas, et hoc est quod Sp. Sanctus 1 Cor. 15. vult, dum agit de perfecta felicitate: dicit inter alia, quod hostis ultimus sit abolendus.

2. Quia nondum vident^r fratres suos et omnia membra corporis Christi secum.

Quod ad animas damnatorum, illæ etiam nondum cruciatibus debitis excruciantur: liquet hoc ex ipsis diabolis qui nondum perfectè cruciantur. Marc. 5. clamant ad Christum dicentes,^s quare venisti nos ante tempus cruciare. 1 Pet. 3. Iud. 6.

III. Animæ piorum separatæ à corporibus orant in communi pro ecclesiâ militante, sed non in particulari aut singulari.

¹ TP, 269-289 [187-204].

Chapter XVIII

On the State of Souls Before the Resurrection

1. There are no more than two places to which after death the souls are taken away: hell and heaven.

As Scripture amply bears witness of this, so also Mt 7 speaking about the broad as well as the narrow way. J 5 teaches that he who believes has eternal life and that he who does not believe is already condemned. Therefore, the limbo as the abode of patriarchs and children, and the purgatory are rejected as being traditions of men speaking without Scripture.

2. The souls in heaven do not yet enjoy perfect happiness; just as the souls in hell do not yet endure all due torments.

Regarding the souls of the faithful this is certain:

1. Because they are not yet united with their bodies, | and this implies that they see that not all enemies are so bound that they are no longer able to harm them. This is what the Holy Spirit teaches in 1Co 15 speaking about perfect happiness. Among other things, He says that the last enemy is still to be destroyed. 145
2. Because they do not yet see their brothers and all the members of the body of Christ together with them.

Regarding the souls of the damned, they also are not yet tortured with the due torments. This is clear from the devils, which are not yet perfectly tortured. According to Mc 5,7 they cry to Christ saying: 'Why did you come to torture us before the due time?' See also 1P 3,19; Jd 6.

3. The souls of the pious, separated from their bodies, pray collectively, but not particularly or separately for the Church militant.

1. Quia angeli qui sunt fratres nostri, orant pro nobis.
2. Quia jam major est gradus Charitatis in fidelibus defunctis, quàm fuerat cum essent in vivis, utpote perfectè regeneratis.

IV. Fidelium animæ separatæ à corporibus, non norunt quæ in his terris geruntur, nedum perfectè norunt.

Posterius volunt Pontificii et dicunt^t quod in essentiâ Dei tanquam in speculo videant omnia. At absurdum; Dei enim solius est scire omnia. Si res ita esset, ut Becanus Jesuita observavit, quæ causa esset quod ignorarent diem judicii? nam de hoc dicitur quod nec filius hominis noverit. Et contra, multa in sacris Litteris habemus, eos nihil scire eorum quæ in terris geruntur, ut 2 Reg. 22. 20. Esai. 63. 61.^u

V. Nullus eorum qui excluduntur à regno cœlorum, sentiet tantum^v *pœnam damni*, sed etiam *sensus*.

Contra Pontificii, qui dicunt infantes non baptizatos, quidem sentire pœnam damni sed non sensûs; sed falsum, nam Sp. Sanctus dicit quod omnibus erit fletus et stridor dentium. Luc. 13. 18.

VI. Animæ hominum corruptis corporibus non pereunt.

Philosophi Ethnici hoc animadverterunt, idcirco etiam docent, quod cum anima rationalis inorganica sit, ut et independens in agendo à corpore, ita etiam in essendo. Scriptura hoc clarissimè testatur Matth. 10. Nolite metuere eos etc.

VII. Anima rationalis est immortalis.

Fluit hoc ex priori. Quomodo immortalis?^w *Resp.*

1. Immortalem esse *privativè* non *negativè*.

^t ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-146 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-146 ⁶¹G-146 | ^u ⁵⁹R-45 | ^v ⁵²F-152 | ^w ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-147 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-147 ⁶¹G-147

1. Because the angels who are our brothers pray for us.
2. Because by now there is a higher degree of love in the defunct souls than during their life on earth, inasmuch as they are now perfectly reborn.

4. The souls of the faithful, separated from their bodies, do not know what happens on earth; much less do they have perfect knowledge.

The Papists assert the latter and say | that in the essence of God they see all things as in a mirror. But this is absurd. For God alone knows all things. If this would be the case, what then - as the Jesuit Becanus has observed - would be the reason that they do not know judgment day? For it is said that even the Son of Man does not know that day. On the contrary, we have many places in Holy Scriptures saying that they do not know anything of what is happening on earth, such as 2R 22,20 and Is 63,16.

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5. None of those who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven, will experience merely the punishment of damnation but also the sensible punishment.¹

The Papists teach the contrary by saying that unbaptized children do indeed experience the punishment of damnation but not the sensible punishment. But this is false, for the Holy Spirit asserts that there will be weeping and the gnashing of teeth for all, Lc 13,28.

6. Although their bodies are being destroyed, the souls of men do not perish.

Heathen philosophers have already observed this. For this reason they also teach that because the rational soul is inorganic² it is independent from the body, in acting as well as in being. In Mt 10,28 Scripture most clearly testifies this: 'Fear not them who kill the body' etc.

7. The rational soul is immortal.

This follows from the preceding rule. In what manner is the soul immortal? |

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Answer:

1. It is immortal in a privative sense and not in a negative sense.
2. We assert that it is impossible that the soul of those who have a soul perishes in such a way that the soul dies. But it is possible for the soul to

¹ Confer *Distinctiones*, XXII,1.

² Possibly Maccovius means by this strange word that the soul has no organs, viz. that it is not corporeal.

2. Dicimus non posse interire ut moriatur, est eorum qui animam habent; sed ita potest interire ut annihiletur; ille enim qui animam ex nihilo fecit, eandem etiam in nihilum redigere potest.^x

x ⁵²F-153

perish in such a way that it is annihilated. For He who has made the soul from nothing is also able to reduce the same soul to nothing.

CAPUT XIX.

De Resurrectione.¹

I. Resurrectio dupliciter accipitur.

1. Ut opponitur ei qui non superest à morte, et hoc modo accipitur cum de Sadduceis refert Scriptura, quod dicant non esse resurrectionem, id est, negant quenquam superesse à morte; aliquando verò accipitur pro resurrectione carnis, ut in symbolo Apostolico, *credo resurrectionem carnis*.

II. Eadem caro resurget quoad substantiam, non quoad qualitates.

Obj. Socin. Caro et sanguis non possidebunt regnum Dei. 1 Cor. 15. *Resp.* Notum est carnem accipi vel pro parte essentiali hominis,^y et ita resurget, Job. 19. *In carne meâ videbo Dominum:* vel accipitur pro depravatione naturæ, ut Rom 8. 6, 7, 8, 9. Et certè talis non hæreditabit regnum Dei.^z

III. Resurrectio fidelium et reproborum habet diversas causas.^{2a}

Fidelium resurrectio præter decretum Dei causam habet Christi resurrectionem, ut hoc prolixè probatur. 1 Cor. 15. At vero reprobi resurrectionis suæ causam habent decretum Dei potentiâ suffultum: et hinc etiam ratione propriæ resurrectionis Christus dicitur *primogenitus mortuorum*, Col. 1. Quod scilicet sit caput omnium in beatâ resurrectione.

¹ LCT, c. 87, 783–796 [869–884]; TT, 399–405; TP, 269–289 [187–204]; TQ, 441–444 [124+127]; TC, 498–499; ПΨ-Anabaptistarum, 629 [141]; A-S, 836–842 [154–161]. | ² LCT, 784–791 [870–875]; TT, 399–401.

^y ⁵⁴R-55 | ^z ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-148 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSN}O-148 ⁶¹G-148 | ^a ⁵²F-154

Chapter XIX

On the Resurrection

1. Resurrection is understood in a twofold way.

1. As opposed to him who does not survive death; and in this way it is understood when Scripture reports of the Sadducees as saying that there is no resurrection, i.e. they deny that anyone survives death.

2. Sometimes, however, it is understood as the resurrection of the flesh as in the Apostles' Creed: 'I believe in the resurrection of the body.'

2. The body raised up again will be the same as regards its substance, not its qualities.

The Socinians *object*: 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God', 1Co 15,50. *Answer*: it is known that the word 'flesh' can be understood either as the essential part of man and so it will rise, according to Job 19,26: 'Yet in my flesh I will see God.' Or the word 'flesh' can be understood as a deprivation of nature as in Rm 8,6-9. And, certainly, such a man will not inherit the kingdom of God. |

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3. The resurrection of the faithful and the resurrection of the reprobate have different causes.

The resurrection of the faithful has as its cause – besides God's decree – the resurrection of Christ, as is proved extensively in 1Co 15. But the cause of the resurrection of the reprobate is the decree of God supported by the power of God. Hence, because of his own resurrection, Christ is called the 'Firstborn of the dead', Kol 1,18, because in the glorious resurrection, He is the head of all men.

IV. Resurrectio futura est in corporibus habilibus, non inhabilibus.³

Disceptant aliqui in qualibus corporibus resurrecturi simus, an corpora futura sint æqualia, quæ quidem quæstio hactenus curiosa est. At verò utut corpora sint inæqualia, erunt tamen habilia. Apoc. 20. 12. hoc est, quod non sint infantilia futura, nam certe embrio resurget, tamen ineptum esset in tali corpusculo, quod vix apiculæ corpus adæquat resurrecturum. Idem de infantibus cogitandum, qui sæpè parvi nascuntur. Verbi gratiâ. Illi quorum trecenti nati unâ vice dicuntur, quorum singuli vix muris justis quantitatem habebant.

V. Homines omnes resurrecturi sunt omnibus membris, non mutilati.^{4b}

Inter alia etiam hæc nobis Socinus obiicit,^c quod multorum membrorum usus nullus esse poterit in cœlis. Ut membrum nutritionis, generationis et similia. *Resp.* Fines esse duplices nobis ignotos et notos; fatemur multorum fines nos ignorare, propterea non sequitur res non futuras. At quod omnibus membris simus resurrecturi, liquet ex Christo salvatore, quemadmodum enim ille resurrexit, ita et nos resurgemus. Sed hoc liquet præterea ex iis, quos dies Domini inventura est, nam illi cum omnibus membris immutilati resurrecturi sunt.

VI. Resurrectio futura est omnium non eodem momento, sed successivè.

Docet hoc Spiritus sanctus 1 Cor. 15. 23. Interim sciendum est eodem tempore omnium resurrectionem fore, ut hoc arctè teneamus contra illos, qui statuunt martyres mille annos ante^d omnium resurrectionem resurrecturos, et cum Christo in terra regnatos; Nam Sp. S. non nisi duos adventus Christi visibiles ponit, unum in carne dum factus est homo, alterum in carne, dum venturus est judicare vivos et mortuos: et cum adventu hoc conjungit statum resurrectionem mortuorum. Mat. 24. vers. 30. 31.^e

³ LCT, 789–792 [875–878]; TT, 402–405. | ⁴ LCT, 792–796 [879–883]; TT, 402–405.

^b ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-149 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-149 ⁶¹G-149 | ^c ⁵²F-155 | ^d ⁵⁹R-46 | ^e ⁵²F-156 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-150
⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-150 ⁶¹G-150

4. The future resurrection will take place in fitting bodies, not in bodies unfit for life.

Some discuss with what kind of body we will be raised and whether our future bodies will be equal in size or age, which is as yet a curious question. But although the bodies are unequal, they nevertheless will be fit for life, Apc 20,12. I.e. they will not be like children's bodies, for an embryo might certainly rise, but it would not be able to rise with such a body that is hardly bigger than a little bee. The same thing must be thought of little babies, who often are born small. For example, those babies of whom it is told that three hundred were born at the same time, each of whom having hardly the size of a regular mouse.¹

5. All men will rise with all the members of their body without any mutilation. | 149

Among other things, Socinus also *objects* that in heaven many parts of the body will be useless, such as the organs of nutrition, generation and such like. *Answer*: there are two ends, one unknown to us and one known to us. We acknowledge that we do not know the goal of many things. But from this it does not follow that they will not exist. But that we will rise with all our members is evident from Christ our Savior: for just as He has risen from the death, so we, too, will rise. But most of all this is clear from those who will be found by the Day of the Lord, for they will rise with all their members without any mutilation.

6. The future resurrection of all men does not take place in one moment, but occurs successively.

This is taught by the Holy Spirit in 1Co 15,23. In the meantime one must keep in mind that the general resurrection will take place at the same time, so that we might tightly hold this against those who state that thousand years before the general resurrection the martyrs will be raised and reign with Christ on earth. For the Holy Spirit shows us only two visible comings of Christ: one in the flesh when He became man, and another in the flesh, when He shall come to judge the quick and the dead: He immediately connects the resurrection of the dead with this [second] coming, Mt 24,30-31. |

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¹ Maccovius refers to the miracle of Loosduinen, a village in Holland near The Hague, where (as is told) on Good Friday of the year 1276 the Countess Margaretha of Henneberg gave birth to 365 children at once. Since then the place has become a place of pilgrimage; touching the baptism font in which these children have been baptized, was supposed to increase fertility.

CAPUT XX.

De Innovatione Mundi.¹

I. Mundus interibit non secundum *substantiam*, sed secundum *accidentia*.²

Quemadmodum mundus aqua perpurgatus est in diluvio, ita etiam igne perpurgabitur in extremo iudicio. 2 Petr. 3. v. 11, 12, 13.

II. Ignis iste non futurus est *ordinarius*,^f sed *extrordinarius*.

Habemus duas species ignis in S. literis, extraordinarium, qualis fuit iste ignis quo ardebat dumus, aut iste, qui etiam lapides combussit in sacrificio Eliæ: alterum ordinarium, quo utimur in usu quotidiano. Hic autem ignis quo omnia solventur, erit extraordinarius; nam aget in elementa.

III. Perire dicitur aliquid non tantum tum, cum substantia perit, sed etiam quando accidentia pereunt.

Liquet hoc tum ex aliis, tum ex versu isto:^g *Vino forma perit, vino corrumpitur ætas.*

IV. Creare aliquid dicitur non^h secundumⁱ *substantiam* tantum, sed etiam secundum *accidentia*.³

Ita Psal. 51. Cor mundum crea in me Domine; et hinc etiam est, quod regeniti dicuntur nova creatura.

1 LCT, cc. 86, 88, 776-783 [862-869], 796-809 [884-897]; TT, 389-399, 405-408; TQ, 444 [127-128]. |

2 LCT, 776-783 [862-869]; TT, 389-392. | 3 LCT, 776-783 [862-869].

f ⁵⁴R-56 | g ⁵²F-157 | h ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-151 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSNO}-151 | i ⁶¹G-151

Chapter XX

On the Renewal of the World

1. The world will not perish according to its substance but according to its accidental properties.

Just as during the flood the world was purified by water, so in the last judgment it will also be purified by fire, 2P 3,11.

2. This fire will not be an ordinary but an extraordinary fire.

We have two sorts of fire in Holy Scripture: extraordinary fire such as the fire by which the bramble burnt or the fire of Elijah's sacrifice that consumed the stones; and we have ordinary fire which we use in our daily life. This fire by which all things will be dissolved will be an extraordinary fire, for it will affect the elements.

3. Something is said to perish, not only when the substance perishes but also when the accidents perish.

This is evident from other verses, but especially from this [Latin] verse: 'Through wine form [beauty] passes away, through wine life is in decay.'¹

4. The expression 'to create something' does not | refer to substance only but also to accidents.

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So Ps 51,10: 'Create in me a clean heart, o Lord.' For that reason the regenerate are called new creatures.

¹ The Latin text runs as follows: '*vino forma perit, vino corrumpitur aetas*'. Cf. MACCOVIUS, *Loci communes* (1641), 398. It is a quotation taken from the Latin poet SEXTUS PROPERTIUS, *Elegiarum*, XXXIIIb, 11-12: '*Vino forma perit, vino corrumpitur aetas, vino saepe suum nescit amica virum*'. Propertius' words address his beloved Cynthia.

V. *Judicium Dei est vel condemnationis, vel absolutiois.*⁴

Quando dicitur de fidelibus, quod non venient in iudicium, tum intelligitur iudicium condemnationis; hoc modo etiam illud Psal. 143. intelligendum: Domine ne ingrediaris in iudicium cum servo tuo.

VI. *Judicium aliud est universale, aliud particulare.*⁵

Universale erit extremum, Particulare fit quotidie in discessu animæ à corpore.

VII. *Redeunt animæ quæcunque ad Deum, vel ad iudicem, vel ad patrem.*

Eccl. 12. 9. Socinus inde concludere voluit, quod impiorum animæ non sint resurrecturæ; quia omnes animæ redituræ sunt ad Deum. At consequentia nulla est, illæ redituræ sunt tanquam ad iudicem, hæc ut ad patrem.^j

VIII. *Judicabit Christus non excluso Patre aut Sp. Sancto.*^{6k}

Etiam hoc urgent Sociniani quod pater non sit iudicaturus. Joh. 5. Pater non iudicat quenquam. *Resp.* Malè hoc accipiunt si absolutè intelligant; Nam non iudicat pater quenquam absque filio, alioquin ipsum iudicare liquet. Rom. 2. 16. *In die illo quo iudicabit Deus de rebus occultis hominum ex Evangelio meo per Jesum Christum.*

IX. *Christus iudicabit secundùm utrámque naturam, divinam et humanam.*⁷

Secundùm divinam *cognoscendo peccata, pœnas infligendo et vitam conferendo;* secundùm humanam, *sententiam pronunciando et divinæ sententiæ iudicia approbando,* qualiter etiam nos dicimur iudicaturi 1 Cor. 6. vers. 8.

4 LCT, 796–797 [884–885]; TT, 405–408. | 5 LCT, 796–797 [884–885]; TT, 405–408. | 6 LCT, 796–797 [884–885]; TT, 405–408. | 7 LCT, 796–797 [884–885]; TT, 405–408.

j ⁵²F-158 | k ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-152 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-152 ⁶¹G-152

5. The judgment of God is a judgment of condemnation or a judgment of acquittal .

When the faithful are said not to come in God's judgment, then this refers to the judgment of condemnation. In this manner Ps 143,2 should be understood: 'O Lord, do not enter into judgment with thy servant.'

6. A distinction must be made between the universal and the particular judgment.

The universal judgment will be at the last judgment, the particular judgment takes place daily in the separation of the soul from the body.

7. Every soul returns to God, either to God as Judge or to God as Father.

Qoh 12,9. From this text Socinus wanted to infer that the souls of the impious will not rise, because all souls will return to God. But this is no valid consequence, for the souls of the impious will return to God as a Judge, the other souls to God as a Father.

8. Christ will not judge without the Father or the Holy Spirit. |

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The Socinians also insist that the Father will not judge; they refer to J 5,22: 'The Father judges no man, but has committed all judgment unto the Son.' *Answer:* if they understand this in an absolute sense, their interpretation is wrong. For the Father does not judge anyone without the Son. For the rest it is clear that He does judge, Rm 2,16: 'In the day when God shall judge the secrets of men by Jesus Christ according to my gospel.'

9. Christ will judge according to both his natures, his human and divine nature.

He will judge according to his divine nature by identifying sins, afflicting punishments and bestowing life; according to his human nature by announcing God's sentence and by approving the judgments of the divine sentence, just as is said that we too shall be judges, 1Co 6,2.

X. Non peragetur iudicium hoc in particulâ terræ tantùm, sed etiam in totâ terrâ et ære.

Pontificii volunt in valle Josaphat, idque ex Ioel. 3. 2. Sed ineptè, nam ibi agitur de iudicio particulari in hac terrâ, de gentibus, quæ adduci debebant eò ad puniendum. Quod ad posterius, illud satis à nobis in locis communibus probatum.^l

XI. Iudicium hoc celerrimè peragetur.^m

Sunt qui duraturum putant per sex annorumⁿ millia, sed ineptè; nam in momento peragetur, ut liquet ex istis quos dies domini vivos reperiet, nam in momento mutabuntur et rapiuntur in occursum.

XII. Dicuntur iudicandi vivi et mortui.⁸⁰

Ejus sensus hic est, non quod mortui iudicabuntur, sed quod illi qui mortui fuerant, postquam resurrexerunt, iudicabuntur, ita ut vivi hîc dicantur illi qui non sunt mortui. Socinus ait iudicare mortuos, esse facere ut mortui in morte maneat, ita ut non sint resurrecturi: adeoque hanc pœnam ipsorum futuram, quod nim. ipsis in morte manendum sit. Sed ineptè. Contrarium exstat. Joh. 5. 38.

XIII. Iudicium futurum est ex lege, non secundùm Evangelium.

Quia ex lege peccatum cognoscitur. Cæterùm aliqui sunt qui putant ex Evangelio et secundùm Evangelium iudicatum iri, ex loco Rom. 2. Ubi dicitur iudicaturum Deum secundùm Evangelium. *Resp.* Evangelium ibi nihil aliud significat, quam^p annunciationem Pauli et præconium ejus. Paulus autem non tantum Evangelii; sed et legis doctrinam prædicavit.^q

XIV. Justificabuntur reprobi aliqui ex parte.

Hoc est, absolventur à pœnâ, non quidem absolutè, nam omnes reprobi condemnandi sunt; sed quoad gradum, proinde etiam dicitur conditionem Sodomitaram tolerabiliorem fore quam illorum in die iudicii. Mat. 11.

8 LCT, 796–797 [884–885]; TT, 405–408.

l ⁵²F-159 | m ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-153 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-153 ⁶¹G-153 | n ⁵⁹R-47 | o ⁵⁴R-57 | p ⁵²F-160 | q ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-154 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-154 ⁶¹G-154

10. This judgment will not be accomplished at a particular place on earth, but it shall extend to the whole world and air.

From Jo 3,2 the Papists infer that it will take place in the valley of Jehoshaphat. But this is incorrect. For this passage refers to the particular judgment of the nations on this earth brought there in order to be punished. Concerning the latter, this is sufficiently proved by us in the *Loci communes*.²

11. This judgment is accomplished very quickly. |

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Some think that it will continue for six thousand years, but this is wrong. For it will be accomplished in a moment, as is evident from those whom the Day of the Lord will find alive, for then they will be changed in a moment and be caught up to meet the Lord [1Th 5,17].

12. The quick and the dead will be judged, according to what is said.

The meaning of this is not that the dead will be judged, but that they who have died, shall be judged after having been raised from the dead; so they who are called here 'the quick' are those who have not yet died. Socinus asserts that to judge the dead is to make them stay dead, so that they shall not rise, and that, therefore, this will be their punishment, viz. to remain dead. But this is false. The contrary is said in J 5,28-29.

13. The judgment will be made by virtue of the Law and not according to the Gospel.

The reason is that the knowledge of sin is through the Law. From Rm 2,16 some theologians, however, conclude that the judgment will take place by virtue of the Gospel and according to the Gospel. For in this place it is said that God shall judge according to the Gospel. *Answer:* here, the word 'gospel' only refers to the proclamation of Paul and his preaching. Paul, however, did not only preach the doctrine of the Gospel but also the doctrine of the Law. |

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14. Some of the reprobate will be partly justified.

I.e. they will be freed from punishment, yet not absolutely, for all reprobate are to be condemned: but in respect of degree. Consequently, in Mt 11,24 it is said that for the inhabitants of Sodom the circumstances will be more tolerable than for others in judgment day.

² See MACCOVIUS, *Loci communes* (1641), 405-408.

CAPUT XXI.

De Glorificatione.¹

I. Glorificatio erit eadem *naturâ* non *gradu*.

Liquet Dan. 10. ubi illi qui resurgent, comparantur partim firmamentis, partim stellis.

II. Deum videbimus non absolutè *sicut est*, sed sicut erga nos *est comparatus*.²

1. Joh. 3. Videbimus Deum sicuti est, dicitur, sed hoc non absolutè intelligendum,^r sed ita videbimus eum perfectissimè, quatenus se erga nos declaravit pater. Hoc est cognituri sumus perfectè quæ et quanta in nos contulit beneficia.

III. In vitâ futurâ erit notitia inter homines, sive beatos, tum eos^s qui unâ convixerunt, tum omnes alios.

Testatur Joh. 19. ubi dicitur, et videbunt eum quem transfixerunt; quod etiam alios agnitori simus quos non noverimus, id liquet Matth. 17. ubi conspecti sunt Moses et Elias cum Christo colloquentes; dicitur enim de Petro quod ipsos noverit, et quod dixerit Christo, faciamus tria tabernacula, etc.

IV. Salus consistit tum in liberatione à malo, tum in vitâ æternâ.

¹ LCT, 798–809 [886–897]; TT, 408–425; TP, 269–289 [187–204]; TQ, 444–446 [128–130]; TC, 499–501; ПΨ-Lutheranorum, 594 [102–103]; A-E, 694; A-S, 842–843 [162]. | ² LCT, 798–809 [886–897]; TT, 408–411.

Chapter XXI

On Glorification

1. Glorification will be the same according to nature but not according to degree.

This is evident from Da 12,2-3 where some of those who will rise again are compared with the firmament, others with the stars.

2. We shall see God: not absolutely as He is in Himself, but we shall see Him as He is in his relation to us.

1J 3,2 reads: 'We shall see God as He is.' This should not be understood in an absolute sense but in such a manner that, in so far as He has revealed himself to us as Father, we shall see Him in a most perfect way. I.e. we shall perfectly know which and how great blessings He has bestowed on us.

3. In future life men (or: the blessed) will be acquainted with each other; | this regards both the ones with whom they shared their lives and all the others.

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This is testified in J 19,37 where it is said: 'They shall look on him whom they pierced.' That we shall also know other people whom we did not know previously, is evident from Mt 17,4 where Moses and Elias appeared talking with Christ. For it is said that Peter knew them and that he said to Christ: 'Let us make here three tabernacles' etc.

4. Salvation comprises liberation from evil and eternal life.

Salus est ens aggregatum; duo enim notat, tum liberationem à malo, et dationem boni, et quidem prioris causa est mors, posterioris causa sancta vita cuiúsvís est.

V. Distinguitur vita à salute.

Vita æterna competit Angelis absolutè; nobis verò non competit absolutè, sed ut salus.^t

t ⁵²F-162 ⁵⁴R-58

Salvation is an aggregated entity, for it means two things: both liberation from evil and donation of the good. The cause of the first is death; the cause of the latter is everyone's holy life.

5. Life is distinguished from salvation.

Eternal life belongs to angels in an absolute way. To us it belongs not in an absolute way, but in so far as it is salvation.

CAPUT XXII.

De Condemnatione.¹

I. Condemnatio est ens aggregatum, non simplex.

Constat enim ex pœnâ damni et sensûs.

II. Pœna sensus est etiam ens aggregatum.^u

Constat enim ex morsu conscientiæ, et angoribus et honoribus, quod Spir. Sanct. explicat^v per stridorem dentium, ex molestia quam percipient tum ex loco, tum ex societate cum diabolis et aliis reprobis; sicut etiam ex clamoribus reproborum.

III. Ignis qui dicitur fore in inferno, non erit materialis, sed dicitur ita figurativè.^{2w}

Quia aget in Diabolos; corporeus autem ignis id præstare nequit.

IV. In inferno non erit desperatio.

Quia nullæ promissiones; desperatio opponitur promissionis privationi. Ubi ergo non erunt promissiones, ibi nec oppositum,^x desperatio.

V. In inferno peccaturi sunt homines.

Sunt enim blasphematuri Deum.

¹ LCT, c. 89, 809–812 [897–901]; TT, 426–430; TP, 269–289 [187–204]; TQ, 446–447 [130–131]; TC, 499–501; ПΨ-Socinianorum, 576 [81–82]; A-S, 843–844 [163]. | ² LCT, 811–812 [900–901]; TT, 428–430.

^u ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-156 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSN}O-156 | ^v ⁶¹G-156 | ^w ⁵⁹R-48 | ^x ⁵²F-163

Chapter XXII

On Condemnation

1. Condemnation is not a simple but an aggregated entity.

For it consists in the punishment of damnation and the punishment of sensation.

2. The sensation of punishment also is an aggregated entity. |

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This is clear from the actual vexation of the conscience, fears and torments, which the Holy Spirit indicates by the gnashing of teeth; it is also clear from the trouble they shall feel, caused by the place and the company of devils and other reprobate; as well as the cries of the reprobate.

3. The fire that is said to be in hell is no fire in a material sense, but it is figuratively called fire.

The reason is that it will also affect the devils; corporal fire cannot perform this.

4. In hell there will be no desperation.

The reason is that there will be no promises; desperation is opposed to promises. Therefore, when there will be no promises, the opposite, desperation, will not be present.

5. In hell men will sin.

Because they will blaspheme God.¹

¹ Curiously, Maccovius says the opposite in *Distinctiones*, X, 29.

VI. Infernus erit certo loco.³

Non ergo, inter orbis cælestes. Nos probabiliorem sententiam asserimus, fore in terris, quia inter judicandum reprobis in terrâ manebunt. Sed parum in eo situm est. Nobis danda est opera ut ita vitam instituamus, ne eò demur præcipientes.^y

³ LCT, 811–812 [901–902]; TT, 428–430.

^y ⁵²F-164 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-157 ⁵⁴R-59 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-157 ⁶¹G-157

6. Hell will be at a certain place.

Therefore, hell is not among the celestial orbits. We affirm the more probable view that hell will be on earth, because the reprobate, when judged, will remain on earth. But this is of little importance. We must make efforts to arrange our life in such a manner that we are not cast into hell. |

CENTURIA DISTINCTIONUM GENERALISSIMARUM.

A Hundredfold Most General Distinctions

PRÆCOGNITA.

Distinctio est determinatio Subjecti et Prædicati: aliàs limitatio, modificatio, conciliatio; cujus examen et lydius lapis continetur sequentibus Theorematis.

I. Distinctio est vel *generalis*, vel *specialis*.

Generalis fit terminis communissimis, quorum usus est omni facultatem¹ genere, ut *Actu primo et secundo, absolute et respectivè, per se et per accidens*:

Specialis sit in specialibus ad Specialem aliquam et restrictam Disciplinam pertinentibus, ut *Ethicus inter vulgarem et heroicam virtutem, Politicus inter telum offensivum et defensivum* distinguit.

II. Utraque distinctio fit per diversos respectus, quorum oportet² considerare *Conditiones* et *Species*.^a

III. Conditiones diversorum respectuum sunt tres. 1. *Convenientia*. 2. *Diversitas*. 3. *Perspicuitas*.

IV. *Convenientia* est quâ distinctio petita est ex visceribus rei et ex ipsâ naturâ Subjecti et Prædicati.

1 We read facultatum in stead of facultatem.

2 ⁵²F-165 | a ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-158 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-158 ⁶¹G-158

Prolegomena

A distinction¹ is a determination of a subject and a predicate: sometimes it is a limitation, sometimes a modification and sometimes a conciliation;² the examination and touchstone³ for a distinction is comprised in the following theses:

1. A distinction is either general or special.⁴

A distinction is general if made by very common terms that are used in every sort of discipline, such as: in the first and second act, in an absolute way and in a relative way, by itself and accidentally.

A distinction is special if made by special terms, which pertain to a special and restricted discipline, such as a moral philosopher who distinguishes between common and heroic virtue, and a political philosopher who distinguishes between offensive and defensive weapons.

2. Both kinds of distinction are made by means of differing respects. Of these differing respects we have to consider the conditions and the specific types. |

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3. The conditions for the differing respects are three: 1. Agreement. 2. Difference. 3. Perspicuity .

4. The condition of agreement is fulfilled if the distinction is derived from the core of the thing and from the very nature of both the subject and its predicate.

1 Speaking about a distinction presupposes a proposition as the object of the distinction.

2 Maccovius discerns three forms of distinction. Modification is a qualitative, limitation is a quantitative, and conciliation is a logical concept.

3 Lydian stone: black jasper, a variety of siliceous or flinty slate, of a grayish or bluish black color. It was used to test the purity of gold, the amount of alloy being indicated by the color left on the stone when rubbed by the metal.

4 Maccovius wants to treat the general distinctions only, according to the title of this part of the book.

Sophistia ergo est quando diversi respectus pugnant cum rei² ipsâ. Quare quæ vera sunt contradictoria, *explicitè*, ut Deus est ligneus, vel *implicitè*, ut homo est leo, hæc inquam nullo modo conciliari possunt.

Ad veram autem contradictionem requiruntur ista quatuor.

1. Idem Subjectum et Prædicatum.
2. Ut dicatur *secundum idem*, hoc est, secundùm eandem partem.
3. Ut fiat *ad idem*, hoc est *ad eundem respectum* et eodem plane modo.
4. Ut sit *eodem tempore*.

V. Diversitas est quando distinctio non est eandem³ cum re quam distinguit, sed illius quædam circumstantia.

Inanis ergo est ταυτολογία, si quis dicat, *corpus est sensili modo insensile*.^b

VI. Perspicuitas est quando distinctio est clara adeoque facilè explicabilis, non autem chymerica vel vitrea.^c

Mala enim communis est distinctio illa quorundam^d Scholasticorum inter veritatem *Theologicam* et *Philosophicam*. Vitium

1. Contra hanc committitur, quia distinctio est explicabilis.
2. Chymerica dicuntur quæ sunt salebrosa.
3. Distinctio vitrea est quæ habet fucum seu colorem.
4. Cum Scholastici deberent explicare hoc Sophisma; Mus habet pedem, etc. dicebant murem habere pedem *irrationalem*, *rationale* enim pertinet ad totum hominem.

2 We read re in stead of rei. | 3 We read eadem instead of eandem.

b ⁵²F-166 | c ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-159 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSN}O-159 ⁶¹G-159 | d ⁵⁹R-49

It is therefore a sophistry if the different respects are in conflict with the thing itself. Therefore, things that are true contradictories, explicitly such as 'God is like wood', or implicitly such as 'man is a lion', these, I say,¹ can in no way be reconciled.²

For a true contradiction the following four things are required:

1. that subject and predicate are the same;
2. that what is said, is said of the same, i.e. predicated of the same part;
3. that it refers to the same, i.e. in the same respect and in plainly the same mode;
4. that it happens at the same time.

5. The condition of difference is fulfilled when a distinction refers to certain circumstances and is not identical with the thing it distinguishes.

Therefore, it is an empty tautology when you say that a body is insensible in a sensible way.³

6. The condition of perspicuity is fulfilled when the distinction is clear and therefore easily explainable, and not a worthless or vitreous one. |

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The common distinction of some scholastics between theological and philosophical truth is a bad one.

1. Here a fault is committed against this condition, for a distinction must be explainable.
2. Things are called worthless if they are full of jolting.
3. A distinction is vitreous if it has a disguising red or green color.⁴
4. When the scholastics had to explain this sophism: 'the mouse has a foot etc.', they said that the mouse has an 'irrational' foot. [This is wrong], for 'rational' pertains to the whole man.⁵

1 Interjections like this *inquam* show that the book is originated as lecture notes.

2 It is not easy to see why the first proposition is, according to Maccovius, explicitly contradictory, and the second only implicitly. We suggest that the second case is implicitly contradictory, because both man and lion belong to the same genus of *animal*, and they differ only in the *differentia specifica* (man is an *animal rationale*, while a lion is an *animal brutum*). For Maccovius, the concept of God necessarily implies that He does not possess a material body.

3 Here Maccovius criticizes the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation.

4 The Latin word *vitreus* has the meaning of 'colored' too: 'resembling glass in its color (greenish).'

5 Probably, Maccovius gives an example which might have been used to prove the validity of the distinction between theological and philosophical truth. The scholastics say that, since a mouse is an irrational animal, one should say that a mouse has an irrational foot. This Maccovius denies. Just as a foot cannot be rational or irrational, likewise truth cannot be philosophical or theological.

VII. Species diversorum respectuum^e sunt, quorum alii sunt *diversarum rerum*, alii *diversorum modorum*.

Modi sunt veluti *nodi*: ut nodus facit ad rei firmitatem, ita modus rei: quo modum rei tenet, ipsam rem tenet.

Omnis distinctio profluere debet ex *diversis*, non *adversis*.

VIII. Respectus diversarum rerum petuntur ex ipsis formis.

Ut si quis distinguat inter artem et artificem,^f inter *Philosophiam* et *Philosophum*; *rem* et *rei formam*, *substantiam* et *accidens*, *nomen* et *factum*; Hujusmodi distinctiones sunt circa diversas materias, hoc est circa diversa subjecta.

NB. 1. Qui confundit artem cum artifice^g malè agit.

2. A Personâ ad rem non valet consequentia; ut Nero et Caligula fuerunt mali principes, ergo magistratus est malus.

3. Ab accidente ad subjectum non valet consequentia, hoc est ab *abuso* ad *usum*.

4. Vetus Testamentum fuit abrogatum quoad *circumstantiam* non quoad *substantiam*.

IX. Respectus diversorum modorum petuntur ex unius ejusdémque rei multiplici determinatione.

Modus enim rei nihil aliud est quàm restrictio rei et determinatio. Sunt autem quatuor classes modorum.

1. Modus Essendi.

2. Prædicandi.

3. Cognoscendi et considerandi et incipiendi.

4. Modus habendi se aliter atque aliter.

Huc pertinent distinctiones, mediata et immediata, Primariò et Secundario, à Priori et Posteriori; Naturaliter et Sacramentaliter. Primariò ac mediata agit princeps per officiales. Deus cognoscitur à posteriori per effectum, non à priori per causam. Panis^h consecratus dicitur corpus Christi sacramentaliter.

e ⁵⁴R-60 | f ⁵²F-167 | g ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-160 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSNO}-160 ⁶¹G-160 | h ⁵²F-168

7. There are two types of differing respects: some refer to 1. the differing things, while others refer to 2. differing modes.⁶

Modes are like knots: just as knots make a thing firm, so the mode of a thing. If you know the mode of a thing, then you get hold of the thing itself.

Every distinction must flow from differing and not from opposite things.

8. The respects referring to the differing things are derived from the forms themselves.⁷

For example, if you distinguish between art and artist, between philosophy and philosopher, the thing and the form of a thing, substance and accident, noun and fact, then such distinctions and the like refer to differing matters, i.e. to differing subjects.

NB. 1. When you confuse the art with the artist, | you make a mistake.

2. Drawing a consequence from a person and applying it to a thing is an invalid procedure, such as: Nero and Caligula have been bad emperors, therefore, a magistracy is bad.

3. A consequence drawn from an accident and applied to a subject is invalid, it is a consequence from abuse to use.

4. The Old Testament has been abrogated according to its circumstances, but not according to its substance.

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9. The respects referring to the differing modes are derived from the manifold qualification of one and the same thing.

The mode of a thing is nothing else than a restriction and determination of a thing. There are four kinds of modes:

1. the mode of being;

2. the mode of predicating;

3. the mode of knowing, considering and beginning;⁸

4. the mode of behaving this way or that way.

The following distinctions also belong here: mediately and immediately, primarily and secondarily, a priori and a posteriori, naturally and sacramentally. A king acts primarily and mediately through his officials. God is known a posteriori through effect, not a priori as a cause. Consecrated bread is sacramentally called the body of Christ.

⁶ The 'different things' are elaborated in 8, the 'different modes' in 9.

⁷ That two things have the same property is not enough to draw valid consequences. They need to have the same *forma*.

⁸ This mode points to the so called *Synkategoremata*. They are compound hypothetical propositions. They form an addition to the traditional analysis of subject and predicate.

X. Duæ sunt Disciplinæ modorum magistræ. *Physica et Logica; illa modum Essendi, Cognoscendi; hæc modos prædicandi* exponit, proponit.ⁱ

1. Non omnis Disciplina modos explicat.
2. Prima est Physica et Metaphysica.
3. Qualis est essentia talis Prædicatio.
4. Modus prædicandi necessariò sequitur modum essendi, ut non possumus dicere stellam esse animatum⁴, quia essentia talis non est. Item panem esse corpus Christi. Nam panis est verus panis, Corpus autem dicitur *sacramentaliter*.

XI. Accuratè oportet distinguere inter axiomata *limitata* et *illimitata*, inter propositionem *limitatam* et *illimitatam*.

Quo observato, facile erit respondere ad Syllogismum illum etiam à Magistratis nostris frequentatum: Qui dicit vestras theses esse theses, verum dicit. Qui dicit vestras theses esse falsas theses, dicit vestras theses esse theses; ergo, qui dicit vestras Theses esse falsas theses verum dicit. Argumentum hoc puerile est, et Sophisma viris doctisⁱ indignum, resolvendum ex hoc Axiomate: A propositione illimitatâ, ad limitatam non valet consequentia. Major enim illimitata⁵ est, qui dicit vestras theses esse theses. Minor limitata; qui dicit vestras theses esse falsas theses. Dicere theses illimitatum est, et, dicere falsas theses limitatum. Ergo non valet consequentia. Est animal. Ergo canis?^k Sunt theses ergo falsæ.

Secundùm quid autem aliquid dicitur quinque modis.

1. *Reduplicativè*, quod fit per essentiam, ut homo quatenus est homo, est rationale animal.
2. *Genericè* hoc est Prædicamentaliter, quod fit per genus, ut homo quâ homo corpus habet trinæ dimensionis.
3. *Partialiter*, quod fit secundum partem, vel quandam partem, ut homo est mortalis quantum ad corpus. Christus est ubique qua Deus.

4 We read animatam. | 5 We read illimitata.

10. There are two disciplines that teach the modes: physics and logic. Physics proposes and explains the mode of being and knowing, logic the modes of predicating. |

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1. Not every discipline explains its modes.
2. The first discipline is physics, and metaphysics.
3. Essence and predication must correspond.
4. The mode of predication necessarily follows the mode of being, so that it is impossible for us to say that a star is animated, because it does not have such an essence. Likewise, it is impossible to say that bread is the body of Christ. For bread is truly bread; it is called the body of Christ in a sacramental way.

11. One should distinguish accurately between limited and unlimited axioms, between a limited and an unlimited proposition.

Having observed this distinction it is easy to respond to the syllogism that is frequently used by our magistrates⁹ too: 'He who says that your theses are theses tells the truth. He who says that your theses are false theses, says that your theses are theses. Therefore: he who says that your theses are false theses tells the truth.' This is a puerile argument and a sophism unworthy of learned men. It must be resolved by this axiom: to argue from an unlimited proposition to a limited one is no valid consequence. For the major, saying that your theses are theses, is an unlimited proposition. The minor is a limited proposition, saying that your theses are false theses. Bringing forth theses is unlimited, while saying that there are false theses is a limited proposition. It is therefore not a valid consequence. It is an animal. Is it therefore a dog? | They are theses. Are they therefore false?

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'In a certain respect' something can be expressed in five modes:¹⁰

1. By way of reduplication, that is: by means of reduplication of the essence of a thing: man, as far as he is man, is a rational animal.¹¹
2. Generically, that is: by way of category¹² of the genus such as: man as man has a body of three dimensions.
3. Partially, that is: according to any or a certain part such as: man is mortal according to his body; Christ as far as He is God, is omnipresent.

⁹ Maybe this is an outburst against the civil authorities which were critical towards Maccovius, when he was accused of heresy by his fellow professor Sybrand Lubbertus.

¹⁰ *Secundum quid* is the opposite of *absolute*, which means: apart, not in a relation.

¹¹ The Latin word *animal* has a broader meaning than the English word animal. Actually, it means 'living creature'; confer *anima*: soul, life. In the genus *animal*, man is a species, specified by having reason: *animal rationale*.

¹² *Prædicamentaliter* has to be seen as the Latin translation of the Greek word *categoria*.

4. *Accidentalis externa*, quod fit per accidens externum, ut Evangelium movet seditiones non per se, sed per accidens. Jacob est Pater et Filius, diversa Comparatione. *Accidentalis interna* dicitur quæ fit^m per accidens internum, ut bona opera reatorum sunt perfecta, *perfectione partium*, non *graduum*.

XII. Fallacia à non limitato ad limitatum est, cum quis accipit simpliciter quod cum restrictione accipi debuit.

Frequens est hac⁶ fallacia Arrianis de Personaⁿ Christi differentibus. Christus enim minor Patre est non ratione *essentiæ*, sed *officii* vel *œconomia*, per respectum humanæ naturæ et officii mediatorii.

XIII. Neque Plato, neque Aristoteles possunt hic distinguere, ut habet^o proverbium, in iis quæ vera sunt secundum tres gradus, κατὰ παντὸς, κατ' αὐτὸ, καθόλου πρῶτον nullum admittunt distinctionem. Qui volunt contra principia disputare produnt suam inscitiam.

XIV. Vocabula quædam notant privationem, quædam negationem.

In Deo semper notant negationem vocabula, in creaturis et negationem et privationem notant.

⁶ We read here haec.

4. An accidental-external relation is brought about by an external accident such as: the Gospel does evoke quarrels, not by itself but by accident. Jacob is father and son in different relationships.
5. An accidental-internal relation is brought about by an internal accident such as: the good works of the reborn are perfect because of the perfection of parts and not of degrees.

12. It is a fallacy to argue from the unlimited to the limited when you take something simply which should have been taken with restriction.

This fallacy is frequently made by the Arians in discussing the person of Christ. But Christ is lesser than the Father: not regarding essence, but regarding office or economy, in respect of his human nature and mediatorial office.

13. Neither Plato nor Aristotle are able to distinguish here, because they | – as the proverb says – do not allow any distinction in things which are true according to three degrees: according to the whole, according to itself and according to being first in general (*kata pantos, kat-auto, katholou proton*).¹³ Those who want to dispute against principles show their own ignorance.

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14. Certain words denote privation, others negation.¹⁴

In God, words always denote negation, in creatures negation or privation.¹⁵

13 The meaning of the Greek words becomes clear from ARISTOTLE, *Analytica Posteriora*, 73a27 etc.. When a thing is predicated of all things (*kata pantos*) it means for example that when all men are living beings and Socrates is a man, Socrates is a living being. *Kath-auto* means that a thing belongs to the essential nature of something, in the way that for example a line belongs to a triangle. The condition of *katholou proton* is fulfilled when one says that some figure is a triangle when the sum of the angles of this figure is always equal to two right angles. These words are useless for the understanding of the Trinity, Maccovius seems to say. It is unclear to which proverb Maccovius refers in this distinction.

14 *Negatio* is the statement that a certain property is absent. *Privatio* is stating that a property that should be present, is absent. So, saying that that a certain person lacks wings, is a negation, whereas saying that a certain bird lacks wings, denotes a privation.

15 God is seen as a perfect being. Denying that God has some properties, can never be a shortcoming, but must always be a perfection. Therefore in God there is no privation.

DECURIA I.

I. Distinctiones illæ fermè æquipollent inter Essentiam et Existentiam; inter rem^p in Abstracto et Concreto consideratam; in Ideâ et Subjecto, in formâ et formato. Item in momentum primum et secundum, Esse generale et^q speciale, substantiam denique et circumstantiam.

Sic, verbi gratiâ, Theol. itémque aliæ facultates et virtutes in suâ *essentia* consideratæ, non variant, sed in *existentia* seu subjecto variant. Artes quoque et definitiones sunt ex ideâ, quæ est rerum perpetuarum.

Momentum primum est materia generalis. Momentum secundum est proprietas Characteristica (personalis) quæ variat subjecta.

Prima Decuria est manipulus militum, et sicut milites dividuntur in certos ordines, ita et hic sub uno signo interdum distinguuntur aliquot.

2. Essentia notat universalitatem: plura requiruntur ad existentiam, quam ad essentiam, existentia notat Circumstantiam rei.

3. *Idea* nihil aliud quam forma sive essentia rei. *Idea* est duplex, rerum *universalium*, et hæc eodem se modo habet, ut natura humana ab initio mundi. *Singularium* rerum est mutabilium.

The First Decade of the Most General Distinctions

1. The following distinctions are considered to be approximately equivalent:¹

- essence and existence,
- a thing considered in the abstract and a thing considered in the concrete,
- a thing considered in the idea and in the subject,
- a thing considered in its form and as a thing formed.

Likewise, equivalent are the distinctions between

- first moment and second moment,
- general being | and special being and, finally,
- substance and circumstances.

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1. So, for example, the theological and other faculties and virtues considered in their essence do not change; but they change in existence or in the subject. The arts and definitions are derived too from the idea which belongs to perpetual things.

The first moment refers to matter in general. The second moment is the characteristic (personal) property that changes the subjects.

The first decade of distinctions is like a maniple of soldiers and just as soldiers are divided into certain ranks so here too several distinctions are set off under one banner.

2. Essence refers to universality: for the existence of a thing there is more required than for its essence; existence notes the circumstances of a thing.

3. The idea is nothing else than the form or essence of a thing. 'Idea' is twofold: First, when it refers to universal things it behaves always in the same way, such as human nature, from the beginning of the world. [Secondly], the idea of particular things is of changeable things.²

¹ The first term of the distinction is equivalent with the first term of the following distinctions.

² According to Maccovius true knowledge always consists in knowledge of the ideas. The ideas are not mere concepts in the human mind (as the nominalists say), but they are present in reality.

II. Per se et per Accidens, suâ Naturâ et Determinatione, Essentialiter et Accidentaliter, Internâ ratione, et Externâ accessione: Formaliter et Abusivè, ratione usus et abusus: ratione Naturæ^r et eventus, denominatione Intrinsecâ et Extrinsecâ æquipollent.^s

Ita vinum per se exhilarat, per accidens^t inebriat.

Sic divitiæ denominativè intrinsecè sunt dona Dei, extrinsecè sunt incitamenta malorum. Evangelium suâ naturâ est odor vitæ ad vitam, odor mortis ad mortem præter naturam. Huc pertinent et ista: Abusus non tollit usum: tollatur abusus maneat usus. Ab eo quod est per accidens ad substantiam rei non valet consequentia: à Persona ad rem non valet Consequentia.

III. Æquivoce et Univoce; Verè et Apparenter; Synonymicè, Homonymicè; Verè et quæ sunt opinione hominum; Propriè et Impropriè; secundum rei veritatem, et nominis similitudinem; reverâ et nomine tenus, idem sunt.

Verbi gratia, Theologia vera est univocè, falsa æquivocè;

Malum est bonum apparenter, opinione peccatoris;
Homo vivus verè est homo, mortuus est nomine tenus.

Cæterùm variè Physici distinguunt hæc tria *Univocè*, *Analogicè*,^u et *Æquivocè*.

Univocè est idem quod perfectè, ut homo est animal; istud est idem quod est secundum convenientiam et similitudinem rei.^v Angelus est Spiritus *analogicè*, Deus *univocè* et *primo*.^w Hoc verò idem est quod secundum Homonymiam, ut

r ⁵²F-172 | s ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-165 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-165 ⁶¹G-165 | t ⁵⁴R-62 | u ⁵⁹R-51 | v ⁵²F-173 | w ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-166 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{JNSN}O-166 ⁶¹G-166

2. The following distinctions are equivalent:

- by itself and by accident
- by nature and by determination,
- essentially and accidentally,
- internal structure and external addition,
- formally and abusively,
- in respect of use and in respect of abuse,
- in respect of nature and in respect of event,
- intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. |

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So wine by itself cheers up, but it makes drunk by accident.

Richness considered by intrinsic denomination is an intrinsic gift of God, but by extrinsic denomination it is an incentive to bad things. By its nature the Gospel is a savor of life unto life, but beyond its nature it is a savor of death unto death [2Co 2,15-16]. To this category the following phrases also pertain: 'abuse does not cancel the use: let the abuse be removed and let the use remain.' To infer from what is by accident to a substance is an invalid consequence. To infer from a person to a thing is an invalid consequence.

3. The following distinctions are identical :

- univocal and equivocal³
- truly and seemingly,
- synonymic and homonymic,
- true things and things of human opinion,
- properly and improperly,
- according to the truth of a thing and according to the similarity of a name,
- in reality and nominally.

For example true theology is theology in a univocal sense; false theology is theology in an equivocal sense.

In the opinion of a sinner evil is a seemingly good.

A living man is really a human being; a dead man is nominally a human being.

Moreover, the physicists distinguish the following three [predications]: univocal, analogous, equivocal.

Univocal predication identifies what is completely so, such as: 'man is an animal'. Analogical predication refers to what is the same by virtue of conformity and similarity. An angel is a spirit analogously, God is spirit univocally and primarily. | Equivocation is identical with homonymy, as 'a sophist is a

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3 The Latin text says: *Aequivoce & Univoco*. We changed the order of these two words.

Sophista est Physicus Æquivocè et falsò, *illud* remotissimum, *istud* medium, *hoc* proximum denotat.

(Univoca dicuntur perfecta, Æquivoca multis modis imperfecta. Alii ita: Exclusivè et Nuncupativè. Primo modo diabolus dicitur Deus. 2. Dicitur nomine tenuis, μιμετικῶς) Analogæ ad rem, æquivoca ad nomen extenduntur.

IV. Late et Stricte, Laxe et Pressè, Generaliter et Specialiter, Exotericè et Acro-
maticè, Populariter et Philosophicè coincidunt.

Ut omnis Disciplina est Ars, latè sumpto vocabulo artis, strictè non nisi illæ, quæ sunt directivæ et organicæ.

Physica sumitur laxè et ita complectitur Medicinam, Theologiam, vel pressè et ita contradistinguitur reliquis facultatibus. Sic Aër aqua appellatur in suis terminis populariter. Directivæ Disciplinæ sunt quæ dirigunt nos in rerum et verborum cognitione. Organicæ dicuntur, quæ suppeditant instrumenta ad eas. Artes dicuntur, quæ redeunt ad hominem artificem. Quatuor dicuntur facultates, et dicuntur Quadriga generis humani, ut Theologia,^x Physica, Medicina, Juris prudentia. Stylus^y sacrarum Literarum est popularis; Scriptura enim non Philosophatur.

V. Absolutè et Respectivè, Consideratione absolutâ et relatâ, In se et In alio, Simpliciter et Relatè, Secundum Essentiam Absolutam et Relatam sive Respectivam; secundùm naturæ consequentiam, et muneris gratiam, sunt unum.

physicist' is a proposition in an equivocal and false sense. Equivocal terms denote the most remote, analogous terms denote the middle, univocal terms the proximate.

(Univocal terms are called perfect, equivocal terms imperfect in many ways. Some make [in case of equivocation] a distinction between exclusive and nuncupative ways of predication: in the first way the devil is called God; in the second way he is nominally called God, by way of imitation). Analogue terms extend to the real thing, equivocal terms to names.

4. The following distinctions coincide:

- broadly and strictly,
- loosely and concisely,
- general and special,
- for the general public and academic,
- popular and philosophical.

When the word art is taken in a broad sense every discipline is an art, but taken in a strict sense only the directive and organic disciplines are arts.

Physics broadly taken include medicine and theology; but strictly taken it is distinguished from the rest of the faculties.⁴ Thus, taken in its popular terms, the lower atmosphere is called water [Cf. Ex 20,4]. Directive disciplines direct us in the knowledge of things and words. Disciplines are called organic when they provide us with the instruments for the arts. Disciplines are called arts when they refer to man as their maker. Four faculties are mentioned and they are called the four-horse team of humankind: theology, physics, medicine and law. The style | of Holy Scripture is popular, for Scripture does not philosophize.

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5. The following distinctions are identical:

- absolutely and respectively,
- absolutely and relatively,
- considered in it self and in something else,
- simply and related,
- according to absolute essence and according to related or relative essence,
- according to the consequence of nature and according to graceful institution.

⁴ To understand how it is possible that theology belongs to physics, it is helpful to refer to Maccovius' statement on page 160 (§ 10). The assumed distinction here is between physics and logic: 'Duae sunt Disciplinae modorum magistrae. *Physica et Logica; illa modum Essendi, Cognoscendi; haec modos praedicandi* exponit, proponit.' Because theology is not a matter of language, but of reality and knowledge, it belongs to physics.

Ita Paulus persecutus est Ecclesiam *Absolutâ*, Christum *Relatâ* consideratione.

Panis Cœnæ Domini non considerandus secundùm naturæ consequentiam, sed muneris gratiam. Ecclesia in se patitur, Christus relatè: Adamus erat mortalis conditione naturæ, immortalis largitione gratiæ. Anima hominis non moritur secundum Essentiam absolutam, sed moritur in relatione ad Deum, hoc est, quæ non fruitur visione Dei. Respectus verò sive relationis¹ possunt esse intimæ, quarum summa capita sunt loca inventionis Logicæ, ita ut non abs re Logica dici queat volumen Relationum.

VI. Ignorantia *Simplex et malitiosa, puræ negationis, et pravæ dispositionis, negativa, et affectata seu sophistica æquipollent.*²

Ignorantia simplex excusat peccatum, quia scilicet est juris particularis et facti; affectata non item, sed auget peccatum, qualis ignorantia juris universalis. De illa loquitur Paulus: *Ignovit mihi Deus quia ignorans feci*. De hac dicitur: Ecclesia ignorans, ignorabitur scilicet in iudicio.

[Dolus bonus sunt stratagemata Sophistica, bellica, et militaria; in bello non licet Sophisticari. Ius particulare est ius nationale, quod in certo aliquo loco viget.]

VII. Formaliter et Eminenter, Subjectivè et Effectivè, Essentialiter et Virtualiter, Reipsa et Eximiè idem notant.

Ut vinum est calidum non *subjectivè* sed *effectivè*. Stella dicitur et calida eodem modo. Deus erit omnia in omnibus *eminenter*, non *formaliter*. Sol est calidus in se et *Effectivè*.

1 We read relationes instead of relationis.

2 ⁵²F-175 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-168 ⁵⁴R-63 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-168 ⁶¹G-168

Thus Paul persecuted the Church in an absolute sense, but Christ in a relative sense.

The bread of the Lord's Supper should not be considered according to the consequence of nature but according to the graceful institution. The Church suffers in itself, but Christ suffers relatively. Adam was mortal regarding the condition of his nature, but immortal regarding the bestowal of grace. According to its absolute essence the soul of man does not die, but it dies in relation to God, i.e. when it does not enjoy the vision of God. Respects or relations, however, can be internal. The main points of it are found in the topics of logical invention, so that it is not without reason that logic can be called the 'book of relations'.⁵

6. The following distinctions are equivalent:

- simple ignorance and evil ignorance,
- ignorance by pure negation and ignorance by evil disposition,
- negative ignorance and pretended or sophisticated ignorance. |

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Simple ignorance excuses sin, because it is ignorance of a particular law and fact. This is not so regarding pretended ignorance, for this augments sin, since it is ignorance of the universal law. The first is what Paul discusses [in 1T 1,13]: 'I obtained mercy because I did it ignorantly.' To the second refers the phrase: 'a not-knowing church shall not be known in the last judgment.'

(Sophisticated strategies, strategies in wars and military strategies are a great deceit; during war it is not allowed to use fallacies. National law is a kind of particular law, for it obtains at a certain place).

7. The following distinctions note the same:

- formally and eminently,
- subjectively and effectively,
- essentially and virtually,
- actually and exceptionally.

For example: wine is warm not subjectively but effectively. In the same manner a star is said to be warm. God will be all in all: eminently, not formally. The sun is warm in itself and is warm effectively.

⁵ The humanist Rudolf Agricola (1444-1485) divided logics into two parts: the *inventio* (finding) and the *judicium* (judging). *Inventio* is defining things with the help of a questionnaire, in which parts, causes, effects, properties etc. are listed. *Judicium* is the application of some rules, for a clear ordering of the arguments.

VIII. Actu primo et secundo; Actu signato et exercito, scilicet potentiâ activâ: formâ et operatione; Essentiâ et emanatione, Proprietate Essentiali, et virtute actuali æquipollent.

Sic ratio est in infante actu primo non secundo:

Fides non perit in electis quoad^a formam, quamvis pereat quoad operationem.

Sol, ignis, et similia nunquam amittunt actum primum, licet per omnipotentiam Dei possit in ipsis inhiberi Actus Secundus.^b

IX. Cognitio à priori et posteriori, intellectualis et sensualis, distincta et confusa, perfectiva et imperfectiva, comprehensiva et apprehensiva, adæquata et inadæquata sunt idem.

Verbi gratiâ, Deum non cognoscimus à priori, quia non vult aliquem² sui causam; sed à posteriori, non comprehendendo, sed apprehendo.

² We read aliquam in stead of aliquem.

8. The following distinctions are equivalent:

- first act and second act,
- conceived act and exercised act,⁶ namely exercised by an active power,⁷
- essence and operation,
- essence and emanation,
- essential property and actual power.

Thus, in a child reason is present in the first and not in the second act.

In the elect faith does not perish regarding | essence, although it can perish according to its operation. 169

Sun, fire and similar phenomena never lose their first act, although it is possible that by God's omnipotence their second act is restrained.

9. Identical distinctions are:

- a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge,
- intellectual knowledge and sensory knowledge,
- distinct knowledge and confused knowledge,
- complete knowledge and incomplete knowledge,
- comprehensive knowledge and apprehensive knowledge,
- adequate knowledge and inadequate knowledge.

For example, we do not know God a priori, because [the concept of] God does not permit introducing any cause of Himself.⁸ But we know Him a posteriori, not by comprehending Him but by apprehending Him.⁹

6 Cf. NUCHELMANS, 'Distinction', 85: 'the pair *exercitus/significatus* basically stood for an ontological distinction. From an ontological point of view, a form could be taken to exist in two different ways: either as concretely realized in some individual or as abstractly conceived of in an intellectual act of simple apprehension. This ontological distinction was applied in the most general way to existence or being itself, which was divided into actual existence, or existence *in actu exercito*, and potential existence as it is merely thought of in the mind, *in actu significato*. But [...] it was equally applicable to such more specific forms as the activities of running and riding: whenever these are actually performed by an agent they present themselves *in actu exercito*; in so far as they are merely conceived of by someone and signified by the appropriate noun or verb they are before the mind *in actu significato*.' Cf. SUAREZ, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, disp. VIII.

7 On *potentia activa*, see MACCOVIUS, *Metaphysica* (1660), 78.

8 For Aristotle, having knowledge is nothing else than knowing the causes. This kind of knowledge Maccovius calls knowledge *a priori*. Next to this, he introduces a second kind of knowledge: *a posteriori*, which is knowledge by means of the effects.

9 Here *comprehendere* means grasping; *apprehendere* means approaching.

Cæterùm à priori et posteriori sæpe est idem, quasi ex parte ante et post. Ut solus Deus est æternus à priori, sed et angeli et homines pii à posteriori, quia habent initium, sed non habebunt finem.

X. *Essentia et eminentia, forma et gradus, Perfectio partium scilicet Essentialium et graduum, Perfectio prima et secunda, Perfectio Essentialis vel Essentiæ et quantitativa æquipollent.*

Ut religio non facit ad *Essentiam* reipsa, sed ad *Eminentiam*.

Omne Ens est perfectum perfectione prima, non verò ultimâ.

Bona^c opera renatorum perfecta sunt perfectione^d partium, non graduum.

Epistola ad Romanos perfecta est perfectione Essentiali, etiamsi non sit perfecta perfectione quantitativâ, quæ est totius canonis.

A Positivo ad superlativum non valet consequentia, Positivus est Essentiâ, Superlativus Eminentîâ.

A negatione modi ad negationem rei non valet consequentia.^e

For the rest, a priori and a posteriori knowledge are often the same as, and can be seen as before and later. As only God is a priori eternal, so angels and godly men are a posteriori eternal, because they have a beginning but not an end.¹⁰

10. The following distinctions are equivalent:

- essence and eminence,
- essence and degree,
- perfection of (essential) parts and perfection of degrees,
- first perfection and second perfection,
- essential perfection (or perfection of essence) and quantitative perfection.

Thus, religion does not really contribute to the essence but to the eminence [of God].

Every being is perfect in its first perfection, but not in its ultimate perfection.

The good | works of the regenerate are perfect regarding the perfection of parts, not regarding the perfection of grades.¹¹ 170

The Epistle to the Romans is perfect by virtue of an essential perfection, although it is not perfect by virtue of a quantitative perfection that belongs to the entire canon.

To infer from a positive to a superlative degree is an invalid inference. The positive degree concerns essence, the superlative eminence.

To infer from a negation of a mode to a negation of the thing itself is an invalid inference.

10 See also *Distinctiones*, IV, 15: 'The term 'eternal' is predicated in two ways: in a proper and improper sense. In its proper sense it is said of things without beginning and end, and without any succession. In its improper sense 'eternal' is said of things that have a beginning and succession, but are without end: as such it applies to human beings and angels.'

11 Confer the *Heidelberg Catechism*, Question and Answer 114: 'But can those who are converted to God perfectly keep these commandments? No: but even the holiest men, while in this life, have only a small beginning of this obedience; yet so, that with a sincere resolution they begin to live, not only according to some, but all the commandments of God.'

DECURIA II.

I. Actus et habitus differunt, ut *minus et maius*.

Hinc vitia actualia non sunt tam enormia quam habitualia. Verbi gratiâ, ebrietas in Noa actualis veniam meretur, in Cambise habitualis non item [Actus est ipsa operatio. Habitus est rei possessio et actio, sæpe iterata et confirmata. Habitus est difficulter mobilis.] Actus in vitiis magis laudatur^f quam Habitus, in virtutibus autem habitus magis laudatur quam Actus. Una enim hirundo non facit ver.

II. Per naturam et Gratiam idem est quod à se et gratiosâ communicatione.

Verbi gratiâ, Deus est æternus per naturam, Angeli boni per gratiam (scilicet justitiam^g remunerantem, cui opponitur justitia puniens.

III. Cumulative et Privative, ac Collative et Ablative coincidunt.

Sic populus potestatem dicitur resignasse Principi scilicet cumulative; item voluit cumulum potestatis Principi dare, hoc est plenam potestatem; nec spoliavit se illa potestate. Deus Pater omnem potestatem^h dedisse filio dicitur, scilicet collative, vel cumulative, ut per eam regat Ecclesiam.

IV. Aliud dicitur in sensu *formali*, aliud in *Causali*.

The Second Decade of Most General Distinctions

1. Act and habit differ as less and more.¹

For that reason actual vices are not so enormous as habitual vices. For example: the actual drunkenness of Noah deserved forgiveness, unlike the habitual drunkenness of Cambyses.² (An act is the operation itself, a habit is the possession of a thing and an action frequently repeated and confirmed. The habit is difficult to remove). With vices the act is more recommended than the habit, but with virtues the habit is more recommended than the act. For one swallow does not make a summer.

2. The terms 'by nature' and 'by grace' express the same as that which is 'by itself' and what is 'by gracious communication'.

For example: God is eternal by nature, angels are good by grace (namely by remunerative justice | which punitive justice is opposed to).

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3. The terms 'cumulatively & privatively' and 'by addition & by removal' coincide.

Thus the people are said to have transmitted their power to the monarch cumulatively. Likewise, it was the people's will to give the mass of power, i.e. full power, to the monarch, but they have not deprived themselves from that power. God the Father is said to have given all power to the Son, that is to say, He did so in a combined way or cumulatively in order to govern the Church through this power.

4. It is one thing to refer to something in a formal sense, another thing to refer to something in a causal sense.

¹ What is meant is that in regard of morality the act is always of less importance than the habit.

² Cambyses, king of Persia (539-522 BC), was the son of Cyrus. Maccovius refers to the unfavorable assessment of Cambyses' alcohol problems by HERODOTUS, *Histories*, III, 34.

Ut vinum dicitur calidum, Saturnus frigidus, non in sensu formali, sed causali, per Metonymiam effecti.

V. Aliquid dicitur in *sensu absoluto vel comparato*.

Ut Angeli boni dicuntur impuri in collatione cum Deo. Lux nonnunquam dicitur obscura in Comparatione cum majori, quo sensu Astronomi quasdam stellas vocant nebulosas.

VI. Ex parte Rei et ex parte conceptus, ex merito rerum, et ex merito intellectus: juxta rationem et naturarum considerationem æquipollent.ⁱ

Ut multæ sunt proprietates Dei essentielles, non ex parte Dei, sed ex parte conceptus nostri; sic Deus est in prædicamento Substantiæ propter nostrum conceptum.

VII. Aliquid punitur *privativè vel positivè*.

Privativè cum aliquid ipsi denegatur, sicut posteri Protoplastorum sunt puniti in lumbis ipsorum; Sic filii proditorum perfidorum^j puniuntur positivè, cum pœna irrogatur facinoribus.^k

VIII. Defectus est vel *Negativus*, vel *Privativus*: et quælibet imperfectio est vel privativa, vel negativa: Hæc non est mala, sed illa.

i ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-172 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSN}O-172 ⁶¹G-171 | j ⁵²F-179 | k ⁵⁹R-53

As wine is called warm and Saturnus cold:³ not in a formal but in a causal sense by metonymy of the effect.

5. Something is said in an absolute sense or in a comparative sense.

So good angels are called impure in comparison with God. Light compared with greater light is sometimes said to be dark. It is in this sense that astronomers refer to some stars as nebulous.

6. The following distinctions are equivalent:

- to consider something in respect of the thing itself and in respect of its concept,
- to view things in virtue of the things [themselves] and in virtue of understanding,
- according to the structure and according to the consideration of natures. |

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As there are many essential properties of God, not in God himself but according to our conception of Him, so we take God in the category of substance because of our conception.

7. Punishment is privative or positive.

It is privative when something is refused to someone: as the posterity of the first men are punished in their loins.⁴ And the sons of untrustworthy traitors are punished positively, when punishment is imposed for their crimes.

8. A defect is either negative or privative: any imperfection is either privative or negative.⁵ The latter is not evil, the former is.

3 See VIRGIL, *Georgics*, I, 336 (*frigida Saturni stella*, the cold star of Saturn). Moreover, the Roman festival of the Saturnalia was celebrated at the winter solstice from 17 to 23 December. The planet Saturn was considered to be cold by the Ancients in two senses: it was cold itself and it made cold, i.e. killed. Just as the sun (*Decuria 1,7*) was itself warm but also made (the world) warm.

4 Namely the deprivation of original righteousness.

5 For the difference between *privatio* and *negatio* see *Prolegomena*, 14.

Sic in humanâ Christi naturâ locum habuit ignorantia negativa (aliis defectus miserabiles) sed non ignorantia privativa (aliis affectus culpabiles.) Porrò imperfectio negationis solet et dici *comparata*; ut Adam imperfectus erat in statu innocentiae in ordine ad Deum: Huc pertinet quod vocula IN sumatur et privative et negative, Homo dicitur injustus privative, Deus immortalis, invisibilis negative. Negativa pertinent ad contradicentia, privativa ad privantia.

IX. *Intensive* et *Extensive* non accipiuntur^l eodem modo, imò non idem sunt quoad virtutem et molem.

Ut Deo tribuitur Quantitas virtutis seu Intensiva, non materialis seu extensiva. Intensio respicit gradum excellentiorem, Extensio objecta: quo sensu fides et reliquæ virtutes Theologicæ dicuntur imperfectæ intensive non extensive.

X. Desertio est vel Probationis vel Punitiois.^m

Illo modo aliquis deseritur, ut virtutes ipsius manifestæ fiant et roborentur, sic Deus deseruit Adamum labentem, et Præceptor deserit Discipulum in arenâ Disputationis: Posteriori modo aliquis deseritur ob vitium suum, sicut Deus deservit Pharaonem et Apostatas; Prens filium sic exhæreditat.ⁿ

Thus in the human nature of Christ a negative¹ ignorance takes place (while for other human beings negative ignorance is a miserable defect), but not a privative ignorance (while for other human beings privative ignorance is a culpable affect). Furthermore, the imperfection of negation is usually called an imperfection by way of comparison; as with Adam, who, compared with God, was imperfect in the state of innocence. Related to this is also the fact that the prefix 'in-' [in Latin] can be taken as an indication of privation as well as an indication of negation. Thus man is called *unjust* in a privative sense, while God is said to be *immortal* and *invisible* in a negative sense. What is negative belongs to what is contradictory; privatives pertain to words expressing the absence of some quality or attribute.

9. The terms 'intensive' and 'extensive' are not taken | in the same manner:
assuredly, they are not the same regarding virtue and weight.

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So to God quantity of virtue or intensive quantity is attributed, but not a material or extensive quantity. For intension regards a more excellent degree, while extension regards the objects: in this sense faith and the other theological virtues are called intensively, not extensively imperfect.

10. Spiritual desertion is either by way of trial or by way of punishment.

Someone is deserted in the first way in order to demonstrate and strengthen his virtues. In this way God deserted Adam when he was falling and, likewise, a master deserts his pupil in the arena of disputation. In the second way someone is deserted because of his sin, as God deserted Pharaoh and apostates. In this way a father disinherits his son.

¹ It can be helpful for the modern reader to realize that the scholastic word *negative* does not have a negative or pejorative connotation! It does not mean more than the negation of a statement. The same applies to *imperfection*: it is the negation of the statement that something is perfect.

DECURIA III.

I. *Materiale et Formale* accipiuntur duobus modis.

Materiale est res considerata, forma est modus considerandi, ut in Ethicis, res considerata est virtus; modus considerandi est formalis.

2. Materiale idem est quod subjectum relationis, formale est ipsa relatio, ut in limite et pane Eucharistico videre est; sic^o in familiâ et Politiâ est aliquid materiale, sed non quoad formale, hoc est unionem virtutis.

Formale relationis non incurrit in sensus, sed percipitur vel intelligitur fide.

II. *Materiale et formale* opponuntur.

Ut Deus est in loco *materialiter*, id est in omni re, cujus materia quædam dicitur locus respectu creaturæ; sed non formaliter ratione sui:

sic Deus facit impium *materialiter*,^p hoc est, subjectum illud facit in quo est impietas; sed non *formaliter*, hoc est, non infundit impietatem. Impietas enim non est ex creatione, sed accidit.

III. Ignorantia est vel *Formalis* vel *Interpretativa*.

Formalis est defectus scientiæ, ut si quis nesciat rationem officii sui. Interpretativa est defectus elocutionis illius rei, quam alioqui intelligimus: ita in rebus divinis, et aliis sublimioribus¹ persæpe nobis hæret lingua, in dextrâ et commodâ interpretatione et pronuntiatione.

1 We read sublimioribus.

The Third Decade of Most General Distinctions

1. The terms 'material' and 'formal' are taken in two ways.

1. 'Material' is the thing considered, the form indicates the mode of consideration. As in ethics the considered thing is virtue; the mode of consideration is formal.¹

2. 'Material' is the same as the subject of a relation, the form is the relation itself, as can be seen in a boundary and in the bread of the Eucharist. | So, in a household and in politics something material is present, but not as something formal, that is as the qualitative union.²

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The formal aspect of a relation is not met by the senses, but it is perceived or understood by faith.

2. 'Material' and 'formal' are opposites.

For instance, God is present at a certain place *materially*, i.e. God is present in every thing whose matter is called a place with respect to creation;³ whereas *formally*, in view of his own being, He is not present at a certain place.

In this way God materially creates the impious, i.e. He creates the subject in which is impiety. But He does not create him formally, i.e. He does not infuse impiety. For impiety does not come from creation, but it is accidental.

3. Ignorance is either formal or interpretative.

Formal ignorance is a lack of knowledge, as it is the case when someone does not know the reason of his duty. Interpretative ignorance is a defect in the elocution of something, which in itself we do understand. So our tongue will very often stammer in presenting a right and suitable interpretation and exposition of divine and more sublime things.

1 Here we can think of questions like: 'Why is it a virtue? What is good in it?'

2 Confer the *Decuria* IV, 2 and *Decuria* VIII, 5.

3 Space itself was seen as being created. A space was always associated with materiality.

IV. *Esse reale et esse Cognitionis, sive esse Cognitum, idem est quod esse rei et Objectum.*

Ut omnes res fuerunt in Deo quantum ad esse cognitum, sed esse reale acceperunt in tempore.⁹

V. *Formaliter et per Concomitantiam opponuntur.*

Ut Generatio unius est corruptio alterius, scilicet propter necessariam sequelam et per necessariam connexionem.

VI. *Respectus et Despectus opponuntur.*

Ut omnis creatura dicitur imperfecta Respectivè,^r hoc est, contemplativè, non Despectivè.

VII. *Simpliciter et Respectivè opponuntur duobus modis, hoc est, idem sunt quod propriè et impropiè.*

Quo sensu tutores dicuntur Patres respectivè; Julius Cæsar dicitur pater Augusti respectivè.

2. Respectivè idem est, quod cum distinctione;^s ut si quis simul nominet sex vel plures, ex quibus duo vel tres sunt ipsius cognati, utitur hâc voculâ respectivè.

VIII. *Auctoritivè et Nunciativè, idem est quod Principaliter et Ministerialiter.*

Ut Deus solus remittit peccata Auctoritivè, Ministri nunciativè.

Princeps init fœdus cum hoste principaliter et auctoritivè, Legatus ministerialiter.^t

IX. *De Jure et facto ac quæstio juris et Facti idem sunt.*

q ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-175 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-175 ⁶¹G-175 | r ⁵²F-182 | s ⁵⁹R-54 | t ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-176 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-176 ⁶¹G-176

4. The distinction between real being and known being or being known, is the same distinction as the being of a thing and an object [of knowledge].

Thus all things have been in God as far as they are known, but in time they have received real being. |

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5. 'Formally' and 'concomitantly' are opposites.

Such as: the generation of one thing is the corruption of another thing, viz. because of the necessary sequel and necessary connection.⁴

6. Respect and contempt are opposites.

Such as: all creatures are called imperfect in a respective, i.e. theoretical way [in respect to the perfectness of God], not in a contemptible way.

7. 'Simply' and 'respectively' are opposed in two ways: i.e. they are identical with 'proper' and 'improper'.

In this sense tutors are respectively called fathers; Julius Caesar is called the father of Augustus respectively.

'Respectively' is the same as 'with a distinction';⁵ as when someone calls six or more his namesakes of whom two or three are his cognates, then he uses 'father' in a respective sense.

8. 'As a king' and 'as a messenger' are the same as 'acting principally' and 'acting as a minister'.⁶

So God alone forgives sins as a king, the ministers as messengers.

Principally and as a king, the prince enters a covenant with the enemy. The delegate does it as a minister. |

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9. Lawfully & factually are the same as being a question of law and a question of fact.

4 Here Maccovius gives an example of *per concomitantiam*: there can be a necessary sequel between one thing and another, yet this does not belong to the essence or form of one of them.

5 Cf. *Prolegomena*, 7-9.

6 Cf. *Decuria*, V, 10 and *Decuria*, VI, 8.

Ut Papa sibi vindicat Italiam de facto, non de Jure; Turcicus Imperator vindicat sibi Constantinopolin de facto. Quæstio facti est Tyrannorum per fas et nefas.^u

X. Amor est communicationis et complacentiæ.

Ut Deus ab æterno nos amavit amore^v communicationis, ut essemus sancti; sed amore complacentiæ non amat, nisi credentes. Amor antecedens est Communicationis: Consequens sive Dilectio est Complacentiæ.

Factually the pope claims Italy for himself, not lawfully. The Turkish emperor claims Constantinople factually. The question of Tyrants, acting either right or wrong, is a question of fact.⁷

10. Love is love of communication or love of delight.

So from eternity God has loved us with the love of communication in order that we should be holy. But He only loves us with the love of delight if we are believers. Love of communication is antecedent love; love of delight is consequent love or charity.

⁷ Probably, Maccovius means that being a tyrant does not become justified if this tyrant acts right.

DECURIA IV.

I. *Gradus* rerum est vel *Excellentis* vel *Remissus*, ille dicitur *gradus intensus* vel *Excellentiæ*, hic *positivus* infra mediocritatem.

Ut ignis est calidus in gradu excellenti, aër in remisso. Virtutes cadunt in imbecillitatem humanam remisse, non excellenter, ita nullus regenitus in hac vitâ est in gradu excellenti, sed remisso. Ex parte idem est quod remisse.

II. *Ordo* est vel *numeri*, vel *virtutis*;^w hic, non ille spectari debet in Œconomicâ Societate etc.

Et hic ordo nihil aliud est quam unio in virtute morali, Civili, Spirituali. In Ecclesiâ est ordo numeri et virtutis, non verò numeri^x tantùm. Papa vetat ordinem numeri, sed non virtutis.

III. *Ordo Doctrinæ* est vel *sapientiæ* vel *Potentiaë*.

Ille est accuratus tanquam libra Critolai et regula Polycleti; iste est popularis et veluti regula Lesbia.

IV. *Notitia* est *Theoretica* et *Practica*, hoc est, *nuda* et *effectiva*.

The Fourth Decade of Most General Distinctions¹

1. The degree of things is either high or low. The first is called a strong or high degree, the second a positive degree below mediocrity.

So fire is warm in an excellent degree, air in a low degree. Virtues belong to human weakness on a low level and not on a high, so that in this life no reborn person is in an high degree, but always in a low degree. The term 'partly' is identical with the term 'low'.

2. Order is one of number or one of virtue. | In the administration of society etc. the second and not the first must be observed.

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In such an administration order is nothing else than union of moral, civil and spiritual virtues. In the Church there is an order of number and virtue, but not of number only. The pope forbids the order of number; he does only allow the order of virtue.

3. The order of teaching is either one of wisdom or one of ability.

The first is an accurate order like the balance of Kritolaos² and the rule of Polykleitos.³ The second is popular and is like the Lesbian rule.⁴

4. Knowledge is theoretical or practical, i.e. pure knowledge or effective knowledge.

¹ The central focus of this decade is goodness.

² Kritolaos was a Greek philosopher (second Century BC) and head of Aristotle's school. The balance of Kritolaos is mentioned by CICERO, *Tusculanae Disputationes* V,51.

³ Polykleitos was a Greek sculptor (fifth century BC), who wrote a treatise, now lost, on the harmony of ideal proportions.

⁴ The Lesbian rule was a mason's rule of hand, of a type used on the Greek island Lesbos in the northeastern Aegean Sea, which could be bent to fit the curves of a molding; hence, 'pliant judgment or judgment'. See ARISTOTLE, *Ethica Nicomachea*, V.10.7.II37b20-31: 'For when the thing is indefinite the rule is also indefinite, like the leaden rule used in making the Lesbian molding.' Cf. ERASMUS, *Colloquia familiaria*, LVII.

Illa est quâ quis intelligit, et dicitur simplicis intelligentiæ, hæc est quâ quis rem cognitam, solido affectu complectitur: illo modo Deos novit impios, isto non nisi pios.

V. Præstantius, et Eligibilis differunt.

Illud est quod sua natura est dignius, hoc quod propter certas circumstantias præferendum aliis; ut aurum est præstantius ferro, sed ferrum est fabro ferrario eligibilis quam aurum: et vinum licet sit generosius aqua, tamen hæc Venetis et Belgis est eligibilior.^y

VI. Bonitas est vel Naturalis, vel Moralis, vel Supernaturalis.

Illa est omnis Entis, quô pactô et Diabolus est bonus,
ista est virtus Ethica, qualis^z fuit et in gentibus,
hæc Christianorum quatenus credunt.

VII. *Bonum est tale vel Simpliciter, vel in Relatione ad bonum*, et hoc dicitur bonum neutrum, sive indifferens.

Ut divitiæ sunt bonæ quatenus sunt instrumenta virtutis. Idem iudicium esto de omnibus bonis corporis et fortunæ, quæ mensuram suam à bonis animi et amabilitatem habent, ita pulchritudo potiùs dedecus dicitur, si nulla virtus adsit.

VIII. Cognitio est vel Intuitiva, vel Abstractiva.

Illa est perfectior, quàm hæc, hinc Deus omne cognoscit intuendo, non abstrahendo, in altera vita videbunt Deum Electi intuitivè:

Illa videtur ipsa res, hæc species sive imagines rerum.

^y ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-178 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-178 ⁶¹G-178 | ^z ⁵²F-185

Through theoretical knowledge one knows; and this is called knowledge as such. Through practical knowledge one embraces a known thing with loving affection. God knows the impious in the first manner, the pious only in the second.

5. There is a difference between 'more excellent' and 'more preferable'.

The first refers to what has more worth by its nature, the second to what should be preferred under certain circumstances. So gold is more excellent than iron, but for a smith iron is more preferable than gold; and although wine is nobler than water, yet for Venetians and Dutchmen water is more preferable.

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6. Goodness is either natural, or moral, or supernatural.

Natural goodness belongs to all being. In this respect the devil is also good.

Moral goodness is an ethical virtue such as the gentiles possessed.

Supernatural goodness belongs to Christians in so far as they believe.

7. Something good is good either simply or in relation to another good and this is called a neutral or indifferent good.

So riches are good in so far as they are an instrument of virtue. All bodily health and fortune must be judged likewise. They derive their measure and amiability from mental goods. Therefore, beauty without virtue could better be called a disgrace.

8. Knowledge is either intuitive or abstract.⁵

The first is more perfect than the second. For that reason, God knows everything by intuition and not by abstraction. In the next life the elect will intuitively see God.

By intuitive knowledge the thing itself is seen, by abstract knowledge the species or images of things.

5 Intuitive knowledge is a direct knowledge that rest on the immediate apprehension of a thing. The basis of immediate apprehension is and must be an existent thing or an existent quality in a thing. Abstractive knowledge does not involve the immediate apprehension of existent things; it is a knowledge of the essence or quiddity of things, apart from their individual, concrete existence. See MULLER, *Dictionary*, 69-71.

IX. *Appetitus* est vel *Innatus* vel *Elicitus*,^a ille inditus est creaturæ, hic excitatus ab objecto.

Sic omnes animæ rationalis feruntur ad^b gloriam Dei appetitu innato, appetitus autem^c ille est absque præviâ cognitione,

et hoc modo appetit homo scire, scilicet appetitu ordinato. Est enim duplex *appetitus* ratione^d objecti sui, *Ordinatus* et *Inordinatus*; Ille vult finem et media, hic finem tantùm.

Dum homo magis magisque cognoscit alicujus rei præstantiam, appetit illam appetitu elicitio.

X. Transcendentale et Prædicamentale plurimùm differunt.

Transcendentale est quod superius est omni Prædicamento. Estque vel singularissimum, ut Ens.

Prædicamentale est quod ad certam Entis Categoriam pertinet, ut sunt decem summa genera rerum. Ubi teneatur regula, Deus et quicquid de Deo dicitur habet rationem Transcendentis. Hinc actiones et relationes divinæ non sunt Accidentia sed Transcendentia.

a ⁵⁹R-55 | b ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-179 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{INSNO}-179 ⁶¹G-179 | c ⁵⁴R-67 | d ⁵²F-186

9. Desire is either innate or elicited. The first is implanted in creatures, the second is evoked by the object.

So by innate desire all mankind endowed with a rational soul are driven to | the glory of God. But this desire is without previous knowledge. 179

In this manner man desires to know, namely with an orderly desire. For in respect of the object, desire is twofold: orderly or not orderly. Orderly desire is willing goal and means, not orderly desire only the goal.

When man comes to know more and more the excellence of a certain thing, he desires it with an elicited desire.

10. There is much difference between 'transcendental' and 'categorical' .

Transcendental surpasses every category. And it is even most singular, like being.

Categorical is what pertains to a certain category of being, as there are ten main categories of things. When this rule is maintained, God, and whatever is attributed to Him, has a transcendental reality. For that reason divine actions and relations are no accidentals but transcendentals.

DECURIA V.

I. Assertivè et Narrativè opponuntur.

Ita dicimus nos aliquid commemorare *narrando*, non *asserendo*;

quo pertinet discrimen inter mentiri et mendacium dicere; multi enim minimè mentiuntur cum mendacium^e dicunt; Mentiri enim est contra mentem ire, cum non consentit Os et Conscientia.^f

II. Historicè et Oratoriè sunt idem quod nudè et Symbolicè.

Hinc dicimus aliquem laudare Oratoriè, hoc est, cum Schemate rhetorico ad cælum usque tollere.

III. *Abstractè* et *Applicatè* opponuntur.

Abstractè idem est quod in se ipso. Applicatè idem quòd in legitimo usu. Verbi gratia, Hypocritæ accipiunt Sacramentum abstractè, non applicatè. Idem est iudicium de instrumentis et mediis quibusvis. (Omne Instrumentum habet suam perfectionem à fine et legitimo usu.)

IV. Δύναμις et Ἐξουσία differunt.

Illa est actualis possessio, hæc facultas; sic *omnipotentia* et *omnis potestas* differunt: Illa enim est attributum Deitatis, hæc Mediatoris; et data est ei omnis potestas ratione Officii et Œconomiae. Imperator Romanus habet potestatem recuperandi Orientem, tametsi destituatur potentiâ.

The Fifth Decade of Most General Distinctions

1. 'Assertively' is the opposite of 'narratively'.

Thus, we are said to commemorate something by narrating it, not by asserting it.

To this pertains the distinction between lying and telling a lie; | for many people do not lie at all when they are telling a lie. Lying is to go against one's mind while mouth and conscience are not in agreement.

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2. The distinction between 'historically' and 'rhetorically' is identical with the distinction between 'straightforward' and 'symbolically'.

Hence we speak about someone praising [another] rhetorically, i.e. to extol him to the skies by using a rhetorical figure of speech.

3. 'Abstract' is opposed to 'applied'.

'Abstract' is identical with 'in it self'. 'Applied' is identical with 'according to lawful use'. For example: hypocrites receive the sacrament in an abstract manner and not in the applied sense. The same judgment applies to whatever instruments and means (for every instrument derives its perfection from its goal and its lawful use).

4. *Dunamis* (power) differs from *exousia* (authority).

The first refers to actual possession, the second to the faculty. In this way there is a difference between being omnipotent and having all authority: the first is a divine attribute, the second is an attribute of the Mediator to whom all authority is given in respect of his office and work of salvation. The Roman emperor has the authority to reconquer the East but he does not have the power to do so.

V. Potestas est vel Pura et Absoluta, vel Limitata et Mixta.^g

Ita populus Universus habet potestatem absolutam, Princeps limitatam, quippe à legibus fundamentalibus et populo pendentem.^h Princeps pendet à lege *Naturæ, Divinæ et fundamentali*. Quatenus ergo *homo* est, dicitur observare *legem naturæ*; quatenus *Christianus*, legem *Divinam*, quatenus *Princeps*, legem *fundamentalem*.

VI. Secundùm Potentiam et secundùm Propositum differunt.

Ita Logicus et Sophista idem sunt secundùm Potentiam, sed non idem secundùm Propositum. Logicus enim non habet principium fallendi.

Sic bonum opus sæpe malum fit, quia non fuit ibi bonum propositum.

Hypocritæ et boni viri est quidem una Potentia, sed non una intentio; Nam ambo frequentant templum, sed diverso fine et modo.

VII. Secundùm Proprietatem et Similitudinem plurimùm differunt.

Verbi gratiâ, Solus Deus est bonus secundùm proprietatem, Creatura autemⁱ secundum similitudinem. Unde patet proprietatem rei non omnem causari; sed similem effectum posse producere, ut cum sol illustrat aërem.^j

VIII. *Par* et *Simile* differunt tanquam *magis* et *minus*.

Ut homo non est Deo *par*, sed *similis*.^k

Hujus loci est distinctio illa inter *proportionem paritatis* et *similitudinis*; ut inter finitum et infinitum non datur proportio paritatis, sed est *similitudo* aut *univoca*, ut Alexander Magnus est similis^l Philippo Patri; aut *Æquivoca*, ut homo dicitur similis Deo.

IX. Ordo est vel Naturalis Conditionis vel Potentia¹ Dei absolutæ.

1 We read potentiae.

g ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-181 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-181 ⁶¹G-181 | h ⁵²F-188 | i ⁵⁴R-68 | j ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-182 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-182 ⁶¹G-182 | k ⁵²F-189 | l ⁵⁹R-56

5. Authority is either pure and absolute, or limited and mixed. |

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Thus the people taken collectively have absolute authority, the prince has a limited authority, because his power is depending on the fundamental laws and the people. The prince depends on natural, divine and fundamental law. As far as he is a human being, he is said to keep the law of nature; as far as he is a Christian, he is said to keep the divine law; as far as he is a prince, he is said to keep the fundamental law.

6. There is a difference between 'according to ability' and 'according to intention'.

Thus the logician and the sophist are similar with respect to ability, but not with respect to intention. For a logician does not have the intention to deceive.

Likewise, a good work becomes often bad, because it was done without a good intention.

Hypocrites and good men share the same ability, but not the same intention. For both visit the temple, but they do so with different ends and in a different manner.

7. There is a great difference between 'properly' and 'according to likeness'.

For example: God alone is good in a proper sense, the creature is good according to likeness. For that reason it is clear that not every propriety of a thing is caused, but the propriety of a thing can produce a resembling effect, as when the sun illuminates the sky. |

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8. 'Equal' and 'similar' differ as 'more' and 'less' differ.

Thus man is not equal to God, but he is similar to God.

To this topic belongs that distinction between proportion of equality and proportion of similarity. For example: between the finite and infinite there is no proportion of equality, but rather one of similarity. This similarity is either a univocal similarity, such as: Alexander the Great is like his father Philippos, or an equivocal similarity as when man is said to be like God.

9. Order denotes either the order of natural condition or the order of God's absolute power.

Juxta Conditionem rei naturalem, fieri non potest, ut sol suum cursum sistat, sed secundum potentiam Dei absolutam. Quia omnes Creaturæ sunt præditæ *potentiâ obedientiali*. Hoc tamen ita accipiendum est, ne potentia Dei absoluta extendatur ad Contradictoria, ut Deus non potest mentiri.

X. Immediatè et Mediatè opponuntur.

Sic Deus quædam agit mediatè, quædam immediatè. Hæc distinctio in vitâ humanâ habet usum, ubi superioribus actio ascribitur inferiorum. Ita quod legatus agit nomine Principis id ipse Princeps dicitur agere.^m

m ⁵²F-190 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-183 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{NSN}O-183 ⁶¹G-183

According to the natural condition of things it is not possible for the sun to stop its course, but according to God's absolute power it is possible. The reason is that all creatures are endowed with a power of obedience. This, however, should be interpreted in such a manner that God's absolute power is not stretched out to contradictions, for it is impossible for God to lie.

10. 'Immediate' & 'mediate' are opposite to each other.

Thus God performs certain things in a mediate way, other things He does immediately. In daily life this distinction is applicable where an action of inferiors is ascribed to superiors. In this manner the action performed by a delegate in the name of a prince is said to be an action of the prince himself.¹ |

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¹ See also *Decuria*, III, 8 and *Decuria*, VI, 8.

DECURIA VI.

I. Transitiuè et Distributiue opponuntur.

Illud notat *migrationem*, hoc *communicationem*;

sic lux solis est in aëre non transitiuè, sed communicatiue.

Hæc distinctio utilis est in consideratione de Communicatione proprium¹, quæ non datur. [Proprietas non communicatur, sed effectum proprietatis.]

II. Esse et Subsistere differunt ut commune et Proprium.

Sic una eadêmeque Essentia communis est tribus personis, SS. Trinitatis: Subsistentia est cuique propria. Anima hominis non pendet à corpore quoad Essentiam, licet pendeat quoad Existentiam.

III. Sæpe distinguimus inter *Simpliciter* et *Huic*.

Sic pœna justa est bona secundum se et simpliciter, sed est mala *huic*. Sic serpentes sunt boni secundum se, mali verò sunt huic vel illi.

IV. In Distinctione inter *Essendum* et *Agendum* multiplex petitur conciliatio.ⁿ

Nam accidens excellit in agendo, subjectum in essendo: in agendo, ita calor in igne calefacit, et ea quæ sunt extra ignem.

V. Natura et Œconomia, Essentia et Dispositio, Forma et Dispensatio, Materia et Officium, non sunt Synonyma.

1 We read proprietatum instead of proprium.

n ⁵²F-191 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-184 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}^{INSN}O-184 ⁶¹G-184

The Sixth Decade of Most General Distinctions

1. 'Transitively' and 'distributively' are opposite to each other.

The first denotes a transfer, the second a communication.

So the light of the sun in the sky is not transitive but communicative.

This distinction is very useful when you consider the communication of proprieties, which does not exist (a propriety is not communicated, but the effect of a propriety).

2. 'Being' and 'subsisting' are different in the same manner as 'common' and 'proper' differ.

So the three persons of the Trinity all share one and the same essence, but they have their own subsistence. In respect of its essence the human soul does not depend on the body, although in its existence it does depend on the body.

3. We often distinguish 'simply' and 'in relation to this or that'.

So, a just punishment considered simply and in itself is good, but considered in relation to this or that it is harmful. Considered in themselves serpents are good, but they are bad in relation to this or that.

4. In the distinction between 'being' and 'acting' a manifold conciliation is aimed at. |

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For the accidental predominates in acting, but the subject in being: in this way in acting the heat heats inside the fire, as well as things outside the fire.

5. The following terms are no synonyms:

- nature and administration,
- essence and disposition,
- form and dispensation,
- matter and office.

Ita Christo aliud tribuitur ratione Naturæ, aliud ratione Œconomix; sic in politicis instrumenta non sunt consideranda ratione formæ sed officii.

VI. Alia intelligenda sunt secundum Essentiam, alia secundum Prædicationis modum.

Ut cum Herodes dicitur vulpes, non^o verba sed Prædicatio spectanda est: Idem iudicium est de omnibus Tropis et Figuris, et diligenter tenenda est Regula: *Verba sunt intelligenda secundum subjectam materiam.*

VII. *Directè et Indirectè* opponuntur.

Sic aliquid potest esse in certo Prædicamento indirectè, quod non est directè in ullo. Sic Pars est indirectè in Prædicamento, in eo scilicet in quo totum. Ita Princeps in alios habet imperium directè, in alios indirectè.^p

VIII. Ratio agentis et instrumenti opponuntur.

Ut Deus confert aliquid tanquam Autor, homo tanquam minister. Omne autem instrumentum agit dispositivè.

IX. Effectivè et Permissivè opponuntur.

Sic bona opera prodeunt à providentiâ Dei effectivè, mala et peccata permissivè.

X. Sufficientia et Efficientia differunt.

Ita Præceptor adhibet diligentiam humanam, hoc est quæ posset sufficere ad omnes discipulos solidè informandos, licet illa non sit efficax in omnibus et singulis; ita Deus dedit Protoplastis gratiam sufficientem.^q

o ⁵⁴R-69 | p ⁵²F-192 ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-185 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZ}A^{JNSNO}-185 ⁶¹G-185 | q ⁵⁹R-57

So one thing is attributed to Christ in respect of his nature, another thing according to his administration. Thus in politics, instruments must not be considered with respect to form, but with respect to office.¹

6. Some things must be understood according to their essence, others according to the way they are predicated.²

Thus, when Herod is called a fox [Lc 13,32], one should not consider the words as such but the predication. The same judgment must be made about all tropes and figures of speech. Therefore, the following rule must be diligently maintained: words are to be understood according to their subject matter.

7. 'Directly' and 'indirectly' are opposite to each other.

Thus, in a certain category there can be something indirectly present, which is not directly included in any predicament. So a part is indirectly present in a category, namely in that one in which the whole is present. Likewise, a prince reigns directly over some people, while ruling indirectly over other people.³ |

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8. The role of an agent is opposite to that of an instrument.

So God brings something about as author, while human beings act as ministers.⁴ Each instrument, however, acts according to its disposition.

9. 'Effecting' and 'permitting' are opposite to each other.

So good works come forth from God's providence by effecting; evil and sins come forth from God's providence by permitting.

10. 'Sufficiency' and 'efficiency' are different.

So a teacher applies human diligence, i.e. he uses all that can be sufficient in order to instruct all pupils in a solid manner, although it is not effective in all pupils and in every single pupil. In this way God bestowed upon the first men sufficient grace.

1 Cf. *Decuria*, V, 3.

2 Cf. *Prolegomena*, 9.

3 Cf. *Decuria*, III, 8 and *Decuria*, V, 10.

4 *Ibid.*

DECURIA VII.

I. Essentialiter et Characteristice opponuntur.

Et essentia quidem est natura communis, Character est natura singularis,
sic risibilitas est proprium totius speciei humanæ; competit autem huic vel
illi. Ita tres personæ SS. Trinitatis ex æquo habent proprietates Essentiales,
personas¹ non item.⁷

II. Proportio est vel Arithmetica vel Geometrica.

Illa consistit in æqualitate differentiarum;⁸

hæc inæqualitate rationum. Ibi est æqualitas commutativa, hîc distributiva.

Poriò Deus O. M. proportionem Arithmeticam in regimine mundi servat.

III. Inter rem ipsam et rationem dicendi oportet distinguere.

¹ We read personales instead of personas.

The Seventh Decade of Most General Distinctions

1. 'Essentially' and 'characteristically' are opposite.

For an essence is a common nature, a character is an individual nature.

Thus the ability to laugh is a property of the whole human race, but it occurs only to one or another. Likewise, the three persons of the Holy Trinity equally have essential properties, but they do not have their personal properties in the same way. |

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2. 'Proportion' is either arithmetical or geometrical.¹

The first consists in equality of differences, the second in equality of calculation.²

In the first case the equality is commutative, in the second case the equality is distributive.³

Furthermore, God exercises an arithmetical proportion in his government of the world.⁴

3. A distinction should be made between the thing itself and the manner of speech.

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- ¹ The use of the terms geometrical and arithmetical is derived from ARISTOTLE, *Ethica Nicomachea*, Book 5.
 - ² Goclenius gives the following examples: a series of numbers with each time the same difference between them (like 4, 7, 10, 13, 16) has an arithmetic proportion. A series like 2, 6, 18, 54 has a geometric proportion. See GOCLENIUS, *Lexicon philosophicum*, 884.
 - ³ A distributive equality pertains to general goods which can be divided over different persons. Which part a certain person receives of the good divided, depends on his merits. A commutative equality pertains to things which cannot be distributed but must be exchanged. A person's *merits* cannot have any influence here. Cf. ARISTOTLE, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1130b30–1131a2. The distinction is approximately like the modern distinction between civil law (distributive) and criminal law (commutative).
 - ⁴ God's justice requires the exclusion of human *merits*; He also demands an exact recompense in case his justice is offended. Confer *Heidelberg Catechism*, Question and Answer 11: 'Is not God then also merciful? God is indeed merciful, but also just; therefore his justice requires, that sin which is committed against the most high majesty of God, be also punished with extreme, that is, with everlasting punishment of body and soul.'

Multa enim sæpius in modo locutionis, magis quam in re ipsa differunt. Notari autem debet quod de verbis minus laborandum sit, si res ipsa intelligatur.

IV. Dialecticè et Analyticè, Declaratoriè et Logicè, Oratoriè et Metaphysicè. Sunt idem quod populariter et ad amussim.

Ita Posteriores Ecclesiastici sæpe rhetoricantur, ubi non iniquum fuerit imò æquissimum ad stateram artificii omnia examinare; Idem iudicium esto de scriptis Classicorum, quorundámque Theologorum, Politicorum. etc.

V. *Supra Naturam* et *contra Naturam* differunt.

Nam quod est *supra naturam*, naturæ limites transcendit, quod est *contra naturam*^t perimit naturam. Verbi gratiâ. Articuli fidei non sunt *contra naturam*, sed *supra naturam*, quia gratia accedit ad naturam, eámque excedit, non abolet.

Observandum est nihil dari posse, quod fit *contra naturam Universalem*, tametsi multa^u dantur, quæ sunt *contra naturam particularem*; talia sunt mala tam culpæ, quam pœnæ. *Contra* notat Excellentiam, *Supra* repugnantiam. Peccare est *contra naturam*,^v quia destruit eam, ut homo cum peccat est brutum, nam illius imaginem destruit peccando. Natura Universalis respicit speciem, hanc diabolus conatur destruere, sed Deus nunquam permittit, sed particularem permittit destrui.

VI. *Esse* et *Habere*, *Essentialiter* et *Habitualiter* Coincidunt.

Ut, Deus est bonus essentialiter, homo habitualiter.

Tot autem sunt modi essendi, quot modi Prædicandi.

Pro tempore enim aliquid habet veram quantitatem, qualitatem, figuram. Huc pertinet *Distinctio* inter *quod* et *quale*; ut Deus est sapiens, sapientia de eo prædicatur in *Quo*; sed homo est sapiens, sapientia de eo prædicatur in *Quale*: Sæpe tò habere est idem quod possidere, quò sensu solus Deus dicitur habere

For frequently, many things differ more in manner of saying than in reality. But it must be noticed that one should be less concerned about words, if the thing itself is understood.

4. 'Dialectically' and 'analytically' is the same as

- 'indicatively' and 'logically',
- 'rhetorically' and 'metaphysically',
- 'popularly' and 'exactly'.

So, later ecclesiastical authors often use rhetorical language wherefore it would not be unfair and even most advantageous to weigh all they wrote in goldsmith's scales. The same judgment must be given on the writings of classical authors, some theologians and politicians.

5. There is a difference between 'above nature' and 'against nature'.

For what is above nature transcends the limits of nature; what is against nature | destroys nature. For example: the articles of faith are not against nature but above nature, because grace is added to nature and exceeds it; but it does not abolish nature.

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It should be observed that nothing can exist which is against general nature, although many things are against a particular nature; of such kind is evil, the evil of guilt and the evil of punishment. The word 'against' denotes contradiction, the word 'above' excellence.⁵ Sinning is against nature, because it destroys nature. A man who sins is a beast [Ps 73,22], for by sinning he destroys the image of God. General nature has regard to the species of mankind, which the devil tries to destroy, but God will never permit this. But He does permit that a particular nature is destroyed.

6. The distinction between 'being' and 'having' coincides with the distinction between 'essentially' and 'dispositionally'.

Such as: God is good in an essential way; man is good in a dispositional way.

There are as many modes of being as there are modes of predication.⁶

At a certain time, something has true quantity, quality and shape. To this pertains the distinction between 'what' and 'how'. For example: when you say 'God is wise', wisdom is predicated of Him in a sense of what. When you say 'man is wise', wisdom is predicated of man in a sense of how (*in quale*)⁷. Often

5 In our translation we interchange *contra* and *supra*.

6 Cf. *Prolegomena*, 9.

7 So *quod* coincides with *esse*, and *qualis* with *habere*.

immortalitatem.^w [*Quod* notat Substantiam; *Quale* Accidens omne quod supervenit.]

VII. Medium est vel participationis vel Negationis.

Illud nihil habet commune cum extremis, ut virtus est medium bonarum actionum. Nihil enim est vitiorum.

Hoc habet aliquid commune cum extremis, ut omnes colores^x sunt medii inter album et nigrum, quicquid congregat visum communicat cum nigredine; quod disgregat, cum albedine.

VIII. Totaliter et Partialiter opponuntur.

Ut Electi amittunt fidem non totaliter, sed partialiter. Et homo dicitur interire *partialiter*; nam anima non interit, sed corpus resolvitur in sua principia, scilicet Elementa.

IX. Explicite et Implicite, totidem verbis et bona consequentia, Expresse et Analogice sunt Synonyma.

Sic multa continentur in scriptura, ut et in jure Justiniano non ad literam sed ad sensum; sic Trinitatis vox non habetur in Scriptura, sed habetur Analogia: Nam dicitur quod Deus sit trinus.^y

X. Pugnancia in re ipsa et pugnancia in speciem non sibi contradicunt.^z

w ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-188 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-188 ⁶¹G-188 | x ⁵²F-195 | y ⁵⁹R-58 | z ⁵³FA^{ELZ}-189 ⁵⁶FA^{ELZA}JNSNO-189 ⁶¹G-189

'having' is identical with 'possessing'. In this sense God alone is said to have immortality. | ('What' notes substance, 'how' notes each accident which is added).

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7. The term 'in the middle' is either a middle of participation or a middle of negation.⁸

In the second sense it has nothing in common with extremes, like virtue is the medium of good actions; but virtue has nothing to do with vices.⁹

In the first sense it has always something in common with extremes, like all colors are in the middle of white and black. Whatsoever contracts the visual stream participates in blackness, whatsoever dilates it participates in whiteness.¹⁰

8. 'Totally' and 'partially' are opposites.

Thus, the elect never loose faith totally, but partially. And man is said to perish partially: for the soul is not destroyed, but the body is dissolved into its first origins, that is to say: into its elements.

9. These distinctions are synonyms:

- 'explicitly' and 'implicitly',
- 'in express terms' and 'according to good consequence',
- 'expressively' and 'analogically'.

So Scripture, as the law books of Justinian, contains many things not literally, but in intention (*ad sensum*). So the word 'trinity' is not found in Scripture, but Scripture contains an analogy of the trinity. For it says that God is three .

10. What is really incompatible and what is seemingly incompatible do not contradict each other. |

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8 Goclenius gives as an example of *medium negationis*: 'neither blind nor seeing' and 'nor teacher nor pupil'. As an example of *medium participationis*: 'lukewarm is between hot and cold'. See GOCLENIUS, *Lexicon Philosophicum*, 677.

9 See GOCLENIUS for a different view: '*Medium inter contraria [est Negativum seu] Positivum, quod est forma Positiva; [Medium Positivum est formale seu Virtuale, seu per recessum]. Per recessum, ab utroque extremo, ut Virtus inter duo vitia.*' GOCLENIUS, *Lexicon Philosophicum*, 677. See also ARISTOTLE, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 1133b30–1134a15.

10 Contrary to our own understanding, whiteness is seen by Maccovius as the absence of color and blackness as the full presence of color, maybe because color can be added to a white piece of paper. Maccovius refers to PLATO, *Timaeus* 67 d-e.

Ita in Scriptura sicut et in Jure et alibi multæ sunt contradictiones apparentes. (Cum duo loci pugnantés occurrunt debent per bonam distinctionem conciliari.)

Thus, in Scripture, in law and elsewhere there are many apparent contradictions (when two conflicting passages occur, they must be reconciled by means of a good distinction).

DECURIA VIII.

I. Thesis et Hypothesis differunt ut *Generaliter* et *Specialiter*.

Huc pertinet illa regula: Transferre Thesin ad Hypothesin; sæpe enim Hypothesin^a dicimus fundamentum alicujus rei, ut cum dicitur Disputationem niti falsa hypothesi, hoc est, falso fundamento.

II. Medium Rei et Personæ, Arithmeticum et Geometricum, Æqualitatis et Rationis æquipollent.

Illud æqualiter differt à suis extremis, ut est centrum circuli, hoc inæqualiter distat, ut in regula proportionis videre est; Illud in proportione Arithmetica, hoc in Geometrica cernitur, illud semper idem manet, hoc accommodari potest circumstantiis.

III. Perfectivum et Destructivum, Salvativum et Corruptivum, Perficiens et Deficiens opponuntur.^b

The Eight Decade of Most General Distinctions

1. Thesis and hypothesis¹ differ as 'generally' and 'specifically'.

To this the following rule pertains: to transfer a thesis into a hypothesis; for we often call the hypothesis the foundation of a certain thing, when, for example, it is asserted that a disputation rests on a false hypothesis, i.e. a false foundation.

2. The following distinctions are equivalent:

- the middle of a thing and of a person,
- arithmetical and geometrical middle,
- the middle of equality and the middle of proportion.²

The first [of these pairs] equally differs from its extremes as the centre of a circle does, in the second there is an unequal distance to its extremes as can be seen in the rule of proportion. The first is seen in an arithmetical proportion, the second in a geometrical proportion. The first always remains the same, the second can be adapted to the circumstances.

3. Opposite are:

- perfective and destructive,
- salutary and corruptible,
- that what makes complete and that what is incomplete. |

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¹ These terms are derived from the so called syllogism. In the 'first figure' form the first assertion in a syllogism is called the thesis, the second, which stands under (hypo) the thesis, is called the hypothesis. Together they lead to a conclusion. For example:

Thesis: All men are mortal

Hypothesis: Socrates is a man

Conclusion: Socrates is mortal.

It is important to notice that the use of hypothesis is different from the modern use. It is not a weakening notion, but at the contrary it denotes the foundation: that which bears.

² See also *Decuria*, VII, 2.7.

Hinc Passio, Privatio, Abolitio,^c Negatio, dividuntur in Perfectivam et destructivam: ut reformari ad imaginem Dei, est Passio Perfectiva; deformari ad imaginem diaboli est destructiva.

IV. Sensibile et Intelligibile, Materiale et immateriale, Physicum et Logicum, Crassum et Analogum, sunt homonyma.

Ut Angeli dicuntur habere materiam intelligibilem, non sensibilem; Cognitio item dividitur in sensitivam et intellectivam. [Physica sunt sensibilia; Logica verò sunt intelligibilia,]^d

V. Status Quantitatis et Qualitatis opponuntur, ille consistit in amplitudine, hic in unione virtutis.

Sic in qualibet societate oportet spectare potiùs statum Qualitatis, quàm Quantitatis. Sunt etiam qui Quantitatem distinguunt, ita ut Quantitas sit vel amplitudinis, vel excellentiæ; quo sensu Turcicum imperium dicitur maius Romano.

Huc quoque pertinet Distinctio *in quantum* et *quale*, sive inter *gradum* et *rem ipsam*, inter *modum* et *Essentiam*, ut Electi non amittunt fidem *quoad quale*, sed *quoad quantum*.^e

VI. Tota res et Totum rei differunt.

Ut tota res dicatur de subjecto ratione alterius partis, totum rei de utràque parte subjecti: totus homo intelligit et moritur, sed non totum hominis; Totus Christus est ubique, sed non totum Christi. [Tota res notat Personam; Totam¹ Rei notat naturam alterutram vel partem essentialem.]

VII. *Finaliter* et ad *Tempus* opponuntur.

1 We read totum instead of totam.

For that reason undergoing, privation, abolition and negation are divided into perfective and destructive: so being restored unto the image of God is undergoing something in a perfect way; being deformed to the image of the devil is undergoing something in a destructive way.

4. The following distinctions are homonyms:

- sensible and intelligible,
- material and immaterial,
- physical and logical,
- rough and analogous.

Thus, angels are said to have intelligible matter but no sensible matter. Likewise, knowledge is divided in sensible and intellective knowledge (physical things are sensible things; but logical things are intelligible things).

5. The state of quantity is opposite to that of quality. The first consists in amplitude, the second in a union of virtue.

So, in whatever society, one ought to be more concerned about the state of its quality than that of its quantity. There are also who distinguish quantity in such a way that quantity refers either to amplitude or to excellence. In this sense the Turkish Empire is said to be greater than the Roman Empire.

To this also pertains the distinction between 'how much' and 'of what sort' or between degree and the thing itself, between mode and essence, as the elect do not lose their faith according to its quality, but only according to its quantity. |

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6. There is a difference between 'the whole thing' and 'all of a thing'.

So 'the whole thing' refers to the subject in respect of one of its two components,³ whereas 'all of a thing' refers to both components of the subject: so the whole man understands and dies, but not all of man understands and dies. The whole Christ is omnipresent, but not all of Christ is omnipresent. ('The whole thing' denotes the person; 'all of a thing' denotes one of both natures or the essential component).

7. 'Ultimately' and 'for the moment' are opposite.

³ Maccovius relates this distinction to the two parts of man, soul and body.

Ut electi excidunt ex gratiâ Dei, non finaliter, sed ad tempus, quo pacto sol patitur Eclipsin.

VIII. Philosophicum et Sophisticum opponuntur.^f

Sic ignorantia Philosophica est qua quis paratus est, ignorantia Sophistica est, quâ quis non cupit discere.

IX. Propositum et Infirmitas, Malitia et Imbecillitas, Datâ operâ et Ex infirmitate opponuntur.

Ut vir bonus peccat non ex proposito, sed ex infirmitate.

X. Gymnasticè et Dogmaticè; Interrogative^g et Definitive; Exercitii gratia et seriò, sunt idem.

Sic multi disputant contra articulos fidei, ut tum se, tum alios exerçant, non ut animi sensa prodant; cum hac Distinctione coincidit, quod aliquid fiat tentative et assentative, ut cum Præceptor Discipulo proponit Sophisma.^h

Thus the elect do not fall out of the grace of God ultimately but only temporarily, as the sun suffering an eclipse.

8. Philosophical reasoning is opposite to sophistic reasoning.

Therefore, it is philosophical ignorance when you are ready to learn something; it is sophistic ignorance, if you do not desire to learn anything.

9. Each others opposites are:

- resolution and weakness,
- malice and powerlessness,
- acting on purpose and acting by weakness.

Thus, a good man does not sin on purpose but by weakness.

10. The following distinctions are the same:

- 'by way of exercise' and 'systematically',
- 'by interrogation' | and 'by definition',
- 'disputing for the sake of exercise' and 'disputing seriously'.

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Many dispute against the articles of faith in order to train themselves and others. They do not have the intention to betray the feelings of their heart.

What is done by way of experiment and for the sake of flattery – for example a teacher who proposes a fallacy to his pupil – coincides with this distinction.

DECURIA IX.

I. Principium Quod et Quo oppoſuntur.

Illud eſt cauſa Efficiens Princeps, ipſumque Suppoſitum quod agit, hoc nihil aliud eſt quam instrumentum totale; homo eſt principium quod loquitur, ſic tota perſona Chriſti eſt principium *Quod*, altera natura eſt principium *Quo*.

Hinc facile reſpondetur ad illud Sophiſma: Quicquid videt habet oculos. Tui oculi vident. Ergo tuiⁱ oculi habent oculos. Item. Quicquid loquitur habet linguam. Tua lingua loquitur. Ergo tua lingua habet linguam. Limitanda eſt major ex fundamento diſtinctionis^l ſuppeditato inter Principium *quod et quo* hoc modo. Quicquid videt ſcilicet ut *principium quod*, illud habet oculos. Atque^k oculi mei non vident ut *principium quod*, ſed tantum ut *principium quo*; ergo non neceſſe eſt ut habeant oculos.

II. Magis et Maius differunt, illud notat intensionem, hoc extensionem.

Verbi gratiâ, Subſtantia quidem admittit Maius et Minus, ſed non Magis et Minus. Cæterum Magis et Minus non variant ſpeciem, ſed gradum, ut infirma fides non differt ſpecie, ſed gradu; ſic virtus heroica gradu tantum differt à virtute communi.

III. Essentialiter et Virtualiter; Subjectivè et Objectivè; in ſe et in effectu, idem ſonant.

The Ninth Decade of Most General Distinctions

1. The principle 'which' and the principle 'by which' are opposed.

The former term refers to the principal efficient cause and the acting subsistent thing,¹ while the latter is nothing but the instrument as such; man is the principle which speaks; so the whole person of Christ is the principle which, whereas one of his natures is the principle by which.

Hence the following sophism can be easily refuted: 'Whatsoever sees has eyes. Your eyes see. Therefore, your eyes have eyes.' Likewise: 'Whatsoever speaks has a tongue. Your tongue speaks. Therefore, your tongue has a tongue.' The major of this syllogism must be limited on the basis of the provided distinction between the principle which and the principle by which, namely in this manner: whatsoever sees, namely as the principle 'which', has eyes. But my eyes | do not see as a principle 'which', since they are only the principle 'by which' I see. Therefore, it is not necessary that my eyes have eyes.

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2. There is a difference between more and bigger. The former refers to intension, the latter to extension.

For example: a substance can be bigger and smaller but not more and less. Furthermore, 'more' and 'less' do not change the species but the degree, just as a weak faith is not different in species but in degree [from a strong faith]. Likewise: heroic virtue differs only in degree from common virtue.

3. 'The following pairs of distinctions denote the same:

- 'essentially' and 'virtually',
- 'subjectively' and 'objectively'
- 'in itself' and 'in effect'.

¹ For *suppositum*, see SUÁREZ, *Disputationes metaphysicae* 26, 352b (34.1.14.): '*Substantia vero singulariter subsistens, et incommunicabilis aliis similibus substantiis, sicut latine dicitur suppositum et persona, ita graece vocatur hypostasis ... Et interdum generaliter accipitur [hypostasis], ut significat rem subsistentem incommunicabiliter in quacumque natura, et ita idem significat quod suppositum.*'

Ut justitia et misericordia sunt æquales in Essentia Dei, sed misericordia est major ratione Effectorum, sive Objectorum.

IV. Indifferens et Externum opponuntur.

Ita quidem ut hoc sit simpliciter bonum vel malum, ut virtus et vitium, illud tametsi sua natura bonum est, per accidens^l tamen sit malum; ut sunt divitiæ et plurimæ ceremoniæ, quæ neque præceptæ, neque interdictæ sunt, ut aperire caput ad nomen Jesu. Sunt et necessariæ ceremoniæ, quæ nituntur aliquo præcepto.^m

V. Necessitas coactionis et immutabilitatis, violentiæ et naturæ, impulsiois et definitionis coincidunt.

Necessitas coactionis respicit locomotivam hominis, quæ sola cogi potest, non voluntatem quæ duci, flecti, persuaderi potest, cogi non potest.

Necessitas verò immutabilitatis respicit formam et proprietatem rei, quo sensu dicimus Deum necessario bonum, ignem necessario esse calidum.

VI. Prius naturâ est tale vel intentione, vel generatione, sive ordine naturæ intendentis et generantis.

Illo modo prius dicitur quod est perfectius, ut finis est prior mediis,

hoc modo prius dicitur quod prius fit, quo sensu imperfecta sunt priora perfectis.

VII. Diversa et adversa opponuntur.

Diversa sunt quæ ita distinguuntur, ut possint convenire eidem, ut, pietas, et divitiæ: Adversa sunt, quæ ita distinguuntur, ut non possint convenire eidem nisi reducantur ad diversa, ut sunt calor et frigus, virtus et vitium. Ex omnibus autem locis inventionisⁿ

Thus, in the essence of God justice and mercy are equal, but in view of the effects or objects mercy is greater.

4. 'Indifferent' and 'external' are opposed to each other.

For they differ in such a way that the latter is simply good or bad like virtue and vice, whereas the former is bad by accident, although it is good by its nature; such as riches and most ceremonies of the Church that are neither commanded nor forbidden as baring one's head for the name of Jesus [when the name of Jesus is mentioned]. But there are also necessary ceremonies that rest on some commandment. |

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5. The following distinctions coincide:

- necessity of coercion and necessity of immutability,
- necessity of force and necessity of nature,
- necessity of impulsion and necessity of definition.

Necessity of coercion regards man's spatial motion that alone can be compelled. It does not regard the will that can be led, bent and persuaded but not compelled.

The necessity of immutability regards the essence and propriety of a thing. In this sense we say that God is necessarily good and that fire is necessarily warm.

6. Something is 'first by nature' either by intention or by generation; either because of the nature that intends or because of the nature that generates.

In the former way 'first' refers to what is more perfect, as a goal is prior to its means.

In the latter way 'first' is called what happens first. In this sense imperfect things are prior to perfect things.

7. Different things and opposite things are opposed to each other.²

Different things are distinguished in such a way that they can come together in one and the same subject, such as piety and richness. Opposite things are distinguished in such a way that they cannot come together in one and the same person, unless they are reduced to different things: such are warmth and cold, virtue and vice.

² Cf. *Prolegomena*, 7.

Logicæ potest necti consequentia, exceptis diversis: Nam quicquid sequitur vel vi consensionis, vel vi dissensionis sequitur; In^o diversis autem neque consensio, neque discensio est necessaria.

VIII. *Necessitas est vel materiæ, et cernitur in Axiomate; vel formæ, quæ cernitur in Syllogismo.*

Illa cernitur immutabili nexu subjecti et Prædicati, ut Deus est omnipotens. Hæc cernitur in conclusionis illatione ex præmissis, et potest habere locum in materiâ contingenti, imo et in falsa; ut, Asinus habet pennas, ergò volat, hoc necessarium est necessitate illationis, non¹ formæ.

IX. Alius et Aliud differunt.

Ut Aliud notet rem, Alius personam, sic in homine non est alius atque alius, sed aliud atque aliud; ut et in Christo, sed in SS. Trinitate^p non est aliud atque aliud, sed alius atque alius.

X. Solus accipitur Categorematicè et Syncategorematicè.

Illo modo idem est ac *separatus*, hoc^a modo idem est ac *solum*, sive *duntaxat*; ut, Oculus videt solus, hoc est, tantùm; sed non solus, hoc est, separatus à corpore: sic sola fides justificat, ut excludantur opera, scilicet Syncategorematicè; sed non sola, hoc est, separata ab operibus.^f

1 We read vel instead of non, in order to keep the text of the explanation coherent with the main text.

From all topics of logical invention³ it is possible to draw a consequence except from different things. For whatever follows, follows either by virtue of consent or by virtue of dissent. | But in different things neither consent nor dissent is necessary.⁴

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8. Necessity is either a necessity of matter as is seen in an axiom, or it is a necessity of the form as can be seen in a syllogism.

The former can be seen in the immutable connection of subject and predicate, such as: God is omnipotent. The latter is seen in drawing a conclusion from premises.⁵ It can occur in contingent and even in false matter such as: 'a donkey has wings. Ergo: it flies.' This is necessary by a necessity of inference, or by a necessity of form.

9. There is a difference between someone else and something else.

As 'something' refers to a thing and 'someone' to a person, so in man there is no someone and another, but one thing and another thing and this is also the case in Christ. But in the Holy Trinity there is not one thing and another thing, but only someone and another.⁶

10. 'Alone' is taken in a categorical sense and in a syncategorical sense.

In the former way it is the same as 'separate', in the latter way it is the same as 'only' or 'merely'. As the eye alone sees, i.e. it exclusively sees, but not on its own, i.e. separated from the body. Likewise, faith alone justifies, so that works are excluded, viz. in a syncategorical sense. But faith on its own does not justify, i.e. faith separated from works. |

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³ Cf. *Decuria*, I, 5.

⁴ Thus, from 'the water is warm' it follows 'the water is not cold' because coldness and warmth are opposite things. But because richness and piety are not opposite but different things, from 'She is pious' it does not follow 'She is not rich'.

⁵ So the first refers to a true proposition, the second to valid reasoning. The validity of reasoning is independent of the truth of the premises or of the conclusion.

⁶ Confer Dist. 4.10, where the opposite seems to be stated. However, elsewhere Maccovius states that the distinction of *aliud et aliud* refers to God *ratione modi subsistendi*, not *ratione essentiae*; MACCOVIUS, *TP*, [31].

DECURIA X.

I. Qualitas sive Conditio est *Interna* vel *Externa*.

Interna pertinet ad Naturam causæ, ut diligentia Discipuli: Externa nihil attinet ad rem, de quâ agitur; ut, in foro non est spectandum an aliquis sit dives, vel pauper: non agitur, est προσωποληψία, si quis pium et diligentem præferat impio et negligenti.

II. Emanatio et Transmutatio differunt.

Ita illa est in actibus immanentibus (hoc est internis, quæ resident in agente) ut cùm Deus pater gignit filium: Hæc in Transeuntibus, ut est Creatio.

[Ubi est generatio, ibi est mutatio]. Hoc non semper valet. Generatio enim est vel *Emanativa*, vel *Transmutativa*, ex qua sequitur mutatio non ex priore illa. Creatio est mutatio transmutativa, qua Deus mutat suum opus, non verò ipse mutatur.

III. Totum est vel Perfectionis, ut Deus; vel Compositionis, ut Creatura; illud est totaliter Totum, hoc per partes.

IV. *Universale* est vel in *Essendo*,^s vel in *Prædicando* vel in *Causando*; ut,^t Deus est *universalis* non priori, sed posteriori modo.

V. *Universale* in essendo est vel *Genus* vel *Species*.

Deus non est vel Genus, vel Species, sed summum Individuum: Est verò universale in causando, quod est omnium rerum causa.

The Tenth Decade of Most General Distinctions

1. Quality or condition is internal or external.

Internal quality pertains to the nature of a cause such as the diligence of a pupil. External quality is in no way related to the thing that is dealt with; so in a court you should not bear in mind whether someone is rich or poor. This is not the point, for if someone prefers [in a court] a pious and diligent person to an impious and negligent person, this is partiality.

2. Emanation and transmutation are different.

Thus, emanation is at stake in immanent actions (i.e. internal actions which reside in the agent) as when God the Father begets the Son. Transmutation is at stake in transient actions like creation.

The proposition 'where there is generation there is change' is not always valid, because generation is either emanative or transmutative. Change follows from the latter (transmutative generation), but not from the former (emanative generation). Creation is a transmutative change by which God changes his work, but by which He himself does not change.

3. The whole is either a whole of perfection like God, or a whole of composition like creature. The former is a whole totally, the latter is a whole by its parts.

4. The term 'universal' is used as referring either to universal in being or | to universal in predication or causation. God is universal, not in the first but in the latter way.

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5. 'Universal in being' refers to either a genus or to a species.

God is neither a genus nor a species but He is supreme indivisibility. Yet He is 'universal' in causation, since He is the cause of all things.

VI. Bonitas et Perfectio est vel Essentialis, vel Accidental.

Si spectetur prior, illa Deus non potuit meliorem mundum facere, sed potuit ratione posterioris.

VII. Bonum agere et bene agere differunt, ut maius et minus.

Sic impii multa *bona* agunt, dant Eleemosynas, etc. sed soli pii *benè* agunt. [Bonum agere notat actum; Benè agere notat habitum.]

VIII. *Latum, Leve, Levissimum*, notat tres gradus vitiorum.

IX. Integrum et Corruptum, Ordinum et Inordinatum, Constitutum et Distitutum, Bene affectum et Turbatum, opponuntur.^u

Ut Natura, Regnum, Societas, quodlibet duobus hisce modis consideratur.^v

X. Vulgare et Heroicum, commune et excellens, populare et supra sortem vulgi opponuntur.

Ut cùm virtus distinguitur in vulgarem et heroicam.

Regnum naturæ, gratiæ, et gloriæ; Horum limites diligenter sunt discernendæ.^w *Regnum gratiæ*, est potentiæ et providentiæ. *Regnum naturæ*, est fidei, prædestinationis, et Ecclesiæ militantis. *Regnum gloriæ*, est visionis, gratiæ, et Ecclesiæ triumphantis.

Quâ distinctione tanquam cynosurâ obsignamus hanc distinctionum centuriam.

FINIS.

6. Goodness and perfection are either essential or accidental goodness and perfection.

If you look at the former, it was impossible for God to make a better world. But He could have created a better one if you look at the latter.

7. Doing what is good and doing well are different like greater and less.

So the impious do many good things: they give alms etc. But the pious only are doing well (doing what is good refers to an act, doing well to a habit).

8. Broad, light and lightest mark the three grades of vice.

9. Opposites are:

- integer and corrupt,
- well ordered and inordinate,
- constituted and destitute,
- being well organized & disturbed. |

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As for example nature, kingdom and society and whatsoever, are considered in these two ways.

10. Opposites are:

- vulgar and heroic,
- common and excellent,
- popular and above popular standards.

So virtue is distinguished in vulgar and heroic virtue.

The limits of the kingdom of nature, of grace and of glory should be carefully distinguished. The kingdom of nature is the kingdom of power and providence. The kingdom of grace is the kingdom of faith, predestination, and the kingdom of the Church militant. The kingdom of glory is the kingdom of vision, grace, and of the Church triumphant.

With this distinction¹ as a leading star we sign and seal this century of distinctions.

THE END

1 Probably Maccovius means that the distinction between common and excellent standards (mentioned at number 10) is only valid in the kingdom of nature.

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